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ABSTRACT 
Value and reasons for action are ofien cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a 
desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is 
dependent upon motivation ofien deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to 
the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to sorne perspective of desire just in case it 
satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for sorne action just in case it indicates that 
something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real 
properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. 
It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of 
value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, 1 attack 
the alIeged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking 
the means to our ends is explicable in terms of oue desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. 
This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between yalue 
judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the 
cennection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made 
frem the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails 
motiyation. But ofien we conversationally bOITOW external perspectives of desire, and subsequent 
judgements do not entail motivation. 
This analysis drives a critique of a cornmon practice as a misuse of normative language. The 
"absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, anaIyze normative language in such a way as to 
justify the imposition of certain interests oyer others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in 
denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which 
is always indexed to sorne particular set of desires. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation advances a theory of value, reasons, and normativity, in the form of a 
reductive semantic analysis - or account of what the Ianguage of value and reasons means in other 
terms - and a metaphysical analysis - or account of what value, reasons for action. and normativity 
are. 1 understand this as a metaethical enquiry: one that describes the meaning of practical language 
and the essence of value properties without itself making value judgements: 1 refrain from making 
claims about what is valuable or has value. In introducing the enquiry like this 1 have already run up 
colours of defiance and invited controversy on numerous counts. Metaethics, reductive semantic 
analysis. and metaphysics are all viewed with skepticism from many quarters in philosophy today. 
The object of this introduction is to provide a limited defense of these orientations. 
The Írrst respect in which my treatment might seem obtuse is the representation to be an 
evaluatively neutral metaethical enquiry. The dominance of metaethics in philosophical approaches to 
ethics early in the twentieth century was in large part tied to the dominance of ordinary Ianguage 
philosophy. Today, with the renaissance of "normative ethics", there are many philosophers who 
question or deny the possibility of descriptive enquiry into ethical matters that does not involve 
expressed cornmítment to sorne set of ethical values. 1 "Reflective equilibrium", in which theoretical 
considerations are balanced against our ethical convictions. is the preferred theoretical method of the 
day, and held by many to be the only legitimate method. Metaethics takes itself to be saying 
something non-ethical about ethical judgements and properties, but Ronald Dworkin, for example, 
expresses a cornmon attitude toward this representation when he objects that anything metaethics can 
say itself constitutes a "substantive and controversial" ethical stance (1996). However, this claim is 
based on a cornmonly shared assumption that reductive semantic analysis of the language of value is 
I Forexample Dworkin 1996, Nagel1997. 
1 
impossible, and so those offering metaethical theories cannot provide semantic or analytic accounts. 
Since this is exactly what 1 propose to do, the objection against metaethics can only be judged in light 
of the success or failure of such an attempt. 
There are also objections conceming the motivations or agendas of metaethical and semantic 
enquiry. Two challenges from opposing directions demand a response. Opponents of metaethical 
enquiry tmd something suspicious in the representation to be performing a neutral, objective 
investigation into ethics. It is allegedly no accident that Umetaethical" investigation generates 
"substantive and controversial" ethical theses. It does so because it is the disguise of substantive and 
controversial ethical agendas - the Trojan horse of the contemporary philosophico-ethical 
battleground. Its practitioners hope to win a partisan victory by urging putative conceptual or 
metaphysical truths in which are concealed an ethical payload. The opponents of metaethics, 
accordingly, demand that the practitioner of such enquiry reveal his or her agenda. The other 
challenge derives, in contrast, from acceptance of the representation to be performing neutral, 
objective investigation. Of what interest or importance could such an investigation be? What does 
language matter in ethics? The reader without an independent and prior interest in the semantic and 
metaphysical foundations of ethics might weIl be wondering about the point of this enquiry. 
The reply to both demands is the same. There is indeed an ethicaI agenda motivating this 
enquiry, its relevance to which lends it the importance 1 myseIf perceive it to have. Against the skeptic 
about metaethics, however, 1 maintain that the agenda is merely motivating, and does not infect the 
content of the analysis. My opponent is challenged to demonstrate otherwise. Those wondering about 
the point, however, might like some indication of my source of motivation and the nature of this 
agenda. In loose terros, 1 am concerned to resist and unmask those who use nonnative judgements to 
seek to justify the imposition of their interests on the lives of others. (l shall cIarify this in the 
concIusion). How can a neutral and objective metaethical investigation advance such a concern? 1 airo 
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to unmask and demolish a rival Trojan horse. My opponent. the "absolutist". whom 1 conceive - justly 
or unjustly - as the ethical dictator or imperialist. attempts to use and analyze value language in such 
a way as to establish such justification. 1 believe these uses and analyses are incoherent: they are in 
conflict with the real meaning of the language in question. By articulating and defending a correct 
account of the meaning of this language. 1 hope to display this incoherence and undermine ethical 
absolutism. Note, however. that in no way do 1 take the account to provide a justification for any 
alternative system of ethical commitments - merely to undermine the absolutists' attempts to justify 
the imposition of their OWll. 1 offer this onlyas background and possible motivation. The enquiry 
itself does not purport to do anything except give a correct analysis. ShouId my further hopes about its 
significance in the context 1 have just described be unfounded. it is no objection to the work in hand. 
Leaving the controversies over metaethics, we come to the cIosely related issue of semantic 
analysis.2 For much of the twentieth century. an empbasis on language and linguistic analysis 
completely dominated philosophy in the English-speaking world. Many believed semantic analysis to 
be the only legitimate tool of philosophical investigation. The comportment of these philosophers 
toward ethics is nicely summed up by Hare: '~thics. as 1 conceive it, is the logical study of the 
language of morals" (1952: Preface). We are now witnessing a backlash that is sometimes as over-
zealous in its repudiation of reductive semantic analysis. Tbere is widespread disillusionment and 
skepticism about the possibility of and need for reductive analysis, especially in ethics, and the very 
concept of "meaning". The favoured contemporary strategies in value theory are to provide (1) llon-
reductive semantic analyses that inter-define the various value terms (or normative terms), at no point 
providing an analysis that eliminates the problematic language in question;3 (2) "reforming 
definitions", or accounts that do not purport to capture wbat we mean but are urged on us as what we 
2 A semantic engagement with ethics is a metaethical engagement, although a metaethical engagement is not 
necessarily a semantic engagement. 
3 Griffin 1992, Smith 1994. 
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should mean, or what we would mean if we were fuIly intelligible;4 (3) synthetic property 
identifications, which, eschewing semantic analysis globally or in individual cases as impossible or 
unnecessary, aim to teH us simply what value is, bypassing questions ofwhat we might mean.s 
I shalI say more against these strategies in the subsequent chapters. For now, the following 
suffices: all three strategies imply something about the Ianguage of value that I consider unwelcome 
and unwarranted. Non-reductive semantic analysis provides a definition for each normative word - in 
terms of other normative words. But since our problem and puzzlement eoncems the meaning of 
normative language as a whole, this is tantamount to declining to give any explanation. When it is 
claimed that non-reduetive analysis is the best we can do, it is further implied that there is no possible 
explanation of the meaning of our value language. This is allegedly unproblematic: I will rely on my 
subsequent arguments for a reduetive aceount to vindicate my eonvietion that this claim is falseo The 
other two strategies (although they are often coy about admitting it) imply that our value language is 
at least partially muddled or has no precise, formulable meaning.6 What reason do we have for 
accepting this pronouncement? Our basic vocabulary of evaluation gives every appearance of being 
fully coherent and serviceable - contemporary theorists haven't given us good reasons to suppose 
otherwise, and have not succeeded in providing liS with c1assifieations or concepts that are more 
serviceable than the ones we already possess. 
These strategies are not motivated by any principled objection to reductive semantie analysis: 
such an achievement would be uncontroversially desirable. They arise rather from skepticism 
conceming the possibility of such a reduction. There is widespread agreement that, as MiehaeI Smith 
writes, HIt is a remarkable faet about the history of philosophy that analyses of normative concepts in 
4 Brandt 1985, Hannan 1996, possibly Smith 1992 (Smith seems to confiate non-reductive analysis with 
reforming definition. He cIairns that because his account is non-reductive, it is no objection to it that it doesn't 
capture what we are thinking about when we think evaIuatively (1992: 349)). 
s Putnam 1981, Railton 1986b, Boyd 1988, Brink 1989. 
6 Sorne philosophers have acknowledged this irnplication oftheir stance: forexample Brandt 1985. 
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non-normative terms have been such spectacular failures" (1994: 164).7 The explanation for the 
preponderance of non-reductive accounts is the failure of philosophers to successfulIy analyze this 
language. The concIusion drawn from this failure has been that no such analysis is possible.8 But we 
must object to the audacity of indicting the phenomena because of one' s own inability to comprehend 
it. 
The resultant situation is a lack of ambition in value theory. Many philosophers advance their 
theories not as being correct but as the best currently on offer, or more boldly, the best we can 
realistically hope foro They admit this is less than we might have wanted, but express doubt 
conceming whether our desires could ever be fully satisfied in this regard. Furthermore, they often 
admit that their accounts faíl to match the phenomena or prima Jacie appearances (noncognitivists in 
denying that value language is truly predicational, subjectivists in denying that value judgements are 
strictly speaking about the object to which value is ascribed, etc.). Perhaps the most representative 
admission of twentieth century ethical theory comes from Bertrand RusselI: ··r can only say that, while 
my own opinions as to ethics do not satisfy me, other people's satisfy me stillless".9 
By contrast, my account appears naively optimistic. r aim to get it right - to provide the 
elusive reductive analysis of the meaning of vaIue Ianguage. Because of this difference, r shall adhere 
to a certain method throughout. r attempt to clarify the phenomena mat require interpretation, then 
rather than aiming at the refutation of rival theories, r will mereIy demonstrate at mínimum that they 
don't sit cornfortably with the phenomena for which they are offered as interpretations. My own 
account is then offered as one that satisfies alI our expectations of a correct theory of value, and that 
71 do not believe this to be true. Both Ziff 1960 and Mackie 1977 pro vide what seem to me substantially 
successful accounts - which (unsurprisingly) are close to my own. 
8 Moare 1903, Brandt 1985, Jobnston 1989: 155, Griffin 1992, Smith 1994: 55-6. 
9 Quated by Mackie 1977: 35, fram Russell's "Reply to Criticisms" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. P. 
A. Schlipp (Evanston, 1944). 
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is completely adequate to the phenomena. If my attempt is substantially successful. then refutation of 
rivals - always an arduous and uncertain task - will be unnecessary. 
Sympathizers of synthetic (property-identity) accounts may object: What does the meaning of 
this Ianguage matter? We want to know what value is, what do we care about the meanings of words? 
The answer is that the two questions are cIosely connected, which is why 1 offer both a semantic and a 
metaphysical account of value. The metaphysics simply falls out of the semantic analysis. Giving the 
meaning of a word is one way of saying what the corresponding thing is. It is not the only way to do 
so, but meaning provides a description of the quarry as it is discemed. identified. and classified by the 
linguistic cornmunity. The philosophical mystery conceming value does not concem its hidden 
chemical structure or anything of the soft. It is rather a mystery of self-comprehension: we are trying 
to overcome the opacity of our practices to ourselves. What are we concemed about when we talk 
about value? What is it we are disceming when we ascribe value? These are the questions that matter 
here, and this is why it is the answer to the metaphysical questibn provided by semantic analysis, 
rather than by any other kind of enquiry, that is needed. 
What about metaphysics? Attempts to ground ethics in metaphysics are ofien - rightly -
viewed with suspicion. Although 1 offer a realist theory of value, it is motivated Iargely by a concem 
to debunk the various mythologies of value properties that have been propounded - both the 
mysterious "nonnatural" properties of G. E. Moare, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann, and the 
(perhaps not much Iess mysterious) properties proposed vaguely as analogous to secondary qualities 
by John McDoweIl and David Wiggins. Furthermore 1 aro concemed to show how we can and should 
avoid the semantic nonsense of noncognitivism in both its classic (Wittgenstein, A. J. Ayer, Charles 
L. Stevenson. R. M. Hare) and modem (Simon Blackbum, Allan Gibbard) forros. The metaphysics 1 
offer is therefore anticIimactic and reductive. It aims at showing us how we already understand what a 
value property is. 
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At a more theoretical level, however, the metaphysical slant of my treatment will be poorIy 
received by sorne philosophers who are suspicious of almost any metaphysics at all, harboring an 
extreme ontological conservatism. 1 will argue tbat value is a real property, and based on the existenee 
of real relations. But sorne reject even properties and relations, together with truth, facts, numbers and 
other abstraet entities as members of the cIass of real, existent things. This however is of no concem 
to me. r aim merely to demonstrate that value is no less real and objective than truth, facts, relations, 
abstraet entities, etc. - and those with nominalistic inclinations are welcome to do with tbis what they 
wiIL r maintain however a healthy skepticism of such anti-metaphysics, believing that what it is to be 
metaphysicalIy real is a distinction eonferred largely by the structures of mind rather than sorne mind-
independent noumenal realm, and that the exeessively materialistie prejudices of nominalism wouId 
strip the world even of physical objeets were they consistentIy applied. 
By giving a precise metaphysieal aecount of value properties, my treatment diverges from 
contemporary debate in one other important respeet. Most of tbe philosopbical work on the 
metaphysies of value is charaeterized by an absence of concrete theories or hypotheses as to what 
value is. Discussions of the nature of value resemble an FBI criminal profile, where the quarry is 
described in general terms but never identified. Beeause of this, contemporary value theory is a 
battlefield of extremely abstraet and general tbeoretical principies - eonceming the nature, meaning, 
and seope of truth, reality, objeetivity, scientific explanation, supervenience, and more. Beeause 1 
attempt to identify the quarry, r will barely toueh on many of these controversies, although they mi 
most of the pages of many rival aeeounts. My stance is rather that these debates all become irrelevant 
and absurd - at least within metaethies - once we recognize what value is. There is a fundamentalIy 
Socratie principIe at work here: that before we argue over the properties of something, we should first 
define what it is we are taIking about: " ... how can r know a property of something when r don't even 
know what it is?" (Meno 71B). Let us, then, try to f'md out what vaIue is. 
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1. WHATDOES VALUEMATTER? 
"No one dies for mere values" (Martin Heidegger 1977: 142) 
l. From ethics to metaethics 
Human life is essentially practical. We are creatures that act in the world. and comport omselves 
toward the world in countless different ways. Human existence is also essentially social. and a most 
important medium of om sociality is om language. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a significant portion of our 
speech expresses om practical nature. Our language of practical life, which encompasses the moral, the 
hedonic. the aesthetic, the prudential, and more, is an essential component in om living together. Jt 
mediates not only om relationships with one another, but also provides the concepts with which we 
mediate om relationships with ourselves. Many recent philosophers have gone so far as to claim that 
language is a condition of the existence of any thought, deliberation, or action whatsoever. This may be 
too radical, but it is true that human thought, deliberation, and action could not eXÍst as we know them 
without language. 
We use our practicallanguage as an extension of ourselves - we express ourselves through it, 
and like any good tool it is normally inconspicuous. Language is like a part of us, and, like the steering 
wheel of a car when we drive, or the keyboard beneath our fingers when we type. when used properly we 
do not notice it. We engage in such first-order use of our practical language when we ask ourselves 
which of two prospective careers is best, when we ask others whether the movie they saw was good or 
bad, when we query whether the government' s latest use of force to "maintain the rule of law" was right 
or wrong, when we express doubts about the value of genetic engineering, and when we teH our friends, 
students, or children they should take their studies more seriously. 
When we use practical language this way, whether in indicative, interrogative, or prescriptive 
speech acts. the words "best", "worst", "good", '1>ad", "right", "wrong", "ought", "value" and their like 
are not points of emphasis nor the foei of om attention, which is ftxed rather on the what. the how, the 
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why, the whom, etc. The practical terms are used pre-reflectively, implicitly adopted as a medium of 
expression, and there is no refIective distance between them and ourselves. We assume we know 
precisely what we mean by "good", "value", "ought", and so on, and would likely react with incredulity 
to anyone who challenged this assumption. 
Practical questions do not however always receive easy and uncontroversial answers. More 
ofien than with questions about other subjects, opinions differ as to what is good, bad, valuable, right, 
and wrong, and as to what should and should not be done. Such disagreement can be found between 
individuals, groups, communities, and cultures. l Disagreements cause tensions and difficulties for us in 
virtue of our social nature, and lead to efforts to overcome them Human history is perversely rich in 
strategies for procuring convergence in ethical opinion, including violence, threat, persuasion, and 
trickery. For all this, many practical issues stubbornly resist yielding answers satisfactory to all. 
Philosophy is closely involved in this age-old struggle. The aim of practical philosophy, 
according to Aristotle, was not primarily to help us to know anything, but to aid us to live as we should. 
But, he recognized, a certain form of knowledge is indispensable for this end - knowledge concerning 
the good. Are we not much more likely, like archers, to hit the mark if we have a clear knowledge of 
what it is at which we are to aim? Philosophy has had no more success in reaching agreement here than 
humanity in general. It has, however, been limited to a single family of strategies. Philosophical ethics 
seeks the elimination of dissent by means of reason alone - if we accept its self -description. The aim, 
however, is not merely convergence in opinion and elimination of dissent. Philosophical engagement 
(not merely the engagement of philosophers) with this problem is concemed with convergence upon the 
truth. 
In a multiplicity of ways, this philosophical concem leads at length to a shift in focus. Inspired in 
part by the sheer intractability of the disputes (prompting suspicion that there is no common truth here to 
1 It is sometimes supposed that the only or chief motivation for relativist metaethical theories is concern for the 
phenomena of cultural disagreement. Hence some effort has been put into demonstrating that on basic ethical 
principIes this disagreement is not as widespread as alleged. This supposition is false: my own relativism arose rather 
from reflection on the differences between myself and those among whom 1 grew up. 
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converge upon), in part by the increasingly alíen pronouncements of ethical theorists (such as Kant's 
declaration that the only thing good in itself is the good wilI. and Bentham' s declaration that the only 
thing good in itself is pleasure), and in part by an attempt by sorne philosophers to prove their ethical 
principIes analytically true (so that the dissenter is not only wrong but engaging in nonsense), we think 
for the first time to step back from the implícit, pre-reflective use of our evaluative and normative 
language, which itself becomes an object of reflective scrutiny.2 We then begin to ask second-order or 
metaethical questions. What does it mean to call something "good" or say it has "value"? Or to ask what 
one "should" do? Our practicallanguage - hitherto as much a part of us and as little questioned as our 
hands when we write or our tongues when we talk - suddenly seems foreign. We are perplexed by ir. and 
ask in confusion, 'What could it possibly mean?" Once this occurs we are in the business ofmetaethical 
theorizing. We attempt to capture in explicit concepts and definitions that which we possess or inhabit 
unreflectivelyas an extension of ourselves. 
This dissertation is concerned with the case of value - both the term ''value'' and its concept 
themselves, and the class of value terms and concepts. HistoricalIy, only "good" and "beautiful77, of this 
broad class, received this alienated and dissociated philosophical attention. But these are only two of a 
rich diversity of value-terms. Until the twentieth century the concept of value largely escaped this 
objectifying, alienating, and dissecting gaze of philosophical reflection. "Value" remained not a term of 
art but a largely anonyrnous, implicitly used word. But late in the nineteenth century, "value" ("Werth") 
was caught squarel y in the headlights of the philosophical thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. Soon afier, it 
became a focal point in the work of Brentano and Meinong, Scheler and Hartmann in Germany, and 
(although still under the rubric of the "good") in the work of G. E. Moore in England. Value has become 
a thing of which we need philosophical theories, and has taken a position centre-stage in philosophical 
controversy. What are we talking about when we taIk about ''value''? What is value? 
2 Heidegger describes, in Being and Time, how tools first come to om attention when they Jail. Philosophical 
focus on the language of value is equally a result of its breaking down (being used incoherently by philosophers). 
This dissertation attempts to fix value language in its philosophical use. 
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This question receives an answer in the next two chapters. The aim of the present chapter is to 
set the stage for that account. First. I situate the question in the context of a fundamental dispute in 
ethical theory. Second, I address the question, ernerging frorn that dispute, whether there is such a thing 
as "value", and consider two strategies for discouraging this supposition. largue that regardless of our 
stance in the aforernentioned dispute, we should be realists about value and proceed to investigate what 
value ¡s. 
2. The significance of value theory 
Why is "value" now such a hotly contested topic in philosophy? What does value matter? This 
question may seern absurd, but one can be excused for asking it of many conternporary protagonists in 
the debate. After perusing sorne of the theories on offer, one can ask with perfect intelligibility, "Why 
can't I live with total disregard for "value", if such a thing existsT Philosophy is believed to delve ofien 
into the arcane and irrelevant, and one might wonder whether the rnetaethical interest in value is another 
instance of this. We can't eat value, or clothe ourselves in it. But value is a topic of debate in ethics and 
practical philosophy, which are concemed with how to live. Practical philosophy is all about reasons for 
our actions. Everything we do as conscious, deliberating persons, we do on the basis of reasons. If value 
is relevant to practica! life and the philosophy of practical life, it is because it has sorne connection to 
and bearing upon our reasons.3 
Our reflection on reasons, and the part they play in our lives, cuts across several dimensions. It 
can be frrst person, second person, and third person, and plural or singular - concemed with reasons for 
me or us, reasons for you or you all, and reasons for him, her, or thero. It can be past, present, or future. It 
thereby figures in personal practical deliberation - where we search for reasons to choose one course 
over others; in advising and regulating others - where we fumish reasons to others in order to influence 
their decisions; and in judgement of the choices of oneself and others - where we measure these choices 
against reasons. Value will have significance in these matters, if anywhere at al!. Most ethical theory is 
3 The concept of a reason for action is analyzed in chapter 4. 
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concemed with second and tbird person cases: giving reasons to persuade or direct others, or giving 
reasons to be able to judge others. In particular, ethical theorists are concemed about how to address the 
moral skeptic: the person who claims to see no reason why he or she should not murder, rape, steal, or lie 
to get what he or she wants. The theoretical problem. from this perspective, concems how to persuade 
this person that (for example) harming others is sornething they have overriding reasons not to do, or at 
least. how to demonstrate that there is something defective in people who do not recognize or are 
unmoved by these reasons. "Why be moral?'" - this question has obsessed ethical theorists since at least 
the time of Plato's Gorgias - and is one of those frrst-order ethical questions that have resisted all 
atternpts at satisfactory resolution. 
1t is, however, a question that allows for an array of different answers. Almost everyone will 
concur that it has at least one answer, but there is an important disagreement over the nature of such 
answers. Many of us have a reason to be moral lying in sorne contingent fact about ourselves (our 
motivational make-up, or our lack of self-sufficiency, or our psychological dependence on the approval 
of others, etc.) Happily for those who could become our victims, we are people who have a reason to be 
moral, due to some desire or need. But if such contingent facts are the only basis for appeal to an 
aggressor's own reasons to be moral, then there is a danger that there may be murderers, rapists, thieves, 
liars. etc. who have no overriding personal reasons to be moral. For many philosophers, reasons that are 
grounded in contingent facts are not sufficient. Morality, they insist. is not a matter of convenience, but 
something that everyone must accept as their code of conduct. There must be reasons to be moral that are 
independent of any contingent facts about a person - reasons for anybody, whoever they are and 
whatever they are like. 
Despite the typically moral rnotivations of ethical philosophers, the issues here extend far 
beyond the reaIm of morality, which is concemed with conduct of particularly social or interpersonal 
importance. In the personal search for rneaning and significance too, there are dramatic problems. When 
we search for sorne valuable ideal to orient our lives toward, or ask ourselves what we should do, it is 
unsettling (at the least!) to think: we can look no further than our own present attitudes and interests for 
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an answer. Ifwe were to question all our attitudes and interests. what then would we fall back upon? For 
the longest time. people found answers in God. society. or tradition. But with the "death.. and 
fragmentation of these forms of solid ground, one is ofien left with an agonizingly existential freedom of 
choice. Are questions of cornmitment to be answered by an arbitrary decision or choice, as some 
existentialists insist? How then can we live cornmitted lives. while knowing our choices are arbitrary? 
Many believe we cannot, and insist the only answer to nihilism is to demonstrate the existence of reasons 
for choice that transcend our present desires. 1 have both these concems - the moral and the existential-
in mind. 1 have a greater interest in the latter. but the majorlty of the thinkers and theorles we shall 
encounter are concemed primarily with the former. (1 shall distinguish between the ''moral'' and the 
"ethicaln , using the latter more broadly to cover the entire realm of practical reasons.) 
The attempt to provide a theory demonstrating the existence of this transcending and grounding 
kind of reason has a history as long as philosophy itself. Strangely. there is no accepted name for this 
project. Something similar is sometimes referred to as '1(antianismn , and contrasted with "Humeanismn • 
but these labels are unsatisfactory on several counts. First. they bring in the baggage of the particular 
details of Kanes and Hume's accounts. Second. on close scrutiny it is hard to distinguish the significant 
differences between Kant and Hume, and it can be argued that Kant himself turns out to be Humean.4 
since he made rational interest a pivotal part of the existence of moral reasons. Third, as 1 wiIl shortly 
explain, Kantianism or rationalism is only one form of such attempt Other labels used inelude 
"absolutism" and "objectivismn , but these are dangerously ambiguous. 
Theorles of this kind seek a flxed ("Archimedeann ) point from which an absolutely authoritative 
assessment of an individual' s reasons, actions, and motives can be made; a point that cannot be got 
around, ignored, marginalized. or made irrelevant. without falling into error or ignorance - an interest-
transcendentfoundation for ethics. 1 wiIl therefore call themfoundationalist positions. This normative 
foundationalism is distinct from the epistemological variety familiar to philosophers - although the two 
positions are close parallels. Like epistemological foundationalism. normative foundationalism arises as 
4 See Nagel 1970: 11, Hampton 1998: 74. 
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a reaction Can overreaction, I will argue) to skepticism, which it attempts to refute by locating a fixed 
point. An account will be considered foundationalist if it cIaims the existence of such a ground outside 
mterests Csubjective motivational states). The most promising and sophisticated foundationalist 
strategies are rationalist, following Kant in focusing on rational agency itself, the ability to autonomously 
determine one' s actions by reason alone. 
Drarnatically, the foundationalist effort appears to have been in vain. Nobody has demonstrated 
why the perfect villain or nihilist has a reason to change his ways, and many assert with some 
justification that such demonstration will never - and can never - happen, because there really is no 
reason. This claim is controversial, and adherents of foundationalist theories (such as Kantianism) will 
cry that I have begged the question. There is a serious issue here, which is addressed in chapter 5. For 
now I will simply charge that such accounts face one irresolvable dilemma. If their account of rationality 
is satisfactory O.e. captures conditions that indeed characterize rational deliberation and action), they fail 
to show that the alleged reasons to behave morally are entailed. On the other hand, if the account of 
rationality is robust enough to generate authoritative reasons to be moral, it is always at the cost of 
artificiality: we do not recognize ourselves in such theoretic "rational agents" - such as Kant's rational 
agents who only act on rnaxims they can consistently will to be universallaws - and hence there is no 
reason to suppose ourselves similarly bound. It seems legitimate in such cases simply to ask, 'Why 
should I be 'rational'?" In other words, tbere appears to be no point of overIap between norrnative 
accounts of rationality and realistic accounts of rationality. 
It is in the light of this foundationalist project and its failure to disco ver a successful strategy that 
we can understand the significance of the rise of value theory in the twentieth century. The 
foundationalists are concerned to counter assertions like the following from Hume: 
It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human action can never, in any case, be accounted for 
by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of manlcind, 
without any dependence on the intellectual faculties. Ask a roan why he uses exercise; he wiII 
answer because he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire why he desires health, he wiII 
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readily reply because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries further and desire a reason 
why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never 
referred to any otherobject. (1751: 268). 
The reason for exereise, aeeording to Hume, is ultimately one's hatred of pain. But hatred of 
pain is just a psyehologieal faet, and there are no reasons to hate pain. Aeeordingly, assuming an 
alternative justifieation is not available (whieh happens to be false), were one not to hate pain, there 
would be no reason to exereise. Likewise, for Hume, if one does not possess any eompassion, the 
"sentiment ofhurnanity", one laeks any distinctly moral reason to be moral. 
The Humean position cIaims we have no reasons to justify our basic passions or interests. But it 
can be observed that there is something very natural to say to someone who asks why we hate pain. It is a 
reply that seems trivial, but then we would typieally be annoyed at the ingenuity of the question. It is 
trivial, we might say, beeause it is so obvious. Our reply is, 'We hate pain because it is bad". With this 
response, we justify a eertain passion or interest by asserting something about the objeet of our passion 
or interest. It appears we point to sorne fact about the objeet - its being bad. We ascribe it badness in the 
same way we would aseribe greenness to grass and irnmensity to a mountain - but unlike these cases, 
here the invoked faet gives a reason. The faet that pain is bad is supposed to, in and of itself, give us a 
reason to hate it. Now, faets that give reasons are precisely the philosopher's stone for which 
foundationalism is searehing. Faets are objective and independent of anyone's motivational, biologieal, 
or psyehologieal makeup, and if such things are intrinsically reason-giving, then there is a possibility of 
basing ethieal judgement on the eriterion of reasons which one eannot ignore without oversight or deny 
without ignoranee. This prospeet of the existenee of value-faets - objeetive states of affairs that are 
intrinsically normative, giving reasons out of their own nature - offers foundationalism hope for an 
objeetive basis for absolute normative judgements and rational choice.5 
5 Foundationalist treatments of the concept of value inelude Moare 1903, Scheler 1966, Nagel 1970, Bond 1983, 
Brink 1989, Quinn 1993, Herman 1996, Millgram 1997. 
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This reveals why value matters to ethical theorists. Foundationalists recognize in the concept of 
"value" a prospective Archimedean point on which to base and judge alI our practical choices. Anti-
foundationalists, concemed to defend the ultimately ungrounded or interest-dependent nature of practical 
choice, therefore recognize the necessity of combatting this enterprise. 
3. Value realism: lnterpreting the language ofvalue 
This foundationalist hope rests upon a particular linguistic practice: the justification of basic 
interests and passions by invoking value-terms. But the Ianguage of value by itself does not provide a 
knockdown case for foundationalism - it is a surface phenomenon, an appearance, which demands 
interpretation and is amenable to numerous different interpretations. Foundationalism must provide an 
interpretation that meets two requirements: first, it must portray the language of value as representing 
objective value-facts as being of a kind that furnish reasons independently of the possession of particular 
interests, and second. it must be defensible as the correct interpretation of this language. (A third task for 
the foundationalist is to defend this practice as both intemalIy coherent and extemalIy adequate to 
reality6 - but 1 wiIl put this problem aside here.) 
This interpretation takes its initial cues from the surface form of the language of value. 
Statements such as "pain is bad," "altruism is good," .. the good wiIl is valuable in itself' take the form of 
assertoric sentences in the indicative mood, like propositions of science and everyday description. 
Furthennore, they take the subject-predicate form of ordinary descriptive language, joining a predicate-
term ("bad") to a subject-term ("pain"). This naturally suggests we interpret the predicate as in an 
ordinary descriptive statement. When we say that blood is red, we are asserting that blood has the 
property of redness; that the property of being red is part of the nature of blood. Thus, when we say that 
pain is bad. it is reasonable to suppose that we are asserting pain to pos ses s the property of badoess. We 
6 J. L. Mackie (1977) accepts the foundationalist interpretation on the frrst two criteria. but cIairns that the everyday 
practice of (moral) value-ascription is a metaphysical error: we are asserting there to be value qualities whereas in 
reality nothing ofthis kind exists. According to John McDowell's critique ofMackie, what ordinary moral discourse 
would then be doing would not be merely erroneous, but deeply incoherent. 
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thereby arrive at the notion of value as a class of objective properties. Most notoriously, G. E. Moare 
proclaimed the existence of the non-natural property of "goodness". 
It is not enough for foundationalism simply to affirm the existence of objective value properties. 
It needs something that provides reasons through its own intrinsic nature. without the necessary 
participation of any contingent fact about the motivations of the person to whom it is providing reasons. 
Affirmation of objective value properties, assuming that such things could provide reasons. does not yet 
accomplish this goal, since being a property of an object does not entail being independent of anybody' s 
motivational or psychological state. Being-desired-by-me can unproblematicalIy be considered a 
property of an object, but wiIl not provide the sought interest-transcendent foundation for value 
judgements. The concept of a property is very vague, and can be filled out in numerous different ways. 
In the next two chapters 1 consider several such strategies and offer one myself. 
Foundationalism thereby arrives at the doctrine of value realism, the struggle of which against 
its opponent, value anti-realism. has recently been in the forefront of philosophical controversy.7 There 
is imprecision in how this controversy is defined. Sometimes, realism is construed as the thesis that value 
statements are at least sometimes true. This leaves open how the language is interpreted, and pennits 
those who deny it refers to objective value properties to be value realists. Altematively, the line can be 
drawn with regard to the particular interpretation advanced by the foundationalist. Value realism would 
thus be the stance that value statements refer to objective value properties that realIy exist, while value 
anti-realism would be the stance that there are no such properties, regardless of the proper interpretation 
of the statements. We might call the former semantic value realism, and the latter metaphysical value 
realism. 8 It is metaphysical value realism that is of concem here, and so "value realism" henceforth is 
only used to mean this. 
7 This debate is most frequently cast in terms of moraL realism and anti-realism. But moral realism is just a 
microcosm of the broader doctrine of value realismo 1 shall be discussing realism and anti-realism about value, 
which encompasses moral value. 
8 Korsgaard (1996a: 34-36) malees the same distinction in terms of"proccdural" versus "substantive" realism, but 
1 find this classification less cIcar. 
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1 will argue the anti-foundationalist case against interest-transcendent value properties - but 
from within a realist analysis of value. The remainder of this chapter is aimed at establishing that tbe 
anti-foundationalist should join witb the foundationalist in rejecting anti-realism. and accept tbat there 
are real. objective value properties. Let us. then. criticallyexamine tbe anti-realist strategies. 
4. Value anti-realism: Reinterpreting the language ofvalue 
An anti-realist can accept the realist interpretation of the language. and deny that there exist any 
such properties. This is to attribute a massive error to ordinary belief and practice. and is therefore 
termed an e"or theory (Mackie 1977). Such an indictment of common sense is not to be accepted 
lightly. and 1 will not consider this strategy until chapter 6. Tbe edifice of value realism has been 
constructed largely on an interpretation of the language of value. Unsurprisingly. it is attacked 
principally by critique of this interpretation, and anti-rea1ism has flourished by articulating and defending 
rival accounts of how to understand statements like "pain is bad". We can tben deny the existence of 
value properties witbout being skeptical about such a basic human practice. Foundationalist-realist 
interpretations of the language of value put great weight on its grarnmatical forro. But is it always the 
case that the most obvious and straightforward interpretation of OUT linguistic practices is best? This 
seems false, and anti-realists draw attention back to the interpretive question, arguing that the realist 
strategy is naIve and fundamentally mistaken. 
There are two broad families of the reinterpretive anti-realist strategy. The most dramatic break 
with realism is to be found in a position that disputes the very semantic status of the language in 
question, and denies that the Ianguage of value is "cognitive" or descriptive at all. According to this 
noncognitivism or nondescriptivism, the basic function of the language of value is not to assert facts or 
predicate properties - it is merely cloaked in this guise. 1 shall return to consider noncognitivism in more 
detail after briefly treating the other anti-realist option. 
Anti-realism is not committed to noncognitivism. and there is a family of theories that sides with 
realism in providing a cognitivist interpretation of the language of value. Subjectivism maintains that the 
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language of value is descriptive. but that its primary object of description is not the object evaluated. but 
in sorne way evaluating subjects. This is not necessarily incommensurable with objective value 
properties. but they make uneasy bedfellows. If there are objective value properties. we might expect to 
be able to predicate them directly. The chief motivation for advancing a subjectivist account seems to be 
skepticism concerning the existence of these. Subjectivism enables us to be anti-realists at little cost, at 
least, since it holds that we never predicate such properties.9 
"Subjectivism" evidently contrasts with "objectivism". and the debate between "subjectivism" 
and "objectivism" in ethics has been long and verbose. But the terms are vague.10 and we can distinguish 
at least between strong and weak forms of "subjectivism" and "objectivism". Strong subjectivism is the 
view that our language of value is strictly speaking about subjects and their attitudes. not about the 
character of objects. Weak subjectivism rnerely maintains that taIk about value is meaningless except 
frorn the perspective of certain subjective interests. Strong objectivism holds that value is metaphysically 
and conceptually independent of subjects and the subjective. Value is "out there in the world" in sorne 
sense. like chairs and elephants. and OUT subjective relation to it is completely external to its nature and 
existence: we merely cognize it. Weak objectivism. on the other hand. holds merely the metaphysical 
cIaim. not the conceptual cIaim. Value exists in the world as a property of objects. and exists 
independently of any subject' s actual interests or attitudes. 
Note that weak subjectivism and weak objectivism are compatible. Value exists in the world 
independently of anybody' s actual interests. but the concepts of such subjective states are a condition of 
the meaningfulness of speech about value. 11 Both strong subjectivisrn and strong objectivism have 
serious difficulties. we shall see. and so it is this middle ground. incorporating elements of objectivity 
and subjectivity. that we should seek to occupy. For present purposes. however. all we need to observe is 
that this discussion is concerned onIy with strong subjectivism. 
9 Subjectivism is only metaphysically anti-realist. Unless coupled with the ridiculous claim that we never utter true 
statements conceming evaluating subjects, subjectivism is semamically realist. 
10 Price 1983 gives a careful taxonomy. 
11 As Johnston (1989: 141) suggests. these concepts are not subjective in depending upon our affects. rather, they 
are subjective in depending upon the concepts of our affects. 
19 
There are various forms of (strong) subjectivism. which share the c1aim that value judgernents 
are assertions about the attitudes of sorne subject or subjects. The simplest account (arguably found in 
Hobbes and Spinoza) analyzes value statements as direct descriptions of the speaker' s attitudes. "This is 
a good meal" accordingly means simply "1 like this meal". Primarily, my value judgements are 
descriptions of me, not descriptions of objects. Besides the counter-intuitiveness of this c1aim, this theory 
suffers one particuIarly difficuIt problero. It implies that despite appearances, two speakers who verbally 
dissent over the value of sorne object are not rea1ly disagreeing at all, since each is just describing bis or 
her own attitudes. There can be no contradicting one another concerning value, unless one talles directly 
about the other' s attitudes. 1 only contradict your assertion that ''This is a good meal" if 1 say sornething 
like "You dOD't like this meal". 
Subjectivist strategies can depart from this naIve model in a number of ways. First, value 
assertions can be tied to groups of various kinds, rather than simply the individuals uttering thero. Thus, 
"Your action was evil" might mean, "Our cornmunity disapproves of actions like yours", or ''Human 
beings universaliy disapprove of actioDs HIce yours". This rescues our ability to contradict each other 
with our value-discourse, since it CODstrues us as at least potentially talking about the same subjects. 
However it suffers further problems. If it indexes value judgements to localized groups, then the same 
problem recurs on a different leveL Now, members of different groups do DOt disagree with one another 
when they verbally differ on the value of objects. If it indexes value-utterances globaliy, then it seems to 
malee value discourse universaliy false, since it is implausible to maintain that there are anyattitudes that 
are held universally. More seriously, it appears to miss the point of evaluation altogether. Value 
judgements are ofien made to criticize the attitudes of others, and sometimes to criticize the attitudes of 
one's group, or even those of ali humanity. But critical evaluation is not, and cannot be, simply a matter 
of contrasting with the attitudes of sorne group or other. 
Consideration of a further problem introduces us to an additional sophistication in subjectivism. 
If value judgements simply report the attitudes of sorne group, it follows that no value judgements can be 
made concerning objects that the group in question has not been acquainted with - or else, that the value 
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judgernents start to look very wrong. (One might, for example, claim that anything one' s community has 
never encountered and formed attitudes toward rnust be valueless). A promising solution to this problem 
is to add a hypothetical construction to the analysis. To say something has value is to say that, should 
certain conditions be met (such as the object's being regarded objectively and a1l its relevant features 
being recognized, all el se being equal) sorne subject or subjects would react to it in a certain way. A 
related category of accounts is termed "dispositional", in virtue of specifying a disposition of attitudinal 
response possessed by the subject or group. Referring to dispositions permits the suppression of the 
hypothetical clause (rather than formulating the analysis in terms of "If ... then ..... one can formulate it in 
terms of "x has a disposition to y"), but these strategies remain hypothetical nonetheless, since the latter 
formulation effectively means, "If x is placed in circumstances z, a1l eIse being equal x will y". A class of 
accounts termed "full information analyses" also belongs in this category. The term refers to a particular 
counterfactual clause that specifies full relevant information about the object as a necessary condition for 
an attitudinal response satisfying the truth conditions of the value staternent. 
This strategy does not solve the problems that arise from indexing value staternents to the 
attitudes of particular subjects. All human beings at times manifest inclinations and attitudes of which 
we disapprove, and so even a hypothetical formulation is subject to the danger of contingent foibles of 
character. Even if 1 were provided with full information and retlected on it in the desired manner, 1 might 
still have inappropriate attitudinal responses. There is a tmal developrnent of subjectivism designed to 
solve this problem Rather thao analyzing value judgements as statements about actual subjects, we can 
aoalyze them as being about hypothetical or ideal subjects. There are several ways of doing this. One, of 
which the leading exponent today is the dispositionalist Michael Smith,12 is to take an idealized version 
of oneself as the relevant subject. Value statements are analyzed as stating roughly that were the speaker 
fully rational, he or she would react to certain objects in certain ways. In moving back to a flrst-person 
analysis, this strategy again faces the problematic consequence that opposed value judgernents aren't 
12 See also Sidgwick 1907: 110-112. 
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contradictory.13 Altematively, we can eliminate reference to an actual subject altogether, and consider 
value statements as asserting sometlúng about a completely ideal subject - the '"Ideal Observer". This 
approach is cIassically modelled by Adam Smith, and more recently, by Roderick Firth (1952). Value 
statements would then assert that were an ideal observer to consider the object (with full information, 
etc.), it would react with a certam attitude (desire, approval, etc.). 
Hume can be seen as offering a third version of this strategy - although he does not talk about 
ideal subjects. Rather, he cIaims (roughly) that when we call sometlúng good, we mean that (under 
conditions of full information) it excites approval in the sensibility of human nature. This is distinct from 
any specification of actual individuals, since human nature is an abstract kind that transcends the 
existence of any individual instantiating it. Actual human constitutions can diverge from what is natural. 
This strategy also has serious flaws. It is not incoherent to suppose human nature and human sensibility 
to be corrupt and evil - and although there is no inconsistency in the idea of human nature being such as 
to disapprove of itself, we do not suppose that someone who views human sensibility as corrupt would 
thereby cease to see value language as normative, or refrain from using it. This is a difficulty that the 
properly ideal hypothetical accounts alone have overcome. Any subjectivism that interprets value 
judgements as descriptions of subjects' responses has trouble accounting for the normativity of value 
judgements, or the fact that possessing value is matter of meriling the relevant response, rather than 
merely contingently exciting it. Hume's account fails to show why value gives us any reasons, unless we 
contingently desire to conform with "human nature". 
The ideal observer theory of Adam Smith and Firth, and the agent-dispositional theory of 
Michael Smith are constructed so as to solve this problem. Their strategy is to build normativity and 
merit into the idealized subject to whose responses they c1aim value language refers. If the subjects are 
"fully rational" or otherwise ideal, they will only make responses which are merited. Even this most 
13 Smith (1994: 164-174) tries to avoid this problem by sliding to talle about "we" instead of "r', which may be 
excusable in light of his claim not to be giving a reductive analysis. Even so, he needs (and attempts) to show that 
we expect everyone would desire the same things if fully rational. Any plausibility this has in the moral case, 
however, does not carry ayer to value judgement generally, which Smith ignores. It is absurd to suggest that, 
were we all fully rational, we would all want the same spouse, the same food, the same art, etc. 
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sophisticated form of subjectivism. however, has serious problems. Frrst. it asks us to believe the 
implausible thesis that when we make value judgements we are thinking about and describing not merely 
the reactions of subjects, but the reactions of imaginary subjects. 14 More seriously, there are problems of 
circularity. Value is defined as that which an ideal agent would desire or approve of. But "ideal" is itself 
a value concept: howare we to understand it? To be thoroughly subjectivist, we would have to say that 
by the "ideal agent" we mean simply an agent that an ideal agent would approve of - but the circularity 
is vicious. Perhaps we can defme "ideal" here without reference to a subject. But the subjectivist cannot 
take this option, since it admits that there are value concepts that can be defined nonsubjectively. If we 
can define the ideal agent without describing sorne subject' s responses, there are no c1ear reasons we 
cannot define the valuableness of other kinds of objects in a similarly objectivist fashion. 
Suppose we bypass this problem. Another puzzle is: how does the ideal agent deliberate, or 
choose actions? If value is by definition whatever the ideal agent would choose, then wouldn't the ideal 
agent recognize that whatever she chooses is by definition the right choice? The ideal agent cannot 
choose any course of action because it is the right choice. To avoid this result, we need sorne 
independent way of specifying the characteristics of the ideal agent. The ideal agent is ideal in virtue of 
being the kind of person who has the right attitudes and malees the right choices. To say this, however, 
presupposes a prior conception of what it is for attitudes and choices to be right. If we have such a 
conception, then why does our thought about value have to be mediated by thought about ideal subjects 
who respond appropriately? Why can't we directly invoke these value properties ourselves? 
Subjectivism, far frorn giving an analysis of value language, rather provides us with a gratuitous 
intermediary . 
Indeed, Michael Smith (and Sidgwick 1907: 112) seems to concur. He recognizes the 
implausibility of the dispositional theory of value as a reductive analysis of our rneaning, and responds 
that he is not aiming to give such an account (1992: 349-352). His dispositional formula (which he calls 
a "platitude") is rather offered as afonctional equivalent to taIk about value: it models the judgements 
14 In the case ofMichael Srnith this will receive significant qualification shortly. 
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we actuaIly make. In other Ianguage. he believes bis account fixes the extension but not the intension of 
the Ianguage of value. Thls is to follow the strategy described by Richard Brandt as giving "reforming 
definitions" rather than "reductive definitions" of our Ianguage. But why give such an account. and why 
claim. as Smith does, that it is the best availabIe account of what we mean, when it does not even tell us. 
strictly speaking, what we mean? Like many, Smith doubts the Ianguage ofvalue permits ofan adequate 
reductive defmition or semantic analysis. The reforming strategy wagers 00 the failure of semantic 
analysis and reductive definition, and expects to win the game by defauIt, waiting in the runners' up 
position in expectation of no winner emerging. I aim to disappoint such refonners by providing a 
reductive analysis that satisfies every reasonabIe condition for an acceptabIe theory of value. 
My treatment of subjectivism has been brief. However, it is an unsatisfactory family of theories 
in two basic respects: it clashes with cornmon sense concerning what we mean by our value utterances, 
and it has trouble accornmodating the normativity or merit that value utterances involve. It should be 
endorsed onIy out of necessity: if it emerges that all other available theories are less satisfactory. In the 
following chapters 1 will demonstrate that there is an alternative, objectivistic theory that should 
completely satisfy uso However, 1 now consider the second anti-realist strategy, noncognitivism. 
5. The implausibility ofnoncognitivism 
Noncognitivism denies the cornmon claim of realists and subjectivists that the language of value 
is cognitive or descriptive. Its rationale emerges from a consideration of the context of use and the 
functions of value language. Unlike normal statements of fact, value statements are characteristically 
accompanied by certain sentiments, attitudes, or purposes. They are used to express one's attitudes 
toward an object. or to influence the attitudes or behaviour of others toward objects. Taking these 
characteristics of the language of value seriously yields a different sort of interpretation that does not 
construe such speech as predicating sorne representational concept of sorne object, and thus does not 
refer to or invoke objective value properties. 
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Tbis approach yields numerous interpretive strategies, which all retum scrutiny to the 
interpretation of value language, rejecting the face-vaIue interpretation that gives credibility to vaIue 
realism. The original form of noncognitivism is emotivism (A. J. Ayer, Charles L. Stevenson), which 
maintains that the language of value functions semantically by expressing non-propositional attitudes: 
voicing our emotional responses to objects (the "boo-hurrah" theory of ethlcal discourse). R M. Hare 
(1952) advances a different noncognitivist theory, prescriptivism, according to which value statements 
function as prescriptions, recommendations, or exhortations. The indicative surface grammar of value 
utterances conceals an imperative speech act, so that "x is good" really rneans sornething like "Do x'. 
AIthough noncognitivists may acknowledge that statements about vaIue contain sorne descriptive 
content, they deny that any strictly practical, ethicaI, or evaIuative content is descriptive. Both these 
strategies are noncognitivist in virtue of their cIaim that value judgernents - at least insofar as they are 
vaIue judgements - say nothing descriptive about the world and have sorne other non-propositionaI 
semantic status. Noncognitivisrn is strongly represented today by Simon BIackburn and AIlan Gibbard, 
who label it expressivism. 
Noncognitivists are anti-realists. Their noncognitivist interpretation of the language of vaIue 
enables thern to deny there are any representationaI vaIue-concepts. The significance of this stance, in 
the context of our concems, is that they reject the foundationalist claim of value realists that reasons for 
action and rational choice are provided by objective, subject-independent facts about the worId. The 
plausibility of their position, as with cognitivist value realism, finges largely on the plausibility of their 
interpretation of the language of vaIue, and so it is here that critical scrutiny of these theories must begin. 
The noncognitivist stress on the essential role of speaker attitudes, interests, and purposes in the 
rneaning of the language of value is a crucial insight that must be accornmodated, and poses difficulties 
for most realist theories, as we shall see in the next chapter. However noncognitivism has a greater 
number of counter-intuitive implications and is therefore the less plausible strategy. I wilI now defend 
the cognitivism of the realists against the noncognitivism of the anti-realists. The debate over 
noncognitivism has been long and intense, and has reached a level of considerable sophistication. Rather 
25 
than aiming at refutation, therefore. I will argue that cognitivism is intuitively more plausible and so we 
ought to prefer it unless we have strong reasons not to. Noncognitivists attempt to furnish such reasons, 
but I will urge in the next section that none existo 
Noncognitivist theories are well known to have trouble accommodating the logical behaviour of 
value terms in our usage: words like "good" behave exactly like ordinary descriptive predicates. "Geach-
Frege" problems emerge when we examine the behaviour of evaluative sentential elements in indirect 
contexts. Where we have a common sentential element occurring in different sentential contexts, that 
theory is preferable that provides a single analysis of the element to cover every case. But it seems 
noncognitivism canoot accomplish this. If the sentence 'Trees are good" means something like ''Hurray 
for trees!" or 'Take care oftrees!" then how are we to analyze the same element in the sentence "Iftrees 
are good, then we should plant more"? Remember that noncognitivism is distinct from subjectivism. 
'Trees are good" does not describe our attitude toward trees. it expresses ir. But the conditional in which 
we are considering this element embedded does not express any attitude toward trees, so "Trees are 
good" must mean something different in this contexto It seems as if to make sense of this occurrence. we 
have to interpret "trees are good" here descriptively, like ''1 like trees" or "My attitude to trees is 
hurray!" or "1 prescribe taking care of trees". 
Are there any reasons to accept that 'Trees are good" requires different analyses as it occurs by 
itself and within a larger sentence? The serious problem with accepting this state of affairs is that it 
breaks logical connections that appear legitimate. We canoot infer by modus ponens froro (1) Iftrees are 
good, we should plant more; and (2) Trees are good; that (3) We should plant more trees. since, frrst, 
"trees are good" means something different as it occurs in (1) and (2), and second, (2) has no truth 
conditions, since it does not assert anything to be the case. It canoot be used to utter a falsehood or líe 
(although it can be used deceptively). It can have no truth-functional role - but this is a most surprising 
resulto The articulation of objections to noncognitivism on this basis has reached a level of considerable 
sophistication,15 as has the formulation of an ambitious defense by Simon Blackburn (1973, 1988b). I 
15 Those worthy of mention inelude Schueler 1988, Brighouse 1990. 
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believe Blackbum's defense is unsatisfactory. but it is undeniably sophisticated. and 1 will not critically 
engage with it here. 1 wish to note merely that there is a serious difficulty here for noncognitivism, one 
we have good reason to suspect insurmountable. 1 offer instead the following argument against 
noncognitivism. aimed also at displaying its primafacie unsatisfactoriness. 
1 introduced the motivation for noncognitivism by pointing to functions of evaluative speech acts 
and the psychological contexts in which they manifest themselves. These suggest a close connection 
between the use of value language and certain attitudes, interests, or purposes. Noncognitivism infers a 
conclusion about the meaning and semantic status of this language itself. But this inference is no more 
legitimate than the realists' inference from the grammatical forro of value language to its semantic 
structure. The meaning of a speech act is not necessarily identical to the function of a speech act,16 and 
so the noncognitivist needs to do more than point to the functional role of the language of value in order 
to establish a thesis conceming its rneaning. Suppose a child says to her father. <'Those lollies are really 
cheap!" The purpose of her utterance is to induce her father to buy her sorne lollies. But the meaning or 
semantic content of the utterance is quite different - she made a factual assertion about the price of 
lollies. The cognitivist can accordingly object to the noncognitivist that while the purpose of utterances 
about value might often be to express attitudes or influence others, its meaning remains descriptive and 
predicational. 
The noncognitivist can reply that purpose may determine meaning without this entailing that any 
purpose determines meaning. Inducing her father to buy lollies is not the ooly purpose the child has 
when she speaks, and it can be argued that it is not the purpose contributing meaning to her speech acto 
She also intends to communicate to her father that the lollies are cheap. She hopes he will come to 
believe this. and will subsequently buy lollies for her. Suppose she does not intend to communicate that 
she wants her father to buy lollies, rather choosing her words precisely in order to disguise this motive 
(with amusing transparency). Surely, the noncognitivist can argue, the meaning of the speech act will be 
16 As Gibbard admits (1990: 116). 
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contributed by the purpose to communicate something. With value judgements it is the purpose to 
cornmunicate one's altitudes or wishes that is the relevant, meaning-giving purpose. 
However this reply quickly lands the noncognitivist in hot water. For there are more straight-
forward and obvious ways to cornmunicate such things. On the emotivist analysis, ''Pain is bad" could be 
expressed by "1 don't like pain," and "You ought not frighten children" could be expressed by "1 don't 
want you to frighten children". On the prescriptivist anaIysis, we could say instead "Do what you can to 
alleviate and avoid pain" and '1)on't frighten children". These locutions communicate the same 
attitudes, wishes, and directions much more cIearly - so why don't we use them instead? Indeed, the 
problem is more serious than this. Not only must the noncognitivist explain why we don't use the 
cIearest form of expression, but he also must explain away the intuition that these expressions are not 
equivalent at all. The person who wants to affum, "You should not frighten children," will vehemently 
deny that he means nothing more than to express his dislike of frightening children or to order someone 
not to frighten children. "You shouldn't frighten children," he will say, "because it is wrong, regardless 
of whether 1 want you to or not, and regardless of whether you care about what 1 want or not". 
There are pragmatic reasons, noncognitivists reply, for not expressing OUT concems and wishes 
in the clearest way, and for denying the correct interpretation. Others may not care about OUT wishes or 
attitudes, and therefore will not see them as any reason to adopt or abstain from sorne end. By disguising 
oUTselves behind the apparently factual, descriptive language of value in the indicative mood, we lend 
OUT value utterances a semblance of authority and objectivity, and thereby have greater influence over 
the attitudes and behavioUT of others (Blackbum 1998: 84). It seems, however, that the further 
noncognitivism goes to defend its thesis, the more it mires itself in difficulty. On this account, the use of 
vaIue language in the indicative mood is explained by an intention to disguise one's real purpose from 
the audience of the speech act, and misrepresent it as something it is noto Butjust as the child's purpose 
of getting her father to buy lollies does not enter the meaning of the utterance (because the child believes 
that revealing her motivation would lead to refusal), so too the ulterior purpose to communicate one' s 
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attitudes or wishes and thereby influence the other, it appears, will not enter the meaning of the 
utterance, since the speaker believes that revealing this purpose would undermine her chance for success. 
The child disguises her motive behind an utterance with a different meaning from either "r want 
you to buy me a lolly" or ''Huy me a lolly". If the misrepresenting statement chosen by the person 
judging is to be able to disguise bis real purpose, it must be a statement with a separate meaning from 
either "r don't like you frightening children" or '1)on't frighten children". This is evident in the 
indignant reply to the noncognitivist translation that a person making a value judgement is likely to 
make. The truth or falsity of this judgement is considered to be independent of what the speaker likes 
and wants. We shouId ask: What is the meaning of the statement that was actually made, the one behind 
which was concealed the ulterior motive? It is natural to suppose that, since expressed in the indicative 
mood and considered to be factual and objectively truth-evaluable, this "cover" expression is cognitive -
unless it itself is misrepresented as something it is noto The noncognitivist cannot consider the actual 
statement to be cognitive, since this would be to give the game away, and admit there are cognitive 
value-statements. 17 
Noncognitivists must deny that the language of value has a literal cognitive meaning that carries 
evaluative contento Nonetheless, they hold that the real status of value-Ianguage is disguised in sorne 
sense (Blackburn 1998a: 51). This implies that the language ofvalue is expressed in the indicative mood 
and in a descriptive, assertoric form to give the impression of objective cognitive vaIue, but that this is 
only an appearance, and in reality there is no coherent (evaIuative) cognitive content in such utterances. 
In other words, they deny the appropriateness of my analogy. The child states sometlúng meaningful that 
is indirectly intended to further her purpose, but according to the noncognitivist the only evaluative 
meaning value-statements have is essentiaIly tied to their emotive or prescriptive function. Is the 
noncognitivists' account a plausible interpretation? r suggest it is noto For if value-statements have no 
evaIuative meaning other than their emotive or prescriptive noncognitive meaning, then in what sense 
can we take them to be misleadingly represented? According to the noncognitivist, there is no sense we 
17 It appears to have been in part recognition of such problems which Ied Mackie to formulate his error theory. 
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can connect with a statement like '"Frightening children is abad thing to do" except something like 
"Don't frighten children" or '"Frightening Children? Yuck!". In that case, how could we possibly 
understand such a statement to have a different semantic status, as the noncognitivist c1aims we do? 1 
suggest it makes sense to suppose we can't. 
The central insight of noncognitivism can be put to work in the service of another cognitivist 
objection to noncognitivism. Granting that the usual use of the language of value is to communicate 
attitudes or desires and influence others, we should expect that the means adopted is at least reasonably 
effective. Furthermore, the rationale behind the opaque fono of the language of value is allegedly that 
simple expressions of one's own attitudes or wishes and direct imperatives are relatively ineffectual in 
influencing the attitudes and behaviour of others. It is this fact that allegedIy explains the indicative 
grammatical form of value-Ianguage. But what the noncognitivist will have difficulty explaining is how 
this form serves the function ascribed to it. For if the ooly sense we can attach to such language is 
emotive or prescriptive, it remains unexplained how its use performs this function. The influential power 
of value judgement seems limited by the receptivity of others to care and take heed of what one cares 
about or commands. In which case, there is an effective and unanswerable reply to any value judgement: 
"1 don't care what you want". 
Noncognitivists reply by appealing to mechanisms of socio-psychological influence. 
Expressions of attitude or prescriptions are efficacious on our socially conditioned psychological nature. 
This, however, is a scandalous interpretation of the dynamics of ethical argument, which consists in 
engaging with others as ethieal agents, not as malleable psychologies, and is about demonstrating to 
others that they should eare, that they have reasons for eertain attitudes and actions that extend beyond 
their desires to please or obey uso Argument over value involves trying to demonstrate to the other the 
justification for what one advocates, and thereby influence them, not the attempt to browbeat or 
intimidate. Cognitivism ean explain how value judgement has this function. Value judgement involves 
aseribing properties that justify the advocated stanee. If we can persuade others, by rational argument, of 
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such facts. then we can succeed in justifying these stances to them. and thereby influence their attitudes 
and behaviour. 
I do not take these objections to provide a decisive refutation of noncognitivisrn: there are 
sophisticated maneuvers a stubbom noncognitivist can make to keep the controversy alive, efforts which 
are notably found in Blackburn's "quasi-realist" writings. 18 My aim has been rnerely to demonstrate that 
cognitivisrn has the prima Jade greater plausibility, and I believe rny treatment has accornplished this. 
We should not give up cognitivisrn unIess we are presented with strong reasons to do so. Noncognitivists 
cIaim there is such a reason, but I wiII argue that they are mistaken. 
6. Language, reification, and Jacts 
We have seen how value realism takes its clues from the surface appearance ofthe Ianguage of 
vaIue. and how anti-realists respond by objecting to the naiveté ofthis interpretive strategy. Armed with 
a plethora of sophisticated deflationary and functionalist theories from recent phiIosophy of Ianguage 
(notably inspired by Wittgenstein, Quine. and Davidson), anti-realists point out that to suppose that the 
use of nouns and adjectives implies reference to sorne irreducible part of rea1ity. there independently of 
any way of conceiving of it or any attitudinaI stance toward the world, is to neglect the diversity of ways 
language functions. Scrutiny of language in the indicative mood, in which we predicate properties of 
objects, naturally inclines us to a naIve assumption that every terrn stands for a particular independent, 
separable. perspective-transcendent entity or substance, and that our speech cannot be understood 
without a grasp of these entities. This is the reifying mistake often labelled "Platonism". 
Most proponents of real objective vaIue properties believe that attention to these properties qua 
properties is essential in ethical theory. Construing thern as entities at the conceptual heart of ethics, they 
feeI that any ethical theory neglecting to speak about "value" as such fundamentally misses the boat -
both Humeanism by basing ethics in our subjective affective states. and Kantianisrn by basing ethics on 
18 Quasi-realism is defined as the project of demonstrating that noncognitivist analyses can accommodate all the 
apparently cognitivist features of this language. 
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reason. This is a result of the attention of theorists tuming to bear on the hitherto pre-reflective concept 
of value. and reifying it in a naYve manner. The theory of value I wiIl advance is relatively exceptionaI in 
this regard: although I give a cognitivist account of how value terms function, and a metaphysicaI 
account of what a vaIue property is, I do not cIaim that a recognition of vaIue as a speciaI category of 
properties is necessary for cornpetence in practicallife or for adequate ethicaI theory. Rather, taIk about 
value is one of a number of ways of carving up the practical worId - legitimate, but not necessary, and 
no more correct than speaking in terms of ends, passions, or reasons. In fact, on my analysis value turns 
out to be a very uninteresting kind of property, qua property. 
In taking this stance, I come under pressure from anti-realism and noncognitivisro, with whom I 
share this caution in respect to the language of value. If fixing our phiIosophical reflection on the 
language of value has a tendency to lead us to a false reification and a naIve platonistic view of value 
properties, why consort with the rnetaphysicaI focus ofthe realists? Wouldn't it be better to let ''value'' 
and the other value terms slide back into the pre-reflective, functional anonymity in which we found 
thero, rather than to argue over theories of what "value properties" are? No doubt due to their suspicions 
abaut realisro, one ofien finds an interesting treatment of these terms in the writings of anti-realist 
philosophers. There is a conspicuous absence of taIk about the value of objects, replaced instead with 
talk about our values - it seems as if, distrusting the realist connotations of our ordinary manner of 
speaking, these thinkers (consciously or unconsciously) restríct the word "vaIue" to only its verbal and 
subjective functions and applications. 19 
Why play the realist' s rnetaphysical game at alI, if we can make perfect sense of our practical 
utterances and deliberations without doing so? My answer to this challenge is as follows. Frrstly, there is 
a pragmatic point to be made about the developrnent of theory. It may indeed have been abad thing, in 
sorne sense, that we ceased using the language of value pre-reflectively and made it the object of 
philosophical reflection - thereby subjecting it to the indignity of platonization. But even ifthis is so, we 
cannot remedy the situation simply by turning our eyes away from this language again. Once we have 
19··See for example Gibbard 1990, Blackbum 1998a, and especially Korsgaard 1996a: 124-5, 138,161. 
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taken explicit notice of a cIass of terms and concepts, it is very difficult if not impossibIe to effect a 
forgetting en masse. The question of the analysis of this language and tbe metaphysics it invokes has 
been raised - and will not go away until it receives a satisfying answer. Until a satisfactory version of 
value realism is provided, tbe inability of anti-foundationalists (noncognitivists and subjectivists) to 
account for the phenomena of value discourse will be grist to tbe milI for the foundationalists. 
This, however, is the crux of the matter. The noncognitivist and subjectivist anti-realists, who 
wish that we aIl would just forget about the language of value, council us in this direction because they 
do not believe that these questions have satisfying answers. They believe that the Ianguage of value is 
indeed pureIy functional in some manner, and that demanding from it conceptual analysis and a 
correIated metaphysics is inappropriate and doomed to failure.20 There is no purely intellectual and 
objective concept of "value" or "goodness", and there is certainIy no objective property of value or 
goodness. This however is what the surface foem of the language suggests, and tberefore, in the eyes of 
these thinkers, so much the worse for the surface foem of our language. Despite the problems with anti-
realism outlined in the two previous sections, we must be anti-realists, because the altemative is 
untenable. 
The reason 1 instead play the realist's game is that 1 believe this is mistaken. The language of 
value reaIly does give clues to its proper nature and function by its surface appearance: it is as it appears. 
Rather than trying to suppress natural ways of expressing ourselves with the language of value, 
accordingly, we should attend to the ways we are naturaIly inclined to speak, and search for the meaning 
or structure that the appearance does not conceal, but ratber manifests. When we use the language of 
value, we are implicitly predicating concepts of objects, and referring to subtle metaphysical properties. 
The realist game, in other words, may not be necessary, but it is legitimate. And given that it is being 
played, it is important that somebody demonstrate how it is played correctly. 
\Vhy do so many philosophers suppose that the language of value cannot involve tbe ascription 
of predicates and real, objective properties? Such acts belong to the activity of description, but the 
20 See for example Hare 1985. 
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opponents of value realism all recognize acutely that the language of value has crucial other functions -
it expresses attitudes and interests, desires, and wishes, and it exhorts, condemos, praises, persuades, and 
dissuades. Further, value judgements are largely contingent on motivational features of the person 
making them: given exactIy the same objective situation, two people who do not differ in what they 
factually perceive can hold wildly incornmensurable value judgements about that situation. Description 
and evaluation accordingly appear to be irreconcilable linguistic actions. 
However this situation is complicated by the fact that the language of value cannot plausibly be 
interpreted as having a solely expressivist meaning. Even Charles L. Stevenson admitted that the 
language of value had both a descriptive and an evaluative component, and this became a central part of 
the analysis of the prescriptivist Hare. Gibbard recognizes this implicitly, when he tries to increase the 
sophistication of bis expressivist account, by cIaiming that evaluative statements express states of mind 
"in which various [factual-normative] possibilities are ruled out" (1990: 99). In other words, by using 
evaluative language a speaker "expresses a set of factual-normative worIds", and "expresses a thought". 
But this is pushing the expressivist analysis beyond its capacities. 
Observe that there is no essential incompatibility between an "expressivist" account and a 
"cognitivist" account. To "express" a belief is typically to assert a proposition - to make a cognitive 
statement. "Expressivism" is opposed to "cognitivism" only in cIaiming that what the language of vaIue 
expresses is not a belief but an attitude. Even here, of course, we can point out that a belief is technically 
considered a "propositional attitude" - so strictly speaking, to hold a thesis incommensurable with 
cognitivism, expressivism must hold that the language of value expresses principally non-propositional 
attitudes. Gibbard's account, however, does not seem to do this. How does one "express a set offactual-
normative worlds" without expressing a belief or propositional attitude? - likewise, how does one 
express a "thought", or "rule out factual-normative possibilities", without expressing a belief or 
propositional attitude? 
We need to point out again thefunctionalistfallacy that noncognitivist approaches tend toward 
committing. The use we make of language is not necessarily equivalent to the meaning or semantic 
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content of tbat language. All language "expresses", but its rneaning is determined by what it expresses, 
not the mere fact of express ion. If what is expressed is a belief, thought, or propositional attitude, tben 
the speech act is cognitive as well as expressive. Sophisticated noncognitivists admit tbat tbere is sorne 
factual content in value-utterances, but insist that the expression of non-propositional attitudes is what is 
characteristically essential in tbe language of value. Once the mixed nature of tbe language of value is 
admitted, however, why not concede tbat tbe language of value is cognitive, is about real value 
properties, and is true or false in virtue of these? Noncognitivists furtber hold that the essential role of 
non-propositional attitudes of fixing tbe meaning of value discourse rules out tbe possibility of 
corresponding value facts. If sorne specification of tbe way the world is depends essentially on 
possession of subjective affects or rnotivations, tben it cannot be said to pick out a "fact" in the world. 
John McDoweIl cIaims this doctrine is an error deriving frorn tbe eighteenth century division 
between cognition and conation. If tbis is the basis for rejecting the sense of talking about value 
\properties, tben it applies equally to our talle about colour properties and all other secondary qualities. 
For our cIassifications of colour are based on tbe way in which objects affect our perceptual sensibilities. 
We could equally point to predications of tbe terms "tall", "short", "big". and "little" - and everything 
else dependent upon nonos. By the noncognitivists' criteria, description of a person or building as tall 
can never be the cognitive specification of a fact. But, McDowell and otbers claim. in fact tbis destroys 
our capacity to know and discuss facts altogether. since even the concepts of physical science are 
similarly anthropornorphic. AH of a sudden. tbe language of vaIue seems to be in very good company. 
locked out of tbe house of cognition and fact along with all our ordinary descriptive talk and tbe 
technical discourse of science. 
McDowell's critique certainly shows up the nai'veté of tbis conception of facts and cognitive 
discourse. But Ido not believe that this strategy sufficiently accounts for the possibility of tbe existence 
of value properties. McDowell focuses on "thick" value concepts. These are concepts like ''brave'' and 
"stupid". with a strongly descriptive worId-directed nature. In Appendix A I deny tbese are reaHy 
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<'value" properties. For now, 1 will simply echo Blackbum's and David Copp's critique,21 by pointing 
out that their extension can be specified, and the concept applied, without any attitudinal colour or 
evident connection to reasons for action. The trick is to give a cognitivist account of general (or <1:hin.") 
evaluative terros like ugood". McDowell's strategy, 1 contend, cannot succeed in this case. 
Given that use of the language of value expresses both propositional and non-propositional 
attitudes, why should we join with the noncognitivists in believing that it is the non-propositional that 
play the essential semantic role? We can follow Gibbard in representing value judgement as consisting 
of the following two circumstances: (1) Non<ognitivelaffective: the speaker accepts sorne norros, or 
expresses sorne attitudes. (2) Cognitive/intellectual: the speaker considers those norms or rnotivations to 
in sorne way fit with a certain attitude or course of action toward the object in question. Now, the 
question becomes: which of these elernents enters the semantics or the linguistic meaning of the 
language of value itself? 1 contend, against the noncognitivist, that our choice should be neither (1) 
alone, nor (1) and (2) together, but solely (2) alone. Only the cognitive elements of the language of value 
actually figure in the semantics of that language. 
There is a distinction made in twentieth century philosophy of language between semantics and 
pragmatics. The former is meaning that the language carries in itself (by virtue of a common social 
practice of usage, of course). The latter is meaning that is supplied non-linguistically: that which is not 
explicitIy stated by an utterance, but which is supplied by context and provides essential information for 
understanding what the speaker means. The noncogniti ve aspect of expressing oneself by the language of 
value is not part of what the language means, or the content that the speaker intends to communicate. 
Rather, it is a non-semantic element carried by the content in combination with context - what Grice 
termed a conversational implicature of the speech act. Consider the following example. According to 
Bertrand Russell, when sorneone says, UThe man responsible for this rnurder is evil," they are really 
asserting a cornplex of propositions, to the effect that (A) there exists a man who is responsible for this 
murder, (B) any man who is responsible for this murder is that person (Le. he is uniquely the rnan 
21 Blackbum 1992: 295; Copp 1995: 13. 
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responsible for the murder), and (C) that man is evil. This theory is unsatisfactory, because the person 
who utters such a sentence has typicalIy no intention to assert either of tbe former two propositions. He 
may assume their truth, in making such a statement, and further, express his belief in their truth, but it is 
false that tbese extra two propositions are part of the content of what he said. Nonetheless, his speech act 
has the effect of communicating to us propositions A and B - they are conversational implicatures of the 
speech act that arise due to our expectations that (1) speakers of our language do not use referring 
descriptive phrases that tbey do not believe any individual to satisfy (except in certain conditions such as 
telling a story that happen not to be present), and (2) they do not use definite descriptions in 
circumstances where they believe them not to be uniquely satisfied. 
My claim, then, is that when we use the Ianguage of value, what is explicitIy and semanticaIly 
expressed is not an attitude, interest, or the acceptance of a norm. These are rather contextual 
accompaniments of or conversationaIly legitimated inferences from the utterance. Reasons for supposing 
this correct emerge when we consider our linguistic behaviour. Use of the language of value has the 
characteristic of being ingenuous and dishonest in contexts in which it is evident that the participants in a 
conversation have fundamentally differing (relevant) interests. If I am buying a car, and want a compact, 
fuel-efficient family vehicle, and you know this yet want me to buy a muscle-car (perhaps because you 
know I'lllet you drive it), then it is deceptive for you to teH me, of a certain compact family car, that it 
would be a bad choice (on the unstated grounds that it is not big or fast). I will assume you mean to say 
something about the car from the perspective of my interests - because I assume tbat in adopting the 
Ianguage of value we are entering a consensus on what interests we are pursuing. This is not what we 
would expect, however, if tbe noncognitivists were right, and the principal meaning of value-discourse is 
the expression of non-propositional attitudes. 
All this argument really demonstrates, a noncognitivist could reply, is that sorne interests are 
assumed as a cornmon basis for value discourse. It does not then prove that the value discourse itself 
expresses a propositional rat.her than non-propositional attitude. It might be the case that an appropriate 
response from you in regard to the car would be to express your approval relative to the interest you have 
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kindly adopted from me. Indeed, this might be so: for our purposes it is enough to point out that to make 
this move is implicitly to accept that certain interests relevant to our use of the language of value enter at 
the level of context rather than explicit semantic content. This enables a cognitivist account of the sort 1 
advocate to explain the expressivist elements of the use of value-Ianguage without thereby compromising 
the cognitivism of the semantic analysis itself, and reopens the debate at the level of semantic contento A 
cognitivist strategy makes much better sense of the behavior of this language than a noncognitivist one. 
7. Rethinking the value realism debate 
The noncognitivist and subjectivist reinterpretations of the language of value are mistaken, 1 
have suggested, and there are strong reasons for taking this language at its face value as the semantically 
evaluable cognitive predication of sorne value concept of an object. To retum to the critical evaluation of 
value realism, however, 1 wish to demonstrate that realism (value language ascribes a value property to 
an object) does not entail a foundationalist formulation of this language (value language refers to 
objective facts that are intrinsically reason-giving independently of any interests of the agent). In this 
section 1 argue for the stronger thesis that the controversy over the reality of ''values'' rests on a mistake 
and needs to be reconsidered. The real issue is something different, and needs illumination. 
The noncognitivists' reinterpretation of the language of value may be mistaken, but they are not 
mistaken in their view that the interpretation favoured by value realists needs to be critically 
reconsidered. They are right that the realists' interpretation must be repudiated, but advance the wrong 
rival account. In the folIowing chapters 1 argue for what 1 take to be the right account, which is 
cognitivist and realist, but rejects the crucial foundationalist thesis that values are properties of objects 
that are intrinsically reason-giving independently of agent's interests. The aim of this chapter, however, 
is more modest: to demonstrate the (widely overlooked) existence of theoretical space for a theory of 
value of such a kind. 
One basic reason motivating anti-foundationalists to articulate and defend a noncognitivist or 
subjectivist theory is an aversion to what they perceive to be the altemative. If value judgements are 
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cognitive ascriptions of value properties to objects, as realism asserts, and therefore there exist value 
facts, or facts which give reasons, then we appear to have the ontological oddities of value realism: to put 
it in the harshest way: "values" as entities of an undisclosed nature, which exist in the universe in an 
undisclosed way, and are perceived by creatures through an undisclosed sense, and in sorne undiscIosed 
manner motivate us to action (supply us with reasons). In other words not the products of philosophy but 
of mythology, which provide us not with an explanation, but with a mystification. Furthermore those 
defending anti-foundationalist intuitions like myself wiil perceive in such "values" the denial of 
relativity and conditionality of value to the perspectives and interests of subjects, something we are 
concemed to defend and preserve. 
Therefore "anti-realisrn": the rejection of the existence of any such thing as an ··objective 
value". But this stance is mistaken. Belief in the reality of value does not commit one to any of the 
foundationalist theses sketched aboye. 1sn't it absurd, however, to suggest that anti-realisrn ought to give 
up the claim that there is no real value? What remains of ··anti-realism", once the denial of the reality of 
value has been given up? The characteristic insight motivating anti-realists is the belief that ta1k about 
value can only be meaningful because of the interests and concems of human beings (or perhaps 
creatures relevantly similar). Value is derivative, conditional, and contingent upon such interests and 
concems: in other words, interests and concems are metaphysically prior to value. 
The most debated issue here has been the ontological one of whether values exisí. But values 
have passed over into the realm of bonafide entities or qualities overly fast, and the real issue has been 
Iargely overlooked. This issue is metaphysical, not ontologicaI: it concems what values are, not whether 
such things existo Clearly, the metaphysical question deserves prior consideration - to argue over 
whether sorne sort of thing exists is premature when we haven't even determined what sort of thing we 
are talking about. Anti-realism is guilty ofthe same fault as realism: it has assumed that the nature ofthe 
object of discussion was settled. 1 wilI provide a theory of value that gives a metaphysical account of the 
nature of values, showing thern to be metaphysically posterior in existence and nature to interests. 
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In shoI4 my thesis is that values are a certain species of relational property holding between 
interests and things. 1 will further articulate and defend this claim in chapter 3. My present purpose is to 
provide support for the claim that anti-foundationalists should abandon the stances of noncognitivism. 
subjectivism and anti-realism. Given such a metaphysical account of value, there seem to be no good 
reasons left for advocating these positions. That there really are relations between interests and objects 
appears trivially true - 1 fail to see any reason why one would choose to be an "anti-realist" in relation to 
these. Such an account of the nature of value also should dispel worries arising from the anti-
foundationalist intuitions of anti-realists, which 1 have suggested to be another major motivation behind 
these stances. ConsequentIy, there seem to be no good reasons for favouring noncognitivism over 
cognitivism, and since there is a strong prima jade case in favour of cognitivism, this should be 
sufficient to demonstrate that we should adopt cognitivism, if an appropriately sophisticated 
metaphysical account of value can be found. 
Is it then the case that a number of philosophical controversies will simply dissolve, if my 
analysis is correct, leaving the protagonists with nothing left to fight about? Could it result in metaethical 
armistice? This utopian anticipation is undoubtedly misguided. There is a real issue here, between the 
proponents ofrival kinds ofmetaphysical analysis ofvalue. On the one hand there are positions that, like 
mine, analyze value as being posterior to interest, and on the other hand, there are positions that analyze 
it as being prior to interest. The latter is the stance of the foundationalist, and the former that of the anti-
foundationalist. The agenda for this dissertation, therefore, is to argue the anti-foundationalist case. In 
brief, my argument will be that only the anti-foundationalist account of the nature of value can make 
seos e of the reason-giving character or normativity of value. In other words, only a metaphysical analysis 
of value similar to mine can explain why value matters. The conclusion of this chapter, however, is that 
the anti-realists - both noncognitivists and subjectivists - should give up their anti-realism, and attempt 
rather to see whether it is possible to articulate and successfully defend a theory of value that is both 
cognitivist and realist while rejecting foundationalism, the claim that there are objective facts which are 
intrinsically reason-giving independentIy of persoos' interests. 
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2. METAPHYSICS OF V ALUE: A SURVEY 
1 have suggested we provisiona1ly reject anti-realism (subjectivism and noncognitivism) - until 
we have sought to see whether a realist theory can fit with a1l the phenomena. and accommodate all the 
anti-realist insights. Value realist stances, 1 argued, are often manifestations of a particular 
foundationalist agenda in ethical theory, and the postulation of objective value properties is seen by most 
realists and anti-realists as a gambit in pursuit of an objective, interest-transcendent authority for 
practical judgements. These properties give us a set of fixed stars by which we can navigate our lives and 
judge others with objective justification. not contingent upon our own subjective prejudices. It is this 
aspect of value realism that particularly motivates anti-realism, which is seen as the solution for 
defending anti -foundationalisro. 
Indeed. realism in ethics is sometimes defmed as the position that there are normative standards 
with practical significance for individuals independent of their actual interests and motivations. 1 This 
equates realism with foundationalisro. By value realism 1 however mean only the doctrine that value is 
something real and objective in the world. 1 have argued that the theoretical space exists for a theory of 
value that is both metaphysicalIy realist and anti-foundationalist.2 Value exists as an objective property 
of objects, but nonetheless it cannot be appealed to as a guide or judge transcending any and alI interests 
and motivations we possess. 
In the next chapter 1 provide such a theory and defend it as both the correct way to interpret our 
language of value and a non-problematic metaphysics of value properties. First. however, 1 must survey 
and critically evaluate the main accounts of the metaphysical nature of value properties that have been 
advanced, together with the correlated accounts of the semantics of the language we use to invoke thero. 
I For example Zirnmerman 1985b: 80, Korsgaard 1996a: 35-6. 
2 By "real and objective" 1 mean having a nature and existence that is independent of what any individuals desire, 
believe, do, etc. - a metaphysical status unaffected by whether or not creatures exist that cognize it. 
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This approach has the following threefold pay-off. Frrst. the failure of these theories enables us to 
appreciate the need to find something better. Second. it enables us to recognize the important insights of 
the various strategies. so we can accornmodate them. Tbird. it enables us to recognize the various traps 
into which theories of value can fallo so we know to avoid them. By identifying the insights and errors of 
these theories. we can generate a list of criteria that a fully satisfactory theory of value must meet. We 
can then test any hypothesis against this listo As before. the territory to be surveyed is large. and so 
critical engagement with each position must be brief. My strategy. again. is to demonstrate merely that 
other theories of value invariably get into serious difficulties. and conflict with cornmon sense. This is 
not a method of refutation. but such a measure is redundant if my own account satisfies the criteria. 
living up to al! the insights while suffering none of the difficulties of other accounts. and adding no new 
problems of its own. 1 recommend this theory primarily on the basis of the ease of its fit with the 
phenomena. 
Value realism maintains that our language of value functions by predicating objective value 
properties of objects. Many foundationalists embrace it. seeing in the notion of objective value properties 
the prospect of facts that are intrinsically reason-giving to persons independently of their interests. But. 
to return to a point from the last chapter. the notion of a "property" is very vague - it can even be 
questioned whether the extension of "property" is any narrower that the extension of "predicate". Not 
everything that can be said to be a property of an object is independent of the interests of subjects. such 
as beíng loved. If having value for x is simply a matter of being desired by x as sorne philosophers have 
claimed (Hobbes. Spinoza). then objective value properties exist. but are not independent of our 
interests. Value realism must say more than simply that value properties existo It must give a metaphysics 
of value. an account of the nature of value properties. For it to satisfy the designs of foundationalism. 
this account must depict value properties as being not posterior or dependent in essence to interests. 
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1. Naive naturalism 
Value, we might roughly say, is an object of desire, appreciation, and pursuit.3 Everything we 
desire, according to Plato, we desire as being good. Arguably everything we do is in order to attain or 
realize value. Perhaps, then, we can determine what vaIue is simply by investigating the objects of desire 
and choice. Sorne things we desire or seek as means to further ends. But sorne ends we pursue for their 
own sakes alone, and appreciate for their own intrinsic natures alone - they are the good and the 
beautiful. Perhaps we can identify value with the ultimate ends of our desiring and choice. Perhaps we 
must, for if vaIue is not what we desire for its own sake, then it seems there is something more valuable 
than vaIue - and that sounds absurdo 
Reasoning like this has guided many to identify value with sorne supposed universal or correct 
object of desire. Bentham appears to have maintained that pleasure or the cause of pleasure is goodness 
(1823: 31, 87, 102). Hedonisrn (normative, not psychological4) and eudaemonism point to our almost 
universal favour for pleasure, satisfaction, or happiness to argue that these subjective states are value, or 
altematively that value properties are the properties of pleasantness, etc. E. J. Bond, for example. argues 
that hedonic value consists in the hedonic properties of pleasantness, enjoyableness, agreeableness, etc. 
(1983: 61-2, 87).5 
Nonnative hedonisrn identifies value with certain subjective states or their causes, but this rnove 
rests on a mistake. Even if it is true that attainment of our ends brings us pleasure or satisfaction, it is 
faIse that aH our motivations are ultirnately directed at our own psychological states. "Satisfaction" is 
ambiguous, and can mean either the fulfiHment of sorne interest. or a particular subjective state 
(cornmonly brought about by the fulfillment of interests). It might be analytic that we always pursue 
3 See Lewis 1989: 113. Value is oot actually an object of desire, but a property for which we desire an object. 
4 Normative hedonism holds that we should always seek pleasure; psychological hedonism holds merely that we 
do always seek pleasure. 
5 This strategy is not absolutist. sioce the pleasantness of an experience depends as much upon our contingent 
sensibilities as upon the character of the object. but it is intended to be foundationalist, since whether an experience 
is pleasant for us is discovered or empirically deterIlÚned, Bond believes, and isn't simply a function of our desires. 
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satisfaction in the fonner sense. but it doesn't follow that we always pursue satisfaction in the latter 
hedonic sense. When a rugby player seeles to score a try, it is not the happiness of scoring the try he 
desires. but the try itself. The happiness that success brings depends upon there being such an extemally 
directed desire to be satisfied. A proponent of nonnative hedonism might point out that not all objects of 
pursuit are valuable. and claim that in fact only hedonic states are value. This is implausible. since we 
cornmonly believe desire for pleasure to be one of the lowest fonns of desire. It also undermines the 
hedonisfs case, since the strongest argument for normative hedonism proceeds from the premises that 
value is whatever we want for its own sake and that the only thing anyone wants for its own sake is 
pleasure etc. Bentham and other hedonistic utilitarians were mistaken in identifying all value with 
subjective states. Desire aims mostly at objects outside our states. and so value must be out in the 
external world too. 
Can objective value be identified with the particular objects or properties of objects that we say 
"possess" value or are valuable? 1 will term this the naive naturalist strategy.6 We have substantive 
notions of the good and of the beautifuL And while there may be plenty of disagreement. we also seem to 
have substantive agreement - between most reasonable individuals within societies. and between 
different societies - on what are the good and the beautifuL Consider. for example. that despite the 
familiar wisdom, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". social scientists teH us there is a surprising 
degree of convergence in judgements of beauty made both intra- and inter-culturally. Certain facial 
features are consistently rated as more beautiful, and by observmg such pattems. social scientists can 
identify natural, objective features that are constituents of a universal substantive conception of the 
beautifuL Symmetry is one such natural property that seems universally associated with beauty. Perhaps 
beauty is a complex physical property of objects, of which symmetry is a mark. Bond gives such an 
account of aesthetic value. identifying it with properties of gracefulness. majesty, etc. (1983: 88). Brink 
6 Narve naturalist accounts are advocated by Bentharn (1823), Putnam (1981) Bond (1983), Boyd (1988), Brink 
(1989). 
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identifies moral rightness with the production of maximal moral goodness. and moral goodness with 
qualities like fairness and respect foc persons (1989: 216), a realist strategy he shares with the "Comell 
realists" Boyd and Sturgeon, who likewise claim that moral goodness is a complex natural property for 
the sake of which we approve of those who possess it. 
The classic objection to naIve naturalism comes from Moore (1903) and Sidgwick (1907: 109). 
Indeed, Moore believes all naturalistic accounts of value (those which identify value with sorne natural 
property or properties describable in nonevaluative terms) to be vulnerable to his argumento Goodness 
cannot be identical to sorne natural property of objects because foc any naturalistic account of what 
goodness ís, we can Iegitimately enquire whether such a thing is good. This "open question" argumene 
consists of two steps. Any such question is "open" because, Moore claims, no identification of value 
with a natural property is analytically true, i.e. true in virtue of the meaning of "good" alone. Asking, for 
example, whether all things pleasant are good, is an open or nontrivial question because it is not true by 
detmition: it requires a synthetic enquiry into whether all pleasant things are good, unlike the question, 
"Are all bachelors unmarried men?" which can be answered in the affirmative on the basis of meaning 
alone. If Moore is correct there can be no reductive semantic analysis of the language of value into 
nonevaluative terms. In regard to the various versions of müve naturalism we can safely assume he is 
right - since not even the nalve naturalists deny it. 
So far we have a conclusion regarding the meaning of the language of value. This refutes naIve 
naturalist semantic accounts, such as Bentham' s (possible) identification of the concept of value with the 
concept of pleasure, and Kant's (possible) identification of the concept of (moral) value with the concept 
of accordance with duty, but it does not refute naIve naturalist metaphysical accounts, oc accounts of 
what value is, and most contemporary naIve naturalists onlyaddress the metaphysical question, steering 
7 Moore offers not so much a single argument as an argument-schema from which arguments can be fonned by 
plugging in a proposed definition. No argument is given foc the claim that all possible naturalistic definitions wiIl 
fail, so Moare really presents naturalism with a challenge he believes unmeetable rathec than an argument 
(Griffin 1992: 307). 
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clear of saying anything substantial about the meaning of value language. Their retort to Moore, in other 
words, is: what does meaning matter? 
Moore's argument is certainly directed at the metaphysical as well as the semantic question, but 
it requires a further premise to get there. The premise is that synonymy is a criterion for property 
identity: or in other words, that two expressions only stand for the same object or property in the 
cÍIcumstance that they are synonymous, like "bachelor" and ''unmarried male". Together with the 
conclusion of the semantic part of the argument, we arrive at the further conclusion that the openness of 
Moore' s question in any case demonstrates the non-identity of the property of goodness with the 
proposed natural property. Unfortunately for Moore's argument, however, this additional premise has 
been shown to be quite implausible, as it denies the possibility of synthetic property identity (Kripke, 
Putnam 1981) and thus the possibility of any substantial scientific discoveries about familiar substances. 
H20 (the ionic compound ofhydrogen and oxygen gases) is the same stuffwe call "water", but it is false 
that this composition has always been part of the meaning of "water". Other paradigms are temperature, 
as mean molecular kinetic energy, and light, as electromagnetic radiation. 
Moore's argument proves too mucho The non-synonymy of concepts does not entail the non-
identity of corresponding properties. Thus recently naive naturalism and other forros of realism have 
thrived on the idea that certain naturalistic properties are synthetically identical with value properties 
(Putnam 1981, Railton 1986b, Boyd 1988, Brink 1989) - that a satisfactory theory of value might be 
yielded by synthetic enquiry. The failure of Moore's argument does not, however, entail that there is 
such synthetic identity to be found in the case of value. 1 believe that this direction of investigation is a 
red herring in value theory, which errs by excessive neglect of the semantics of value. 
There are sorne differences between value and the cases of water, heat, light, etc. The latter are 
natural substances or properties that can be investigated byempírical scientific research. Value is not a 
physical "stuff' in this way. One might object: so what? It is true that synthetic research into value 
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cannot proceed in the same way as research into the constitution of water, heat and light. but one has to 
assume that the only kind of synthetic research is that conducted by the physical sciences in order to 
accept that research could not reveal hitherto unknown facts about value. But unlike water, heat. and 
light, in the case of value a large part of the problem consists in the fact that we can't explain exactly 
what it is we are talking about. We can noncontroversially identify paradigm instances of water or heat 
or light. But we're not sure what "value" is. (We can, of course, identify paradigm instances ofwhat has 
value or is valuable, but this is a different matter). We can give the pre-theoretic meaning of "water" 
(simplistically, a clear liquid with a certain recognizable and ostensively demonstrable taste), but none of 
the nonreductive naIve naturalists believe they know the pre-theoretic meaning of "value". 
Is this a problem? The naIve naturalists do not think so. Synthetic enquiry is necessary, they 
claim, because the ordinary concept of "value" is so confused that it cannot be easily or productively 
analyzed. There are two problems 1 wish to emphasize with this stance. First, we have no reason to 
suppose the ordinary concept of value is confused except for philosophers' failure to analyze it. But such 
failure might reflect on the philosopher rather than the concepto We have good reasons to suppose that 
the philosophers are implicated, not the concept - for we have not been furnished with any reasons for 
getting rid of the concepto nor have any purified concepts been offered that would be more serviceable. 
"Value" seems to perform perfectly well for our everyday communicative needs. which suggests its 
meaning is sufficiently coherent. 
Second. even synthetic enquiry depends upon rneaning. Synthetic accounts of particular 
properties still have sorne obligations to the meaning of the concepts in question. To be able to say that 
value is the natural property Z one has to know that when people talk about "value" they are in fact 
talking about the same thing that one would be talking about when taIking about the property Z - and 
what people are talking about is determined by the meaning (or classification-criteria) of the Ianguage 
they use. The meaning of "value" rnust guide synthetic investigations ioto what value really is, or else 
47 
the investigator is simply coining a new meaning for ·"value" and speaking bis own private language. 
Why would this be a problem? Because philosopbical accounts of value are supposed to be motivated by 
and connect with our ordinary concems and puzzles about value - it won't do for the philosopher to set 
off and talk about something else. Specifications of the natural constitution of value, therefore, must 
allow for substantial tracking ofthe application ofthe concept ·<Value". We shall see that there are strong 
reasons to suppose naIve naturalism fails to accomplish this. 
Since the meaning of the ordinary concept of value has yet to be identified, mightn't it be the 
case that it itself - rather than synthetic investigadon - \Vill tell us what value is? Both analytic and 
synthetic investigations are concemed with what an object is - but the dynamics of the enquiries differ. 
Synthetic investigation aims to discover facts about the object that are outside the epistemic access of 
ordinary users of the concepto But philosophical accounts of the nature of value aim rather at clarifying 
what it is we are distinguishing by our value-classifications and the critería by which we do so, and do 
not purport to tell us anything not already available to us about when something is valuable and when it 
is not: they aim to teH us, in effect, what we implicitly already know. This is consonant with analytic and 
not with synthetic investigation.8 
Regardless of whether naIve naturalist accounts aim at providing an analytic or synthetic 
account of what value is, we can demonstrate that they significantly fail to track applications of value 
language, which constitutes an objection even if their accounts are supposed to be synthetic. First, there 
is an problem offragmentation. NaIve naturalism identifies value as the various objects, properties, and 
qualities tbat we desire, admire, pursue etc. But these properties - the valuable properties of objects - are 
very diverse, including the hedonic quality of pleasantness, the aestbetic quality of symmetry, and the 
moral quality of altruism. But in virtue of what do all these qualities count as value? None of the natural 
8 See for example an objection Sarah Stroud makes to Gilbert Harman's claim not to be concemed about what 
our ordinary valuejudgements mean (Harman & Thomson 1996: 4). Stroud (1998: 191) points out that Harman's 
concem that his account not conflict with our linguistic practices gives the líe to this representation. 
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properties for which we desire, admire etc. an object are common to a1l objects that we deem good. No 
such natural property, then, can be the common property of value that a1l these objects possess, the 
property in virtue of which they are a1l "valuable". 
Perhaps it is a mistake to seek unity in the property of value? On different occasions "good" 
signifies different things (V on Wright 1963, Prior 1949). Even if there is sorne variability in the meaning 
of "good" and other value terms, however, it cannot plausibly accommodate the limitless number of 
properties that néÜve naturalism suggests. NéÜve naturalists, for example, have ofien been concemed only 
with the property of moral goodness, and have identified it with certain virtuous traits. But "good" is the 
same word with the same rr:.eaning in moral and non-moral contexts, and such identifications fail to 
identify the property of value that covers moral and nonmoral circumstances. Our value terms have 
cornmon, unified meanings - but the objects to which we apply them, the properties of which néÜve 
naturalists attempt to identify synthetica1ly as value, demonstrate no such commonality. Given the na'ive 
naturalist' s separation of meaning and metaphysics, however, is this so significant? Yes: our synthetic 
investigations have to begin by looking at that class of objects or properties that are picked out by the 
meaning of the terms. Value differs from water, frre, and heat etc. in this matter. There is little dispute 
over which substances are water, frre, etc. One need only point and the investigator can get to work. 
Someone whose judgements concerning which substances were water wildly differed from those of 
everyone else has to be taken not to have the same concept of water that other people do, since meaning 
is constituted by the application-criteria: Le. the set of conditions that competent speakers of the 
language recognize as warrant for using the term. Competent users of value Ianguage, however, can 
differ greatly in their ascriptions of value. We do not thereby suppose that they fail to understand the 
meaning of "good" and "valuable", and accordingly it follows that we do not suppose the meaning of 
"good" to involve the natural properties on the basis of which we judge something to be good. 
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Even if it is true that, for example, alI humans substantialIy concur in their judgements 
concerning what type of face is beautiful, we cannot identify the concept of '1Jeautiful", or the property 
of having beauty, with the complex natural property that we happen to concur in considering necessary 
and sufficient for possessing beauty. If we were to encounter an outsider - perhaps an alien - who 
understood our Ianguage, but had very different aesthetic sentirnents, there is no inconsistency in 
imagining them to say of sornething twisted, asymmetrical, and gnarled, "1 find this beautiful". If 
"beautiful" simply represents a certain cornplex natural property of objects incorporating symmetry, then 
we would have to conclude that the outsider did not understand our Ianguage. We should reply, ''No, no, 
you don't understand. Beauty is the property exernplified by this face" (providing an example). But this 
is cIearly absurdo There is no mistake of meaning made by the outsider whose aesthetic taste is radicalIy 
different from our own. Accordingly the rneaning of ''beautiful'' cannot be exhausted by specification of 
the natural properties that we consider to be beautifuI, even if we alI happen to agree in such a 
judgement. As Moore put it, any such judgernent presents us with an open question that we cannot 
answer by rneaning alone. 
What is it that naIve naturalisrn is missing? The fragmentation problern shows that our concept 
of value has a unity that is lacked by the properties naIve naturalism suggests are syntheticalIy identical 
with it. This is the element of normativity (rnerit or practical significance). Indeed, crude subjectivism 
(Robbes, Spinoza) and noncognitivisrn have an insight that we should seek to preserve against the naIve 
naturalists: the only element even approximating commonality in judgements of value appears to be the 
presence of sorne interest in or attitude toward the object. To say sornething is good is, roughly speaking, 
to express one' s liking or approval of it. But the naIve naturalistic identification of value with properties 
we like or approve of strips value of this meaning. Nalve naturalisrn removes the value frorn value. If 
value terms simply pick out certain natural features, then there is no internal normativity in the use of the 
language of value or in value itself. If, when we calI sornething good, we are simply referring to sorne 
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natural property of the object that we can identify as "goodness", then the language of vaIue comes to be 
only externally related with practicaI reason, deliberation, and ethics. "Yes," we might say, "1 can see 
that this object is best. So what? Why should 1 choose it?" But as 1 said in the previous chapter, the 
significance of vaIue is that it is supposed to be intrinsically reason-giving. Recognition of vaIue has a 
non-accidental, even if defeasible, connection with motivation and justification. 
These problems of naIve naturalism are symptoms of a basic error that can now be identified. 
Note that naIve naturalism clashes with our locutions concerning vaIue. \Ve don't say that symmetry is 
value, or that kindness is vaIue, or that pleasantness and happiness are vaIue. Rather, we say that 
symmetry has (aesthetic) value, kindness has (moral) value, and pleasantness has (hedonic) vaIue. We 
state that they possess value; that vaIue is a property they have. These natural properties, therefore, are 
not vaIue; rather, they are valuable - just as a red ball, a green hat, and a purple dinosaur are not colour, 
but are coloured.9 A significant ambiguity plays a central role in the argument that brought us to consider 
naIve naturalism. The substantive "good", which we can also call "goodness", is ofien used not for the 
property of being good, but for those things that possess the property of being good, or those quaIities in 
virtue of the presence of which objects possess the property of being good - in the same way as talle 
about rny "happiness" can be talle about not my subjective states but rather those things that make me 
happy. Likewise, the substantive "beautiful", which we can also call ''beauty'', is ofien used not for the 
property of being beautiful, but for those things that pos ses s the property of being beautiful, or those 
qualities that make beautiful. 10 On the basis of this equivocation, naive naturalism has confused the 
property ofbeing valuable or having vaIue with the properties that are valuable or that make valuable. 
9 The paraUel between "colour"/ "coloured" and ''value''/ "valuable" is obscured by the response-dependent 
construction of "valuable" (Le. its etymological connection with the verb to value). 1 interpret ''valuable'', 
however, simply as meaning "having value", an interpretation defended in Appendix A. 
10 Greek lends itself to such equivocations even more easily: "The white" in Greek, for example, can mean either 
the colour white, or a thing of that colour. Ancient philosophy is testimony to the confusion that can resulto 
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Moore's argument may have failed, but he was nonetbeless rigbt in opposition to naIve 
naturalisrn (l maintain it is tbe first part of Moore' s argument, not tbe second part, tbat fails 
significantly). The assumption tbat synonymy is a necessary condition for property identity is false, but 
tbis doesn't entail tbat synonymy is not a condition for property identity in tbe case of value. We have 
seen reasons to think: Moore' s test appropriate in tbis case. 
2. Non-naturalism 
If value cannot be identified witb any natural objects or properties tbat are tbe objects of our 
interests. what is it? It seems to be sornething objective, sometbing we perceive or cognize, and yet it 
seems distinct from any of tbe natural properties of tbe objects in which we discem it. Furtbermore, it is 
intrinsically normative or reason-giving, which seems completely at odds witb mere natural facts. 
Perhaps, tben, value is something irreducible to natural properties, and indefinable in natural terms. 
Value must tben be a separate. metaphysically independent category of reality, existing alongside 
natural. physical reality. According to the realist strategy 1 will call non-naturalism value terms represent 
these value qualities.11 Non-naturalisrn is a foundationalist strategy: value is metaphysically independent 
of our interests, but is nonetheless intrinsically reason-giving, and we should guide our interests 
according to our cognitions of it. It is an objective, factual foundation for practical judgements - indeed, 
Moore insists tbat value exists even in tbe absence of any beings for whom it could matter. 
We need clarification of the concepts of tbe "natural" and "non-natural". Sorne advocates of 
"non-naturalist" axiological tbeories object to Moore's classification tbat on tbe "non-naturalist" view, 
value properties are just as natural as physical or chemical properties. Certainly, no one is claiming tbat 
value properties are supematural, or unnatural (artificial). The classification is devised with a bias 
11 This conclusion was embraced early in the twentieth century by Moore (1903) and Russell. and by Max Scheler 
and Nicolai Harnnann building on work by Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong. More recently non-naturalism has 
been espoused by 1. N. Findlay and Frithjof Bergmann. 
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toward non-value properties. We should acknowledge this, although for convenience and continuity 1 
will discuss these issues in terms of the naturaJ/non-natural cIassification. The non-naturalist position 
should be understood simply as the claim that value properties are irreducible and indefinable except 
into other value properties and by other value terms - they cannot be explicated by the concepts of 
physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc., being a metaphysically basic and separate part of reality. 
While non-naturalism may avoid all the problems of naIve naturalism, it is very much a matter 
of evacuating the frying pan for the fue. It is the non-naturalist version of value realism that is foremost 
in the minds of those driven to opt for anti-realism. The complete rejection of value properties is 
commonIy seen as preferable to non-naturalism. It is not the onIy altemative, but we shouId surnmarize 
the problems that make non-naturalism so problematic. 
First, there are considerations that constitute what Mackie (1977) christened the "argument from 
queemess". Non-naturalism fumishes the world with a whole domain of entities or qualities outside 
those recognized by science. The reason they are not recognized by science is that, fust, they are not 
perceivable directly by our senses - they aren't visible, audible, or tangible in any other way our senses 
detecto But second, they also don't causally interact with any properties or objects that are detectable by 
the senses. Accordingly, the charge of queemess crosses over from ontology to epistemology. We don't 
perceive or cognize value properties through our standard senses, but since they are elements of the 
external world, we must have sorne form of access to them. Hence, non-naturalism postulates a special 
faculty of "intuition". This might be an intellectual intuition or cognition, or it might be an emotional 
intuition, as in the theory of Max Scheler (1966), for whom emotions are intentional states that take 
value-essences as objects. There is additionally an argument from queemess against the motivational and 
normative claims of non-naturalismo Cognition of these value properties is alleged somehow to give us 
reasons for certain attitudes and actions, and motivate us accordingly. But this is particularly where the 
query, "What does value matterT becomes appropriate. We have many different desires, and care about 
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many different things. Why shouId we - why would we - pay any attention to these non-natural 
properties? 
The charge of queemess is threefold: ontologicaI, epistemologicaI, and motivationaI. 
PhilosophicaI treatments of non-naturalism ofien go no further than asserting the strangeness of these 
doctrines as an argument against them. But this is dogmatic. Others argue there are no grounds for 
rejecting these properties if they play an important role in our body of belief and practice. and that non-
naturaIism requires no additionaI "faculties" as charged (Brink 1989: 109-113. Hampton 1998: ch. 1). 
More needs to be said to justify the rejection of non-naturaIism on the charge of queemess. 
The essence of the problem with non-natural vaIue properties is this: They are said to be 
completely independent in existence and essence from anything subjective. But their characterization is 
in terms of their effects on or significance to subjects: their action-guidingness oc normativity. 
Accordingly, non-naturalism has not yet toId us anything about what these properties are. And the non-
naturalists have nothing further to tell us - because, they cIaim, nothing more can be said with 
descriptive. non-evaIuative language. We have no way of describing vaIue properties except as 
"properties" or "quaIities". But as aIready observed, this is too vague to mean anything. The non-
naturalist explanation of vaIue is therefore no explanation at all- it malees vaIue an occult quality. 
These observations constitute an objection because the queemess seems gratuitous. It seems we 
understand our statements of vaIue perfectly welI without positing the existence of such a domain of 
properties or entities, it seems we can recognize vaIue perfectly well without such cognition or 
perception, and it seems our reasons and motivations can be explained perfectly weIl without such 
dispositions. Non-naturalism explains something familiar and everyday by appeaI to things utterly 
foreign and strange, which is to say that it fails to explain at all. Utterances about vaIue are an absolutely 
central and ordinary part of life, and so theories of vaIue must meet a constraint of anaIyzing vaIue in a 
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way that demonstrates it to be perspicuous in its nature to US (ontologically/metaphysically. 
epistemologically. normatively). Non-naturalism violates this constraint. 
In contrast to non-naturalism, naIve naturalism possesses a number of virtues. It places value in 
objects as recognizably natural properties they possess. thereby avoiding ontological and epistemological 
oddity; and it recognizes we desire and pursue objects for their natural properties, thereby avoiding 
normative and psychological oddity. Non-natural properties are redundant and unnecessary. It is 
problematic for non-naturalism that we make value judgements about objects on the basis of their 
natural, or non-value properties alone. It is enough to know that an action is performed with the sole 
intention of inflicting pain for me to judge that the action is morally bad. 1 need not experience or discem 
anything additional called '<Yalue" in order to know how to judge. This consequentiaI aspect of value is 
ofien discussed under the rubric of "supervenience". V alue properties, it is claimed, supervene on natural 
properties. This move represents an attempt on the part of the realist to preserve the doctrine of objective 
value properties in light of the difficulty we are exarnining, which lends primafacie plausibility to anti-
realist interpretations. If the predication of value is not an additional element in the description of the 
object, then perhaps we ought to thiok: it is just an expression or description of attitude toward the object 
on the basis of the described natural features. as the noncognitivist urges. The thesis of supervenience 
states that value properties. while rnetaphysically real and irreducible to natural properties, are 
undivorcably lioked to certain natural properties. The appropriateness of this rnove is controversial, and 1 
will not atternpt to evaluate it here. 12 The paint is simply that we do not need to discem sorne irreducible 
non-natural value property in order to rnake value judgernents. and that as naIve naturalism recognizes, 
things are said to possess value on the basis of their natural or non-axiological properties. 
12 B lackburn pro vides an effecti ve critique of this use of supervenience in bis 1985b. 
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3. Sophisticated naturalism 
1 have rejected the suggestion that value properties are the natural properties that are the objects 
of our interests. and 1 have rejected the suggestion that value properties are non-natural properties. Must 
we concIude that value properties do not exist? 1 have given the game away by labelling the naturalism 
already considered "naIven • There is a more sophisticated fonn of naturalism that identifies value 
properties with natural properties other than those in virtue of which objects possess value. But at this 
point it is appropriate to reflect on a serious difficulty facing naturalistic realism in general. which might 
lead us to conclude that only an anti-realist analysis is acceptable. Simon Blackbum puts it as follows: 
The reason expressivism in ethics has to be correct is that if we suppose that belief, denial, and so 
on were simply discussions of the way the world is. we would still face the open question ... [of] 
what importance to give it. what to do. etc. For we have no conception of a 'truth condition' or 
fact of which mere apprehension by itself determines practical issues. (1996: 70. See also Gibbard 
1990:3~) 
Oue treatment has given us cause to take Blackbum's objection seriously. Value has an intrinsic 
connection with motivation. but it appears implausible that natural facts are intrinsically connected with 
motivation. We must accept sorne measure of intemalism about the relation of the language of value to 
motivation. To recognize something has value is. at least paradigmatically, to experience it as justifying. 
and hence to be motivated accordingly. 
Intemalism is however controversial. and faces significant extemalist opposition (e.g. Putnam 
1981. Brink 1989. Hampton 1998). The possibility of amoralism and akrasia (weakness of will) 
demonstrate that the link between cognition of value and motivation is not essential - it is defeasible. 1 
will not attempt to solve any of these problerns at this point. but we can observe that there are both 
intemalist and extemalist points that seem sound. Extemalism is much more plausible in regard to moral 
value than it is to value in general. and since oue concern is the wider one. we must note that value is 
more essentially tied to motivation and reasons for action than other kinds of objective property -
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something reveaIed in the evident oddity of the question. 'What does vaIue matterT Even in the case of 
morality. however. there is something peculiar about a full-blown externalism like one finds in David 
Brink. "Justice" might be a natural property with only external connections with motivation. as he 
claims. but "rightness" or "goodness" cannot be only externally connected with motivation. 
Does this observation require anti-realism about value properties, and noncognitivism about 
value language, as Blackburn believes? It only appears so if we assume that objectivity and subjectivity 
are mutually exclusive domains. If subjectivity infiltrates objective facts. then it remains possible that 
there might be an intrinsic link between motivation on the one hand and objective fact on the other. This 
is the theoreticaI space in which a successful reaIism might be forged. and it is within these confines that 
my own account is located. However, we must first consider other important ventures in this direction. 
John McDowell has advanced an influentiaI theory of this kind. Diagnosing an error stemming 
from the eighteenth century, the divorcing of cognition and conation, he urges that our comprehension 
and experience of objectivity cannot be detached from our subjectivity, and that facts are importantly 
conditioned by the constitution of subjects. The paradigm here is the concept of secondary qualities, 
particularly colour. The coocept of secondary qualities. as received frOID Joho Locke, is of intrinsic, 
"natural" (in Moore's parlance) qualities of objects that have a certain effect 00 certain kinds of 
subjective sensibility (pertinently, human sensibility). Locke calls this effect the "impression" or "idea" 
of the quality, and distinguishes it from the quality itself. The redness we experieoce is a "secondary 
existeoce" in the miod, caused by and representing though not identical to the quality in the object 
Although the quality itself is independent both in eXÍstence and essence from our sensibility, it is 
identified and classified according to the impression it produces in standard human sensibility. To be 
green is to possess the quality that produces in a standard human sensibility (read de re) the impression 
or idea of greenness. 
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McDowell (1985) and Wiggins (1976) suggest that value might be like secondary qualities. We 
might be talking about objective, natural properties "humanIy signified" - Le. classified in terms of 
effects on our sensibility. Talle about these properties is onIy made possible and meaningful by 
subjective sensibilities, but is nonetheless about objective, intrinsic features of the world. Note that the 
secondary quality model is a foundationalist realist strategy. Value properties exist independently of 
subjective human interests, and are merely specified and categorized by means of their relation to our 
sensibilities. In the same way that it is simply wrong to claim pandas are green and yellow, rather than 
black and white, it is simply wrong to claim sunsets are ugly, or factories are beautiful. 
It might be supposed that the secondary quality model has room for the possibility of reIativism, 
since sensibilities can differ, and the same quality in objects can have different effects in different 
people. Secondary qualities per se do not display such relativism, because they are specified by reference 
to a normal condition. Need this be the case with value? There are strong reasons to suppose so. 
Secondary quality terms supposedly stand for particular intrinsic qualities of objects. and are merely 
identified according to the effect they have upon the sensibility. But, accepting that we leam the meaning 
of words by "ostensive definition" - by observing how they are applied, and also that the effects on 
sensibility are private and cannot be demonstrated. terms of these types can on1y form part of a real 
language - Le. a medium of communication - on the basis of the objects to which they are applied. Thus, 
if you experience the quale 1 consider redness when you view objects that 1 call "green", and the quale 1 
consider greenness when you view objects that 1 call "red", we will stiU concur in calling the same 
objects red and green, regardless of their actual effect on our sensibilities. We have no way short of 
(perhaps) neuroscience to determine whether these objects present us with identical experiences, and 
thus whether the impressions that lead us to attribute red or green colouration are common between uso 
There are important disanalogies between value and secondary qualities. First, secondary 
qualities are not intrinsically reason-giving, so the analogy doesn't offer any explanation of how facts, 
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even if identified by means of their interaction with human sensibilities, can be rnotivating and perceived 
as justifying. The strategy ofMcDowell and Wiggins as it stands does not meet Blackburn's challenge of 
accounting for the practical significance of value. Second, value is not a direct object of perception of 
any of our senses, unlike heat, colour, sound, etc. - as non-naturalism recognizes. There is no "value-
qualia" we discem in objects. This threatens the plausibility of the suggestion that the explanation for 
our experiences of value lies in the nature of our sensibility. Third, such properties ultimately look no 
less rnysterious and strange than non-natural properties: like non-naturalism, the secondary quality rnodel 
rnust hold that there is sorne intrinsic natural property that all good things have in cornmon, in virtue of 
which we judge thern to be good. 1 have already remarked on the implausibility of this suggestion. Value, 
it appears, is not a secondary quality, and not alike enough to secondary qualities for the analogy to 
suffice as an explanation of their nature. But in general, the strategy of blurring the distinction between 
world (objective) and creature (subjective) is on the right track, as we shall see. 
4. A list of criteria 
1 have surveyed sorne noteworthy theories of value and found thern all lacking. By reflecting on 
the various ways in which these alternatives have appealed and have fallen short, we can generate a list 
of criteria that we can expect a cornpletely satisfactory theory to rneet. 
(1) Cognitivism. The problems faced by noncognitivism illuminate the insight of all cognitivist 
theories that taIk about value consists in the intellectual ascription of properties of sorne sort, and that 
value judgernents express beliefs about the distribution of these properties, not rnerely attitudes. 
(2) Objectivism. Examination of subjectivism revealed that any account analyzing the language 
of value as about subjects - singular or plural, real or hypothetical - is inadequate, and that value talk 
must be interpreted as abaut properties of objects. Value judgements express propositions about the 
character of the object, not the character of subjects. 
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(3) Consequentialism. NaIve naturalism provides one important insight: value properties are 
ascribed to objects on the basis of natural properties they possess. One accordingly attends to the value 
of an object by attending to its natural properties. Subjectivism and non-naturalism both fall afoul of this 
constraint. 
(4) Moore's attack on naIve naturalism reveals a crucial naturalistic error. The properties of 
value, of being valuable, cannot be identified with the properties that are valuable, or that make 
something valuable. The value of an object therefore cannot be any combination of the natural properties 
in virtue of which we consider that object valuable. 
(5) Non-mysteriousness. The excesses of non-naturalism remind us that pre-reflectively we have 
no problem understanding what value is. A correct account therefore cannot appeal to queer entities, 
faculties, or motivational propensities. A satisfactory theory of value must sit comfortably in our 
comprehension of our selves, our evaluative practices, and our environment, and it must provide an 
explanation rather than a mystification of value. 
(6) lntemalism. From anti-realism (subjectivism and noncognitivism) we shouId recognize the 
insight that statements about value have a non-accidental relation with motivation, justification, and 
attitude. Under normal conditions, to recognize something has value is to recognize the existence of 
reasons for oneself concerning it. To state something has value is (loosely speaking) to express approval 
or endorsement of it. This is the "intemalism" constraint on theories of value. We have seen it cause 
problems for néÜve naturalism. non-naturalism. and the secondary quality model, and so Blackbum 
identifies it as the basic reason only an anti-realist and noncognitivist theory can succeed. 
(7) Extemalism. Externalist rejoinders to intemalism indicate that the connection between 
cognition of vaIue and motivation, even if non-accidental and normal, is defeasible. A satisfactory theory 
of vaIue must accornmodate the facts that lend credence to externalism. Noncognitivism especially 
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struggles here. A fully satisfactory theory of value. in other words. must explain as consistent the facts 
that motivate both intemalist and extemalist positions. 
Can any theory satisfy a1l these constraints. and do so without giving us cause to add more to our 
list? Most philosophers have thought not - witness for example Moore's and Blackbum's challenges. 
They therefore advocate their favoured positions not as being self-evidently correct. but as the least 
unsatisfactory. 1 believe they are wrong. and now 1 must prove it. 
5. Relational theones 01 value 
Most of the theorles we have considered analyze value as an intrinsic and monadic property of 
objects. By "intrinsic and monadic" 1 mean that objects pos ses s these properties solely in virtue of their 
own natures. without reference to anything eIse. Nai:ve naturalism identifies value with the properties of 
objects for which we desire them. non-naturalism identifies value with metaphysica1ly basic. irreducible 
value properties. and the secondary quality model suggests identifying value with "primary" qualities of 
objects that are merely cIassified by their effects on sensibility. With a1l these strategies Blackbum's 
chaIlenge seems unmeetable. If there is such a thing as "value". it must have an internaI connection with 
motivation and nonnativity. but it seems impossible to plausibly explain how monadic and intrinsic 
properties of objects can have such a necessary connection with om conative nature. 
An aIternative view is that value is a genus of relational properties. Relations are dyadic or 
polyadic. rather than monadic. While relationaI facts are objective facts about objects. (extrinsic) 
relationaI properties cannot be pos ses sed by objects solely in virtue of their own nature. and cannot be 
comprehended except from a perspective encompassing not only the nature of the object. but aIso the 
nature of other things that relate to it. 1 advocate a relational theory of value. 1 am not the frrst to do so: 
relationalism is a familiar option offered by a survey of twentieth century axiological theory. Ralph 
Barton Perry (1926) and John Dewey (1939: 5) were two prominent proponents ofrelational theorles of 
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value in the early part of the century. and my position. although not inspired by them, stands in this 
tradition. 13 However. earlier versions of relationalism suffer many problems. and toclay it is ofien treated 
disdainfully, not considered a real option. The arena is dominated by hypothetical subjectivism (Smith. 
Lewis), noncognitivism (Blackbum, Gibbard), naIve naturallsm (Brink. Sturgeon. Boyd) and the 
secondary quality model of realism (McDowell, Wiggins). 
How does a relational view fare any better against Blackbum's objection? How can a property 
have an internal connection with motivation in virtue of being relational rather than monadic? Being 
relational does not by itself solve the problem. Being older than 1 is a relational property you might 
possess, comprehensible oo1y from a perspective that encompasses both you and L We are no closer to 
recognizing any facts that are intrinsicalIy reason-giving. The pieces of the puzzle are, however, lying 
side by side in clear view. Blackbum's question: how can a mere property have an internal connection 
with rnotivation? The answer: value properties are relational, and one of the relata is, in sorne sense in 
need of further specification, our motivational seto The plausibility of such an account as a theory of 
value will need defense and argumento which the next chapter will provide. Crudely, my thesis is that 
value properties consist of relations between objects and interests. This is a form of realism, since 
relations are objectively real. It is also a form of naturalism, since the formula analyzes value properties 
solely in natural tenns. Relations between objects and our interests do have an internal connection with 
our motivational nature, and so Blackbum' s basic reason why noncognitivism must be true is not sound. 
It is not yet obvious, however, that this move will establish the realist case against anti-realism. 
Explanation is needed of how these relations connect with our interests, and naIve fonns of relationalism 
faíl to escape the force of the objection. Relationalists have typicaIly claimed, for example, that the 
relation in question is simply the relation of being desired or being the object of interest, so that 
something has value if and oo1y if it is desired or is the object of interest - for example, Perry claimed 
13 More recent relational accounts are given by Mackie (1977: Ch. 2), Ziff (1960: Ch. 6), and Railton (l986b). 
62 
that value is any object of any interest. E. E. SIeinis has recently attributed (incorrectly) such a view to 
Nietzsche, stating that "For Nietzsche, things are vaIuable because we value thero; it is valuing that 
malees things valuable!,14 The cIassic expression of this position is provided by Spinoza, who cIaimed 
against Aristotle that "in no ease do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we 
deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good. beeause we strive for it. wish for 
it.long for it. or desire it." (Ethics: ill.ix, see a1so m.xxxix) 
Against sueh a naIve relationalism, Blaekbum's point must be upheld. Despite the internal 
eonnection to our interests, sueh vaIue properties fail the internalism requirement. For vaIue is supposed 
to give us reasons for attitude and choice - as Aristotle c1aimed. we desire things because we believe 
them good. But the mere fact that we desire something gives us no reasons to desire it. It does not teIl us 
what we should desire or choose. The noncognitivist can therefore continue to maintain that. although it 
might be true there can be internal eonneetions between facts about objects or properties of objects and 
om interests. no faet - even of this nature - ean be intrinsieaIly reason-giving. To refute him, we will 
have to provide a detailed aeeount of a relational theory that does meet the internalism criterion. as weIl 
as a11 the other eriteria we derived from our survey. and that does not do this at sorne other unpalatable 
expense. 
14 Nietzsclle's Revaluation ofValues: A Study in Strategies, p. 1. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994). 
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3. TIIE INTEREST-RELATIONAL TlIEORY OF VALUE 
1. An analysis 01 value 
1 will begin my account of the nature of value by examining sorne mundane examples, to see 
what analysis best captures them. On this basis we can make a provisional hypothesis conceming the 
nature of value in general, and then proceed to test this against a variety of cases and objections. 
Consider this unexceptional speech act concerning value: "Is this car any good?" So far, how much do 
we understand? The noncognitivist can say something relatively substantial: the speaker is enquiring 
whether the other will commend the car or noto About all the cognitivist can say is that the speaker is 
enquiring about whether the car pos ses ses the property of goodness. This however is very peculiar 
and quite uninformative - any perception otherwise is mistaken, as the following considerations 
reveal. 
What constitutes being a good car? Aristotle, despite knowing nothing about motor vehicles, 
offers us an answer. The goodness of any kind of object consists in its performing its function well 
(I097b25-29). Being a car is essentially a functional matter. In many cases, being an object of a 
certain kind is determined largely by function. Tables, chairs, hammers, nails, swords, and gumboots 
are all manufactured in order to perform a specific function or set of functions, and it is impossible to 
be such an object without having some such connection to those functions. Likewise, to be a car is to 
be manufactured for a specifically car-ish purpose, and typically to be used accordingly. We can 
approximate this function as transporting people on roads. The goodness of a car, according to 
Aristotle, is its being such as to perform this function welL 
There is a problem here, however - it concems what it means to perform a function "well". 
This is itself a value term, so such an account of what it is to have value is unsatisfactory, as it 
employs a value term in the explanans (thereby effectively defining "value" by appeal to "value"). We 
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can substitute other expressions for "well": perhaps, "to certain standards", "meeting certain norms", 
or "with sufficient efficiency and reliability". The problem here remains that of keeping evaluative 
terms out of the formula, since "standards", "norms", and "sufficient" are all terms that appear 
evaluative. In the view of noncognitivists this is the final word on the matter - at sorne point a simple 
fact of subjective endorsement fixes the meaning of value judgements. For Allan Gibbard (1990), for 
example, to pass a value judgement is to express endorsement of certain norms in conjunction with 
the thought that the objectjudged conforms to them. 
There is an additional problem, however, that cannot be solved simply by stating that the 
value of an object is determined by whether it meets standards one endorses for objects of that kind. 
We have been told very little about what is being asked in our example, until we have a contexto You 
may have imagined that the question is addressed by a prospective customer to a salesman in a car 
sales lot. How does the functional account of value apply in this case? The customer will be enquiring 
whether the car fulfills the function of being a car well. Let us simplistically assume this means: 
transports people on roads well. But the question can be asked in quite different contexts. Here's a 
couple: a car thief enquiring of another conceming the appropriateness of the vehicIe as their next 
target, someone looking for a vehicIe to drive in a demolition derby. Even in the car lot there is no 
limit to the number of potential contexts. The customer may be looking for a cheap car, or a fast car, 
or a safe car, or a reliable car, etc. Can we say that in every scenario, the question is about whether the 
car fulfills the function of being a car well? 
We could make our account of the function of a car more sophisticated, by building sorne of 
these other criteria into it. A car's function is then to transport people quickly, efficiently, safely, 
cornfortably, etc. - and to perform this well requires satisfactory performance in all these respects. 
But this won't work, since the criteria of value operating in each of these cases are not only diverse, 
but in many instances incompatible. To meet a certain level of speed, one has to sacrifice a certain 
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level of economy. To meet a certain level of cheapness, one has to sacrifice a certain degree of 
cornfort. To meet a certain level of ease of theft, one has to sacrifice a certain level of security against 
theft! That which qualifies as a good car for one person in one context may fail to qualify as a good 
car for another person in another context, or even for the same person in a different c~mtext. It seems 
impossible, therefore, to adequately account for a car' s being good on the basis of its performing the 
function of a car welL The problem for the Aristotelian analysis is compounded by the fact that we 
ascribe value to objects that don't seem to have a distinctive function, such as persons, events, 
colours, and days. 
What we have seen is that ascriptions of value are meaning-deficient without important 
contextual information. Given only the question, "is it a good one?" we have only a schema of 
understanding, which requires something further for full comprehension. This is characteristic of the 
language of value, but it is not the essence of value language as such. Likewise, predicates like "hot", 
"tall", "small", and "real" all draw on the context of utterance to supply important elements of their 
sense. To understand what we mean by "value" we must attain an appreciation of the way context 
supplies meaning to the use of value language: not just any contextual information affects the 
meaning of utterances about value. What element or elements in the context play this crucial role in 
the case of value? 
The right answer, it seems, is interest. In each context, the person enquiring has a specific 
interest that leads him oc her to enquire about the value of the vehic1e. The auto customer has an 
interest in rrnding on the lot and buying a car meeting certain criteria (which cannot be glossed in 
terms of "performing the function of a car weU", as they may be as diverse as cheapness, ostentation, 
reliability, efficiency, cornfort, speed, safety, etc.), and it is in the service of this pursuit that the 
evaluative question is asked. The car thief has an interest in rrnding a car to steal, meeting certain 
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criteria (perhaps ease of theft, power or speed, resale value, or the value of its contents) - and here it 
is in the service of this pursuit that the evaluative question is asked. 
Next, we rnust determine how the contextual interest helps constitute the rneaning of the 
evaluative utterance. Since a change in interest entails a change in truth conditions, and truth 
conditions are determined by meaning, the rneaning of such an ascription of value rnust be a function 
of the interest. Relative to interest, what is value? Value is (approximately) the satisfaction or 
fulfillment of interest. An object has value for an interest if it stands in a relation of being such as to 
satisfy that interest (Ziff 1960: 247, Mackie 1977: 55-6).1 Are value properties relations between 
objects and interests? This is almost right, but value is a property that objects pos ses s, and relations 
aren't properties.2 This problern is easily solved. Relations aren't properties, but they support 
relational properties. If 1 am taller than you, then a height difference relation subsists between uso 
Being shorter than me is not a relation subsisting between us, it is a relational property you (might) 
possess beca use of that relation. The proposed formula is: value is the relational property of being 
such as to satisfy sorne interest. To have value is to be such as to satisfy sorne interest. To say an 
object has (sorne) value is to say it is such as to satisfy (sorne) interest. 
This is an account of value only in the narrow sense in which it rneans goodness. ''Value'' also 
stands in philosophy for a wide range of concepts including bad. My account focuses on the property 
of goodness, but the theory by extension maintains that all value properties (including poor, excellent, 
important, wondeiful, beautiful etc.) are interest-relationaI properties of various kinds. Badness, for 
example, is the property of being such as to frustrate the satisfaction of sorne interest. This account, 
which 1 call the interest-relational theory of value, now requires articulation and defense. It has been 
1 In saying "such as to satisfy" rather than "satisfying" 1 do not add unnecessary verbiage. Here is Mackie's 
justification for the same move: "a good carving knife is still a good one if it is never used, and never even 
needed. It could still, perhaps, be said to satisfy "requirements", but these are thernselves only abstract 
requirements, abstracted from any concrete relations of requiring." Since 1 identify the "interests" invoked as 
abstractions, 1 could perhaps simplify the definition by saying simply "satisfies". 1 do not do so in order to avoid 
misunderstanding. 
2 This confusion can be seen in other relationaI accounts, such as that ofPerry (1926). 
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derived from a very small sample of value judgement. and we need to see how far it can legitimately 
be extended. 
2. Interests 
What do 1 mean by "interests"? The term is vague. broad. and dangerously ambiguous. lt is 
employed for the fust two of these characteristics - since the range of phenomena 1 seek to capture 
are equally diverse - and the third is an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of using a term 
possessing such generality. The aim is to capture the fact that every value judgement has an associated 
motivated perspective. This claim is relatively uncontroversial - even many foundationalists are 
prepared to grant it - the real dispute concems the order of explanation. whether the cognition of 
value explains the interest. or the interest explains the judgement of value (or. as McDowell and 
Wiggins argue. there is no order of priority here). 
Interests come in a variety of different types, including desires. aversions. inclinations. 
likings. concems. fears. hopes. wishes. regrets. impulses. and so on. They are those things that 
constitute what Bemard Williarns termed our "subjective motivational sets", and for which we have 
the technical terms "pro-attitude" and "con-attitude". Basically. they all consist of a content and a 
conation or motivational directedness. Conation has polarity. and is either toward the content (pro-
attitudes) or away from the content (con-attitudes). This is the element of fearing that. or hoping that. 
or desiring that. or yearning for. etc. The content is the object of the conation - that which is feared. 
or hoped for. etc. lt is typically specified as a representation of a state of affairs. and in recent 
philosophy there has been a strong current - manifested for example in Donald Davidson and Joho 
Searle - to insist that it is necessarily linguistic-conceptual in character. 1 believe this to be seriously 
mistaken. although it remains true (of course!) that we can only represent such content in discourse 
linguistically. Not only animal s and infants. but even we ourselves in much of our practicallives have 
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conations toward and away from non-linguistic contents - be they sensations, images, objects, etc. It 
is revealing in this regard that any propositional representation of the contents of many of our 
interests remains perpetualIy underdetermining of the actual content; i.e. any description of the 
content of such an interest can be revealed to be incomplete by discovering satisfiers of the 
description that fail to satisfy the interest (since "pictures tell a thousand words"). 
This account of the nature of interest reveals an important fact. Interests (or passions) are not, 
as Hume supposed, "original existences" in the mind. Rather, they have an intentional structure much 
liIce beliefs, and their objects can even be linguistic-conceptual or propositional. Belief (as 
propositional attitude) on this account is a clase cousin to interest. This justifies the reluctance with 
which many "noncognitivists" wear their label, and helps explain why Hare (1985) pushes instead for 
the label "nondescriptivist", and Gibbard and Blackbum "expressivist". Interests can be cognitive, 
even if they are not always. 
1 am not, as 1 have said, pioneering the notion of an "interest" theory of value. Ralph Barton 
Perry gives a classic exposition (1926). But interest theories are not alI created equal, and Perry's 
position is fraught with difficulties, exploited by W. D. Ross (1930). It is important to note the ways 
in which rny appeal to interests differs from others, and how it thereby avoids their problems. One 
objection is: whose interests constitute the relatum in question? It seems it will paradigmatically be 
the speaker's interests. To ascribe value is then to assert that the object is such as to satisfy one's own 
interests. But this looles as if it will suffer the same problems as subjectivism. Relational properties 
notwithstanding, ultimately such a statement is not much more than an assertion about what the object 
means to me, and lacles the objective normativity of the language of value. Also, one can observe that 
such an account makes very poor sense of the ascription of instrumental value. 1 can concede that 
forced conscription is a good way to acquire soldiers, even as 1 am unwillingly dragged away to the 
anny. The end for which the means is adopted might be contrary to my interests, but it doesn't 
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legitimate my caIling their means bad as means. In fact. in calling their chosen means good as means, 
it seems 1 am ascribing vaIue from the point of view of their interests. 1t is a good means, because it is 
such as to satisfy the interests for which it is a means. 
The phenomena force upon us the conclusion that ascription of value, generally speaking, is 
ascription of relationaI properties corresponding to some interest - not necessarily my interest, or our 
interest, etc. (perry 1926). Consideration of instrumental value then generates another objection. 
Things remain instrumentally good for some purpose even at times when such interests do not exist, 
times when nobody possesses those interests. Likewise, exponents of "intrinsic value" insist that 
objects do not shed it merely because no one happens to have a corresponding interest at that momento 
If value is a relational property. however, the non-existence of one relatum annihilates the relation, 
and thereby the relational property. You cannot have the property of being an employee if there does 
not exist another who has the property of being your employer. So it would seem that objects cannot 
be valuable in the case that there is no one whose interests they would satisfy (Dewey 1939: 37). 
Worse, it seems that objects gain and lose the property of having value according to the fluctuation of 
people's interests. This seems to be a fundamental unpalatable consequence of interest-based theories 
of value - but it is actually a consequence only of a confusion harboured by both the proponents and 
the oppcnents of such theorles. 
The formula for the nature of value properties 1 propose is void of any reference to particular 
subjects (unless a subject figures in the content of the interest): value is the relational property of 
being such as to satisfy sorne interest. Reference to subjects is only made to fIX which interests are in 
question. This might appear to be just a verbal game. All interests, it might be objected. are someone's 
interests, and reference to an interest is obliquely reference to the person whose interest it is. But if 
we look to the account aboye of what an interest is, we can observe that interests can be described 
independently of being a state anyone is actually in. They have an intentional structure that pennits us 
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to consider them as universaIs and thus multiply realizable. Interests are similar in nature to beliefs 
and thoughts, and like these, it is possible for two distinct creatures to possess the same interest. If 
you believe that the earth is displaying the symptoms of global warming, and 1 believe that the earth is 
displaying the symptoms of global warming, then you and 1 have the same belief. We can say this 
without absurdly committing ourselves to our sharing the same brain or mind. Similarly we can share 
the same interest (the fear that genetic engineering may have unforeseen negative consequences, the 
desrre that 1 start picking better illustrations, and so on). 
Do interests and beliefs, etc., only exist in the crrcumstance that someone harbours them? 
There is a sense in which this is true. Interests and beliefs are onl~stantiated in the world if there is 
someone who pos ses ses them, and in this respect it is appropriate to deny they exist otherwise. But as 
universals, they also exist abstractly. Suppose my wife and 1 both desrre that 1 take out the trash 
tonight. Do we have here two desrres or one? Two tokens of this desrre exist, we might say, but only 
one type or kind. Interests and beliefs exist as abstract kinds, and this existence does not depend on 
facts about the psychological or motivational states of any creatures. No supernatural platonic realm is 
invoked here: abstract objects exist in a different way from chairs and people (they "subsist"). 
V alue is the property of being such as to satisfy sorne interest kind.3 The connection to 
creatures, in this regard, is contingent and external. We merely inhabit interests for a time. The 
language of value is not indexed to subjects, only to interests: it is not subject-relational. Subjects 
merely help fIx which interests are in question. Hence contingent facts about the existence of 
creatures and the nature of therr motivational and psychological states have no bearing on the 
existence of value properties. Objects possess value even in the crrcumstance of the complete 
annihilation of all creatures. The music of Beethoven would still possess aesthetic value (relative to a 
certain aesthetic taste) even if all life able to appreciate it became extinct. The interest-relational 
3 Mackie (1977: 55) also invokes kinds in his definition ofvaIue, but doesn't amplify on the suggestion. 
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theory of value is therefore robustIy objective and even accommodates the kinds of pronouncement 
that G. E. Moore insists indicate that value is a monadic, irreducible and non-natural foundational 
property. This may, however, seern to have gone too faro Many anti-foundationalists feel no need to be 
able to echo Moore, an ability that may appearpurchased at too great an expense.4 
3.0bjects 
What is meant by "objects"? This too is a broad and vague term, and chosen for this reason in 
order to cover a wide domain. If rny analysis is adequate, then (1) "objects" will extend over every 
type of thing to which we can legitimately as cribe value; and (2) it will extend only over things that 
are such that they can satisfy interests. We attribute value to a vast range of things - material objects, 
people, events, states of affairs, intentions, ideas, beliefs, actions, and even interests. Sorne c1aim this 
Iast fact is a serious problern for interest-based theories of value. How can value be analyzable in 
terms of interests, when interests themselves can be evaluated? But this is no objection at all. Interests 
themselves stand in certain relations with other interests (strictly speaking, with the instantiation of 
other interests). 1 want rny daughter to want my approval. Her wanting rny approval is an interest 
(token) that satisfies this interest of mine. Her wanting my approval is an interest that has value for 
me. 
To be an "object" in this sen se is simply to be a potential intentional object or object of 
thought (or interest, or desire, etc.). Any suspicion that tbe relational formula has an excessive focus 
upon physical objects is therefore mistaken. To any contrary suspicions that talk about objects that 
aren't physical or material is dubious, 1 point out that being an object is a distinction largely conferred 
4 The majority of value-analyses falI into one of two categories: those that refer to "interests" (perry 1926, 
Mackie 1977, Railton 1986b), and those that refer to acceptance of "norms" (Rare 1952, Gibbard 1990, Copp 
1995) A brief expIanation of my endorsement of "interests" over "norms" is therefore in order. The concept of 
norms is rather unclear, and per se does not explain value. 1 "accept the norms" that 72 degrees is a normal room 
temperature, and that 5'11" is an average height for an adult maleo But such norros do not generate nonnativity 
or practical guidance. One has to have an interest or bave sorne motivational tendency connected with such 
acceptance before value is generated. 
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by the structures of thought. not the world - even in the case of material objects. What malees a yak 
one object. and not a conglomeration of severa! distinct interrelated objects? What makes a rabbit one 
object. rather than a series of temporal rabbit-slice objeets? 1 cannot delve deeply into metaphysics 
here, but 1 eonsider "objeet" to mean any instantiation of a eoneept. Objeethood is one of the 
categories by which we make sense of the world. 
Granted that events sueh as Nelson's vietory at the battle ofTrafalgar are objeets, and abstraet 
principIes such as Euelid's axioms are objects. and institutions like the catholie ehurch are objeets. 
and material things like shoe laces are objects. it may seem strange to suggest that all these types of 
objects can possess the same property. What sort of property could be possessed equally by abstraet 
objects and material objects? However, we do ascribe value to all these kinds of objects. and an 
adequate theory will accommodate this. Many realist theories fall down on this point. It is hard to 
conceive how axioms and intentions can possess properties akin to secondary qualities sueh as colour 
and heat, or how there eould be irreducible non-natural properties that are possessed both by axioms 
and kitehen knives. The solution is simple. Abstract objeets cannot possess physieal properties, or 
anything like physical properties - they can only possess abstraet properties. Value, since abstraet 
objects have it. must be an abstract property, like a relational property. There is no problem, 
furthermore, in attributing abstract properties to non-abstraet objeets. 
Are there are any limits on the kinds of objeet that can possess value? A simple argument 
demonstrates there are not. One possible interest - which you might entertain at this moment - is the 
interest in finding some object that cannot possess value in any manner. But sueh an object. if it 
existed. would be sueh as to satisfy this interest, and aeeordingly would possess value for this reason. 
This eonstitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that it is possible for there to be objects that 
possess no value whatsoever. There is a still a tension here however. Every kind of objeet can 
legitimately be ascribed value. but it is still questionable on a different level whether every kind of 
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object is such tbat it can satisfy an interest. Strictly speaking it is not my daughter' s desire for my 
approval tbat satisfies my interest in her wanting my approval. rather it is the state of affairs of her 
desiring my approval. Likewise. strictly speaking it is not tbe object that cannot pos ses s value that 
satisfies an interest in finding such an object. but the event of frnding such an object. This suggests 
the onIy objects tbat possess value are events and states of affairs. This however is unacceptable as an 
analysis of what we mean by "valueU • 
The imprecision in our taIk about value is matched by imprecision in our taIk about interest. If 
1 go to an art gallery. and sayo "rm interested in the renaissance artu • 1 have not specified my interest 
precisely. 1 am interested in seeing the renaissance arto which is an evento 1 am not interested in 
buying it. or eating it. or destroying it, etc. Our normal practice of ascribing value to objects is 
similarly lacking in precision. We might attribute value to the renaissance art in tbe gallery. but it is 
mistaken to suppose this to be a property that adheres to the art as such. 1t is not value for purchasing 
with which we are concemed, or value for consuming, and so forth. The value of the art líes in the 
contemplation of it. Likewise, tbe person who, informed that chocolate is good, frames some and puts 
it on her wall or grinds it up and sprinldes it on her wrinkles, has failed to understand that the value of 
the chocolate is in its consumption. 
Strictly speaking, value is ascribed to tbe event or state of affairs concerning the object in 
question (the event or state of affairs itself being anotber object) ratber than to the object. But just as 
we can say that we are interested in books by Dostoevsky, so we can say that books by Dostoevsky 
have value. There are several different ways we could go here, and 1 will not favour any. We might 
claim that value is a concept with a focal meaning and derivative meanings - or tbat it is a "cluster 
conceptU that embraces distinct but related meanings, and that when we ascribe value to objects that 
figure in the events or states of affairs that satisfy interests, we are using the word in a related but 
distinct sense frOID "such as to satisfy sorne interest BU. Or we could c1aim it is just a shorthand way 
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of stating that the event or state of affairs in which the object figures possesses value. In any case. the 
interest-relational account of value properties can accommodate the usage. 
4. An analogy with truth 
To allay doubts possibly lingering over this rnetaphysics of value. it is helpfuI to consider the 
following analogy. It turns out that value has the same sort of rnetaphysicaI status as truth - which. I 
suggest. should strike us as prima Jade desirable. The proper definition of truth has of course been 
the subject of even greater controversy than the proper definition of value. which might suggest that it 
is abad analogy to draw. Admittedly. my construal of truth will be naIve and old-fashioned - by 
adhering to the correspondence theory - but I am by no rneans alone in considering this view of truth 
to be basically sound. if in need of greater explication. Also. the parallels are obvious enough that 
should one prefer sorne other account of truth - such as the deflationary - this analogy points the way 
toward a similar reworking of the account of value. 
Truth on a traditional conception is a property of statements and beliefs - a relational property 
consisting in the correspondence between the content of the statement or belief and sorne object (a 
fact, or state of affairs). This parallels rny account of value as the relational property pos ses sed by 
objects of standing in a relation to sorne interest. Further, it seems we cannot identify the staternent or 
belief relatum with any particular instance of speech or belief - since we want to be able to say. for 
example, that it remains true that Tyrannosaurus Rex was a meat eating reptile even if no one says it 
or believes it, and would have been true even if there had never been a sentient being in existence who 
could say it or think it.s For this reason and others, the statement or belief that partakes in the truth-
relation is identified not in the frrst instance as any actual uttering or believing of sorne person, but as 
5 Corresponding to the common error of thinking that the existence of vaIue depends on the existence of creatures 
with interests is an error of thinking that the existence of truth depends upon the existence of creatures with 
beliefs. See for example Heidegger 1926: §44. 
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abstract thought-contents ("propositions"), so that we can share beliefs etc. This paralleIs my 
construal of tbe interests underlying value-relations as abstract types or universaIized contents of 
interested states. 
This account of trutb does not invite us to become metaphysical anti-realists about truth. To 
say that truth exists does not imply that tbere is an independently existing entity, "truth", in the nature 
of which individual truths partake, or which attaches as a monadic/atornic and irreducible quality to 
aH and only tbose statements which correspond to some fact - as a semantic anaIog to non-naturaIism 
might maintain. This fails abysmaIly as an explanation, like tbe non-naturalist account of value. It 
becomes mysterious what sort of entity truth is. why it attaches to all and only tbose statements tbat 
correspond to tbe world, and how we detect it. It might seem as if all we need to do to determine tbe 
truth of a proposition is attend to its "truth-quality", and ignore tbe actual state of the world. In tbe 
same way, foundationalist accounts of vaIue (like non-naturalism) suggest we ignore the relations 
between objects and interests, and thereby make value meaningless and absurdo This is not, either, 
license for a "noncognitivist" account of truth, according to which saying something is true is merely 
expressing an attitude of belief toward it. Once we recognize what truth and vaIue are, the debate over 
whether they exist appears ridiculous. 
5. The role 01 context in value language 
We now have the resources to understand the claim that to have vaIue is to be such as to 
satisfy an interest. I suspect, however, that you are still unsatisfied and have numerous objections. 
There is one major piece of the puzzle yet to be put in place. Thls concems how the described value 
properties are situated in relation to the language of value (or, how the metaphysics connects with the 
semantics). This Ianguage has sorne peculiar characteristics, without an appreciation of which the 
interest-relationaI theory of value looks absurdo 
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I have presented my metaphysics of value as recommended by a straightforward investigation 
of our linguistic practices. Unfortunately it seems to faíl abysmally in one basic respect as an adequate 
account of the meaning of that linguistic practice. If someone asks whether sorne object has value they 
cannot be enquiring whether it is such as to satisfy some interest. People have many bizarre interests, 
and the mere fact that an object is such as to satisfy any arbitrary interest certainly doesn't meet the 
conditions for assenting that the object has value. My knowledge that many people desire to inject 
themselves with cocaine doesn't encourage me in the slightest to judge such injection to be good. The 
problem would appear to be even more serious, since I connect value not with the actual interests 
people have, but with any 10gica1ly possible interest of any 10gica1ly possible creature. There are 
inf'mitely many such interests, infinitely many ofwhich are absurd or perverse from the perspective of 
normal human beings. We have already seen that every conceivable object has value - now we 
discover that every conceivable object has inconceivably many different values. This consequence 
seems incompatible with our evaluative practices. This theory of value can be accused of furnishing 
the world with too much value. 
We have already seen the answer: value statements depend upon context to fix sorne of their 
meaning. and the relevant contextual detall is an implicit interest. When someone enquires about the 
value of something, she is enquiring strictly about the value properties pertaining to specific implicit 
interests. It is only insofar as objects are such as to satisfy this narrow set of interests that they possess 
value in this restricted sense. and in this circumstance the charge of absurdly proliferating value no 
longer sticles. Our everyday discourse about "valuen simpliciter picles out the value properties 
revealed by a particular perspective of interest. In this narrow sense it is indeed true that to a world 
without creatures with interests there is no value. But this is not necessarily true of such a world. 
This reply can be challenged. If we do not ordinarily acknowledge value in situations to 
which the theory attributes value, cIaiming semantic analysis as its authority. then the theory can be 
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accused of failing by its own lights. But we do uItimately recognize value to exist in circumstances 
other than those in which we would initially ascribe it. First, tbere is the case of instrumental value. If 
"value" only applied to that which stood in the right relation with the speaker' s implicit interests, then 
objects would only possess instrumental value provided the end to which that instrumentality attached 
was part of that interest-set. Hare actually takes this stance, but it seems contrary to ordinary usage 
and theory-driven. 1 can concede that nuclear weapons are good for destroying the planet without 
there being cause to suspect that 1 harbour a desire for Armageddon. Second, we concede that certain 
objects have value for others, even if we have already denied tbeir value simpliciter. One might try to 
construe this as a statement concerning how the objects seem to otbers, but this canoot do. Objects to 
which 1 attribute no value personally can be valuable for others, even if they don't recognize that 
value. Third, it is a mistake to think this distinction between the simple ascription of ''value'' and the 
ascription of value more generally is a difference between value for me and value for others. The non-
qualified ascription of value is rather context-bound, not subject-bound, and 1 might deny value as 
such to something in one context to which in a different context 1 would not hesitate to as cribe value. 
The use of value language is to be understood as implicitly qualified by its contexto Our car 
thief means to ask, "ls this a good car from the perspeetive of our interest in stealing a vehicle 
meeting eriteria K"; the car lot customer means to ask, "Is this a good carfrom the perspective ofmy 
interest in buying a vehicle meeting eriteria L?" There is no such thing as value per se, merely value 
relative to sorne interest - although this is a controversial claim that 1 must defend. 
6. Value: instrumental, intrinsie, and other kinds 
I have given one aceount of what value is, and have proceeded on the assumption that this 
aceount covers all instances. This, it might be charged, is obtuse. It is unexceptional to claim that 
value terms are sometimes used in this way. The philosophicalliterature is replete with concessions of 
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this. Sometimes, however, they are used differently. It is these other instances that are philosophically 
important, and therefore the interest-relational analysis misses the boato There is a distinction, for 
example, between instrumental and intrinsic value. AH the examples considered aboye, it might be 
urged, are instrumental. These objects are good for such and such. That may presuppose an interest, 
but sorne things have intrinsic value, which warrants certain altitudes and courses of action 
independently of their utility as means. Instrumental value might be a paradigm case of a relational 
property, but intrinsic value cannot be relational in this way. 
1 reject the claim that there are distinct types of value in this sense. The relational character of 
instrumental value has been recognized, but it is strange that the alleged categorical differences with 
intrinsic value have not raised more suspicions. In virtue of what are instrumental value and intrinsic 
value both value, if they are so fundamentally different? My view is rather that value is one definite 
sort of thing. The division of value into instrumental and intrinsic is no more fundamental than the 
division into biological value, political value, military value, academic value, etc. 
Note rrrst that the account is not distinctively instrumental. To be such as to satisfy an interest 
is not the standard definition of being instrumentally valuable. How then does the interest-relational 
theory accornmodate instrumental value? Objects possess instrumental value in relation to interests in 
objects as instruments. If 1 am looking around for sorne way to move a piano, my relevant interest is 
in finding a means that enables me to satisfy the (originative) interest of moving the piano. Myeyes 
alight on the furniture trolley, and 1 recognize that it is such as to satisfy tbis interest. 1 therefore 
recognize its value. What is distinctive here, and has been overlooked, is that it is not the property of 
value that has an instrumental character, but the content of the interest. The interest-relational theory 
of value accordingly accounts for instrumental value without building any distinctively instrumental 
character into the nature of value. 
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Before looking at intrinsic value. we can observe that it is not the only other class. In pursuing 
the satisfaction of sorne interest we can be led to consider the significance of environmental 
conditions. We recognize, for example. that in order to cool down the room by opening the window, it 
is necessary that the air outside is cooler than the air inside. We thus develop a motivated interest in 
the temperature of the air outside. If the air is in fact cool, this state of affairs is such as to satisfy this 
interest, and thereby according to our account of value, is good. But the coolness of the air cannot be 
called a means or instrument, which strictly speaking is a course of action one follows to achieve an 
end, or an implement one manipulates in the course of such an action. Neither would we call the 
coolness of the air intrinsicalIy valuable. Rather we have an instance of what might be termed 
"environmental value". Again the object merits the ascription of value merely on the basis of its being 
such as to satisfy an interest. an interest in certain environmental conditions obtaining. 
What are we to say about intrinsic value? This notion is actualIy ambiguous, and is used in a 
number of different senses to mischievous effect. When we ascribe "intrinsic value" pre-reflectively 
we mean, 1 believe, that the object possesses value as a direct result of its intrinsic as opposed to 
extrinsic properties. Aesthetic value is one paradigm of intrinsic value. Objects are ascribed aesthetic 
value because of their own intrinsic characteristics. Contrast this with instrumental value, which 
objects possess as a direct result of their extrinsic or relational properties: more precisely, the 
relational property of being an effective tool for accomplishing sorne end. To appreciate instrumental 
value, one rnust appreciate the relation the object stand s in to the end for which it is an instrument. 
To appreciate aesthetic value, one need only appreciate the natural properties inherent in the object 
itself.6 
6 Another, I believe (ess satisfactory account of intrinsic value (which may in the end be equivalent) is as that 
which we ascribe on the basis of interest we just have, for no further reason: an '<Unmotivated" as opposed to a 
"motivated" interest. OUT interests in finding means, or contributive factors, are motivated by preceding interests, 
but not all OUT interests arise in this way. Sorne are simply spontaneous, or else deep and abiding, such as perhaps 
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It may not. however. be evident how an interest-based account can accornmodate aesthetic 
value. which is often considered a decisive counterexample to such theories. It is objected that 
aesthetic value is encountered where there was no preceding interest. To be struck by beauty is not to 
discover an object that satisfies an interest one was pursuing - the discovery of beauty is ofien, if not 
usually. completely out of the blue. But 1 have not claimed that value is being such as to satisfy 
preceding interests. The appearance of certain objects immediately excites certain interests in us - of 
awe. enchantment. Iust. or conversely disgust etc. - and it is in virtue of their capacity to satisfy these 
interests that we ascribe aesthetic value to them. Beauty is accordingly the property of being such (in 
appearance) as to satisfy an interest in perceptually contemplating particular characteristics. This of 
course makes all objects beautiful- as sorne have indeed cIaimed.7 The point to remember. however, 
is that everyday judgements of beauty. lilee those of goodness, are contextually restricted to aesthetic 
interests whose perspective the speaker takes. We can expect the objection. "But the beauty is what 
excites the interest. and so must be logically prior to it!" This is true, but it is an instance of confusion 
arising from the ambiguity of value terroso '13eauty". as 1 noted, can be used either to mean the 
property of being beautiful (our concem). or the properties which are beautiful or confer beauty. The 
beauty of a landscape. in this sense, might be the greenness and Iushness of the vegetation, or the size 
and bulk of the mountains. etc. These are the features that excite the interest. and in virtue of which 
we ascribe the value - but they are not "beauty" in the sense we are pursuing. We must avoid the error 
of confusing value with the valuable. 
Hence, articulation of what is "intrinsic" about intrinsic value does not enter into the account 
of what value is, but rather into the specification of the interest: it is value pertaining to an interest in 
the desire for love, or sexo or happiness. To say something has intrinsic value, accordingly. is simply to say that it 
is such as to satisfy an unmotivated interest. 
7 Another legitimate objection points out that this definition makes the objects of curiosity beautiful - but 
extreme ugliness is a paradigm object of curiosity, and hence on this account, beautifuL The solution is to 
distinguish carefully the types of interest involved. Curiosity is not motivated simply by a desire to contemplate 
sorne features. 
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intrinsic properties of objects. We need no separate analysis of value in order to account for "intrinsic 
value". As 1 said. however. different things have been meant by "intrinsic value". and notably in 
philosophical discussion it is ofien assumed that the expression qualifies the metaphysical nature of 
the property in question - i.e. it is an intrinsic rather than relational property of the object. 1 deny that 
this is ever the meaning it is given outside the philosophical arena: we may commonly talk about 
"intrinsic value" but we don't taIk about value properties that are intrinsic to objects. Despite my 
analysis. it is likely that foundationalists will continue to insist there are indeed non-relational value 
properties. and that 1 have not yet proven otherwise. In the next chapter 1 will further demonstrate the 
absurdity of this stance. 
7. Value for persons 
At the conclusion of the chapter 1 consider whether this theory lives up to the promise of 
escaping the difficulties to which the surveyed strategies fall victim. But does the interest-relational 
theory of value present us with new problems? There are several objections commonly made against 
interest theories that may also seem problematic for the interest-relational theory. First. there is a "value 
[or persons" objection. We ofien discuss that which is good or bad for particular persons or persons in 
general. But the notion of value [or a person A seems quite unconnected to any desires or motivations 
that A might have. What is "good [or me" is supposed to be independent of what 1 want. and this is used 
against theories that analyze value as sorne product of subjective interests. We must note an ambiguity in 
the term "interests". which can mean either subjective motivational states C"subjective interests") or that 
which would be good for uso whether we desire it or not C"objective interests"). What is ··in my interest" 
in this latter sense (in my "real" interest) is. like what is "good for me". paradigmatically conceived as 
sornething that can diverge considerably frorn rny actual desires. By identifying the kind of interests 
invoked in the concept of value as (albeit abstract types of) subjective conations have 1 pinned my 
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colours to the wrong mast? Value, supposedly, connects with objective interests, not subjective interests. 
Objective interests cannot be accounted for in terms of desires. What is good for, or in the best interests 
of, a young child, drug addict, or Alzheimer's sufferer can sometimes have 00 point of cootact with bis 
or her actual desires. Value has no esseotial connectioo with interest in the subjective sense, and the 
interest-relational theory of value is untenable. (Henceforth by "interests" 1 shall mean subjective 
interests unless otherwise specified). 
Observe that the interest-relational theory is not as directly vulnerable to this objectioo as sorne 
other interest theories are - since it does not stipulate whose or which interests are involved. It does oot 
cIaim that the valuable for A is that wbich is such as to satisfy A's interests: merely that the valuable for 
A must be that which is such as to satisfy some cootextually implicit interest. This may appear futile hair-
splitting. Whose interests could be relevant other than those of A? CertainIy 1 don't mean to cIaim that 
someooe else's interests determine one's good. The point is that the interest-relatiooal theory does not 
require that the interests implicit in judgements of what is good for A need be interests that currently 
motivate A. The question, theo, is which interests they are. Value for persons is undoubtedly a difficult 
business. But the difficulty, 1 believe, is contributed oot by the nature of value, but by the nature of 
persons. The nature of personhood is the subject of a vast and sophisticated philosophical literature, and 
here it is unavoidable that my treatment be brief and superficial. 
A "persoo" is oot simply a contemporaneous collection of physical and meotal states. It is 
something unifying "time slices" of individual s and underlying differences - the "substance" or 
"essence" of the individual. (I do not mean to cornmit to any dubious ootology - "persoos" may be 
pragrnatically motivated constructioos). The interests of a persoo are more than merely the set of preseot 
conatioos - and do oot necessarily include all present conations. The objective interests of a person are 
those subjective interests that we imagine her having ideally, the interests of her "full self' - that 
potential for which we love, respect her etc. Wheo a parent denies a child excessive candy, citing as her 
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reason that "It' s not good for you" even though the child has at the time no antipathy to illness, she is 
thinking of her child as she would be (soon afier eating the candy), and the implicit interest providing the 
context for her judgement is the one the child would have (were she to eat the candy) in not feeling ill. 
When we judge death to be bad for a fretus, we do not have in mind the frustration of its 
interests at that time - which are of the immediate biological variety. From the point of view of the fretus 
as the organism that it is at that instant, however, this is the only way in which death is bad for it. Instead, 
we are judging death to be bad for the person who the fretus had the potential to become - to be such as 
to prevent the satisfaction of the interests of the person the fretus potentially was. Since fretuses are not, 
for us, merely the biological organisms they happen to be, but rather the persons they have the potential 
to become, it is natural that we evaluate their deaths from the perspective of those imagined interests. 
And it is quite c1ear that from the perspective of these yet to be realized interests, death is abad thing on 
the interest -relational account of value, for it signifies the frustration of at least most of them. 8 
The "person" is something more than what actua1ly exists, and this is why value for persons 
presents such difficulties. It is not the case, therefore, that the concept of value carries any of these 
difficulties in itself. Thinking in terms of persons requires adopting the perspective of interests which are 
for the moment still unoccupied - but there is no problem in this phenomenon for the interest-relational 
theory of value, since it deals only with abstract types of interest. 
8. An objectionfrom pleasure and pain 
There is an objection concerning the moral psychology underlying the interest-relational 
account. 1 have admitted my treatment of moral psychology to be one-dimensional in my use of one term 
8 On the other hand, if we anticipate a lifetime of suffering and misery for that fretus, we might judge death to be 
good for it. This is because premature death satisfies the anticipated desire not to suffer like that. It might be 
objected that suchjudgement is impossible or illegitimate because we can only imagine what interests that person 
would have hado In reply, we need not imagine any particular desires to make this judgement: it is enough to be 
confident that the person would have had sorne such desires in order to judge the value of their life from their 
perspective. 
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("interesf') to cover a wide range of conative states. Superficiality in sorne matter is not necessarily a 
vice in a theory, if the matters wiili which the theory is centrally concemed are not significantly 
influenced thereby. But this superficiality does become a problem if it tums out to conceal a confusion 
with considerable importance for the nature of value - and this is what has been alleged by severa! 
opponents of interest-based theories, such as Warren Quinn, Thomas Nagel, and E. J. Bond. 
These foundationalists observe that a wide variety of mental states are lumped together under 
banners like "interest" or "desire" - and are then treated as essentially akin with desires. They object that 
"liking" something is very different from "desiring" it. Whereas to desire something is to have an urge 
toward obtaining it or its obtaining, to "like" is to derive pleasure or enjoyment from what is present. The 
difference is alleged to be significant. Desire seeks satisfaction - but the notion of "satisfaction" is itself 
ambiguous, as 1 remarked in the previous chapter. The thin concept of satisfaction is simply that of 
things coming to be as desire would have them, whereupon desire subsides. According to any interest 
theory of value, which takes desire as its paradigm, value is aH about interest-satisfaction. But what is so 
good about satisfaction as such? This question might seem absurd, but only because of an equivocation. 
"Satisfaction" also can mean (on the thick conception) a particular affective state, a type of pleasure or 
happiness. This thick kind of satisfaction indeed seems good - "good in itself', it is said. We must 
distinguish it from interest-satisfaction, which need not be accompanied by affective satisfaction or 
anything else "good in itself'. 
What is good about interest-satisfaction, if it brings no pleasure or happiness, or anything el se 
independently characterizable as good? In fact, we can have desires for things that are harrnful or hurtful 
to uso \Vhen these desires are satisfied, it is not value but disvalue we discover. The masochist who 
wishes to hurt himself does not seek something good, but something bad. Conversely, the person who 
unexpectedly experiences pleasure or affect-satisfaction, and encounters something he immediately likes 
has acquired something of value, even though he pos ses sed no interest for it. The suggestion therefore is 
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that there are things, such as the experiences of pleasure and pain, which are good and bad in themselves, 
independently of whether they are the objects of any interests or satisfy any interests. These are value-
qualities that we discover, and exist independently of what we want. 
The objection is forceful, and it suggests that the interest-relational theory malees a vital mistake 
in connecting value to interests rather than to states of enjoyment. 1 believe however that it is the 
objectors who are mistaken, and that the interest analysis of value can be successfulIy defended against 
this attack. First, we can note a problem rnentioned in the last chapter. By connecting value with 
receptive, hedonic states rather than active, striving states, the objection becomes a rather common form 
of hedonismo Value, on this account, is pleasure. Bond, Quinn, and Nagel do not, it is true, conceive of 
themselves as hedonists, and are concemed to insist that this analysis only reveals the nature of hedonic 
value, and that there are many other species of value, such as aesthetic value, moral value, etc. But since 
they have identified the essence of the valuableness of hedonic states as their hedonic character, they 
have failed to give an account of the essence of valuableness as such altogether. Either the valuableness 
of hedonic value is something utterly unlike the valuableness of aesthetic and moral value, or else there 
is an essence ofvalue common to alI three that they have so far failed to identify.9 
How can the interest-relational theory of value be defended? Note first that it is much less 
vulnerable than some other interest theories. Something is "good" not merely because we want it, but 
because it is such as to satisfy sorne implicit interest. Not all objects that have this property are also 
abjects we desire, partIy because we da not always know which objects are such as to satisfy particular 
interests, and partIy because sorne things that are such as to satisfy certain of our interests are 
contingently also distasteful to us. Therefore we are able to account for things being valuable that we 
don't actually want, and things that we want not actualIy being valuable. In arder to evaluate the theory 
9 When we say, "Pleasure and virtue are both good''. there seems to be a univocity of meaning that is absent when 
we say, "The side of a river and the Federal Reserve are both banks". 
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in light of this challenge. we must identify the interests from which the allegedly problematic judgements 
are made. 
The interest-theory is depicted by its opponents as foIlows. We have a desire: suppose for the 
death of a political rival. This comes to pass - an event occurs that satisfies our desire. thus 
straightforwardly valuable according to an interest theory. But in fact nothing good whatsoever results 
from this evento We derive no pleasure or joy from it. and rather than acquiring benefits. with the 
removal of our opponent from the scene we quicldy become very unpopular with the people whose 
support we are courting. On an interest theory. this event is good. simply in virtue of our desire for it. 
But this is false - the event is bad. our desire for it notwithstanding. It is bad in light of its consequences 
- but the interest theory cannot accommodate this fact. 
Is the interest-relational theory vulnerable to this objection? It may seem so. since relative to the 
interest in the event. its occurring is immediately such as to satisfy that interest. and thus of value by 
defmition. Indeed. 1 insist that relative to the interest in the event its occurrence is indeed good. Someone 
who wished his rival dead out of pure hatred might indeed stand by such a judgement in the face of the 
overwhelmingly negative consequences. But the important question here is: given that we rather judge 
the event to be had. from which perspective of interest/s is it appropriate to construe us to be evaluating? 
It is trivially true that an event is good relative to an interest in its occurring. therefore it is pointless and 
trivial to malee such a judgement. If the judgement of value is to be interesting and informative. then it 
must be from the point of view of a different interest. An interest such as the one we are considering is 
most likely to be motivated or derivative, rather than unmotivated or prlmary. One rnight desire the death 
of an opponent. for example. because of a belief that it will bring about something el se one desires. This 
is something that the event may or may not do. In our example. it is contingently and nontrivially true 
that this does not occur. The death does not have the value that was anticipated. 
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The response to the objection is to insist on greater conscientiousness in determining which 
interests are implicit in any such instance of value judgement. In particular. it is important to observe that 
value judgemeots oever simply state that an object stands in a value-relation with some interest or other. 
They are always madefrom the point ofview of sorne particular interest. which contextually cootributes 
to the meaning of the utterance. When we enquire after the value of satisfying sorne desire we possess. 
we are seldom speaking from the perspective of that desire itself. On the interest-relational theory. there 
is always sorne implicit interest. and the meaning of the value judgement always depends upon it. It 
remains to be seen whether this strategy succeeds completely. We have to consider the cIaim that we can 
discover value where we have no interest or desire - the cIaim that Hliking" or "enjoying" reveals value 
that is not interest-relational (putting aside difficulties conceming the resultant fragmentation of the 
concept of value). The paradigms here are pleasure and pain. and it is worthwhile considering them in 
detall. 
Pleasure. it is cIaimed. is an affective state that is intrinsically good - Le. good whether or not 
anyone wants it. Pain. likewise. is aIleged to be intrinsically bad. This value character is said to be "self-
evident" - directly manifest in their experience. independent of any mode of subjective conative activity. 
Any cIaim of self-evidence should immediately arouse suspicions. What is this self-evident goodness of 
pleasure and badness of pain? It would be desirable here to describe my opponents' account and submit 
it to critical scrutiny - but if there is any account to describe, 1 have failed to notice it. The stance seems 
simply to be: HIsn't it obvious that pain is intrinsically bad? Whether you want it or oot?" The c1aim that 
the badness of pain is self -evident appears to be an empírical or phenomenological position: that 
"badness" is immediately intuitable in the experience of pain. When 1 introspect on pain, however, 1 
discem only two types of phenomenon - frrst. sorne sort of sensation Ca stinging. or a throbbing, or an 
aching, etc.) and second, a desire to be rid of it. The desire, we are told, is merely a consequence of my 
perception of the badness. So the badness either is something about the sensation itself, or is something 1 
88 
have not noticed. We can discount this latter possibility, however, since the badness is supposed to be so 
eminently self-evident that it shouId be impossible for me to fail to discem it, and because 1 have the 
desire that is supposed to result from recognition of this value-quality. 
Is the badness of pain manifest simply in the sensation itself? The claim to self-evidence, 1 
suggest, is based on the belief that it is impossible to experience this sensation and not immediately 
recognize its badness. But it is not the case that everybody all the time reacts to pain with dislike. It is not 
even the case, 1 believe, that any of us all the time react to pain with dislike - although there are certain 
people who particularly seem to enjoy the sensations of pain. This makes it difficult to maintain that the 
sensations are self-evidently bad (or good) in themselves. It is false that no one can ever be mistaken 
about what is self-evident, assuming for the moment that sorne things are. But whereas one can, in other 
cases, miss the self-evidence of propositions by self-deception or insufficient attention to the matter at 
hand, these explanations are implausible in the case of pleasure and pain. We are invited to suppose that 
we might be self-deceived, or confused, or inattentive to our own likes and dislikes, and this is 
implausible here. Proponents of this objection respond to the problem of the masochist simply by 
ascribing perversity or sickness. Such people are not normal; there is sornething wrong with them. 
Besides being faIse (we can all enjoy pain in certain circumstances) this is no answer at all- merely a 
dogmatic rejection of disconfinning data. 
My opponents have no account to give of the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure. 
Value is a quality that sits there in our experiences, unexplainable and indefinable. The only evidence 
they can provide for the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure is the fact that most of the time we 
desire the one and desire the absence of the other. This, however, is no evidence for the existence of 
value "in itself', independent of any interest. The objection remains intact, however dissatisfactory, 
however, unless we can see as at least plausible the interest-relational contention that the badness of pain 
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and the goodness of pleasure depend upon our interests in avoiding or escaping the former and acquiring 
or maintaining the latter. What folIows is bighly speculative, but 1 take it to be substantially correct. 
Observe that "pain" and "pleasure" conceal an ambiguity. The objection gets started because 
"pain" and "pleasure" are on the one hand things that seem essentially good and bad. and on the other 
hand as sensations are mere contents of consciousness - something passively experienced and thus 
independent of active conative states. But these two "hands" are juggling different concepts of pain and 
pleasure. As 1 have been treating them. aboye, "pain" and "pleasure" are indeed terms for certain 
sensations. 1 will consider tbis the narrow sense of the terms. But we also use these terms in a much 
broader way. applying them to situations where none of these sensations are presento We might say. for 
example. that a certain memory causes us pain. or that the thought of revenge gives us pleasure. This is 
not an inappropriate use of the terms, but it is not true that such a memory or thought causes us to 
experience the physical sensations we call pain and pleasure (although tbis may sometimes happen). It is 
because of this ambiguity that we can without nonsense say that a certain pain pleased us, or that a 
certain pleasure pained uso It is this pleasure (as enjoyment) and pain (as suffering) that seem 
intrinsically good and bad, rather than the sensations we call pleasure and pain. (The sensations of 
pleasure and pain are the paradigm instances of experiences that we respectively enjoy and suffer, which 
explains the ambiguity). What then do "pain" and "pleasure" in the broad sense amount to? 
1 find within limits that my reaction to the same sensory stimulus depends upon my frame of 
mind. If 1 hurt myself deliberately, 1 ofien enjoy the pain (sensation). But if someone else hurts me in the 
same way, when 1 don't want it, 1 do not enjoy it - it is painful (a cause of suffering) to me. Assuming 
that the sensation in both cases is the same, what this shows at mínimum is that the value-quality of the 
sensation is not intrinsic to the sensation. but depends at least in part upon the state of mind. (Should we 
reject the assumption. we have the consequence that the sensation itself depends upon my state of mind-
thus is not merely a content of passive consciousness). But note that strictly speaking pleasure (as 
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enjoyment) and pain (as suffering) are not contents of experience. Rather. enjoyment and suffering are 
states of being. A state is not an intentional object but an organic whole that incorporates a mode of 
action or subjective comportment toward the content of consciousness. Pleasure (enjoyment) is a state of 
enjoying or liking some present content of consciousness. Pain (suffering) is a state of disliking some 
present content of consciousness. Enjoying. liking. and disliking are all modes of activity on the part of 
the subject, and so the intrinsic value of enjoyment and suffering is not necessarily independent of any 
mode of subjective activity. The question then becomes: what sort of activities are "liking" and 
"disliking" - and the c1aim that they are very different from interests or conations in general becomes 
very significant. If it is unfounded. the ooly species of pain and pleasure that we can affirm to be 
intrinsically good and bad are states that incorporate a fonn of interest. 
Dismissing the masochist as "perverse" begs the question. The intrinsically bad character of 
sorne experience is demonstrated ooly by the presence of pain (suffering). not by the presence of pain 
(sensation). which by itself indicates no value at all. My opponents must therefore argue that the 
masochist is perverse or mistaken in not suffering from pain (sensation). But this is absurd: it amounts to 
the elaim that the masochist ought to suffer from his or her pain (sensation) - that the perversity of 
masochisrn líes in failing to observe an obligation to suffer in the presence of pain. We would rather 
judge it desirable that we not suffer from pain. if only we could. 
What is the difference between pain (sensation) accompanied with suffering. and pain 
(sensation) without it? If 1 introspect for the difference between when 1 hurt myself and do not suffer 
frorn it, and when 1 am hurt by another and suffer frorn it. 1 find ooly this: 1 do not want the other-
inflicted pain, 1 actively want not to experience it. Likewise, between experiencing a sensation as 
pleasing and experiencing the same sensation as not pleasing. the only difference 1 find is that in the 
former case 1 desire to indulge in the experience as it occurs whereas in the latter 1 do noto Indeed. 1 
believe it is impossible to conceive of someone enjoying, liking, or taking pleasure in sorne experience 
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or occurrence without desiring it. or to conceive of someone disliking or suffering from some experience 
or occurrence without desiring its absence or non-occurrence. Equa1ly, it is not possible to conceive of 
someone being stimulated by an experience to desire the experience for itself and yet not enjoying or 
liking it, nor to conceive of someone being stimulated by an experience to desire its cessation for itself 
and yet not dislike it or suffer from it. 
1t is no objection that it is possible to desire that our enjoyment come to an end, or that our 
suffering continue. (Qne might object to my portrayal of the figure of the masochist. for example, that he 
or she is not the person who likes pain (sensation), but who seeks pain (suffering»). We can have 
conflicting desires: it is quite compatible with having a desire that a sensation continue that 1 also have a 
desire that it stop. The point. then, is that even when 1 desire my suffering continue or my pleasure stop, 
inasmuch as 1 am still in a state of pleasure or suffering 1 still at the same time have a desire that the 
cause of my suffering cease, or the cause of my pleasure continue. One cannot sensibly deny that even in 
cases of unwanted pleasure and desired suffering, the states respectively include desires that it 
respectively continue and cease - such states are essentially conflicted. 
To "like" or "enjoy" a sensation (be "pleased" by it) is to desire it spontaneously as one 
experiences it. To dislike a sensation (be "pained" by it) is to desire its absence spontaneously as one 
experiences it. 1O "'Liking" accordingly does not present a distinct phenomenon frorn desiring that 
undermines the interest -relational theory - rather it is a special case of an interest that is aroused by the 
very stimulus it is an interest in. What is good about pleasure is that we spontaneously desire it, and what 
is bad about pain is that we spontaneously desire its absence. There are sorne natural objections to this 
account, however. One problern for the thesis that desire is integral to pleasure (enjoyment) is that desire 
is supposed to be for that which is not (yet), and cannot exist in company with its own satisfaction: the 
satisfaction of a desire is its termination. Also, just as it is possible to desire the absence of pleasure 
10 Christine Korsgaard clairns in the same spirit that pain wouldn't be so bad if we could onIy relax and enjoy it 
(1996: 148). 
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(enjoyment) and the occurrence of suffering, so it seems possible to desire spontaneously the absence of 
pleasure (enjoyment) and occurrence of suffering. On the assumption that one and the same state is never 
both suffering and enjoyment, it foIlows that it is possible to spontaneously desire sorne present 
sensation and yet not enjoy or draw pleasure from it. 
The kind of desire essential to enjoyment and suffering is significanlo and needs to be 
distinguished. Even with a present sensation, one can desire it in certain ways. One can desire its 
continuation from one moment to the next, one can desire its intensification, and rnost importantly, one 
can desire to take it aII in. There is no necessary connection between sensation and attention: our 
consciousness always puts sornething to the fore and thereby something else recedes. To desire the 
sensations of pleasure is to desire experiencing the sensations of pleasure, and this requires conscious 
activity. Hedonic desires that playa role in the nature of enjoyment and suffering are desires that aim 
immediately at the experience of the sensation themselves. These are not the only kinds of desires that 
one can have toward the sensations of pleasure and pain or the states of enjoyment and suffering. One 
can desire suffering as penance or self-punishment. One can desire to escape pleasure in order to avoid 
being tempted into sin. These however are not hedonic desires, since they aim not at an experience but at 
sorne other kind of event. To enjoy something is to desire spontaneously (Le. stimulated by the 
experience itself) to take in fuIly the experience of ¡lo while to suffer from something is to desire 
spontaneously to escape the experience of it. 
For the objectors this puts the cart before the horse. We spontaneously desire pleasure because it 
is good, and desire the absence of pain because it is bad. Most of the time we cannot help but like 
pleasure and dislike pain - and this must be due to their vaIue. This seerns prima Jade correclo but it gets 
things back to front. ll Our love of pleasure (sensation) and our antipathy to pain (sensation) are deeply 
moted in our sociaIly and biologicaIly conditioned natures. We indeed have dispositions for such 
11 Actually it is true that we desire pleasure because it is good. We desire to experience the sensations ofpleasure 
because those sensations satisfy the liking for themselves that they stimulate. 
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spontaneous conative reactions to certain stimuli. and in the case of pain particuIarly. it being our boclies' 
evolved warning system. the compulsion to desire its absence is deep and our ability to overcome it 
slight. Furthermore. OUT mature awareness that pain signifies damage to our bodies makes it difficult for 
us. except with the most trivial of hurts. not to reinforce our natural impulse with a secondary. self-
preserving desire to escape the cause of the pain. We might add an argument from evolutionary 
economy: assuming pain exists basically to the extent to which it was biologically advantageous. all that 
is needed is an automatic impulse to desire the absence of certain sensations (which happen to inclicate 
bodily harm). The rival suggestion of a sensation that contains "in itself" bad.ness and a faculty for 
cognizing such value-qualities. which is connected to a motivational propensity to clislike negative 
values. is clearly redundant. if not incoherent. The case is further bolstered by the argument from 
introspection 1 have given. All 1 can perceive in an experience of pain is a certain sensation and an 
immediate aversion to it that arises spontaneously in me. 1 can discem no additional qua/e of "intrinsic 
bad.ness". If we did not spontaneously desire the absence of pain. and it clid not inclicate bodily harm. we 
would have none of the reasons for which we judge pain to be bad. 
The interest-relational theory survives the objection. In fact. the rival pasition is empty. Value is 
intrinsic to pleasure (enjoyment) and pain (suffering) because they are both states that incorporate 
interest. which on the interest-relational theory is logically connected to value. My analyses of 
enjoyment and suffering perhaps remain highly speculative and controversial. although 1 am ignorant of 
viable alternatives. Perhaps. however. altematives are possible that show enjoyment and suffering to be 
states that don't incorporate an essential element of interest. This however would not hurt the interest-
relational theory of value, as it would merely reveal that enjoyment is not necessarily intrinsically good, 
or suffering necessarily intrinsically bad. 
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9. How the interest-relational theory measures up 
Having articulated the interest-relational theory of value and atternpted to prevent any 
misinterpretations. we can now investigate how it rneasures up against the criteria that rival theories 
variously succeed and faíl in living up to. Our first criterion was that value judgernents rnust be 
recognized as semantically cognitive or descriptive. Value judgernents are beliefs about objects. not 
attitudes toward objects. The interest-relational theory is unproblematically cognitivist. Value terms 
represent relational value properties. constituted by relations subsisting between interests and objects. 
To make staternents about value is to express the beliefthat this relation subsists between sorne object 
and sorne interest. The theory therefore wiil have no problems accornmodating the grarnrnar - both 
superficial and logical - of value discourse. unlike noncognitivism. It also foilows that facts about 
value can be discovered and argued overo and are things about which we can be mistaken - all of 
which are problematic for a noncognitivist account. At the same time. however. we have preserved the 
noncognitivist insight that value judgernents express interests. since they occur in the context of 
implicit interests that supply part of their meaning. 
Second. we determined that staternents about value seern to be about the nature of the object. 
not the nature of the subject. The interest-relational theory is sufficiently objectivist. Value is a 
relational property possessed by objects. although talle about value is impossible outside of the context 
of sorne interest. But this role of interest does not make the theory in the slightest bit (semantically) 
subjectivist - since I have demonstrated interests to be abstract kinds conceptually independent of any 
subject. real or hypotheticaL It remains true to the phenomena in a way that subjectivist theories 
cannot match. 
Third. the interest-relational theory explains the consequentialist character of value 
properties - and without questionable appeals to the notion of supervenience. Whether an object 
stands in a particular value-relation with sorne interest depends. as weil as on the character of the 
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interest, upon the character of the object. Since the interest is implicit or in the background, our 
concem is with how the object measures up to it. Hence our central interest is in the characteristics 
possessed by the object other than its value, since it is in virtue of these that the value-relation 
subsists. To determine the value of sornething (relative to sorne interest), we need only attend to these 
other characteristics, which are viewed from the perspective of the interest. 
Fourth, on this account it is evident that the property of having value is quite distinct from the 
properties that have value. To be value is to be a relational property conceming an object' s connection 
to sorne interest, whereas to be valuable is to be an object possessing the relational property of value. 
Unlike naIve naturalisrn, therefore, this forro of naturalism preserves the unity of value and the unity 
of meaning of our value terms, avoiding the fragmentation that results from naIve naturalist theories. 
Fifth, the interest-relational theory offends none ofthe episternological scruples that encourage 
anti-realism, and is non-rnysterious. It invokes no entities besides relations that subsist between objects 
and interests. It requires no faculty of intuition any stranger than the intellectual ability to recognize how 
objects relate to our interests. It makes no c1aims about our motivational nature other than that we are apt 
to be rnotivated by the discovery that certain objects relate in certain ways with certain of our interests. 
No one should entertain suspicions conceming the plausibility of the ontology, metaphysics, or moral 
psychology of this theory to warrant endorsing anti-realism. It therefore avoids the problems that make 
non-naturalism so intellectually distasteful. 
What about the sixth criterion: can an interest-relational theory of value account for the 
intemalism constraint, which Blackburn considers the trump card of noncognitivism? No mere belief, it 
is alleged, can be supposed intrinsically reason-giving, action-guiding, motivating, and justifying, except 
by a fanciful conception of human motivational nature. If such a belief can be identified, therefore, the 
noncognitivist interpretation of the language of value is severely compromised. The intemalists do not, 
however, have everything their own way. It rnay be true that holding a particular value judgernent 
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normally implies being motivated in a corresponding way, but tbere are significant exceptions to tbe rule 
tbat inspire an extemalist opposition to intemalism. It seems we can sometimes acknowledge objects to 
be good and yet not be motivated toward tbem, and we can acknowledge objects to be bad and yet not be 
motivated against tbem. Intemalists (typically noncognitivists) respond to such objections by describing 
situations of paying lip service to otbers' attitudes, or describing an "inverted commas" use of vaIue 
language, where it really means "what youltbey would consider vaIuable" (Blackbum 1998: 60-1). 
Recognizing that tbe language of vaIue is indeed sometimes put to tbis usage, full-blooded intemalism 
still does not seem adequate to tbe phenomena. It appears, for example, when 1 admit tbat going to tbe 
dentist would be a good thing for me to do, but state that I simply don't want to, tbat 1 feel no noticeable 
motivation to do so on making tbis judgement, but nonetheless am quite sincere in my use of value 
language. 
This is where tbe interest-relational tbeory of vaIue particularly demonstrates its superiority over 
tbe other tbeories available - including noncognitivism. Not only can it prove Blackbum wrong and meet 
tbe intemalism requirement, such tbat to recognize something has value in most situations is sufficient to 
motivate one towards ir - but it can also meet the extemalism requirement tbat noncognitivism cannot, 
such that in sorne situations this is not the case. To recognize something has vaIue is to hold the belief 
that it is such as to satisfy an interest. Of course, the belief that the object stands in any such relation has 
no motivationaI consequences. The recognition that an object possesses value as an instrument to an end 
one does not have is not motivating. But as we saw, in normal circumstances when we say something has 
value simpliciter, rather than value for such and such, we are saying that it has value for some implicit 
interest. Paradigmatically, the implicit interest is part of the agent's present motivationaI seto To believe 
something has vaIue simpliciter, then, is typically to believe it is such as to satisfy one or more 
motivating interests. Certainly, Blackburn is right that the belief on its own cannot motivate - but the 
belief in question is intrinsically motivating, since - and this is to agree with McDowell - it is a belief 
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(or perhaps more accurately. a disposition to affirm and assent to certain utterances) we can typically 
only have provided we are already motivated in certain ways. Accordingly. it is a belief that is never "on 
its owo". but always accompanied by a corresponding motivation. 
This may require qualification. The contextua! role of the interest explains why there is no sigo 
of it in the utterance. But because it is of contextual significance. it is part of the belief: the person who 
judges a car to be good on the ground that it is easy to steal bas a different belief from the person who 
judges the same car to be good on the ground that it is economical to runo Therefore. even though 
someone without the relevant interest may not be inclined to assent to or affirm the bare statement <'Tbis 
car is good". they may still sbare the belief that the person with such an interest is expressing with sucb 
an utterance. This beliefbas no direct motivational or justificational connections forthe person who does 
not possess the interest. and accordingly we see the extemalist is rigbt: possession of the belief is no! 
intemally connected with motivation and justification. but only extemally so. The interest-relational 
theory of value is thus an extemalist position. strictly speaking. But we could perbaps call it uquasi-
intemalist": Blackbum defines «quasi-rea1ism" as the project of sbowing that we can account for the 
apparently realist pbenomena by anti-realist means - «quasi-intemalism" would therefore be the thesis 
that we can account for the apparently intemalist phenomena by extemalist means. 
Intemalism may bave been too hasty in maintaining that beliefs about value are intrinsically 
motivating and justifying. 1 propose instead that we withdraw to the claim that the state of being 
disposed to assert or affirm unrelativized value judgements is intrinsically motivating or justifying. The 
person with such a disposition (to agree "Y es. x is good") is a person for whom the relevant interests are 
already presupposed as part of the perspective. For such a persono the belief expressed in such an 
utterance will be rnotivating and reason-giving, since it is a belief conceming how the object judged 
connects with sorne of her interests. 
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How can it be then that recognition of value can ever faiI to motivate? First, we must observe the 
atypical. For an interest to be assumed in a communicative context, it is not necessarily the case that it is 
a present motivation for every speaker. Sometimes we borrow perspectives of interests from others. in 
the interest of being helpful or promoting cooperation. The subsequent use of value is not insincere or in 
inverted commas. Even when it is our interests that are implicit. it is not always the case that we are so 
motivated at the time of conversation. Suppose 1 am a keen amateur astronomer. but having just finished 
a long day at the office am getting into my car motivated solely by the interest to get home and collapse. 
when 1 am intercepted by an acquaintance who proceeds to teIl me about a comet that he's on bis way to 
view at the local observatory. 1 might agree with him that it sounds like a really good thing to do - since 1 
recognize the implicit interest - but nonetheless remain completely unmotivated to join him. since my 
present interests are dominated by only one desire. 
We might mention. finally. Moore's ""open question" challenge. wbich is not inc1uded on our list 
of criteria due to the failure of bis argument to support it. Many have accepted with Moore that no 
naturalistic account could meet the challenge. but this is unduly pessimistic: the interest-relational theory 
succeeds in drawing this particular sword from its stone. Relative to a particular context of interest. that 
which is sllch as to satisfy that interest is good. Tbis is an anal y tic truth. not a synthetic truth - true in 
virtue of the meaning alone - and therefore the question ""rs that wbich is such as to satisfy interest Y 
good (relative to the perspective ofinterest 1')1" is a "closed" question. one we can answer by consulting 
the meanings of words alone. We can. however. identify the reason the challenge seemed impossibIe to 
meet. A context of implicit interest is needed in order to replicate the semantic force of ""good" with a 
description. and thus strictly speaking it is correct that the semantic force of ""good" cannot be replicated 
by a description alone. An interest has to be added. as the noncognitivists correctly saw. But this is no 
victory for Moore. since the description of an object as ""good" simpliciter does not itself have a fuIl 
meaning except in the context of such an interest. This success of the interest-relational theory has in 
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fact already been recognized in tbe literature (Griffin 1992: 308) in tbe form of Zitr s sinúlar account 
(1960: 247).12 
The interest-relational theory of value. tben. can pass every test suggested by the successes and 
failures of other theories - and with flying colours. 1 have also argued tbat it presents us witb no new 
problems of its own. 1 consider this to fulfill my promise. and to deliver a theory of value tbat is a 
comfortable fit with the phenomena. The interest-reIational theory commends itself to us not only as the 
best account we have (in light of tbe self-confessed difficulties of rival accounts) but also as a 
substantially correct and satisfactory account of the semantics and metaphysics of value. 1 tberefore 
submit tbat it is a good tbeory of value. 
12 Griffin nonetheless rejects Ziff's interest-relational analysis. on the basis of its alleged inability to handle all 
uses of "good", such as in "a good Roman nose". Roman noses, Griffin objects, don't answer to any ordinary 
interests. But this objection is easily answered. A "good Roman nose" is more precisely a good example of a 
Roman nose, and so is good in that it is such as to satisfy the interest in illustrating what is meant by a "Roman 
nose". 
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4. OBJECTIVE REASONS 
1. The foundationalist challenge 
The interest-relational theory of value is a realist but anti-foundationalist theory. It is realist in 
holding that objects possess value properties independently of the beliefs or interests of any persons. But 
because value is interest-relational, it is only of practical significance to those who are motivated by the 
relevant interests. Value is only reason-giving to us as a result of interests we already possess, and hence 
supports an anti-foundationalist theory of ethics. This claim is based on g'!neralization from analyses of a 
handful of cases, and little has been said so far to justify this generalization. But justification is 
necessary, since such an account is incornmensurable with the assertions of many philosophers who 
advocate the foundational nature of value: that there is an objective basis for practical reason and 
deliberation which is independent of and transcends our interests. On this view there exist at least sorne 
non-relational value properties, the paradigm being moral value. 
The aim of this chapter is in the first instance to defend the claim that all value is interest-
relational and refute the opposing suggestion that there is such a thing as non-relational value. However I 
will attempt this indirectly, by focusing on the nature of reasons for action. Part of the motivation for 
this is my underlying concem with the refutation of foundationalism. Axiological foundationalism -
which holds that there exist objective states of affairs that are intrinsically reason-giving independently 
of anyone's i..Tlterests - is not the onIy form of foundationalism, which per se only maintains the 
existence of interest-transcendent reasons. Rationalist foundationalism (of which Kant is the father) 
denies that objective states of affairs give us foundational reasons, but maintains we have foundational 
reasons nonetheless in virtue of our own nature as rational agents. By addressing the question of reasons 
per se, the interest-relational theory can engage with foundationalism more generically. Furthermore, an 
analysis of reasons is independently desirable, since I have introduced the question of value as 
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coocerning objective states of affairs that provide reasoos. So far 1 have relied upoo an intuitive and pre-
theoretic grasp of what we mean by "reasoos", and clarification is oeeded. 
How does an investigatioo of the oature of reasons help determine whether there are 000-
relatiooal value properties? Foundatiooalist value realism amounts to the claim that there are objective 
states of affairs that provide reasoos to ageots indepeodently of any interests they have. If it could be 
established that there are 00 reasons that are oot interest-relatiooal- i.e. that we onIy possess reasoos in 
virtue of our motivating interests - theo it would follow that there could oot be any such objective states 
of affairs, and therefore, any such ooo-relatiooal value properties. Proof, however, might be difficult to 
come by, and my aim will be more modest: to provide a plausible interest-relatiooal analysis of reasoos, 
and show that the opponents of such an account do oot provide us with any good reasoos for doubting it: 
that we have 00 good (epistemic) reasoos for accepting the existence of interest-transceodeot reasoos. 
2. The Case of Nagel 
1 address this task by takiog the work of one particular contemporary foundatiooalist as a foiL 
Thomas Nagel is ooe of the most influeotial and unrepeotant of modero foundatiooalists, and has argued 
for bis positioo in three important works, The Possibility of Altndsm (1970), The View From Nowhere 
(1986), and The Last Word (1997). He frequentlyespouses foundatiooalism: that we can have reasons 
that have oothing to do with and transcend our interests. For example: 
... while ·passions' are the so urce of sorne reasons, other passions or desires are themselves 
motivated andlor justified by reasons that do not depend on still more basic desires. (1997: 102) 
When we take the objective step, we don't leave the evaluative capacity behind autornatically, 
since that capacity does not depend on antecedently present desires. We may find that it continues 
to operate from an external standpoint, and we may conclude that this is not just a case of 
subjective desires popping up again in objective disguise. (1986: 143) 
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This approach is advantageous in several ways. First. Nagel places tbe issues in context in a 
clear and helpful way. Second. his account succeeds in remaining generic. He presents arguments for 
foundationalism per se. not merely his own brand. and mounts arguments against anti-foundationalism 
per se. Third. his account is set up in explicit contradiction with sorne of tbe central claims of the 
interest-relational theory of value. which can hence be seen as biting the bulIet on many of the allegedly 
unpalatable consequences of rejecting his position. Fourth. the mistakes and contradictions of his 
account are characteristic of foundationalism in general. The goal. however. is not refutation of Nagel. 
but refutation of foundationalism, and so 1 will supplement his position and arguments with tbose of 
other foundationalists. 
Nagel facuses on reasons rather than vaIue. and he seems desirous of steering clear from any 
metaphysical accounts of value. This deserves sorne attention. as it casts doubt on his appropriateness as 
a paradigm proponent of non-relationaI value. In 11ze Possibility of Altruism this reticence had yet to 
develop. There. Nagel claims that objective reasons come from objective value. which is introduced (as 
it has been here) as an objective feature of the worId providing reasons for agents. cited by predicates 
such as "badn • Reason-taIk. he states. is just a way of stating facts about value (1970: 88). He tberefore 
places hirnself squarely in the camp of vaIue realists. 
By his own admission Nagel provides no account of what "valuen is - giving only an account of 
formal conditions upon reasons and value - despite conceding the need for a theory ofvalue (1970: 89. 
97, 126). His work thus has the virtue ofuniversality: it articulates and defends tbe foundationalist realist 
strategy in general terms, remaining compatible with a variety of realist theories - giving no preference 
to either naturalist or non-naturalist accounts. The aim is to give an account of reasons deriving from 
value tbat remains correct no matter what value is. It is therefore important to note that his account is no! 
compatible with the interest-relational theory or any other anti-foundationalist theory of value: if the 
interest-relational theory toms out to be correct. his theory of reasons is undermined. 
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In his latee work (1986, 1997) Nagel distances himself from the metaphysicaI claims of value 
realism. and is careful to deny (repeatedly) that value is a separate reaIm of reality: he maintains that the 
objectivity of value and reasons as he means it does not imply any metaphysical theses. When we declare 
pain to be bad, ''badness'' is not a fact about or quality of pain that gives us a reason to want its 
alleviation. In a volte lace, talk about value is now to be reduced to taIk about reasons: when we declare 
pain to be bad, our ascription of the predicate means nothing more or less than that there exists an 
objective reason to seek the alleviation of pain (1986: 144). The fundamental concept is now that of a 
"reason", and "value" is derivative. My point is that we can consider Nagel as advocating a generic form 
of foundationalist value realism, claiming that the considerations to which we attend in determining what 
to do are manifest to an objective U.e. disinterested) point of view. By disavowing objective value 
properties, Nagel gives us a limit case against which to direct our arguments - a foundationalist account 
that is immune to any localized objections conceming the plausibility of the value properties it invokes, 
since it attempts not to invoke any. 
The central concept in this chapter is that of reasons. It is because objective value is something 
that gives reasons that value is of practical interest to us, and "reasons" are also the conceptual 
centrepiece ofNagel's foundationalist realism. We might suspect, however, that any oddity in the notion 
of objective value properties will equally plague the notion of objective reasons, which are described as 
existing independently of being recognized, there to be discovered, not created or invented. Nagel is 
sensitive to this charge: 
What we airo to discover ... is not a new aspect of the external world, called value, but rather just 
the truth about what we and others should do and want. It is important not to associate this form 
of realism with an inappropriate metaphysical picture: it is not a form of Platonism. The cIairo is 
that there are reasons for action, that we have to discover them instead of deriving them from our 
preexisting motives .... We simply airo to reorder our motives in a direction that will make them 
more acceptable from an externa! standpoint. Instead of bringing our thoughts into accord with an 
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external reality. we try to bring an external view into the determinatioo of OUT conducto (1986: 
139) 
Perhaps a richer metaphysic of morals could be devised. but 1 doo't know what it could be. The 
picture 1 associate with normative realism is not that of an extra set of properties of things and 
events io the worId. but of a series of possible steps io the developmeot ofhuman motivatioo that 
would improve the way we lead our lives. whether or oot we will actually take them. (1986: 139-
140) 
He carefully denies that bis doctrine of objective reasons advances metaphysical c1aims. 
However. he seems irnmediately to betray this denial. In contrast to bis claim that objectivity in ethics 
does not involve conforming om thoughts to an objective reality. he states on the next page ...... the world 
of reasons. inc1uding my reasons, does oot exist only from my own point of view. 1 am in a worId whose 
character is to a certain extent independent of what 1 think. .... (1986: 140-1) He then malees a point 
typical of the advocates of metaphysical value entities, saying against anti-realism, "An epistemological 
criterion of reality is being assumed wbich pretends to be comprehensive but wbich in fact exc1udes 
large domains in advance without argument" (1986: 141). NageI is now defending the c1aim that the 
realm of objective reasons is a "domain of reality". We must wonder what difference there is between 
reasons being a "domain of reality" and their being an "aspect of the external world" or "set of properties 
of things and events in the worId". He has surrendered the ramparts ("objective value") to the besiegers. 
and has taken refuge in the keep C"objective reasons"). But bis spectre. the invocation of metaphysical 
entities, seems simply to have followed him in. "Objective reasons", we are told. exist independentIy of 
whether they are perceived. and are "discovered" in the world. Despite bis disavowals, it seems NageI is 
committed to the metaphysical reality of "objective reasons". 
It is easy to recognize what motivates Nagel to deny falsely that he has metaphysical 
commitments: the fear of falling afoul of a reasonable "epistemological criterion of reality". But the 
point is not to raise Occamist doubts against him, nor to engage in skeptical ridicule of pbilosopbical 
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faney. 1 have, after aIl, advaneed a theory of objectively existing value properties, and am not about to 
point the Oeeamist finger at Nagel's invocation of objeetively existing reasons. What is needed. rather 
than misleading and ineonsistent discIaimers, are metaphysical accounts of the nature of reasons and 
value that demonstrate why their postulation does not offend against reasonable epistemologieal 
scruples. In chapter 3 1 undertook this task for value, cIaiming it to be an interest-relational property. 
This metapbysics removes all the sting from the epistemological arguments against value realism. Sinee 
Nagel' s ethical philosophy is built around the concepts of value and reasons, there is an onus on him to 
give such an account. 
Remarkably bowever, Nagel never advances any positive thesis eoncerning the metaphysieal 
nature not only of value but also of reasons - bis central concept - and never provides any analysis of 
the concept of a reason.1 He relies on a pre-theoretical understanding of its meaning, and makes only 
accidental, not essential, predications conceming reasons. The emphasis is on formal eonditions on and 
relations between reasons, whatever they might be. The cIosest thing to a definition that he offers is, 
..... every reason is a predicate R such that for all persons p and events A, if R is true of A, then p has 
prima facie reason to promote A" (1970: 47). Although he describes this as a definition, we eannot 
suppose that it really is intended as such, since it incorporates the concept to be defined in the definiens, 
and is therefore blatantly circular. 
Why does NageI think he can avoid analysis of bis central coneepts? An answer can be found in 
bis observations concerning burden of proof. Objecting to a standard view that places this burden on the 
foundationalist realist, to defend the objective realities he postulates, NageI cIaims that our everyday 
judgements manifest an assumption that there is such a domain of reality. He describes the controversy 
between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as an opposition "between a theory about how things 
1 Gibbard (1990: 161n) observes that Grice 1967, Nagel 1970, & Bond 1983 all offer foundationalist ("non-
Humean") conceptions of reasons, but sirnilarly "none of them ... explains what he is using the term 'reason' to 
mean." Darwall (1983: 82) also declines to give a reductive analysis of what is meant by "reasons", and Hampton 
(1998: 50) declines to give an analysis of"norms", which she claims are the source ofreasons. 
106 
are and a practice that would be impossible ifthis was how things were" (1997: 116-7).2 Accordingly the 
burden of preof lies not on the advocate of foundational reasons and value. but on his opponent. The 
foundationalist need not preve these entities and properties exist - rather. the anti-foundationalist must 
preve they do noto Nagel therefore believes he has escaped the responsibilities of defending the existence 
and explaining the metaphysical nature of value and reasons. 
Is Nagel' s foundationalist interpretation of the language of value and our ethical experience and 
practices correct? Sorne anti-foundationalists (notably Mackie 1977: Ch. 2) have accepted such 
interpretations and striven to show that this everyday assumption is in error because there are no such 
properties and objects. Sorne even naively reject the existence of objective reasons altogether. claiming 
something is onIy a reason for a person at time t if it is motivating that person at time t. Foundationalists 
champion a significant truth against this skeptical anti-realism. If there is nothing more to being a reason 
than being recognized as a reason. or treated as a reason. then troubling questions arise about what 
happens when we search for reasons. or recognize something to be a reason that we had previously 
overlooked. This practice is undermined - it would be impossible to discover that one has reasons one 
hasn't already recognized. 
Foundationalists ofien claim, imply. or suppose that anti-foundationalists. because they base 
ethics and normativity on motivating interests. must reject the existence of real objective reasons - which 
someone has whether or not she recognizes them (Nagel 1986: 157, Korsgaard 1997: 223-4. Hampton 
1998: 97). Nagel seems to think the cornmonsense assumption that there are such things as objective 
reasons already rules out metaethical accounts which base normativity on motivating interests. But if 
reasons tum out to be interest-relational. like value, then the anti-foundationalist can articulate a realist 
account with the resources to distinguish considerations that one takes to be reasons from considerations 
2 This response is Kantian: it points toward a "transcendental argument" for foundationalism. 
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that really are reasons whether acknowledged or noto Then there would not be a primafacie presumption 
in favour of foundationalism. and Nagel will not be able to shirk the burden of analysis and argumento 
Even if we accepted Nagel' s foundationalist interpretation of reasons, we should still see bis 
reticence to provide anaIysis as untoward. Such omissions are dangerous in philosophy: they leave the 
door wide open for the possibility that an analysis of the concepts and a metaphysical account of the 
nature of the things themselves will demonstrate one' s theory to be subtly and deeply incoherent, like a 
theory that identified the mother-in-Iaws of bachelors. My aim is to show that once we understand what 
we mean by "reasons for action", and what a reason for action is, we recognize that Nagel's claims 
concerning the foundationaI character of reasons are incoherent. Reversing the burden of proof is a 
strategy that conceals that Nagel cannot explain what we mean by vaIue or reasons without revea1ing this 
incoherence. What is needed is the missing analysis of reasons. 
3. Analysis of reasons 
What are reasons? We must note an ambiguity in the term. Broadly speaking, reasons are 
answers to ''why'' questions and are thus explanations. Thinkers in antiquity seem not to have 
distinguished between reasons and causes as we do, and still today "reason" sometimes means "cause". 
We talk about reasons not only in the context of human thought and action, but also in the context of 
explaining the behaviour of nonsentient objects. The reason the tree fell is that the termites undermined 
it. The reason your car crashed is that your tyre blew out. Obviously we are not concemed with such 
explanatory reasons. 1s the distinction we are seeking to draw simply that between reasons for the 
behaviour of persons and reasons for the behaviour of objects? Davidson (1963: 34) for example 
identifies a reason as a belief-desire pair, on the ground that such a pair causaIly explains a person's 
behaviour to uso In the same spirit, Audi (1986: 512) identifies reasons as expressible byan infinitivaI 
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phrase: i.e. we can answer requests for explanation in the form "[In order] to p" This is to identify 
reasons for action with Aristotle's "final cause", or the end at which a person aims.3 
This is not the sense in which we are concemed with "reasons". These reasons explain why 
someone acted as they did - they are essentially oriented toward the third persono The reasons we are 
inrerested in are of concern to the agent herself prior to acting: they figure not in the explanation of why 
she acted thus, but rather in the explanation to her of why she should act thus.4 These reasons provide 
answers to the question "Why do thisT' rather than the questions "Why was this done?" and "Why did 
this happen?" We are interested in normatively explanatory reasons rather than causally explanatory 
reasons. 
Wbat is a reason in the normative sense? Nagel rightly wams against "Platonism" (1986:139) -
reasons cannot be construed as simple intrinsic or monadic entities. If this were right, upon the discovery 
of a reason for action, one could ask. ''What does this reason have to do with what 1 should do?" - or 
"What do reasons matter?" We can assume the following about reasons, in agreement with Nagel and 
other rationalists: a reason is something intrinsically relevant to the practical dehl>eration of a rational 
being. One logically cannot recognize something as being a reason, but fail to perceive it as having any 
bearing on deliberation. This is not to say that it is impossible to recognize a reason yet fail to act on it, 
nor to say that it is impossible to recognize a reason yet fail to be rnotivated by it. First, one can 
recognize something to be a reason, but not a reason for oneself - instead, a reason for someone else. 
This "someone else" need not be an actual person - it could be an imagined person (or an uninstantiated 
kind of person). The point is that to recognize sornething as a reason is to recognize it as having bearing 
on the practical deliberations of the person for whorn it is a reason. Hence it is misleading to talk about 
reasons per se. A reason is always a reason for sorne person or persons to do something - and any talk 
3 See also Smith 1994: 96 for an account of "motivating reasons" as psychological states. 
4 It is particularly puzzling that Audi doesn't recognize this, since he is an epistemologist. A reason for beliefis a 
fonn of nonnative reason, but cannot be described infinitivaIIy or identified with an end. The only such reasons 
we could give for holding a belief are "to avoid error", ''to onIy accept what is likely to be true", and the like. 
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about reasons that are for nobody and not for doing something is nonsensicaI. (This doesn't beg the 
question against Nagel's "agent-neutraI reasons": an "agent-neutraI reason" is a reasonfor any person to 
do something.) Second, it is not even true that we are necessarily motivated by recognition of reasons for 
ourselves - although we must recognize their relevance to our deliberations. An interest-relational theory 
of reasons can be objectivist, realist, and (motivation)-extemalist: it only spums Nagel' s 
foundationalism. 
We proceed best by turning to an empirical investigation of which things are reasons. As we 
have seen, Nagel initially (1970) introduces vaIue properties like goodness and badness as fumishing 
reasons. There is an element of truth to this. If 1 want to know why 1 should not take a certain job, there 
is a degree of justification given by a friend's answering, "Because it's abad job". The badness of the 
jobo we might say, gives me a reason for not accepting it. This provides sorne warrant for treating 
badness and other vaIue properties as objective features of objects that give reasons and justify certain 
judgements. But such answers are peculiarly unsatisfying. 1 will likely not accept "Because it's abad 
job" as providing a full reason, and will press my friend: '13ut why? What is it about the job that leads 
you to say it is bad?" Likewise, we are inclined to be scornful of the person who can supply no 
justification for a moral judgement other than the lame and dogmatic assertion "Because it' s wrongr' 
The mediocre justificatory function provided by vaIue judgements can be explained by the 
interest-relationaI theory of vaIue. In asserting that the job is bad, my friend is telling me that it is such as 
to frustrate sorne implicit interest, and if (as one would expect) the interest is an interest of mine, the 
utterance does indeed inform me that there is sorne reason for me not to talce it. 1 am not satisfied, 
however, because 1 do not know what the reason is - 1 do not know which interest rules against it, nor on 
what grounds it does so. (If 1 do accept my friend' s answer, it is only because 1 trust his judgement that 1 
have such a reason: 1 consider him to understand my interests and to be informed about the non-value 
character of the job.) If 1 do not know from the mere vaIue judgement what the reason is, only that there 
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is a reason according to my friend, then it cannot be the case that the reason consists in the job's being 
bad. Nagel must agree: 1 described how he now cIaims that to call pain "bad" is to say nothing more than 
that there exist reasons to seek ¡ts alleviation. This entails he can no longer hold that the reason pain 
should be alleviated is that it is "bad", since this would lead to vicious circularity. The language of value 
does not name reasons but alludes to the further presence of reasons. 
What in Nagel's mature view is the reason for alleviating pain, if not that it is bad? He has 
turned from the language of value to simple descriptions of fact, so that the reason for alleviating pain is 
simply that pain hurts, and the reason for prudently taking into consideration our future desires is simply 
that they are our future desires. Indeed, he is right to do so, since mere value judgements lead to a 
demand for further justification: "Why do you say it is bad?" When we demand an explanation why 
something is bad, we expect a response that describes sorne matter of fact. An adequate explanation why 
a job is bad might be, ''Y ou' 11 be forced to work regular unpaid overtime, and won' t have a tife outside 
of work". 1 willlikely accept this answer as providing a reason. 
On this showing, reasons are simple matters of fact or true propositions, formulable with a 
.. that ... " (Darwall 1983: 31, Smith 1994: 95) or a ''because ... '' expression. It is uncontroversial, in the 
nonmoral case at least, to assert further that there is nothing special about the facts invoked. Depending 
on context, any factual statement can constitute a reason. Evidently, however, not just any fact is a 
reason in any contexto N agel' s position is that certain simple matters of fact - for example that pain hurts 
or that torturing animals is cruel - constitute "objective" (foundational) agent-neutral reasons: reasons 
for anyone to alleviate, avoid, and eliminate such states of affairs. The plausibility of this cIaim depends 
upon what further requirement other than being a malter of fact we require in order to frame a necessary 
and sufficient condition for sornething' s being a reason. 
When presented with such a fact, one can of course demand further justification - as rny two 
year-old daughter is apt to do: "But why?" "But why does the fact that the job will consume rny life give 
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me a reason not to aeeept it?" ''Sut why does the faet that pain hurts give me a reason to seek to alleviate 
it?" This further demand will seern absurd in many eireumstanees. The friend who advises me against 
the job would no doubt be taken abaek by sueh a response - and after a moment' s disorientation, wouId 
probably respond with sornething like, "You want to have a life away frorn work, don't you?" If rny 
reply is '·no·'. then he will probably ehange his opinion. and no longer maintain that 1 bave that reason 
for refusing the job (aIthough he might then insist that 1 have reasons for baving this interest). In this 
case. the invoked faet only eounts as a reason for me in the eireurnstanee that 1 have the relevant 
interests. 
This aeeount lieenses the following interest-relational theory of what it is to be a reason. A 
reason is a matter of faet that reveals an objeet to stand in a eertain relation to an interest.5 A striking 
similarity will be notieed here with the interest-relational theory of value, whieh anaIyzes vaIue as a 
property based on a relation in whieh objects stand to interests. The relations referred to in the aeeount of 
reasons are preeisely the relations upon whieh the properties of value are based. A reason for x to y is a 
matter of faet that reveals y to stand in a vaIue relation with sorne interest z that x pos ses ses. Value and 
reasons are logieally eonneeted. 
In plainer language: you show me a reason for sorne aetion when you point out to me the value 
that aetion has relative to rny interests: a reason is a faet that reveals value. This does not mean, bowever, 
that reasons invoke value properties as such. or that value is logieally and metaphysieally prior to 
reasons. We have already seen that reason-staternents that employ value eoneepts are unsatisfaetory 
beeause they leave too much unexplained. Reasons are facts that enable one to recognize the vaIue, and 
value judgernents by themselves do not necessarily accomplish this (they report only the fact of 
valuableness, not the grounds of valuableness). Sinee the interest-relational theory gives a reduetive 
naturalistic defmition of value, there is a reduction-base that enables us to describe reasons without 
5 The classic articulation of this kind of account is provided by Williams (1980: 10 1). 
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reference to value as such. Stripped of value terms, we can define a reason as a fact that reveals an object 
to be such as to (satisfy, frustrate) an interest. 
We have to unpack what is signified by "reveals". Something being shown implies sorneone to 
whorn it is shown. Whether a fact reveals a value-relation to a person depends upon other information 
that person already possesses. Accordingly, the same fact might constitute a reason for one person but 
not for another who has exactly the same set of interests, in virtue of the fact that the latter lacks a crucial 
piece of information. For this person, the fact together with the missing information will constitute a 
reason. Consider James and Tracy waiting at a bus stop for a bus to take thern into campus. A bus pulIs 
up, and Tracy says to James: "That's the number eight bus". James nods uninterestedly. then notices 
Tracy looking at him expectantly. "So what?" he prornpts. "So the number eight bus goes through 
campus!" is the reply. Tracy thinks she ís providing James with a reason (to board the bus) when she 
describes the bus as the number eight, but fails to do so because of his lack of information. Her second 
statement, however, does provide him with such a reason, because it is the last piece of information 
needed for him to recognize the value ofboarding the bus relative to his interest in getting to campus. 
People can have reasons that they fail to recognize as reasons, and so a reason cannot simply be 
a fact that "reveals value" by contingently bringing it about that a person recognizes value. Reasons 
rather have the normative dimension that, when presented with them, one should recognize the value 
whether or not one does. Failure to recognize reasons doesn't entail one doesn't have them. 1 suggest that 
reasons reveal value-relations in a strong logical sense: they imply their existence. A reason for x to y ís a 
matter of fact that, in combination with information x already possesses, implies that doing y will satisfy 
sorne motivating interest of x. This detall is of note because it enables us to escape one foundationalist 
objection. Hampton (1998: 75-7) argues against naturalistic analyses of reasons on the persuasive ground 
that in order to capture the normativity of reasons they rnust appeal at sorne point to "correct 
deliberatíon". She points out that this appeals to a further reaIm of reasons and norms that cannot, she 
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cIaims. be interest-dependent. But we can avoid such circular definition of the normative byappealing to 
logical entailments. which (as I will argue further in chapter 5) do not invoke a higher leveI of 
normativity. 
To be a reason is to be a fact revealing an object to stand in a value-relation with an interest. To 
recognize something as a reason is to see it as such a revelation. That one recognizes something as a 
reason goes sorne way toward explaining why we make the decisions we do - recognition of reasons can 
motivate. But it is also easy to see. on this analysis. that the considerations we recognize as reasons may 
not really be reasons at all: they may not truly imply the value-relation we infer from thero. and they 
might be false propositions. therefore not facts. The interest-relational theory thus has a story to teH 
about objective and subjective reasons.6 as is necessary: the mere intuition that there are such things as 
objective reasons that we may or may not recognize and that may or may not influence our deliberation. 
does not necessitate acceptance of Nagel's foundational reasons that exist and have a bearing on our 
deliberations regardless of our interests.7 
If this theory of reasons is correct. accounts for the entire genus of reasons for action. and 
captures the content of the concept of reasons. then Nagel's doctrine of foundational or interest-
transcendent reasons is incoherent. Nagel cIaims that certain facts present reasons to anyone. regardless 
of their interests. But if the concept of a reason is simply the concept of a matter of fact revealing that 
sorne object stands in a value-relation to one's interests. then clearIy there can be no such thing as 
objective reasons in Nagel's foundationalist sense - in the same way that the notion of interest-
transcendent intrinsic value is incoherent if the concept of value is simply the concept of a relational 
6 By objective reasons. 1 mean the reasons one actually has whether or not one recognizes them (Smith's 
"normative reasons'" 1994: 95-6), and by subjective reasons 1 mean the reasons one thinks one has and may act 
on (Smith's "motivating reasons", although he misdescribes them.) 
7 1t is important to note just how objectivist this conception of reasons is. Many (including Williams himself: 
1980: 109, 1995: 187) suppose that a broadly Williams-esque analysis entails that it is a necessary condition onp 
being a reason for Ato ct>. that if A knows thatp and deliberates correctly, thenA is motivated to ct>. Hampton 
(1998: 57-8) rightly criticizes this assumption. Even is p is logically connected to sorne motivation of A, it 
doesn't follow that recognition of p wiII be rnotivating. 
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property consisting in the way sorne object stands to an interesL For Nagel's defense offoundationalism 
to succeed. there must be a defensible metaphysical account of reasons which allows that at least 
sometimes a reason is not a fact standing in such a relation to an interest. 1 shall consider Nager s 
account of reasons and the practical context in which they arise. to see whether he can accomplish this. 
Before 1 do so. however. there are a couple of natural objections to my analysis that require 
consideration. 
4. The problem of external reasons 
In Bemard Williams' terroso my interest-relational account ofreasons appears to recognize only 
"internal reasons". or reasons connected with a person's existing motivations and motivational 
dispositions. Put baldly. this interest-relationalist stance faces a certain pragmatic difficulty. The 
foundationalist (who advocates "external reasons" or reasons unconnected with one's motivations) 
sometimes. in exasperation. puts the following sort of challenge to the extemal-reasons skeptic: "Do you 
mean to say there was no reason for Hitler to refrain frorn genocide?" This "put your money where your 
mouth is" argument is ofien the most effective. The skeptic. really an ethical and humane persono is Ioath 
to assent - and this reIuctance appears to observers (and quite likely herself) as a state of aporia. an 
implicit concession of defeat. We do appear to ascribe such external reasons. as even Williams concedes. 
There is a subtle ambiguity at the heart ofthis eonfusion. 1 noted aboye that reasons are relative 
in (at least) two different respects - they are reasons for someone. and they are reasons for something. 
''Por sornething" has been glossed. so faro as sorne action on the part of the deliberating subject. But it 
can be taken more broadly. There is a reason (for me) for my watch to be five minutes fast. (That way 1 
am never late). Of course. this can also be described as a reason for me to keep my watch rnnning five 
minutes fasto The point here is that this nade of a reason-relation is ofien expressed as a faet or event 
rather than as an aetion. And that fact or event can be an action on the part of someone else. 
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We can distinguish, then, between the following two ways of amplifying the original utterance: 
"There is a reason for Hitler for Hitler to refrain from genocide" (or ''There is a reason for Hitler for 
refraining from genocide") and ''There is a reasonfor me (or us) for Hitler to refrain from genocide". 
The anti-foundationalist may wish to deny the former but not the latter. Her aporia signifies that the two 
have DOt been distinguished. For her simply to bite the bullet and assert, ''That' s right - there were no 
reasons for Hitler not to pursue genocide" would be for her to renounce her basic compassion for others. 
It is easy to appreciate how this ambiguity has remained hidden. Suppressing the reiteration of ''for 
Hitler" is entirely natural - but the result is that one cannot tell, from the utterance alone, which clause 
has been suppressed. Thus, the ''for Hitler to ... " of the event-clause can masquerade as expressing the 
subject-clause. Surely, one would think, it would be absurd to suggest that a reason for Hitler not to 
pursue genocide might not be a reasonfor Hitler not to pursue genocide. But in fact this is the case. 
This analysis supports the following distinction between internal and external reasons. An 
external reason for a person is a state of affairs that stands in a value-relation with interests which that 
persoD does not personally possess. An internal reason is a state of affairs that stands in a value-relation 
with interests that the person does personally possess. It is a fact, however, that we cornmonly do not 
recognize externa! reasons to be reasons at aH. An account of our linguistic practices is required 
analogous to that given for value in chapter 3. Talk about reasons is interest-relational, not subject-
relational. To say something is a reason simpliciter is to say it is a reason relative to the implicit interests 
of the discourse, and likewise to deny something is a reason is to deny that it is a reason relative to the 
implicit interests of the discourse. By explicitly relativizing reasons e'for him", "relative to that 
purpose") however, we recognize in our practice the metaphysical domain of reasons this theory maps 
out. 
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5. An objectionfrom motivating reasons 
The foundatiooalist may further object that the interest-reIational definitioo of reasons has been 
reached dogmatically, by generalization from a handfuI of carefully seIected exampIes. By assuming that 
reasoos are connected with interests, 1 have defined reasons in a way that arbitrariIy excIudes an 
important group of reasoos and thereby begged the question against my opponent. Darwall, for exampIe, 
builds on NageI' s position to preseot an argument for a wider definitioo of reasoos, and for the existence 
of reasons that doo't depeod upoo our interests. Nagel and Darwall accept the intemalist principIe that to 
be a reason something must be capable of motivating an actioo, and they further accept the principIe that 
all action requires a desire 00 the part of the subject: an equation that at first appears to force 00 us the 
anti-foundationalist concIusion that all reasons are based on interests. Nagel's cunning move, which 
DarwalI utilizes, is to point out that the desire might not be the source of the reason and its motivating 
power, but one of the effects of recognizing a reason.8 Reasoos would exist indepeodently of, and 
themselves motivate, interests. Darwall provides the following definition of reasoos: a reason for x is a 
coosideration that would motivate x when coosidered ratiooally, all eIse being equal (1983: 107). From 
Darwall's perspective, the interest-reIational theory ofreasoos begs the question against foundatiooalism 
by assuming that ioterests are the only sources of motivation. 
Darwall's and Nagel's arguments against the anti-foundationalist contention that reasoos are 
based 00 interests proceed by pointing out that some coosiderations motivate us without appealing to 
preceding interests we possess. Discovering certain facts can motivate compIeteIy oew interests. These 
coosiderations, on Darwall's definitioo, are thus reasons that do oot depend upon any interests we 
possessed. His position, we must note, is distinct from Nagel's: NageI cIaims that we can be motivated 
by the mere realization that something is a reason - we are motivated by a consideratioo because it is a 
reason. But by Darwall' s definition, it is rather the case that a consideration is a reason because it 
8 See also Smith 1994: 179, Brink 1997: 264. 
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motivates us (in ideal conditions). What motivates. for Darwall. is not the fact that a consideration is a 
reason. but sorne intrinsic features of the consideration itself. and he is quite prepared to recognize this 
motivation as based on contingent features of our dispositions for conative and attitudinal response. 
Does this account cause any problems for the interest-relational theory of reasons? Darwall 
believes it does. because it follows on rus account that we have reasons for wbich we may not at the 
present point in time have any corresponding interests. The mere fact that a consideration would 
motivate me were 1 to rationally consider it makes it a reason for me - but 1 do not possess such an 
interest until 1 consider it. He is right in thinking bis definition of reasons is incompatible with accounts 
such as the interest-relational theory. If such considerations are reasons for us. then we have reasons that 
transcend our present interests. And it looks like we must admit that such considerations are reasons. In 
wbich case. we have interest-transcendent reasons and anti-foundationalism is refuted. 
We can make an objection to any rationalist account of reasons wbich. like Darwall' s, identifies 
reasons as considerations that would motivate or justify for a completely rational agent. (ICorsgaard fits 
in this category too: she identifies reasons as motivations that survive rational reflection (1996a: 89»). 
This objection emerges in reply to a further attack on the interest-relational theory, which goes as 
follows. If 1 demand a reason why 1 should continue my studies toward my Ph.D., someone rrñght 
respond by pointing out that earning a Ph.D. entitles me to wear the doctoral regalia. 1 admit 1 have such 
an interest. This might appear to reveal a problem with the interest-relational account. 1 have been 
shown a consideration that stands in a value-relation with an interest 1 possess. hence a reason on my 
analysis. But, it is objected, this doesn't justify my continued study. The interest is too trivial, too 
outweighed. Reasons can't be generated by just any interest. 
However it is an assumption motivating the objection that is erroneous, not the interest-
relational account of reasons. 1 rrñght reply, to the proposed reason. that it is abad reason. To be abad 
reason is. however, still to be a kind of reason. Rationalist accounts cannot accommodate the distinction 
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between bad reasons and good reasons, unlike the interest-relational theory. The mistaken assumption is 
this: that to be a reason, sornething rnust justify sorne course of action. Only a good reason justifies an 
action, although any reason will provide at least sorne rneasure ofjustijication - Le. an at least minimally 
intelligible explanation of why one should. The rationalist might object that 1 am mistaking the 
significance of the distinction between "good." and "bad" reasons. Talk of '''ad'' reasons is just a 
misleading way of taIking abaut considerations that are no reasons at all. Indeed, 1 might respond instead 
"But that's no reason at all!" My intuition, however, is that such a response is partIy rhetorical. There is 
a genuine difference between considerations that are bad reasons (e.g. 1 should buy this car, because it 
will malee my friends envious) and considerations that are no reasons at all (e.g. 1 should buy this car, 
because today is Tuesday). The difference appears to be congruent with the interest-relational analysis. 
Anything is a reason that reveaIs a course of action to stand in a value-relation with sorne implicit 
interest. When evaluating reasons, we do so from the perspective of the interest we have in reasons: the 
interest in rmding a consideration that enables us to make a decision. A reason is good to the degree it 
satisfies that interest, bad (more accurately, "poor") to the degree it does noto 
Darwail' s account is vulnerable to a further argument aimed directly at bis definition of reasons 
as considerations that would motivate the agent on rational reflection. 1 find myself in the unusual and 
ironic position of being able to accuse the foundationalistlrationalist of "psychologism", or substituting a 
descriptive account for the required normative account of reasons. Rationalists are most insistent that to 
consider ethics from the perspective of "reasons" is to consider it frorn the inside, participant' s 
perspective. On Darwall's dermition, to ask for a reason is simply to ask for something that would 
motivate when considered in a certain way. But for the deliberator, this is to defer a judgernent 
concerning what should be done to a judgement of what would be done. This would be to see oneself as 
extemaIly moved, and base one's decisions on facts concerning contingent motivations. Reasons of 
Darwall's kind would not explain to agents why they should act accordingly. The interest-relational 
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account, although claiming a logical connection between reasons and interests, makes reasons a purely 
Iogical matter of implications conceming value, thus normative and not merely a descriptive fact about 
contingent motivational dispositions. 
DarwaIl's definition and argument therefore fail: we are motivated by considerations because 
they are reasons, so it cannot be the case that considerations are reasons because they motivate. NageI's 
original argument however stilI stands. Such considerations motivate us because they are reasons. But 
the motivation doesn't derive frOID any preceding interest we may have possessed. Therefore, we can be 
motivated by the pure recognition of a reason, without possessing any connected interest beforehand. 
Nagel gives us no definition of a reason, but he does thus offer an objection to the interest-relational 
definition, in the form of a kind of reason that it cannot accommodate. My response to this argument 
which follows is essentiaIly the same as Bemard Williams' (1980). 
The crucial claim in Nagel' s argument is that the motivation in such a case is a response to the 
recognition of the consideration being a reason. If he is right, 1 believe, bis argument worles. The interest-
relational account will concur with him that once the interest has been motivated, the consideration is a 
reason. But it must claim that the consideration is not a reason for a person until it has motivated such an 
interest - and therefore, that the motivation of the interest could not possibly be due to the recognition of 
a reason. The question therefore is whether such a consideration is a reason for a person before he or she 
acquires the interest. Nagel does not ask this question: he seems simply to assume that because it 
motivates, the consideration is indeed a reason.9 Note that unlike Darwall, however, Nagel can't have 
this simply faII out of the definition of reasons. Things may motivate us without being reasons. Is the 
assumption independently defensible? 
9 This assumption can perhaps be explained by the fact that, from bis point of view, he had already conceded the 
crucial premise of his opponent by granting that to be a reason it is necessary that a consideration be able to motivate 
- the objection blindsides mm. 
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One might suppose so. After all. the person in question will affirm the consideration to be a 
reason. Still. the question remains: is it a consideration tbat has been a reason all along for the person. or 
a eonsideration that has just become a reason? We should not deny tbat in being presented with tbe 
consideration the person is given a reason. The point we need to malee. however. is tbat there is a 
differenee between giving a person a reason. and showing a person tbat they already have a reason. 
Imagine an employee demanding of her employer a reason why she should work on New Year's Day. 
and the employer responding: "You want a reason? 1'11 give you a reason! How about 1 fue you ifyou 
don't?" The employer gives the employee a reason. not by showing her that she had one she had 
overlooked, but by changing the eircumstanees, so the employee acquires a new motivation and 
appreeiates a new fact tbat stands in a value-relation to it. A new reason has been ereated for her to work 
on New Year's Day. 
Nagel's correct contention that considerations can motivate new and non-derivative interests 
does not therefore establish that it is possible to recognize reasons that have no eonnection with one's 
existing interests. Motivating eonsiderations do not necessarily motivate because they are reasons, and 
Nagel's and Darwalrs arguments faíl to demonstrate that tbe interest-relational definition of reasons is 
inadequate. However. tbe foundationalists will eontinue to objeet that my analysis of the eoncept of 
reasons begs the question against them. sinee it is derived from a specific range of cases in which 
interests are decisive in determining reasons. When we consider different cases. sueh as those involving 
moral reasons, where this is not true, the analysis of reasons will no longer appear adequate, they will 
say, and the postulation of reasons that transeend interests will become more plausible. Reasons for 
taking ajob may be personal. but the faet that pain hurts constitutes a reason that is impersonal. 
Does the faet that pain hurts, and other such allegedly moral reasons, eonstitute reasons for us 
independently of our interests, or as a function of our interests, as my analysis eontends? Observe that 
the faet that pain hurts can constitute different reasons in different contexts. In the situation in whieh 1 
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have my hated enemy within my power, the fact that pain hurts constitutes for me a reason to inflict it -
due to its relation to my interest in doing him harro. And it is clear that the fact that pain hurts constitutes 
a reason for me to wish to avoid it given simply that 1 dislike pain, and also a reason for me to wish to 
alleviate or prevent it occurring to anyone for whom 1 careo The interest-relational theory can account for 
the reason-giving nature of the fact that pain hurts: in any context in which we care for the person in 
question, our concem turns the prospect of their pain into a reason for us to seek to prevent or alleviate 
it. 
The mere fact that the hurtfulness of pain constitutes a reason for us does not therefore lend any 
credence to the thesis of interest-transcendent reasons. Nagel and the foundationalist must furnish further 
reasons for taking there to be interest-transcendent reasons, since they can no longer claim to stand on 
the right side of the "burden of proof' issue. On an empirically based analysis of the concept of a reason, 
Nagel's postulated entities are logically incoherent The onus lies on Nagel and the foundationalists to 
demonstrate that we sometimes mean something else by "reasons", and that such things actuallyexist. 1 
now tum to his arguments to this effect. 
6. Reasons ami lmpartiality: lnterpreting practical reasoning 
The case for interest-transcendent objective reasons is based on an analysis of the practica! 
context in which they appear. Sentient creatures are the loci of countless impulses, inclinations, etc. that 
on a basic biologicallevel are able to directly motivate action. In higher forms of life, particularly human 
life, there is a capacity to attain sorne autonomy from such impulses and inclinations - a capacity that 
varies in degree and in some humans appears regrettably lacking, while in others is present to such a 
degree that it is arguably a vice. This capacity, which is the basis of our notions of ''free will" and "self-
control", is a distancing oneself from immediate detenmnation by such forces, so that given an 
inclination, attitude, or belief we can suspend action or assent and interpose a deliberative question: 
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should 1 act on tbis inclination, or accept tbis attitude or belie!? We can weigh and examine these c1aims 
on us in intelligent thought, reach a decision, and then act on trus rather than the impulse. It is in tbis 
context that taIk about reasons arises. When we reflectively distance ourselves from immediate 
impulses, we are looking for reasons, or justifications for making a decision one way or another. 
The concept of practical reasons suggests the possibility of escape frOID the doctrine of 
hegemonic interests (or "ruling passions"). For desires themselves have no binding authority in the court 
of "will" or practicaI deliberation. Given any interest 1 have, 1 can hold it at arms length and ask: "Why 
shouId 1 act on tbis? Why shouldn't 1 act on trusT - and even "ShouId 1 tolerate this desire, or shouId 1 
seek to extirpate it?" Reasons appear and take their place in oue practical lives when we stand back from 
immediate motivationaI pressuees and reflect or deliberate. Nagel describes this as the progressive move 
toward a position of greater impartialíty - and claims that practical deliberation is a process of seeking to 
attain an impersonal point of view so one can discem relevant reasons and act on them rather than sorne 
unreflective inclination or partíal perspective. He claims that to the impersonal perspective - in which 
one steps outside one's concems - reasons do not disappear altogether, but appear in the clearest and 
most objective light. The manifestation of reasons to the impersonal point of view is evidence that there 
exist interest-transcendent objective reasons, which are interest-independentIy normative. 
1 concede that reasons are relevant in fue context of a deliberative distancing of oneseIf from 
immediate motivational pressures, !O and that practical deliberation aims at attaining greater impartiality 
in order to more objectively judge between competing claims on one. But 1 challenge Nagel's portrayal 
of the "impersonal point of view" as absolutely impartial, disconnected frOID all interests, and his c1aim 
that reasons exist for such a point of view. My offensive is four-pronged: 1 have aIready (1) denied that 
the concept of "reasons" is even meaningful in a context of disinterest. 1 will now (2) attack the c1aim 
10 However, it is false that we only act on the basis of reasons when we reflect or deliberate. Every intentional 
action is motivated by perception of a reason, and cats and dogs no Iess than humans act on the basis of reasons. 
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that this kind of impartiality is the aim of practical deliberation; (3) the very possibility of such an 
impartial standpoint; and (4) the claim that such a standpoint could revea! reasons. 
Suppose 1 have a craving for ice cream. and looking in the freezer, notice lemonade concentrate, 
which arouses a craving for lemonade. Because 1 am not disposed to satisfy both cravings, 1 am 
presented with conflicting desires, and launch into a process of deliberation. 1 tum the desires for ice 
cream and lemonade into objects for practical reflection, and ask myself what 1 should do. Here, 1 have 
distanced myself from both desires and tumed to look for a reason to decide in the favour of one or the 
other. What sort of thing appears as a reason in this context? It might occur to me that 1 always feel ill 
after eating ice cream but refreshed after lemonade. This might be a reason for deciding to go with the 
lemonade. Altematively, 1 might reflect on the fact that the ice cream is ready to eat, while the lemonade 
requires preparation. 1 don't have time for the latter since 1 want to get back to my study, and so 1 have a 
reason for choosing the ice cream. Either of these reasons can be decisive in enabling me to reach a 
decision. What is happening here? I seek adjudication between conflicting interests, and do so, as Nagel 
maintains, by seeking higher, impartial ground independent of the two desires in question. But the 
reasons on which 1 malee my decision are not "impartial" in Nagel's absolute sense; they rather derive 
from further interests 1 have. 
This may seem unfair to Nagel, who might not resist the analysis. Impartiality is a matter of 
degree, he might reply (1986: 4-5), and deliberation aims at absolute transcendence of interest only as an 
ideal. My point is that it is appropriate to talk about impartiality in these contexts, but incorrect to claim 
this impartiality involves transcending all motivating interests. It is adequately explained as a retreat 
from certain interests to other interests, which arbitrate on disputes amongst the former. Impartiality in 
practica! reasoning is a relative, not an absolute, matter. Reasons onlyemerge out of impartiality as a 
function of the partiality contained therein. Nagel' s correct insistence on the importance of impartiality 
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does not establish the existence of interest-transcendent reasons, since bis construaI of impartiality as 
absolute transcendence of interests misrepresents practica! deliberation. 
According to Nagel, taking the impersonal point of view is ideaIly distancing oneself from aIl 
motivating interests. But how could we and why would we ever wish to do that? Nagel himself 
forcefully makes the point that practica! reasoning is not concemed with finding out what is the case, but 
with determining what to do (1986: 148), but he violates tlús insight by representing practica! reason as 
ideally removed from aIl motivation except that of discovering what there is "objective reason" to 
decide. Deciding what to do, for Nagel, is ideally attaining a state of complete disinterest and then asking 
"what should 1 do?" But deliberation and retlection are things we are motivated to do in certain 
circumstances. Why would we be motivated to attain an indifferent perspective? The answer appears to 
be: an indifferent perspective aIlows us to see without prejudice what is objectively true. Indeed, Nagel 
describes practica! reflection as an attempt to discover objective reasons, to find the normative truth 
(1986: 144-5).11 But from a practica! perspective, one can legitimately ask: why should 1 care about 
truth? If reasons were things that appear in the light of an interest in truth, one could question their 
relevance when pursuing sorne other end. Nagel does not sufficiently appreciate bis own observation that 
practica! reason is not about finding the truth but about determining what to do. 
What motive leads us to adopt the deliberative stance, in which we ask: "What should 1 do?" As 
the example aboye demonstrates, practica! reflection occurs when we are presented with a particular 
practica! problem: when sorne part of our motivationa! state is conflicted, or obsttucted, or confused. We 
are motivated to practica! reflection by the obstacles standing in the way of directly realizing our 
motivating interests. We do not ask, 4'What should 1 do?" in a motivationa! vacuum, an impersonal 
Archimedean point removed from aIl interests, but rather from a motivationa! state of confusion, 
conflict, or frustration. It is because we still have operative, motivating interests that we ask deliberative 
11 He is, 1 suggest, in the grip of a familiar philosophical prejudice with roots all the way back to Plato, Socrates, and 
Aristotle - a prejudice in favour of the motive to truth. 
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questions and can arrive at answers. Reasons are relevant to practical deliberation because they are 
revelations of facts abaut the relation of particular objects (especially actions) to motivating interests. 
Reasons. as I am painting thero. are always grounded in further. motivating interests. It is far 
from the case that Nagel has overIooked the possibility of such an explanation. He explicitly rejects it: 
It is not enough to find sorne higher arder desires that one happens to have, to settIe the matter: 
such desires would have to be placed among the background conditions of decision a10ng with 
everything else. Rather, even in the case of a purely self-interested choice. one is seeking the right 
answer (1997: 110). 
He justifies this with the- following argument: every interest can itself become the object of a 
demand for justification. so there are no higher-order interests that are not themselves normatively 
assessable - we have no "desires or dispositions to which normative assessment has no application" 
(1997: 110-1). Justification can therefore only be achieved by transcending such interests and finding 
foundational reasons: "Only ajustification can bring the request for justifications to an end". 
What is this argument supposed to establish? The correct observation that any interest can be 
subjected to a demand for justification is offered against the possibility of justification being based on 
higher order interests. But this is onlyan objection if it is supposed that these "higher arder interests" are 
"brute motivational data" (1997: 107) beyond the reach of normative assessment. which terminate the 
chain of justification. This is not necessary. however. to maintain the thesis this argument targets. which 
is simply that justification is in terms of interests. It is possible. for example. that we have an infinite 
regress of higher order interests - an altemative Nagel disdains to even mention. 
Nagel assumes a foundationalist model (in the normal epistemological sense) of justification 
here. (This is not question-begging against anti-foundationalism, since we are discussing two distinct 
types of "foundationalism"). He as sumes that justification-chains must come to an end somewhere - in a 
self-justifying justification. We might object that nothing could perform this function - but I suggest we 
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consider other models. such as infinite regress.12 It might seem, however. that here there is warrant for 
assuming the foundationalist model - since we have been speaking in terms of ''higher order interestsn • 
We surely have only a finite number of interests. and therefore an infinite regress is impossible.13 
The possibility Nagel disdains to mention - an infinite regress of higher order interests - is in a 
sense the correct solution. This seems to entail the absurdity of an infinite number of interests and 
hierarchical levels of interests. But it depends on the account one gives of being ''higher order". Nagel 
assumes the "order" of an interest is a fixed matter based perhaps on the relatively invariant structures of 
one' s preferences and psychology. Highest order interests would be perhaps those most deeply imbedded 
passions and impulses deriving from social conditioning or biological nature. or (as suggested by Wright 
Neely. Harry Frankfurt. and David Lewis) interests that take other interests as their objects. By "higher 
order". however. 1 mean only to refer to the particular motivational structure operating at the rnoment of 
deliberation. A "higher-ordern interest is simply one that the agent is not holding at a reflective distance. 
one that is rather sitting in judgement of the interest for which justification is demanded. 
This provides a coherentist, rather than a foundationalist, account of justification. Interests can 
justify each other reciprocally. and the overall system of interests constitutes a dynamic. self-scrutinizing 
network. The foundationalists' cIaim that normativity cannot be outstripped - that it is always legitimate 
to ask for justification for any interest - will get thern nowhere (or perhaps take them around in circles). 
It might be true that we refer questions of justification for our immediate interests to sorne grand 
overarching interest - as 1 do when 1 j udge between my impulses on the basis of my long-term interest in 
becoming a professional philosopher - but it is also true that we can refer questions of justification for 
our tife-plan to our more rnundane interests - as when 1 justify rny pursuit of professional philosophy by 
the daily satisfactions and stimulations that 1 anticípate from that occupation. The project of adjusting 
12 David Copp (1995: ch. 3) defends an infinite regress model ofjustification. 
13 Of course, an infinite regress of potential interests would not be impossible. Hut 1 do not believe that 
something could be j ustified for a person merely in light of his or her potentiaI interests. 
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our interests in the light of justification is best modelled by Neurath' s boat, rebuilt plank by plank while 
at sea, than by the foundationalist conception of the edifice built upon solid rock. 
NageI attacks the thesis that aII justification is based on interests, but he onIy pro vides 
arguments against the different thesis that aII justification has an unconditional foundation in interests 
not themselves normatively assessable. Tbe anti-foundationalist neither need nor should malee this 
second c1aim, since a coherentist model of justification is preferable. Nagel has therefore failed to 
provide an argument to trouble the anti-foundationalist's account of normative reflection, and an 
argument to justify his claim that the quest for justification is at least sornetimes a quest for justification 
transcending all interests.14 
7. Facts about interests aren't reasons 
On the basis of this interest-relationaI analysis of the practicaI context in which reasons are 
significant, we can cast light on sorne problems concerning the relationship between reasons and 
interests - problems that NageI and others believe confront interest-based accounts, but which really 
confront foundationalist accounts of reasons. The foundationalist holds that reasons have no essential 
connection with interests. Nagel is quite typicaI, however, in holding that many of our reasons do derive 
from our interests.15 We migbt think this commits him to two distinct species of reasons that 
metaphysically have little in common - but this is not so, since Nagel actually rejects even the interest-
relational anaIysis of how our i1lterests provide us with reasons. If we have a reason on the basis of an 
interest, it is a reason that arises from the fact we have interests, just as reasons we possess 
independently of our interests arise from certain facts alone. On his account of prudence, for example, 
14 Nagel's foundationalist model assumes the possibility of absolute justification, or interest-transcendent 
normative truth. Coherence theories in epistemology ofien receíve the objection that coherence of belief is no 
indication of truth of belief, but thís may not carry over to an objection against a coherence theory of normativity. 
Anti-foundationalism, as 1 explain in chapter 5, denies there ís any interest-transcendent normative truth, or that 
this is the aim of practical thought. 
15 For example 1997: 102, 120; 1986: 150, 153, 156. 
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the mere fact that 1 will in the future have sorne interest provides me with reasons to pursue its future 
satisfaction in the present. independentIy of any interests that presentIy motivate me. Just how plausible 
is his account of how OUT interests provide us with reasons? 
One might roughIy say that on the interest-relational analysis. the fact 1 desire sorne object 
provides me with a reason to pursue it. Indeed. many philosophers incIuding Nagel (1986: 152) cIaim 
that facts about our desires give us reasons to act accordingly. Robert Audi proclaims this to be an axiom 
of practica! reason (1989: 2). The rationalists Korsgaard (1996a: 93. 97) and Hampton (1998: 52. 92) 
even les s plausibly say that desires can be reasons (after rational endorsement). A desire inclines us 
toward sorne action directly. But in reflection. we distance ourselves from it and we ask for justification 
- for reasons for endorsing this desire. Those who accept desire as a direct source of reasons cIaim that 
the mere consideration that we have such a desire provides a reason to satisfy it. But why should this be? 
Why shouId a simple matter of fact justify such a judgement? The ooly practica! weight of a desire as 
such is its direct motivational force. and so it is difficuIt to see why we should give desires any authority 
when we are reflectively holding that motivational force at arms length. Some philosophers have thereby 
argued that desires or facts about desires aren't reasons at all (Quinn 1993 - whom Nagel in fact cites 
approvingIy; Herman 1996: 40). 
1 concUf. The mere fact that we harbour certain interests need not constitute any reason with 
direct bearing on our practical deliberation. This is the error of ethical naturalism (to be distinguished 
from metaethical naturalisrn). which attempts to derive a normative principIe from a psychological or 
biological fact. According to ethical naturalism. the fact that we desire sorne object provides a reason to 
pursue that object. On one reading. for example. Nietzsche can be seen as cIaiming that because we are 
will to power. therefore we should seek power. Aristotle can likewise be interpreted as cIaiming that 
because we have a certain natural function we shouId seek to perform it well. Less controversially, 
ethical hedonism cIaims that because we desire pleasure we should pursue pleasure. But as the 
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foundationalist and Nagel (1997: 105) insist. normativity can never be outstripped by description. Given 
all the facts, we still have to determine what to do. 
Isn't the interest-relational account of reasons implicated here too, since it makes all normativity 
rest on interests? It is true that on the interest-reIational interpretation, we only have reasons because we 
have interests, but it is mistaken to as sume this entails that the interest-relational theory must identify 
facts about our interests as reasons. Observe that the c1aim of interest-relationalism on this point is 
distinct from the straigbtforward c1aim of ethical naturalisID. Rather than asserting that the fact that I 
have sorne interest in an object constitutes a reason for me, it asserts that a faet about an object which 
reveals it to be such as to satisfy my interests constitutes a reason for me, in virtue of my interests. If 1 
have a desire to eat an apple, then the fact that this object on the tabIe is an apple constitutes a reason for 
me to pick it up and eat it. Should 1 inform a friend of my desire to eat an apple, for example, and my 
disappointment that there are no apples in the house, she provides me with a reason for action when she 
points to an object and says, <That's an apple.,,16 
We can explain this in terms of the distinction made aboye between implicit or operational, 
motivating interests, and the interests we reflectiveIy distance ourselves frOID. As 1 argued, when we 
engage in practical deliberation conceming any interests, we hold those interests at arms length, and then 
evaluate them in the light of other interests from which we are not dissociating ourselves at that time. It 
is like a society meeting to make a decision about the expulsion of one member. The member in question 
is provisionally excluded from the group while the rest make a deeision on whether to allow him to 
remain. Although he is still a member of the group, he gets no vote on this particular question. 17 We 
16 We sometimes do cite facts about interests as reasons. "Why did you do it?" ''Because I wanted to." Sometimes 
such responses are simply rejections of the request foc justification, deliberately offering an uninformative causal 
explanation rather than the invited normative explanation. But at other times, facts about interests really are 
reasons. If I want to be a devil-may·care egoist the fact that I want to do something gives me a reason to do it, in 
virtue of my desire to do whatevec I desire. 
17 The actual deliberative situation is afien not as clear-cut as depicted here, which helps explain why the error of 
ethical naturalism has been made. When we deliberate over certain interests, those same interests may still be 
operative, and sit in judgement of thernselves and their rivals. This generates an instrumental reason for deciding in 
130 
possess reasons only on the basis of our still operative interests, not in virtue of the interests over which 
we are deliberating. The normative point of view is the motivated point of view. 
Both sides in this controversy are holding onto truths. No fact that we have some interest 
constitutes a reason (unless that fact reveaIs the interest itself to stand in a value-relation with some other 
interest), but it is nonetheless true that we have reasons in virtue of our interests - reasons are things that 
appear from the perspective of interests. The significance of this here is that Nagel errs in considering 
the objection to provide support to bis foundationalist account over its anti-foundationalist rivals - the 
reverse is true. The only way in wbich our interests provide us with reasons, on bis account, is precisely 
the way that is illegitinlate. But the interest-relational theory, wbich cIaims that interests are necessary 
for having any reasons, need not identify any facts about our interests as reasons. 
8. The arguments from the impersonal point ofview 
1 have demonstrated Nagel's cIaim that practical deliberation is characterized by an ideal of 
absolute impartiality to be false, and bis interpretation of the deliberative situation to be fundamentally 
rnistaken. This undermines foundationalism' s cIaims that our everyday practices and intuitions provide a 
primafacie case for the existence of interest-transcendent objective reasons and value, and that any anti-
foundationalist account must deny the appearances. 1 wiIl now address the foundationalist cIaim that the 
absolutely impersonal point of view reveals the existence of such reasons and value. In the light of the 
preceding discussion we may be skeptical of this cIaim, but even if absolute detachment does not have 
the importance in practica! deliberation wbich Nagel assigns it, it does not follow that there is no such 
thing as an impersonal point of view in bis sense, nor that there are no such things as foundational 
reasons that are manifest to such a perspective. 
favour of the interest in question: deciding to pursue that interest is a means to something 1 am motivated toward. 
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Here, however, the foundationalist is struggling against the prima facie appearances, as Nagel 
admits: 
... the cIaim that there are objective values is permanently controversial, because of the ease with 
wbich values and reasons seem to disappear when we transcend the subjective standpoint of om 
own desires. It can seem, when one looles at tife from outside, that there is no room for values in 
the world at all. (1986: 141-also 146). 
From such a perspective (the "point of view of the universe" or "objective standpoinf') it can 
seem as if nothing matters, and there are no reasons: nihilism approaches. Throughout history, countless 
philosophers and mystics in different intellectual traditions have come to this conclusion, but Nagel 
believes they were all mistaken. Evidently he will need a strong argument. 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the suggestion that reasons appear from an impersonal point 
of view as Nagel presents it. 1 will distinguish three separate arguments to this effect that he provides. In 
1986, he argues for the manifestation of objective reasons to the impersonal standpoint in the following 
way. He observes that our basic responses to pain are not egoistic or self-referring - they are simply 
responses to pain itself, or the idea of pain, and are too simple to be qualified as responses to "pain for 
me" etc. Our experience of the badness of pain, he infers, does not in the first instance generate 
subjective reasons (a reasonfor me to avoid my own pain) - but an objective reason, a reason to avoid 
pain as such, and he claims it is onIy because of this fact that we can derive a subjective egoistic reason 
to avoid pain. Impartiality thus allegedly reveals the existence of objective reasons. 
When the objective self contemplates pain, it has to do so through the perspective of the sufferer, 
and the sufferer's reaction is very cIear. Of course he wants to be rid of this pain unreflectively -
not because he thinks it would be good to reduce the amollOt of pain in the world. But at the same 
time bis awareness of how bad it is doesn't essentialIy involve the thought of it as bis. The desire 
to be rid of pain has only the pain as its object. This is shown by the fact that it doesn't even 
require the idea of oneself in arder to make sense: if I lacked or lost the conception of myself as 
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distinct from other passible or actual persons, 1 could still apprehend the badness of pain, 
immediately. So when 1 consider it from an objeclive standpoint, the ego doesn't get between the 
pain and the objective self. My objective attitude toward pain is rightly taken ayer from the 
immediate attitude of the subject. To regard pain as impersonally bad from the objective 
standpoint does not involve the illegitimate suppression of an essential reference to the identity of 
its victim. In its most primitive form, the fact that it is mine - the concept of myself - doesn 't 
come into my perception of the badness of my pruno (1986: 161) 
1 cancur with the portrayal of responses to pain as in the first instance impersonal and non-
egoistic. Just the idea of pain can cause us to wince - no matter whose. But note what constitutes the 
"impersonal perspective" in this contexto The point of view is impersonal in not being concemed about 
its self. It is no part of the assumed scenario that this perspective incorporates no interests or motivational 
dispositions - and if it were, Nagel's cIaims would be far less plausible. It is the latter characteristic, of 
course, that is essential to the impersonal perspective as we are - and Nagel was - pursuing it. To 
determine that there are interest-transcendent reasons, we have to determine that they would be pertinent 
to a point of view that had no interests. The "impersonal" response to pain in this new non-egoistic sense 
however could simply be the result of contingent interests and dispositions. 
Nagel is guilty af equivocation over the term "impersonal", wbich can mean (in bis usage, odd 
as it is) (1) being uninfluenced by interests; and (2) being blind to whether the subject in question is 
oneself or another. It is only the fonner kind of impersonality that could pro vide evidence for the 
existence of interest-transce1Zdent reasons. On cIose scrutiny this confusion appears to run deep in 
Nagel's philosophy. It is revealed in bis opaque and puzzling cornment, <'The issue, in a nutsheIl, is 
whether the first person, singular or plural, is biding at the bottom of everything we say or think" (1997: 
3). He construes the issue between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as whether our practices 
and speech are essentially self-referring - but this is no part of the cIaim of anti-foundationalism per se, 
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and certain not of the theory 1 champion. He has confused the position that all value and reasons are 
based on interests with the position that all value and reasons are egoistic.18 
We should therefore insist that an argument from the impersonal point of view must rather 
maintain that when the worId is observed from a perspective devoid o[ any interests and contingent 
dispositions [or the same, certain facts directly present that point of view with reasons for sorne attitude 
or action. This is a second argument from the impersonal point of view. The mere fact that pain is bad-
or that pain hurts - is sufficient to give apure observer a reason to want its alleviation, wherever it is 
suffered. Indeed, this appears to have been what Nagel had in mind in 1970. If this claim were correct, 
then Nagel has strong, if not incontestable, evidence for the existence of interest-transcendent value and 
reasons. 
However, he seems to have backed down from this claim, and has actually asserted to the 
contrary that from such a perspective pain would simply seem alien, and accordingly would not directly 
present absolute impartiality with any reasons. He states "It is true that with nothing to go on but a 
conception of the world from nowhere, one would have no way of telling whether anything had value" 
(1986: 147). It is in actual, interested human perspectives that pain, for example, is experienced and 
suffered, and recognized as of negative value and as presenting reasons. Nagel softens the distinction 
between personal and impersonal perspectives, claiming that for the impersonal perspective, taking as it 
does as wide a view of reality as possible, one of the things that there are in the world is particular 
personal perspectives, and accordingly an inforrned impersonal perspective will take heed of them: ''But 
an objective view has more to go on, for its data include the appearance of value to individuals with 
particular perspectives, including oneself' (1986: 147). Not being able to comprehend the nature of pain 
by its own resources, the impersonal perspective will concede to personal perspectives authority over the 
18 This libellous confusion is characteristic of foundationalists. Darwall (1983: 20) labels the anti-foundationalist 
position the "self-centred" view. Nagel elsewhere (1996: 207) labels anti-foundationalism "egoism". This is a 
remnant of the false theory of psychological hedonism, subscribed to by Kant among others. 
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true nature of pain, and thus will come to perceive pain as bad, and recognize the existence of an 
objective reason to alleviate pain (1986: 161). Count this as the third argument frorn the impersonal point 
ofview. 
This is an outrageous maneuver. In resorting to ir, Nagel can no longer with propriety claim that 
there are interest-transcendent reasons on the basis ofthe claim that there are reasons that are manifest to 
the impersonal perspective. For, on rus own admission. these reasons are not perspicuous to impartiality 
at all, but are adopted by it on the authority of personal perspectives. AccordingIy, any claim that 
interest-transcendent reasons exist depends upon the authority of the testimony of personal perspectives 
that this is the case. And of course, this is a road into Big Trouble. Tbe impersonal perspective is 
invoked in the first place as providing the authority for the existence of interest-transcendent reasons that 
personal perspectives could not, for the very reason that they were interested. Now Nagel needs sorne 
means of arguing that the manifestation of reasons to personal perspectives in sorne way gives evidence 
of the interest-transcendence of sorne of those reasons. Like other foundationalist realists. he believes 
there is a way to establish this - by appeal to the phenornenological character of the experience of value 
and reasons. 
9. The phenomenological argument 
Nagel's case rests upon claims concerning the subjective experiential character of our 
encounters with reasons and value. Like many other foundationalists. 19 he claims that attention to the 
intrinsic character of the experience itself pro vides evidence that value and reasons transcend our 
interests. This is to tum to the phenomenology of value and reasons. This argument maintains that when 
19 A similar point is found in J. S. Mill, when he claims it is objectively better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied. He argues for this conclusion from our conviction that it is intrinsicallya better thing to be a wise unhappy 
human than a happy swine. David Wiggins (1976) likewise utilizes the phenomenological argument, claiming that 
our preferences cannot simply be our preferences, but also must strike us as objectiveIy preferable - or eIse we 
wouIdn't be able to reflectively endorse them. 
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we experience sorne kinds of reasons, we experienee thern not as mere products of our rnotivating 
interests, but as an aspect of the objective charaeter of the object itself. When we react to pain as 
sornething bad and to be avoided, we don't do so simply because we do not like it. Rathec, we do not like 
it because of sornething about the pain itself.20 Aeeordingly, the foundationalist argues, an analysis of 
value oc reasons that denies their interest-transeendent eharacter ventures into Ha denial of the 
appearances" (1986: 145), since these appearances "present themselves witb sorne pretensions of 
objectivity to begin with" (1986: 149). Thus, 'Witbout sorne positive reason to think tbere is notbing in 
itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like oc dislike, we ean't seriously regard the 
common impression to the contrary as a eollective illusion" (1986: 157-8). 
It is difficult to know how to take tbis argument. Early in the twentietb century, it was taken to 
indicate the existence of separate, non-natural value-qualities by philosophers like G. E. Moore and Max 
Scheler - who claimed to pereeive value qualia distinct frorn any natural quality of the object. We have 
already examined the implausibility of non-naturalisrn in ehaptec 2, but it is wortb reiterating here that 
the postulation of separate value qualia is highly suspieious and easily denied, and that the consequential 
aspect of value discernment rnakes it redundant. Modem foundationalists like Nagel do not, with good 
reason, advocate such qualia. But it is difficult then to know what they mean by their cIaim that the 
experience of value and reasons is an experience of the objective character of objects. For as it turns out, 
the interest-relational theory also makes tbis phenornenological claim true. Since value is constituted by 
relations between interests and objeets based on intrinsic features of those objects, it follows that objects 
qualify for value-aseription - and matters of faet qualify as reasons - in virtue of intrinsic, objective 
features they possess (the element of truth 1 identified in naYve naturalisrn). To determine tbe value of 
something or the reasons that sorne state of affairs presents is thus to attend to the intrinsic character of 
20 Note however the folIowing incornmensurable statement: "1 have claimed that sensory experiences which we 
strongly lilce or dislike simply in themselves have agent-neutral value because afthase desires" (1986: 167). 
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states of affairs in the world. and attention to value therefore has an objective or worId-directed 
character. 
It is coherent to assert that sorne object would still possess the same value that 1 now ascribe to it 
even if rny interests were different than they actua1ly are. since it would still stand in the same value-
relations with the implicit interests of this contexto The intuitive correctness of such assertions has long 
been taken as evidence for the interest-transcendence of value and reasons, but this is a mistake. I 
maintain that any objectivity appropriately ascribed to value and reasons is objectivity that the interest-
relational theory can account for, and any objectivity it cannot account for is objectivity only 
inappropriately ascribed to value and reasons. I suggest that the phenornenological argument is aimed 
specifica1ly at the various forms of noncognitivism which interpret the language of value as principa1ly 
expressing one's own attitudes or states of mind rather than ascribing sorne property to the objects in 
question. and the Humean anti-realisrn that declares vice to be found not in the object judged. but only in 
the sentirnents of the judge. This presents no difficulties for the interest-relational theory, which concurs 
with the realist critique of noncognitivism and anti-realism. If so, then the use of the phenomenological 
argument against anti-foundationalism in general and the interest-relational theory in particular is a 
misuse of the argumento 
Since the foundationalists cannot advacate either the non-naturalist or the interest-relational 
account of these phenomena, it is necessary that they provide sorne altemative account of how value and 
reasons are experienced as phenomenologically objective. Such an account is conspicuously lacking, and 
their strategy seems to be simply to reiterate their formulas, resisting any demand to provide analysis of 
what those formulas mean or what the concepts of reasons and value are. There is, however. another 
form of phenomenological argument for foundationalism that facuses on the nature of obligation (Kant; 
Hampton 1998). This is ofien seen as the hardest case for anti-foundationalism, and the plausibility of 
the interest-relational theory depends in part upon its ability to account for this phenomenon. To solve 
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the problem of the phenomenology of obligation. however. we need first to have examined the general 
nature of normativity. which is the subject of the next chapter. 1 have therefore placed my treatment of 
the argument from obligation in Appendix B. 
Obligation aside. 1 have provided an analysis of reasons for action according to which they are 
objective and real. and yet interest-relational. 1 have argued that the foundationalist interpretation of 
reasons is erroneous, and that a more judicious interpretation supports the anti-foundationalist case of the 
interest-relational theory. Reasons are conceptualIy dependent upon interests, and we can have no 
reasons for action unconnected with having sorne interest. Value also, therefore, as an objective property 
of things that is intrinsicalIy reason-giving. cannot ever be interest-transcendent. 
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s. PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMATIVITY 
l. The rationalist ehallenge 
If both value and reasons are interest-relational, then the anti-foundationaIist, who denies 
there is any normative standpoint external to interests, may be excused for believing his case 
established against the foundationalist, who claims that there are such interest-independent 
standpoints for vaIue judgement. However, even if my analysis has been correct so far, 
foundationalism is not yet refuted. There is a gap of explanation between the discrimination of value 
and reasons for action, and the actual matter of deliberation and practicaI choice. For the mere 
recognition of vaIue, and of reasons, does not of itself determine practical questions - which concern 
what one should do. It follows neither from the fact that sorne state of affairs is good, nor from the 
fact that we have a reason to bring it about, that we should in fact seek to bring it about. Due to the 
complex nature of our interests or motivational sets, many different things possess vaIue for us, and 
the world presents us with varied and conflicting vaIues and reasons for action. Facts about value and 
reasons are just the primary input or data upon which our practica! reasoning operates. They can be 
likened to the premises taken into consideration in theoretical reasoning (aimed at determining what is 
true). Deliberation or practical reasoning is the activity which reaches a conclusion from this input-
in the form of a deontic judgement (concerning what one "should" do), a decision conceming what to 
do, or an action. 1 This character of should-ness, which certain courses of action possess, is what is 
meant by the ofien used, rarely explained word "normativity". Basically, it is the character of being 
practicalZy correet, whatever this means. 
Foundationalism can surrender value and reasons for action to anti-foundationalism, and 
make a stand on the ground of practical reason and normativity. Drawing the analogy with theoretical 
1 There has been sorne dispute over which of these is the true concIusion of practica! reasoning. For our purposes 
it is unnecessary to determine this. 
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reasoning provides this opportunity. In the case of theoretical reasoning, premises by themselves can 
never be sufficient to generate conclusions. To be able to do anything with premises, we additionally 
need rules of inference, which cannot themselves be treated as further premises without precipitating 
a vicious infinite regress.2 These rules of inference (laws of logic) are (it is claimed) objective, 
rational principIes or norms, adherence to which is necessary in order to be engaged in reasoning at 
aIl. If we are to construe observations conceming value and reasons as premises in practical 
reasoning, then it appears we will need rules of practicaI inference (laws of deontic Iogic), adherence 
to which is constitutive of and therefore necessary for any type of practical reasoning whatsoever 
(Dreier 1997). 
Foundationalism of practical reason accordingly maintains that there are principIes which 
have an authority over us transcending and independent of our interests: principIes upon which 
depend all judgements of practicaI reason. Normativity derives from these interest-transcendentaIly 
authoritative norms. "Should" and the other deontic operators e'must", "may", etc.) are terms that 
express the commands of objective reason. This provides two levels of foundationalisrn: frrst, the 
rational principIes themselves, the rules of practical inference, are strongly interest-independent. No 
matter what interests one has, one must accept them. Second, (at Ieast sorne of)3 the conclusions of 
practical reasoning - reached jointIy from interest-relational premises and interest-independent rules 
of practical inference - are weakly interest-independent. Because they derive from value andlor 
reasons for action, which are interest-reIational, they only appIy to us as a result of our possessing 
certain interests. However, their requirernents can diverge from our interests as they also depend on 
2 This is famously demonstrated by Lewis Carroll's tale of Achilles and the Tortoise. Confronted with a valid 
modus ponens argument, the Tortoise suggests the principie of modus ponens be added as a premise rather than 
simply assumed legitirnate. AchilIes obliges, but the Tortoise is then able to point to a higher-order modus 
ponens which is now required in order to reach the conclusion. 
3 There rnight be sorne deontic laws that operate directly on facts independent of one's interests to generate 
deontic conclusions. This view is he Id at least by Nagel. 
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the interest-transcendent principIes of practical inference. These insert an objective normativity that 
transcends our set of interests. 
Rationalists push this point for the existence of interest-transcendent practicalIaws, believing 
that the rational requirements of prudence and instrumental (or rneans-ends) rationality, at Ieast, are 
established thereby. Many (such as Kant, Korsgaard, NageI, and Hampton) hoId out for the further 
hope that a substantive moral code can be based on such a foundation. Indeed, even most neo-
Humeans have conceded this rnuch to rationalism (ofien unwittingly) - that there are such 
authoritative principIes of instrumental reason. According to an instrumentalist ethical theory, what 
we should do is whatever is rnost conducive to getting what we most want. It relies upon the 
instrumental norm: the principIe that one ought to take the means to one's ends. Rationalists, 
including Korsgaard (1997: 217-8) and Hampton (1995, 1998), have taken pains to point out that the 
anti-foundationalist is not entitled even to the instrumental norm. According to anti-foundationalisrn, 
all normativity derives frorn the motivational force of sorne interest. The normativity of the 
instrumental norm must derive frorn sorne interest. But all interests are contingent: therefore, the 
authority of the instrumental norm must itself be contingento This is unacceptable. The anti-
foundationalist who sees no problern in the requirement of instrumental rationality has, it seems, been 
deceived by the fact that the conclusions of instrumental reasoning are only weakly interest-
transcendent into believing that they are not interest-transcendent at alL This is to mistake a rule 
whose application depends upon an interest but whose normativity transcends it, for a rule whose 
normativity is dependent on sorne interest.4 
~ It may be helpful to consider a similar mistake in epistemology. Intemalists hold that epistemic justification is 
relative to an agent's own perspective; externalists hold that it is independent of such perspective. Coherentism, 
or the theory that epistemic justification consists in coherence amongst beliefs, is often taken to be a purely 
internalist position: but this is mistaken. The principIe of coherence is supposed to be constitutive of epistemic 
justification for an agent regardless of whether that agent views it as such or not: in other words, it is an external 
norm. It gives the appearance of being internal since it refers to the agent's situation in its contento 
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Very few philosophers, therefore, have been fully conscious anti-foundationalists about 
practical reason.5 Hume himself is a notable exception. Sorne as tute philosophers6 point out that, 
unlike modern Humeans and contrary to the usual reconstructions of Hume's philosophy, Hume 
himself rejected the notion of an interest-transcending (rational) normative instrumental principIe. It 
has been c1aimed that he explicitly rejected the existence of such a principIe, but so far as 1 am aware 
this is not true.7 However such a rejection seems to be directIy implied by bis stance on the practical 
role of reason in general: 
'Tis not contrary to reasoD to prefer the destruction of the whole worId to the scratching of my 
finger. 'Tis Dot cootrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness 
of an lndian or persoo wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as IittIe contrary to reason to prefer eveD 
my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the 
former than the latter. (1739: 416). 
Reason is the discovery of truth Oí falshood. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or 
disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. .. Now 
'tis evident Ollí passioos, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or 
disagreement ... 'Ti s impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be 
either contrary or conformable to reasoo. This argument. .. proves directly, that actions do not 
derive their merit from a conformity to reason, Dor their blame from a contrariety to it; and it 
proves the same truth more indirectly, by shewing us, that as reason can oever irnmediate1y 
500 this point see also CuIlity & Gaut 1997: 6-7. 
6 Including Hampton 1995, 1998; MilIgram 1995. 
7 Hampton 1998: 137-140 (also 1995: 63-65) interprets Hume as rejecting the rational authority of the 
instrumental norm when he writes "'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser 
good to my greater. .. " (1739: 416). She interprets "adrnitted greateí good" as "end", admitting the passage is 
obscure. But it is not true that an adrnitted greater good must be one's end, since one can malee judgements from 
the perspective of interests which do not match ooe's motivational seto She also interprets Hume as talking about 
instrumental irrationality when he writes that "Men often act knowingly against their interest: For which reason 
the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them." (1739: 418). Again, we must reply that 
the concepts of a greatest possible good and an end are not equivalent. "Interest", furthermore, is ambiguous, and 
here refers to objective interests, such as could be ascribed to a tree. 
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prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it. it cannot be the source of 
moral good and evil ... (1739: 458). 
Hume thus rejects the idea of rational requirements on conduct and deliberation altogether -
even the instrumental principIe ofien naively attributed to him. It is this stanee that the rationalists 
seek to prove mistaken, and they strive to make others see that they must choose between the full-
blown heresy of Hume and the aeceptance of at least sorne norms with interest-transeending 
normativity or authority. The latter hom is, they believe, irresistible,8 and their hope is that this 
pro vides the leverage by which anti-foundationalism can be vanquished for good. 
In this chapter, 1 argue on the side of Hume against the rationalists for the radically anti-
foundationalist theses that there are no interest-transeendent rules of practical inference, and that 
normativity is entirely derivative upon and explicable in terms of interests. It might be desired that 1 
address each alleged principIe of practical rationality individually. 1 will not attempt this. Instead, 1 
will investigate the instrumental norm, or hypothetical imperative,9 alone. The hypothetical 
imperative is the most widely accepted principIe of practical rationality - indeed as 1 have said, it is 
accepted almost universally even by the followers of Hume, and rationalists consider it unthinkable to 
deny it (Dreier 1997: 90-94, Korsgaard 1997: 215, 1986: 319). Refutation of its claim to interest-
transcendent normativity provides a good inductive case for the non-existence of any such rational 
norm, and strikes a blow to foundationalism. Furthermore, the details of the analysis of the 
instrumental norm illustrate the fundamentals of a non-rationalist, interest-relational account of the 
essence of normativity, easily extrapolated to deal with any alleged rational norm. Toward this end, 1 
8 Millgram (1995: 87) quotes Nicholas Sturgeon as writing, "[Hume's] 'strict and philosophical' account ... is not 
worth taking seriously, and properly receives aImost no attention at al!." 
9 The instrumental norm and hypothetical imperatives are not identical: we reach hypothetical imperatives by 
universal instantiation upon the instrumental norm. The instrumental norm states, roughly, that (V persons x, V 
ends y, V actions z) ( (x wiUs y & z is the rneans to y) ~ x ought to z). We get particular hypothetical imperatives 
when we instantiate y and z with sorne individual a and b. Here, however, I use the terms interchangeably. 
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attempt frrst to articulate the rationalist case for the hypothetical imperative, and then provide an anti-
foundationalist reply. 
2. The problem of motivation to the means 
The rationalist argument against anti-foundationalism begins by charging it of failing on its 
own terms - of explaining in a satisfactory way how we are motivated to take the means to our ends. 
Consider the following scenario, drawn from Thomas Nagel (1970). 1 desire a drink of soda. In order 
to satisfy this desire 1 must stand up from my chair, wa1k: to the door, open it, walk down the hallway 
and the stairs, talce coins from my wallet and insert them in the machine, pick up the can, break the 
tab, and finally 1 can drink. 1 have no reason or desire to do any of these intermediary actions prior to 
conceiving my desire for a soda, and no reason or desire for them independent of my desire for a soda 
(indeed, 1 might have reason and desire not to waIk down the stairs, etc.) According to the anti-
foundationalist, my desire for a soda explains my performance of the means. But this desire is simply 
an urge toward a certain taste, or perhaps toward a certain experience andlor activity. How couId this 
cause me to open doors and insert coins in a sIot? Here is NageI: 
It must be realized that the case does require an explanation. Upon reflection, it can seem 
mysterious that thirst should be capable of motivating someone not just to drink, but to put a 
coin in a slot. Thirst by itself does not motivate such technical undertakings; an understanding 
of currency and the protocol of vending machines is necessary. But when these factors have 
been added to the explanation, we still lack an account of how they combine with the thirst to 
produce action. (1970: 33) 
If this objection is correct, then thirst or a desire to drink10 cannot directly motivate us to any 
action except that of drinking itself. The anti-foundationalist must, it seems, indicate additional 
10 It could be objected that thirst is not a desire to drink. This doesn't matter. Suppose thírst is a state of desiring 
to be rid of the dry feeling in one's throat. We still have an end, and can identify drinking soda as a means. For a 
detailed consideration of thirst and the desire to drink, see Herman 1996: 45-7. 
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desires or motivational states to explain our taking the means. There are two ways to do so. First. one 
might hypothesize a desire for taking the means to our ends as such Cread de dicto). Given a desire for 
a certain end. and the recognition of a certain action as means to that end. our desire for taking the 
means to our ends provides the motivation for performing this action. Second. one might hypothesize 
individual desires for the particular means in the particular circumstance Cread de re). In the soda 
exampIe. these would be desires to walle down the stairs. insert a coin in the slot, etc. These desires 
would c1early be contingent upon the desire to drink a soda - they would be motivated by desire for 
soda combined with recognition of means. To offer this account would be to postulate that it is a fact 
about our psychology that recognition of means arouses desires. On either account. our taking the 
means is explained by the presence of a further desire. But why would we need to have such a desire? 
Couldn't we just as welllack it? Some anti-foundationalists have been inc1ined to offer evoIutionary 
stories to explain its presence. Possession of such a psychological disposition for desiring the means 
(de re or de dicto) would c1early be biologically advantageous. Perhaps, therefore, we have evolved so 
as to desire the means to our ends. 
The rationalist' s next move is to charge that such an account. with its psychological and 
biological orientation. answers the question in an unacceptably psychologistic way. We have been 
provided with a psychological explanation of why we pursue the means to our ends. But we have not 
thereby been offered any account of why we should pursue the means to our ends. The hypothetical 
imperative is to all appearances a normative principIe. one we believe is justified, and that we use to 
criticize the behaviour of those who fail to comply with it. The alleged psychological fact that we 
have a tendency or universal practice of behaving in such a way doesn't explain this normativity - and 
may well be inconsistent with it. The psychological explanation fails also, therefore, because it can't 
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explain the fact that we pursue the means to our ends at least sometimes because we believe that we 
should, not just because we find that we want too II 
On the anti-foundationalist account, we could just as easily Iack these additional desires as 
possess them. Were we to lack them, it would appear to follow that we would have no reason to 
pursue the mean s to our ends. We wouldn't be irrational. absurd, or wrong, we would just be 
different. B ut that is unacceptable. The correctness of taking the means to our ends is palpably 
independent of such contingencies of psychology. There would be something objectively wrong about 
such a creature - it would be making a mistake, even from the perspective of its own concems and 
desires. We are motivated to undertake the means to our ends tbrough recognition of the correctness 
of doing so. According to the rationalist, when we act rationally and take the means because we 
recognize it as the right thing to do, we are motivated by recognition ofthe hypothetical imperative as 
an objective rational norm. It is our recognition of its dictates, and our acceptance of its authority, that 
leads us to pursue the means to our ends. 12 It appears, therefore, that we do not really believe that 
taking the means to our ends is only justified in virtue of certain interests we possess. It is, in Kant's 
terminology, categorically imperative. Rationalists therefore argue that in conceding the hypothetical 
imperative, the anti-foundationalist has already conceded the existence of categorical imperatives and 
no longer has any justification for denying that morality can be of this nature: the hypothetical 
imperative is her .. thin edge ofthe wedge". 
To claim that the normativity of the instrumental norro, prudence, and perhaps morality are 
analyzable in terms of, and contingent upon, possessing certain interests is allegedly to commit the 
error of "psychologism". Psychologism in logic is the confusion of logical Iaws (conceming which 
11 Some attempts have been made by naturalistically minded philosophers to explain this belief as a psychological 
product of evolution, but this is, as the rationalists insist, an unacceptable attempt at debunking our finn frrst-
order convictions. 
12 Even for most rationalists, one does not have to be motivated by recognition of the requirements of the 
hypothetical imperative in order to be acting rationally. One need not be complying; it is enough to be merely 
conforming. The important point is that the hypothetical imperative can be invoked if one then enquires after the 
justification ofthis behaviour. 
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propositions folIow validly from which) with psychologicallaws (conceming which beliefs causally 
result from which). CorrespondingIy. the charge of psychologisrn here is that the attribution of the 
authority of the instrumental norro. prudence. etc. to sorne further interest puts psychological laws 
conceming causal relations between beliefs and motives in the place of deontic laws or principIes of 
practical reason - or description of what actualIy happens in place of normative judgements 
conceming what should happen. This error rnanifests itself in two unacceptable consequences. First. 
the principIes of practical reason fail as principIes of moral psychology. It is false that people are 
always motivated to pursue the means to their ends. or act prudently. or moraIly. etc. Second. this 
failure illuminates the already noted fact that these principies represent the way we feel that peopIe 
should act. and are the basis of our criticism of the actions and inactions of others. PsychoIogizing the 
principIes of practical reason. it is charged. amounts to absurdIy denying the possibility of the well-
known and widespread phenomenon of practical irrationality. 
This. then. is the basic rationalist case against anti-foundationalism. The rationalists provide a 
putative refutation of one attempt to expIain what normativity is and in what the normativity of the 
instrumental norm and other principies of practical rationality consists. This negative thesis is a large 
part of the rationalists' case: as I shalI discuss, they seldom offer explanations for the phenomenon of 
normativity themselves (and when they do, their accounts are far from satisfactory.13) It is therefore 
appropriate for us not to disrrUss so hastily the only realIy serious explanation we are offered: the anti-
foundationalist explanation of normativity in terms of motivation. I shalI now argue that the interest-
based account is not vulnerable to the rationalists' arguments. 
13 Korsgaard's attempt, 1 wiIl argue, appears to colIapse into an anti-foundationalist analysis. 
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3. A solution to the motivation problem 
The unpalatable psychologistic consequences follow directly on the heels of accepting the 
cIaim that the motivation and justification for pursuing means to our ends must be contingent upon the 
possession of sorne additional desire, if it is contingent on desires at aIl (Nagel 1970: 33-4, Korsgaard 
1997: 231-2). With the further premise that any particular desire is contingent, it follows that 
adherence to instrumental rationality is onIy contingently justified: dependent on one's motivational 
seto This is unacceptable: the correctness of taking the means to one's ends is objective. There is 
obviously something right about this cIaim to objectivity, and 1 will argue that the justification for 
taking the means to one's ends is objective, insofar as "objective" means applying equally to anyone 
whatsoever who has ends. But 1 deny it, insofar as "objective" means independent of one's desires. 
The motivation and justification for taking the means to our ends is purely a result of being motivated 
and having desires. 
How can the anti-foundationalist be entitled lO this cIaim? One might, perhaps, reject the 
further premise and argue that certain desires are necessarily possessed by all persons, and that the 
objectivity of instrumental normativity is a consequence of this. 1 accept the premise, however. 
Rather, 1 reject the rationalist' s assumption that on an anti-foundationalist account the motivation and 
justification for taking the means can only be based on an additional desire. The motivation and 
justification for taking the means does not derive from sorne subset of our desires. Rather, it is 
founded on desires as such. Here we have to be careful: it is not the abstract "instrumental norm", that 
one ought to take the means to one's ends, that is justified by desrres as such. Instead, each desire 
itself motivates and justifies taking the means in that particular case. It is the desire to drink a soda 
that both motivates and justifies putting a coin in the slot of a drink rnachine. 
According to rationalism, the justification for taking the means to our ends is that the 
objectively authoritative hypothetical imperative prescribes that we do so. When we are motivated by 
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recognition of the justification of such action (compIying with, rather than mereIy confonning to 
reason's dictates), we are motivated by the recognition of this prescription from objective reason. In 
contrast, on the anti-foundationalist account, one takes the means to one's end when one is motivated 
by the desire for the end to do so. Rationalism attributes to us "one thought too many" when it malees 
pursuit of the means a consequence of the recognition of the authority of an objective rational nOrID. 
Hume himseIf offers us this, rather than the additional desire account: 
.. .reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence on our conduct only after 
two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which 
is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford 
us means 01 exerting any passion. (1739: 459, emphasis mine) 
There is no passion ... capable of controlling the interested affection, except the very affection 
itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must necessarily take place upon the 
least reflection; since 'tis evident. that the passion is much better satisfy'd by its restraint. than 
by its liberty ... (1739: 492) 
Our desires, in other words, have the flexibility to alter their direction and themseIves 
motivate actions at sorne remove from their actual objects. Hume is extending to desires the very 
capability that NageI and other rationalists have denied. 1 will now defend this stance. 
How, NageI asks, could a desire motivate us, by itseIf, to actions onIy causally connected with 
attaining its object? The first step to solving this probIem is to accentuate it, so we can appreciate the 
full magnitude of the objection. Allegedly, there is a problem in expIaining the action of inserting a 
coin in a sIot by appeal to the desire for a soda. The principIe here appears to be that a desire can onIy 
directly effect a motion or action which is the direct object of the desire. AppIied consistently, this 
principIe has drastic consequences. Given onIy the desire for soda, not only the action of inserting a 
coin in a machine, but also the actions of picking up the can, breaking the tab, and even lifting the can 
to my Iips and pouring it into my mouth become simiIarIy probIematic. The consequence of this 
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principIe is tbat it becomes difficult to see how desire causes much of any action at aH. This is 
especially peculiar since sorne philosophers even claim tbat tbe only recognizabIe content of tbe 
concept of desire is tbat of a functionaI state tbat produces action. This one and tbe same property is. 
on one hand. aHeged to exhaust the concept of desire. and on tbe otber. aHeged not properly to beIong 
to desire at all. 
How do we ampIify tbe desire for soda? Is it an urge toward tbe taste of soda alone? Or an 
urge toward tbe activity of imbibing soda? Or perhaps it is an urge toward tbe broader activity we call 
"drinking a soda". including holding the can. raising it to our lips. swallowing it down, savouring its 
taste. etc.? At tbe extreme, it could be an urge toward tbe entire activity of going to get a soda. 
purchasing it. and drinking it. If the desire is of this most inclusive kind, there is no probIem in 
expIaining how it motivates my actions - tbey are botb means and ends. and the direct objects of my 
desires. But this is impIausible. As 1 have said. 1 may not want to perform sorne of tbe means. 
Furtbermore, it is not to tbe point. It might explain tbe action. but it doesn't address tbe problem of 
how taking tbe means to our ends is motivated and justified - it simply denies tbere is a separable 
means in this case. The rationalists' demand is rather: imagine someone who sought merely to savour 
tbe taste of soda. That person should take the means to tbat end (insofar as he wiIls it), and wiIl be 
motivated to do so insofar as he is rational. How can tbe mere desire explain this justification and 
motivation? 
A distinction can be drawn between two species of desire. desire-to and desire-that. Sorne 
desires take as their object an action by tbe self: for example. the desire to drink (imbibe) soda. Otber 
desires take as tbeir object sorne state of affairs: for example, the desire that the door be open, or that 
the lllinois basketball team had defeated Duke last night. On the rationalist' s conception of desire, 
only desire-to has the power to motivate an action, because only a desire to act can (occasionally) be 
achieved without intermediary means. Consider that if the desire for soda is strictly speaking a desire 
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for the experience or taste of soda. then even the action of drinking or imbibing is an intennediary 
means. hence something that desire cannot directly bring about. 14 Desire generates very few if any 
actions at aH. 
The rationalist could simply accept this analysis. saying that the causal efficacy of desire has 
been greatly exaggerated. and the motivating role of recognition and acceptance of rational norros 
greatly underestimated. But this shouId be an unpalatable choice. Even species of animaIs of 
unremarkable intelligence possess a greater facility for motivated action than simple desire would 
permit, on this account, being able to recognize and pursue means to the satisfaction of their desires. 
Contrary to millennia of dogma, the rationalist would apparently be committed to accepting that dogs. 
pigs, and chickens recognize and accept the rational authority of the hypothetical imperative. Perhaps 
the rationalist could make these consequences look less absurdo A more promising avenue of 
expIoration is to reconsider whether the rationalists' portrait of desires, and subsequent objections to 
anti-foundationalism, are accurate. 
The rationalist, 1 suggest, has mistakenIy conceived of a desire as like an internal muscle or 
mental counterpart to a muscle, tailor-made for a particular range of actions which exhaust its 
capacities. A desire to drink is on this modeI a conation whose power consists in the ability to cause 
swallowing, and which is activated upon the presence of a particular stimulus. To the contrary, 1 
suggest, any desire has in principIe the potential to cause any possible movement. What it is to be a 
certain desire as opposed to some other desire is not constituted by the motions it produces, but by the 
triggers or stimuli that activate it into motion. To be faithful to the obvious motivationaI efficacy of 
desires, we must acknowIedge at mínimum that a desire for x has the power to produce the action of 
14 lt might be objected that the desire for ataste is a desire ro taste or experience, not a desire rhat 1 taste or 
experience. But tasting and experiencing are not actions that desire can irnrnediately effect, so they belong with 
the class of desires-that. as conations that are (according to the rationalist) incapable of generating action. 
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making x so, upon presentation of the appropriate stimulus in the right conditions. 15 A distinction 
between two sorts of stimulus is necessary here. There is a stimulus that arouses desire (the arousing 
stimulus), and there is a stimulus that releases that desire ioto action in the right conditions (the 
activating stimulus). We are concemed only with the activating stimulus here. Desires are activated 
by beliefs: a desire for pis activated (in the right conditions) by the belief that a certain movement m 
constitutes an action of making it the case that p. Should the rationalist deny this is an essential 
characteristic of any desire, we must reply that we cannot recognize anything like a desire in the 
emasculated mental states to which she seeles to restrict US. 16 
This account of desires enables us to understand why desires motivate those actions that 
immediately result in their satisfaction. and it may appear to preserve the rationalist's claim that 
mediate and indirect means are problematic, since putting a coin in a slot and making it the case that I 
am drink:ing a soda are two different actions. To understand why this is not really a problem. eonsider 
that desire and aetion, liIce belief, are characterized by the marles of intentionality. The intentional 
character of action and belief manifests itself in a sensitivity to the particular description used or 
aspect taleen. To use Davidson's example (1963), suppose a woman flicles a switch, thereby 
illuminating a room. and thereby allerting a burglar to her presence. The movement she malees is one 
of displacing a piece of plastic with her finger. But it is inadequate to human experience to say that 
this was her aetion, intentionally speaking. Rather, we say her aetion is one of turning on the light. 
Any movement can be given an indefinite number of descriptions, and therefore can be the result of 
any number of different intentions and motivations. 17 
15 Specifying these right conditions wiil no doubt be difficult. At mínimum, we would need "in the absence of 
overpowering opposing desires". 
16 We would be left with nothing but, for example, a "desire" to see what is before me that, when presented with 
the stimulus of the belief that opening my eyes would make this so, nevertheless produces no inclination toward 
doing it. "Woe is me," I might declare, "for 1 wish to see what is before me, but to do so 1 must open myeyes, 
and for that 1 have no desire at all!" 
17 Consider al so the Heideggerian thesis that our cognition of the world is in the frrst place practical, not 
theoretical. Our environments are structured and interpreted by our projects and concerns, and objects first 
152 
The point is that we cannot identify the intention of a person' s action merely by observing the 
mechanics of her motions. Intentional actions are description-sensitive. and can be made to Iook 
disconnected from the motivating power of desires by offering an inappropriate description. When 1 
insert coins in the vending machine 1 am no! in the rrrst instance inserting coins in a machine, any 
more than 1 am inserting small metal disks into a plastic slot. Rather, because 1 recognize tbis activity 
to be a necessary means to my drinking a soda, 1 identify it as an action of making it the case that 1 am 
drinking a soda. If 1 am asked, <What are you doingT 1 will no! reply "Putting coins in a machine", 
but rather "Getting a drink". My action from my point of view, therefore, is one of getting a soda. The 
belief that such motions are an action of getting a drink is the activating stimulus for my desrre for 
drinking soda. There is no difficulty understanding how desrre for a soda could motivate tbis action. 
1 need no desrre other than the desrre to drink a soda in order to be motivated to get out of my 
chair, open the door, waIk down the hall and the stairs. put money in the machine, break the tab, and 
lift the can to my lips. (AH of these actions, or components of my action. are misdescribed here from 
the intentional point of view. But they are valid external descriptions of what 1 do.) You might object: 
But it is ludicrous to suggest that this is the only motivating interest throughout such an extended 
period of activity! In reply, 1 am not purporting to describe what actually happens when someone goes 
to buy a drink from a vending machine. Our moti vational natures are far more complex and varied 
than tbis crude portrait can do justice too But the point is to respond to the rationalists' claim that 
someone with only this single desire could no! be motivated to perform such actions. It is merely the 
thought experiment they propose. 
manifest themselves to us as existent things in practical ways, as they are significant in the context of these 
projects and concems. The door to my office presents itself to me, in the context of my project of obtaining a 
soda. as an obsracle ro obraining a soda, not as a large piece of wood fllling a door frarne. The door handle 
presents itself to me not as a round, tarnished piece of brass, but as an instrument to overcorning the obstacle. 
Turning the door handle thus appears to me not as the action of rotating a round piece of brass, but of removing 
the obstacle. 
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This interpretation of motivated action has numerous desirable consequences, and much 
explanatory power. It explains why we may perform actions without any desire to do so. 1 need not 
desire to open the door in order to do so. 1 need not desire to put coins in a machine in order to do so. 
It also, therefore, explains why we may perform actions while strongly desiring not to do them. The 
same action can be viewed under different descriptions, and we may feel differentIy about them. 1 
may have a strong antipathy toward diving into freezing cold water, but a strong urge toward 
preventing a child from drowning. Although 1 am conflicted, my concem for the child outweighs my 
antipathy to getting cold, and 1 am motivated to rescue her - an action which, as it happens, consists 
largely of the same set of motions and experiences that 1 desire to avoid under the description of 
diving into freezing water. 
If this is substantially correct, the rationalist is wrong to c1aim that the anti-foundationalist 
cannot explain motivation to the means except by a contingent additional desire. All desire motivates 
to the means considered as means rather than as separate actions in their own right. No motivating 
recognition of an objectively authoritative prescription of reason is required - and it would be a 
strange creature indeed that required such a recognition in order to pursue the means to the 
satisfaction of its interests. 
The rationalist will charge that in fending off the argument against the motivational efficacy 
of desires 1 have opened myself up to the charge of psychologism: 1 have given a descriptive account 
of how we are motivated to the means, but have failed to give a normative account or explain the 
justification for taking the means to our ends. Because the account is descriptive, it fails to be 
normative: it can't explain why taking the means to our ends is correcto It is sometimes c1aimed that 
the anti-foundationalist tums the hypothetical imperative into a psychological rather than normative 
law: we necessarily talce the means to satisfying our desires. This is false: 1 have shown only that a 
desire provides motivation for the means. But motivation can be counteracted, and need not generate 
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action. We are. however. committed to this wealcer psychological claim. How. then. do we explain the 
justification of taking the means? Nothing in this story about motivation. the rationalist will maintain. 
explains what makes taking the means correct and failure to do so incorrecto To do this. and preserve 
our ability to criticize the behaviour of agents as irrational. we allegedly cannot do without the 
hypothetical imperative as an objective command of reason. 
4. The hypothetical imperative 
What exactly is the hypothetical imperative. and why should we obey it? 1 will now attempt to 
clarify this notion. and will argue in defence of Hume and anti-foundationalism that it is a mere 
phantasm of our confusion: there is no such thing as a hypothetical imperative of reason. 
It is surprisingly difficult to formulate the hypothetical imperative. Let us begin with the 
simplest formulation and progressively refine it. One cornmonly hears statements of the form "If you 
want x. you should y". where y is a means to x. Here. "you should y". which 1 shall imagine to report a 
cornmand of reason. occupies the position of the consequent after the hypothetical antecedent "If you 
want x": hence. a "hypothetical imperative". But this first formulation cannot express a normative 
principIe of reason. for we have many desires that we believe should not be satisfied. It does not 
follow from the fact 1 have a desire that 1 ought to act to satisfy it. as we saw in chapter 4. Neither is 
that what Kant had in mind when he introduced the idea of the hypothetical imperative. The 
antecedent should not specify a desire or any other form of interest. but an end. We will want to know 
what an "end" is: this question is critical. but allow me to leave the concept unanalyzed for a little 
longer. 
It is when one is actually committed to attaining sorne end that one should talce the means. Let 
us reformulate the hypothetical imperative as "If your end is x. you shouId y". where y is a means to x. 
There are still problems here. First. it cannot be the case that reason commands us to talce all and any 
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means to our ends. We need only take one available means if severa! offer themselves. Perhaps we 
should qualify our imperative with Hwhere y is the best available means to x". But this faces further 
difficulties. If we anticipate a means becoming available in the future, it isn't irrational to neglect 
taking the best available means if it is not to our liking. Also, instrumental rationality doesn't seem to 
require our taking the best means. We are instrumentally rational so long as we take a (genuine) 
means. The solution is to introduce necessity. One must take the necessary means to one's ends. What 
about the fact that often there are no necessary means, but several possible means? In this case, there 
is a necessary disjunctive means: Le. D, where D = doing A or doing B or doing e, and A, B, and e 
are the only possible means. In this case the hypothetical imperative commands that we perform D. 
Second, what of the person who does not know that y is the necessary means to his end? 
Should he be convicted of irrationality for failing to y? We should rather convict bim of irrationality if 
he y-ed without believing that he would thereby contribute to the attainment of any of bis ends. 
Whatever we mean in ascribing rationality and irrationality, it is sensitive to the epistemic 
circumstances of the agent. Our second formulation of the hypothetical imperative is therefore: HIf 
your end is x, you should y" where you believe y to be the necessary means to x. 
There remains a problem: with the very suggestion that what we have here is a Hhypothetical 
imperative". A genuine conditional of the form lf A then B has the characteristic that if the antecedent 
condition A is satisfied, then the consequent is unqualifiedly true: basic modus ponens. If A then 8. As 
it happens, A. Therefore, 8. Thus, if my end is to give my wife a sapphire ring for our anniversary, 
and the only means is to steal one, then it is unqualiñedly the case that I should steal a sapphire ringo 
Reason cornmands that I do so. [8 Tbis can't be right. Sometimes we set ourselves ends without an 
18 There is a moral problem in the suggestion that reason might require unconditionally that 1 put arsenic in my 
neighbour's food, merely because 1 took upon myself the immoral end of killing him - asad tum of events for 
those hoping the moral credentials of reason would be impeccable. For rationalists who want a categorical 
imperative of reason prescribing such action, there is a further problem conceming consistency. By my willing 
the death of my neighbour 1 cause it to be the case that reason addresses contradictory imperatives to me: 1 must 
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adequate appreciation of what their achievement will require from uso We later realize that attaining 
these ends requires something intolerable. On the second formulation we are nonetheless commanded 
by reason to talee the means. What we do instead - the right thing to do - is give up on the end. Is this 
inconsistent with the second formulation? One might point out that by giving up the end we malee the 
antecedent false and so escape the consequent imperative. But observe that by doing so we are 
violating the alleged command of reason. The second formulation doesn't give the option of 
surrendering the end; it demands only that we talee the means. In surrendering the end we are therefore 
being irrational. But this is absurdo 
A further amendment to the principIe is necessary. There are at least two different ways of 
improving on the second formulation. 1 prefer the following, which is also cornmon in everyday 
discourse: "In order to x, you should y", where y is believed to be the necessary means to x. Note that 
this is no longer overtly hypothetical in structure. The "If ... then ..... form has been replaced with an 
"In order to ... you should ..... formo 1 shall call this a practical directive rather than a hypothetical 
imperative. It respects the ever-present option of surrendering our commitment to the interest or end, 
and leaves open the possibility that there is no situation in which reason addresses us with 
unconditional cornmands merely in virtue of the brute fact that we have certain interests or ends: no 
situation in which reason commands simply "You should y" (or even "You should y or z .. ). 
The rationalists. however, continue to interpret under the rubric of "hypothetical imperative", 
and offer us the following third formulation, which on the surface may not appear to differ in 
substance from the practical directive. For now 1 proceed under the assumption that the two 
formulations are equivalent. The real form of the hypothetical imperative, according to sophisticated 
rationalists like Christine Korsgaard (1997: 237) and Thomas Hill (1973: 24), is: "If your end is x, 
put arsenic in his food, and 1 must not put arsenic in his food. What a strange world this would be if reason could 
contradict itself! It might be replied that no taint is thereby cast upon reason, since this sorry state of affairs is 
precipitated by my choice of an irnmoral end. But surely reason should pro vide me with the wayout, not increase 
my confusion. 
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then you should either y or give up x'" where you believe y to be a necessary means to x. This third 
formulation, which 1 shall call the disjunctive hypothetical imperative. solves the problems that beset 
the second formulation. We are never required by reason to take immoral or unacceptable means to 
our ends. The hypothetical imperative, properly understood, commands us to take what we believe to 
be the necessary means to our ends or else give up our ends. Instrumental irrationality, that which is 
proscribed by the hypothetical imperative, is the sin of not taking what one believes to be the 
necessary means to one' s ends while remaining committed to achieving those ends. 19 
To be genuinely normative, a principIe must meet two criteria. First, its violation must be 
possible (the possible violation criterion). Second, there must be sorne reason or sanction for obeying 
it - and for the normativity to be strictly rational, this must issue from rationality itself. Since reason 
is supposedly the faculty that when properly utilized yields self-evident truths, any command of 
reason itself must be a requirement that we can recognize as seIf-evident or nonnatively transparent 
(the reasonable expectation criterion). 1 will argue that no formulation of the hypothetical imperative 
meets both criteria. 
The disjunctive hypothetical irnperative cannot meet this burden. lt seems a reasonable 
enough requirement - but is practical irrationality as defined possible? Is it possibIe to be committed 
to attaining some end, whiIe not adopting a course of action that one simultaneousIy believes to be a 
necessary means to attaining that end? Kant seems at times to suggest that the principIe, whosoever 
will the ends wills the means, is an analytic truth. Failure to obey this "command of reason" wouId 
then be impossibIe. But a normative principIe that cannot be transgressed is no normative principIe at 
aH, as Kant himseIf insists. It is therefore clear, as Korsgaard (1997: 236) and Hill (1989: 19) claim, 
that the anaIytic interpretation ofKant's presentation ofthe hypothetical imperative must be mistaken. 
19 We must be firm against fudging. Hill ascribes irrationality when, despite not taking the necessary means, a 
person "professes comrnitment to" or "hopes for" the attainment of the end (1973: 23). But these are not the same 
as willing that end - and it is not irrational to do either while declining to adopt necessary means. 
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It is clear at other times that what he means to assert is that insofar as we are rational, it is necessary 
that whosoever wills the ends wiUs the means. But we can be irrationaI, as the rationalists are 
committed to insisting, and therefore we can vioIate the commands of reason. 
We cannot progress further without clarifying the vague notion of <'wiIling an end". What is 
an uend" - how does it differ frOID a desire - and what is it to <\vill" one ofthem? We know, at Ieast, 
that willing an end contrasts with desiring something. Desires can be idIe, unendorsed, or merely 
wishful. Desiring doesn't rationalIy require anything from uso Having an end, on the other hand, 
involves intent and cornmitment. This difference needs greater articuIation. There is ambiguity in the 
notion of an uend". We speak both of our having ends, and of the ends at which we aim. Our having 
an end in the former sense involves our willing the end in the latter sense. The end at which we aim is 
the state of affairs we seek to bring about, while our having an end is our being cornmitted to bringing 
about such a state of affairs. Which sense of Uend" is crucial for us here? The uend" in the sense of 
sought state of affairs does not contain anything to distinguish it from the case of mere desire: it is an 
object, an imagined state of affairs, and the objects of our desires can become the objects of our 
willing and vice versa. The difference, then, is to be found in uends" as a mode of subjective 
comportment toward the object or state of affairs: it lies in the willing. 
Unfortunately, the notion of uwiIling" is as obscure as the notion of an uend". What is willing, 
that distinguishes it from desiring? As we shalI see, the concept contains a great deal of ambiguity 
even as it is used by the rationalists. But, focusing on the contrast with desire, we can begin by 
clarifying the notion in the following, intuitive way, as introduced by Korsgaard: 
When we decide to act on an inclination - to do a desired action or seek a desired end - then its 
object becomes an object of yolition. (1997: 234) 
Mere desiring does not move us to voluntary action, according to rationalism: to act 
voluntarily, for an object to become an Uobject of volition" or object of the will, is to set oneself in 
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motion by an intellectual act of decision and aim at bringing about sorne resulto ·'Willing" is the name 
for this determination of one's activity by intellect, the necessary condition for deliberate and rational 
action. Our frrst version of what it is to have an end, accordingly, is to will sorne object, where willing 
is the intemal intellectuaI actioo of aiming at bringing about sorne result. 
The reasonable expectation criterio n seems safely meto 1t is intuitively obvious that we should 
do what we believe to be necessary for achieving the result we are attempting to bring about. But what 
about the possibIe violation criterion? 1s it possible to fail to do what we believe is necessary for 
achieving sorne resuIt while attempting to bring that resuIt about? Kant' s principIe has been talcen as 
analytic not mereIy because he appears to say that it is, but also because there are grounds for taking it 
to be so. On the present account. one is not willing an end unIess one is attempting to bring its object 
about. One is not atternpting to bring something about unless one is doing something one believes 
could lead to such a resulto To believe y is a necessary rneans to x is. analytically, to believe that if one 
is not doing y, one is not doing anything that could lead to X. 1t follows that if one believes y is a 
necessary means to x and is not doing y, then whatever one is doing it cannot be attempting to make it 
the case that X. On present definitions, if one is not willing what one believes to be the necessary 
means. one is not willing the end. On this interpretation. we have a logicallaw, not a normative law. 
Out of charity we must assume we have DOt captured what the rationalist means by "willing 
an end". We say that we will an end even when there are no present means to its attainment apparent 
to us, no course of action we could embark upon in the here and now that could be seen as an action 
of making it so. This is an act of resoIve, decision, intention, or cornmitment - not to act now. but to 
act to attain the end at sorne future time. 1t is not an action in the future, or a mere desire or wish for 
the goal. but a genuine mental action in the present, an act of will with no concurrent outward 
ma..-lifestations in the form of action. Willing, though. is more than the mere act of resolving, which is 
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only momentary and would therefore be futile since it does not issue in immediate action. Resolving 
results in an ongoing condition of being resolved or committed to the goal. 
Could this interpretation of "willing an end" be more amenable to the rationalists' claims? 
There remains significant ambiguity in the idea of "being resolved". If willing an end is being 
resolved to make it so when the opportunity presents itself. and being so resolved is analyzed as being 
in a dispositional state in which one will act in such a way in such a circumstance, then we have all 
the problems of the rrrst interpretation. Interpreted dispositionally, being resolved amounts to being 
such that whenever one believes the opportunity is at hand. one engages in the action of trying to 
achieve the eud. In which case, if someone believes that y is a necessary means to x and doesn' t Y 
when the opportunity presents itself, he or she is not resolved upon attaining x. Again the possible 
violation criterion is not meto and we do not have a normative principIe. 
Turning to the rationalists for help, we find accounts of willing an endlbeing resolved that are 
free of any conditions on the agent' s present and dispositional states of mind. One wills an end. is 
resolved and committed to an end. if one has in the past resolved to attain it: in the language of Kant 
and Korsgaard, to have an end is to have given oneself a law. to have legislated to oneself. Willing an 
end therefore requires neither occurrent nor dispositional mental states, but only past resolutions. Let 
us suppose that "willing an end" means having previously resolved. 
Clearly, this interpretation meets the pesky possible violation criterion. It is easy to faíl to 
talce the means to one's ends. when having an end lacks any necessary connections with one's present 
state of mind - one may lack any motivation toward attaíning the end altogether. Many people. for 
example, knowingly violate their New Year's resolutions. But are we still satisfying the reasonable 
expectation criterion? I believe noto As defined, why should we talce the means to our ends? In what 
way does failure to do so warrant the charge of irrationality? In particular, we should object to the 
plausibility of our being beholden to every commitment we have ever made in the pasto The 
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rationalists do not, however. intend to subject us to this great a burden. Having committed oneself in 
the past is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition on willing an end. Rationalists accept that we can 
relinquish our ends. A comrnitment is a law one has given oneself. Qne cannot be released from a law 
until further legislation rescinds the previous law. Since we are, here, both legislator and legislatee, 
we can free ourselves from our own laws by a further act of legislation. According to this account, 
then, even though we may be in no way comported toward attaining an end, we have not relinquished 
it uotU we have consciously released ourselves by legislating to remove that law (Korsgaard 1996a: 
234; Sidgwick 1907: 37). 
As it stands. this still looks ridiculous. We can forget our resolutions like we can forget our 
beliefs. It is not irrational to act in a way inconsistent with a belief one has forgotten, and similarly it 
is not irrational to act in a way inconsistent wiLh resolutions we have forgotten we made. We are 
likely to have made many resolutions as children, for example, that we never consciously disowned, 
but that slipped away with the passage of time: such as the resolution never to force my chiIdren to eat 
vegetables when 1 am a parent. We cannot accept that if 1 made such a resolution 1 am now being 
irrational when 1 insist my daughter eat her vegetables. We canoot, therefore. be willing an end just 
because we never released ourselves frOID a previous commitment. 
The legal metaphor does not stand up to scrutiny. but the spirit of the point is more plausible. 
The rationalists do not really wish to capture a1l our childhood resolutions in their net: the real point is 
that we live for the most part according to stable pIans and principIes. which we might momentariIy 
forget or ignore, but which unify the flow of our lives, and to which we return as that by which we 
attempt to live and understand ourselves. Qur ends, therefore, are the stable and lasting comrnitments 
that constitute the essence of our selves, the persons we genuineIy are. A person may become 
overcome by passion and therefore act irrationally, contrary to this stable set of defining 
cornmitments. Irrationality consists in the faiIure to act as a unified agent. where to be a unified agent 
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is to be a consistent C'law-govemed") originator of action across time. The hypothetical imperative 
commands us to live in diachronic consistency. 
Tbis interpretation again seems to present no difficulties with regard to the possible violation 
criterion. But again we can legitimately doubt whether the reasonable expectation criterion is 
satisfied. Why is it irrational to be diachronically inconsistent? Suppose 1 say, "1 know 1 swore rd 
never do this, 1 know ru regret this tomorrow, and maybe for the rest of my life, but 1 don't care. rm 
going to do it alI the same". There are perspectives from which this stance can be criticized, but for 
the charge of irrationality to stick. there must be a difficulty purely in terms of reason. How is this 
inconsistent with objective, disinterested reason? Korsgaard at tbis point utilizes a standard rationalist 
argument: she claims that diachronic agential consistency is constitutive of what it is to be rational 
(1996a: 120-3). To be rational is to live consistently according to stabIe principIes and commitments. 
Failure to live consistently is irrational by definition. 
The cost of Korsgaard's move is that it is now legitimate to raise our concems about the 
satisfaction of the reasonable expectation criterion to a higher level, and ask. "Why should 1 be 
rational?" This question is usually rejected as absurd or self-defeating by rationalists (e.g. Dreier 
1997: 98-9). 1t asks for a reason to be rational - but here the rationalist uses the same argument 
Korsgaard has reappropriated - acting for reasons is constitutive of being rationaL Accordingly, to ask 
why 1 should be rational is to ask for reasons why 1 should act for reasons. To even ask the question is 
already to have tacitly accepted the justification for being rational, and is therefore self-defeating. 1 
have doubts about this argument, but regardIess, defining rationality as diachronic consistency 
removes it from the rationalist's arsenaL 1t appears legitimate to demand to know, "Why should 1 be 
rational 1" 
There is a way the rationalist can preserve the argument: by defming reasons accordingly - as 
Korsgaard indeed does. A "reason" is a motive or consideration that we accept as a stable principIe to 
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govem our lives - Le. a eomponent of diaehronieally eonsistent life. It thereby remains possible to 
dismiss the question, "What reason do I have to be rationaI" as self-defeating. Of course, I have 
already given an interest-reIational anaIysis of the eoneept of a reason in chapter 4, aceording to 
whieh a reason is a faet that indicates to a person that a particular eourse of action would satisfy 
certain motivating interests. Thís anaIysis is incompatible with Korsgaard's, and suggests that we may 
have reasons for not being "rational": Le. there may be facts indicating to us that actions inconsistent 
with our pIans for life wouId satisfy sorne of our motivating interests. 
ShouId we abandon fue interest-reIational account of reasons for Korsgaard' s? A person 
tempted to act HirrationaIly" (Le. in diachronic inconsistency) will ofien demand to be toId why they 
should care about their past and future concems and eommitments; a demand that does not appear 
absurd or self-defeating like fue demand to know why I should aet for reasons. The expense of 
accepting Korsgaard's defmition is that we could then coherently as k: 'Why should I aet for 
reasons?" This strips the coneept of a reason for action of its meaning. Properly understood, reasons 
have no essentiaI conneetion with diachronic agentiaI consistency. It is perfectly coherent for me to 
enquire, HWhy should 1, now, worry about what I resolved in the past or will resolve in the future?" 
Many reasons rnay be given but they will centre upon my present concems and dispositions. If 
consumed by momentary passion, however, 1 might simply not eare about my future - if in despair 
over losing the love of my life, or inflamed by hatred for the person who eaused my loss. Then I will 
reeognize no reasons to worry about my past or future concerns and eommitments. 
Perhaps trus interpretation of the hypothetical imperative can satisfy the reasonabIe 
expectation criterion nonetheless. Were we to ask, ''Why should we take the necessary means to our 
ends?" Korsgaard can answer: "in order to maintain agentiaI unity and consistency". But why can't 
somebody simpIy deny they want to maintain agential unity, and thereby beg off the requirement of 
the hypotheticaI imperative? The authority of the hypothetical imperative appears to depend upon the 
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contingent desire for agential unity and consistency. This, however, should be unacceptable to the 
rationalist, as it concedes an anti-foundational justification for the alleged objective or interest-
transcendent authority of the hypothetical imperative. Korsgaard does not see her account of the 
authority of reason as resting upon any such desire. She recognizes the need to provide a reason why 
we should seek to be "rational", and her answer draws on Kant's argument for why the rational wiIl 
requires a law. To view oneself as an agent is to view oneself as a cause. Tbe concept of cause is 
simply that of a law-like succession between events, since we have no access to the actual 
mechanisms by which one event influences anotber. Therefore, being able to recognize oneself as the 
cause of sorne action requires one's actions to have a law-like connection with one's principIes. To 
fail to act consistently is therefore to lose the cognition of oneself as a cause in the world and thereby 
to cease to eXÍst as an agent (1996: 226-9, 1997: 247-8, 254). We ought to obey the hypothetical 
imperative because otherwise we will lose our conceptions of our practical identities and cease to 
eXÍst as agents. 
This argument is simply bad. Relegating the rest of its problems to a foomote,2O the critical 
problem is that the reasonable expectation requirement is still not meto Why is it rationally mandatory 
to seek to preserve oneself as an agent? It is certainly not the case that we are incapable of aiming at 
the contrary result - witness the practice of suicide. On Korsgaard's account, the authority of the 
hypothetical imperative depends either upon a further, so far unarticulated commandment of reason 
that prescribes maintaining our eXÍstence as agents Ca much more dubious principIe than the 
20 First, Kant's concept of cause as Iaw-like succession between events is, ironically, taken frorn Hume, and is 
inaccurate as an analysis of the ordinary concept of cause, which invoIves the idea of influence that Hume 
paradoxical1y rejects. Second, it is false that we could not perceive ourselves as causes without Iaw-like 
consistency of action. We can recognize our actions as resulting frorn our individual intentions. Also, 
Korsgaard's own presentation is seIf-defeating: she adrnits we recognize "irrational" actions as perfonned by us-
which is inconsistent with agential causation only being evidenced by Iaw-like connection with stable principIes. 
Third, despite sorne individuals engaging gratuitously in "irrational" behaviour, 1 am aware of no evidence that 
anybody has ever as a result ceased to recognize themselves as the cause of their actions. Her warning is 
reminiscent of the threat of appIe trees growing out one's ears if one eats apple seeds. 
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hypotbetical imperative), or else a desirefor continued e.xistence as an agent - to which tbe rationalist 
cannotappeal. 
We seem to have lost our way: tbe supposedly uncontroversial hypotbetical imperative has, 
tbrough our efforts to tmd an interpretation tbat satisfies botb tbe possible violation and tbe 
reasonable expectation cóteóa, begun to loo k less and less obvious or even familiar. We have failed 
to find an interpretation tbat rneets botb criteóa. There is no such interpretation, l suggest: tbere is no 
such tbing as a hypotbetical imperative of reason, because Hume was right: reason never commands. 
The widespread illusion tbat tbe idea had substance, and even tbat it is absurd to deny it, is a 
conjuring tóck - tbe result of tbe rationalists' sleight of hand. Rationalisrn gives us tbe appearance of 
autboritative cornmands of reason by offering a vague and ambiguous formula ("willing an endn ). 
This admits of differing interpretations, sorne of which enable us to satisfy one cóterion, otbers of 
which enable us to satisfy tbe otber, but none of which enable us to satisfy botb. On one account of 
willing an end, it is analytic that if one wills tbe end, one wills what one believes to be the necessary 
rneans, and this gives us tbe impression tbat reason is involved. But of course one cannot violate tbe 
laws of logic, and so to give tbe irnpression that we have a nonnative póociple, we are given a 
different account. 
5. Examples of irrationality 
Are we entitled to draw such conclusions? We have not examined every actual and possible 
interpretation of what it rneans to wiIl an end. lt may seern simply incredible tbat tbere is no 
hypotbetical imperative of reason: aren't there numerous concrete examples of instrumental 
irrationality with which we are familiar, and isn't it the case tbat ascóptions of irrationality and 
utterance of hypothetical irnperatives are not rnerely the preserve of rationalists but arise first in 
everyday discourse? We judge every day as to what persons sbould rationally do, and ascóbe 
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irrationality on the basis of failure to conform.. This, as the rationalists insist, is the sign of a 
nonnative principie, not a descriptive principie of logical or psychological necessity. What of the 
objectivity of this normative principie? 1 still need to demonstrate how Hume and the anti-
foundationalist can explain these phenomena. 
We must consider concrete examples of genuine Hirrationality". The paradigm contemporary 
example is the addicted smoker who, despite being resolved to give up his habit, succumbs and 
smokes another cigarette. Korsgaard offers us the case of a woman (let us call her Jane) resolved to 
overcome her fear and rlde a roUer coaster, who walks away without giving up her resolution (1997: 
228-9). We might indeed attribute irrationality in these cases. But should we? To constitute real cases 
of failure to comply with the hypothetical imperative, these cases must meet two criterla: (1) the 
person must actually believe that the means not taken is necessary for attaining the end; and (2) he or 
she must continue willing the end. 
Is either the smoker or J ane passing up what he or she believes to be necessary means to his 
or her ends? The smoker's commitment, I am assuming, is to give up smoking, Jane's commitment is 
to overcome her fear and ride a roller coaster. The smoker could give up tomorrow instead of today, 
and still achieve his goal. His allegedly irrational action consists onIy in smokingjust one more, as he 
tells himself, which is consistent with the commitment to give up. One reason addictions are so hard 
to shake is that no individual measure to overcome them is ever necessary by itself. We can change 
the example. Suppose the smoker' s resolution is to quit smoking forever, starting today. When 
tomorrow arrives he is again tempted to light up. He knows that abstaining from his vice is necessary 
for attaining his end. Suppose he succumbs. Can we imagine him doing so remaining resolved never 
to smoke again starting from yesterday? I cannot see how. Instead, in choosing to smoke he will 
relinquish his resolution, in all likelihood making a new one but perhaps resigning himself, in self-
disgust, to never escaping his addiction. Perhaps, one might object, he might try to maintain his 
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resolution by saying something like, ''l1's still yesterday on the other side of the worId". But this 
would be to self-deceptively change his resolution. He cannot smoke the day after making his 
resolution and yet remain resolved upon that resolution except by deceiving himself in a radical way. 
But this would not be instrumental irrationality, which is detennined relative to a person's beliefs.21 
Something similar can be saíd of Jane, and any other example the rationalist might provide. 
Even the paradigms of instrumental irrationality faíl to meet the criteria for genuine violation of the 
hypothetical imperative. Since the hypothetical imperative is the Ieast controversial of the alIeged 
rational norros, it seems likely that there are no such rational norros at alL 1 deny, therefore, that such 
"practical irrationality" ever occurs. It might be suggested that we except some subset of those people 
so cognitively dysfunctional that it is difficult to recognize them as agents (such as those who turn up 
in the anecdotes of Oliver Sachs). But the possible violation criterion requires that rational 
requirements do not apply to those incapable of complying with them, and so neither can we label the 
cognitively dysfunctional Hirrational". 
6. Reinterpreting talk of reason and irrationality 
Is it the case, then, that irrationality is impossible? How could we possibly accept that? 
Ascriptions of irrationality and invocations of the hypothetical imperative are part of everyday 
practical life. Rejection of rational norms and the possibility of irrationality accordingly appears to 
constitute an "error theory" of practical reason as condemnatory of common sense and therefore as 
21 It is difficult to know a means is necessary. Determining means to ends requires empírical knowledge not 
merely of all causal effects of the means, but also of everything that could intervene to malee the action fail, bring 
about the desired end without assistance, or malee new means possible. (The rationalist need not establish that the 
means is necessary - which is probably impossible - merely that the person believes it necessary). No matter how 
slender the possibility, the uncertainty of the outcome threatens oue ability to malee a charge of irrationality. The 
hypothetical imperative cannot indict anybody of irrationality for conscious neglect of a means where the 
slightest hope of the end remaining attainable is entertained - unless supplemented with a rational norm about the 
degree of probability it is rational to talee into account: far more controversial than the hypothetical imperative. 
Can we imagine situations of"instrumental irrationality" where no such slim hope is entertained? 
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unpalatable as Mackie's error theory ofmoraljudgement. discussed in the next chapter.22 Not at all. 1 
do not mean to deny that we can appropriately as cribe irrationality to persons and actions. Like Hume. 
1 deny only that irrationality as defined by the rationalist is possible. We have been deceived by the 
fact that the rationalist speaks in the language of common sense into believing that the rationalist 
speaksfor common sense. But rationalism misinterprets these practices and utterances. Here is what 
Hume has to say: 
... every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquillity, is 
confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from the trrst view and appearance. 
Now 'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies .... When any of these passions 
are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the detenrunations 
ofreason, and are suppos' d to proceed from the same faculty, with that. which judges of truth 
and falshood .... Besides these calm passions ... there are certain violent emotions of the same 
kind .... What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions aboye the 
violent ... (1739: 417-8) 
What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind ... By 
reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the former; but such as operate more 
calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper ... (1739: 437 - see also 536,583) 
"Reason" is ordinarily used as a name for calm. stable. settled desires, and the actions 
prompted by the same. wbile unreason consists in violent. momentary passions such as urges of anger, 
terror. and lust - and in the actions prompted by the same, particularly where they conflict with 
"reason". The football player who, overcome with rage. commits a personal foul that deprives himself 
and bis team of the victory that is the object of bis more stable, lasting desires, is acting irrationally. 
22 My personal observations of ascription of "irrationality" suggest that sorne measure of error theory might be 
appropriate. Those inclined to liberally ascribe irrationality ofien fail to appreciate the situation of the other - his 
beliefs and interests - and accordingly his behaviour appears inexplicable to them: incomprehensible, not like 
something issuing from a rational agent at aH. It remains, however, an open question whether the meaning of 
"irrationality" in this context is rationalist or Humean. 
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The roUer coaster and smoker examples are also easily understood on this modeL The smoker acts on 
the prompting of an immediate nicotine-induced urge. rather than on his stable. reflective preference 
that he not smoke. Jane acts on the prompting of a sudden powerful fear. rather than on her stable. 
reflective preference for triumphing over that fear. The anti-foundational account of practical 
irrationality. unlike rationalism. can accornmodate the paradigms of irrational behaviour.2J 
What are we to make of the normative judgements we utter in the form of "hypothetical 
imperatives"? Rationalism has misinterpreted the function of these judgements, which 1 will now 
address as "practical directives". First, we fmd statements of the form, "In order to x. you must y". 
Often. this "musí" is logical. not normative: it expresses the necessity of doing y in order to 
accomplish X. Second, statements of the form "In order to x. you should y" are ofien uttered not to 
inform or remind people that reason commands they take the necessary means to their ends, but to 
inform or remind people about the means to their ends. If 1 say to someone, "If you want to see a 
modero defense of rationalism. you should read Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism", 1 am aiming to 
inform her not of a rationa! requirement that operates on facts we both recognize. but that reading 
Nagel's classic work is an excellent means to that end.24 There is never any need to prescribe to 
anybody that they take what they know to be the necessary means to their ends - although reminding 
or informing about means. and prodding to induce lacking resolve, or decision, are ofien called for 
and easily mistaken for the former. 
23 Note how close Korsgaard's rationalist analysis ends up being to this. Her account is unsatisfactory precisely to 
the degree that she tries to preserve rationalist elements: i.e. making the demand for reasons for being rational 
self-defeating, and denying the dependence of the normativity on interest. 
24 Altematively, if 1 say "You should read Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism in order to see a modem defense of 
rationalism", 1 aro performing a different action: providing a reason for reading the book (being that the book is a 
modem defense of rationalism). 
170 
7. Normativity 
Part of the rationalists' case has gone unanswered, and that is the claim that the 
"psychologizing" of the hypothetical imperative fails to explain the normativity of instrumental 
reasoning. Even iffailure to talee the means to one's ends is impossible, even ifwe take the means by 
necessity, it cannot simply be the case that this is something we do. 1t is also the correct thing to do, 
the thing we should do. The rationalists charge that the problem of explaining this is insunnountable 
for anti-foundationalism. Normativity is a much discussed, little understood notion in metaethics. The 
essence of the norion is that of the "should": of something being practically correct or right. 1t is 
characterized phenomenologically as a "pull", exerted by the circumstances on uso Even if my 
dismantling of the hypothetical imperative is accepted, there is still the problem of how we should 
explain the normativity of prudence, or the correctness of acting on our stable and reflectiveIy 
endorsable interests over our "irrational" passions. Also, when 1 use a speech-act in the hypothetical 
forro to inforro you of a means, 1 say "you shouId", not "you will". If my analysis is correct, shouldn't 
we rather say, "If you want to see a modero defense of rationalism, you will read Nagel's The 
Possibility 01 Altruism, once you know about it."? 
This is falseo 1 am not proposing the psychoIogizing of a normative principIe at al!. The 
"hypothetical imperative", as we have defined it, does not exist - but it is an analytic truth that one 
wills what one believes to be the necessary means to one's ends. This is not a normative principIe. 
There are norroative propositions, however - they talee the forro of practical directives. But their 
normativity, 1 will now argue, is not "objective" (interest-transcendent) and rational, but rather 
interest-relational. Interest-relationaI propositions and judgements, as 1 argued in chapters 3 and 4, are 
not psychologistic, but Iogical: they concem the objective relations between interests and objects, not 
the contingent and subjective psychology of individual s or species. 
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The rationalists contend that tbe presence of nonnativity indicates a rational requirement. 
··Should" expresses a cornmand of interest-transcendent reason, and we are obliged to obey whatever 
our interests and motivations. If it were possibIe not to take the necessary means to one's ends, it 
would not just be peculiar, it would be objectively mistaken. There is an ·'objective prescriptivity" 
built into the world, contra Mackie, which we sense and to which we respondo There are undoubtedly 
difficult questions that the rationalists need to answer themseIves. Despite rationalist criticism of the 
dogmatism in value realism (see Korsgaard's (1996a) critique of Nagers realism), the very same 
probIems facing the realisfs objective value properties face the rationalisfs objective commands of 
reason. How do we detect these objective rational Iaws? Do we have sorne facuIty of perception or 
cognition - sorne moral intuition? Or perhaps the knowIedge is innate? Neither moral intuitions nor 
innate knowIedge of rational principIes make for satisfying philosophical explanations! The 
rationalist, accordingly, has epistemological probIems. She also has metaphysical probIems, just lilce 
the value realist. What is it we are cognizing? Are we hearing the cornmands of Reason, as if it were 
some deity speaking to us? 
More importantly, rationalism shares in probIems of justification and motivation. What does 
reason matter? Or, why shouId 1 accept these alIegedIy objective principIes, if not simply because they 
satisfy certain of my interests? CarroIr s Achilles, arguing with the Tortoise that he must accept 
certain principIes of theoreticaI inference, struggIes with this probIem when the Tortoise stubbornly 
insists on hearing a reason, and offers nothing better than the absurd repIy that Iogic wouIdforce him 
too The rationalists' probIem here is AchilIes' problem. Believers in the hypothetical imperative often 
maintain that its justification is simpIy brute.25 There is no further reason or explanation why we 
should talce the means to our ends; it is simpIy a fact about reason that we have to accept. Indeed, the 
classic rationalist strategy (pioneered by Kant, more recently adopted by Hampton (1998)) is to 
25 This was the consensus, for example, between a speaker and her respondent on a panel on ethical theory 1 
attended at the Eastern APA meeting in New York, December 2000. 
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acknowledge the presence of a mystery, an apparently occult element inconsistent with naturalism, 
but to insist it is one we have no choice but to recognize. They do not seek to explain it, but, in 
Mackie's phrase, to find "companions in guilt" for morality: demonstrate the ubiquity of this 
mysterious phenomenon. 
The anti-foundationalist, on the other hand, can explain why taking the means is correct, and 
can explain the force or pull of normativity. Why is it correct to take the means to one's ends? The 
answer really isn't mysterious at al!. Failure to take necessary means equals faílure to attain the 
sought end. This is the one and onIy reason why failure to take the means is incorrecto But to what 
does it matter that we faíl to attain our ends? According to the rationalist, it matters to objective, 
disinterested Reason. Suppose it makes sense to taIk about something mattering to disinterested 
Reason. We still need an explanation why it would care whether we achieve our ends - even when 
they are evil or misguided. But we don't need to appeal to the strange notion of benevolent reason to 
fmd a patron that cares whether we attain our ends. If we are seeking that which always cares whether 
or not we attain the object of our interest, regardless of the content of that interest, there is only one 
obvious candidate. Failure to attain the satisfaction of an interest always matters - analytically! - to 
that interest itselr.Z6 It is from the perspective of the desire for x that we make the judgement that we 
should y where we believe y to be the necessary means to X. 
Here it is important to contrast the practical directive with the disjunctive hypothetical 
imperative. Earlier we assumed the two were functionalIy identical. But the difference consists in this: 
The disjunctive hypothetical imperative presents its "should" or normativity as an interest-
transcendent matter, a command from neutral reason. The practical directive, on the other hand, 
assumes a context of interest and within that context recommends a course of action. Normative and 
deontic judgements are interest-relational judgements, expressing not a command of objective reason, 
26 See also Velleman 1997: 41-2. 
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but a judgement from the perspective of particular interests. The crucial error of rationalism lies in the 
inference that because taking the means to our ends Cread de re) is correct no matter what our interests 
may be. therefore taking tbe means to our ends is commanded frOID a position outside all interests 
altogether. The disjunctive hypothetical imperative justifies a foundationalist stance. but if all 
"rational norms" reduce to interest-relational deontic judgements like the practical directive. then the 
anti-foundationalist is right. and normativity is a product of interest or motivation. 
Recognition of tbe practical directive as the real normative proposition enables us to 
reintroduce sorne of tbe features we had to strip from the hypotbetical imperative when trying to 
formulate a satisfactory rational norm. The antecedent need not specify an end. it can specify a desire. 
so that "If you want x. you should y" legitimately recommends sorne action y from the perspective of 
the interest in x. Likewise. tbe means need not be necessary. We can commend a means as the best. 
from the perspective of an interest. We can say. "Well. if you want x. tben you should do y ... but you 
cOllld instead do z". Rationalism cannot account for this ··could". since it interprets "should" as 
expressing a command of reason. in which case not doing y is contrary to reason and hence 
impennissible. Even if my arguments against the impossibility of practical irrationality as detmed by 
rationalism are not successful the case against the rationalist interpretation stands. on the ground that 
it fails to account for the everyday attribution of rationality and irrationality and everyday normative 
judgements. 
Rationalists have an argument for preferring brute norms of reason over this explication of 
normativity in terms of interest. The correctness of taking the means cannot be interest-relational 
because the character of practical correctness is not internal to the motivated perspective. Judgements 
of practical irrationality are also made from olltside such perspectives: we consider that person who 
does not talce the means to his ends to be rnistalcen regardless of whether we share those interests. 
This independence of criticism from shared interests supposedly demonstrates tbat the normativity of 
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taking the means in the particular case in independent of the interest in question. The rationalists 
claim or assume that external judgements about what another rationally should do can be made from a 
disinterested perspective independent of alI interests. They themselves demonstrate the falsity of this 
when they defend the claim that their judgements of irrationality are not just relative to themselves. 
Persons who fail to talce the means to their ends, rationalists insist, are making a mistalce even within 
the context of their own desires and beliefs. This is right, and I suggest just the following 
modification: such inaction is incorrect simply because it is a mistake from the perspective of those 
very desires and beliefs. Judging the rationality of others' behaviour is attempting to step into their 
shoes and view their actions from the perspective of their own interests and beliefs. 
Making deontic judgements is always interest-relational: it is always within the context of 
some interest. Some deontic judgernents are "internal" (to the person's perspective of interest), others 
are "externar' (to the person's perspective of interest - the paradigm being moral judgement). 
Judgernents of "instrumental rationality" are internal deontic judgements. When we judge that sorne 
murderer should have used a gun, we are not invoking an interest-transcendent rational norm, but 
making an interest-relational norrnative judgement from the perspective of the murderer's interests. 
One might object that we may not share any of those interests. But one of the claims of chapter 3 is 
that we need not share another' s interest in order to imaginatively talce on and make judgements frOID 
its perspective. We can adopt the point of view of interests that we do not share, and engage in speech 
acts in which these borrowed interests are implicit. 
What is normativity or practical correctness? According to the interest-relational theory, it is 
the phenomenon of a course of action being the one that actually satisfies a tnotivating interest. The 
normative point of view is the motivated point of view. Recognition of normativity is the recognition 
of sorne course of action as being such as to satisfy a motivating interest: Le. recognition of value 
relative to present motivations. Analyses of normativity in terms of interests have the virtue of 
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providing an explanation for its motivating character. an explanation in tenos of the motivating 
capacities of interests. rather than a very problematic motivating capacity of objective states of affairs. 
The foundationalists object that this gets the phenomenology all wrong. The experience of 
normativity is the experience of a pullo not the experience of a push - which is all that motivationaI 
states of the agent could explain. But we can note the parallel phenomenon of temptation - which is 
likewise experienced and described as a pul[ ratber than a push. although we have far fewer quaIms 
about attributing this to our desires. Normativity and temptation are experienced as pulls because they 
are conative responses to the perceived situation. which is objective and independent of our 
immediate controL 1 suggest, in fact, that normativity and temptation are different names for the same 
phenomenon. ''Temptation'' is the word for the drawing power of the recognition of value reIative to 
motivating interests where acting to satisfy these interests would not be reflectively endorsed (Le. the 
draw of immediate. imprudent interests) while "normativity" is the word for the drawing power of the 
recognition of value reIative to motivating interests which would be reflectiveIy endorsed (Le. the 
draw of our more stable interests onder conditions of a long-sighted view of consequences). The 
struggle between temptation and normativity is the struggIe between the stable reflective interests and 
the hotheaded. imprudent ones.27 
8. The analogy to theoretical reasoning 
The suggested analogy between theoreticaI reason and practical reason appears not to hold. 
Tbere are no principies of valid practical inference corresponding to the principIes of modus ponens 
and the like, adherence to which is necessary in arder to be reasoning properly no matter what your 
interests may be. There is no distinct logic of practical reason, no valid inferences that are strictIy 
27 I have only touched on the interest-relational analysis of the phenomenology of normativity, or obligation, 
here. A more detailed treatment is provided in Appendix B. 
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practica!. This is not to say that practical reasoning does not contain inferences that may or may not 
be valid - because practical reasoning is a process that can ofien inelude theoretical reasoning. 
As 1 have mentioned already. however, the mere existence of theoretical norms seems to tell 
in the rationalist' s favour. For theoretical reasoning is an action. and the existence of objective 
theoretical norms which are rationally required of us whatever our interests equals the existence of 
interest-transcendent rational norms. Anti-foundationalism denies the possibility and the sense of such 
things. and so anti-foundationalism (the rationalist elaims) is refuted in at least this domain. But if 
foundationalism is true in the theoretical case, why can't it similarly be true in the practica! case? 
Even if there is no hypothetical imperative, therefore, we are not licensed to reject the possibility of 
objective practical norms. Anti-foundationalism needs to extend the analogy in the opposite direction. 
There are no foundational, interest-transcendent rational norms at all- not even theoretical ones. The 
rationalist may laugh. The rules of logic are objectively correct, she will reply, they are principIes 
required for reasoning, which separate valid from invalid reasoning. To claim their authority is 
interest-relational would be the height of psychologistic absurdity. 
But is this true? The laws of logic are laws conceming the transmission of truth from one 
proposition to another - Le. validity. Rules of inference explain why some conclusions are assured of 
preserving the tnlth of the premises and others lack this assurance. 1 certainly do not wish to claim 
that validity is interest-relational, and the anti-foundationalist need noto The question is, what makes 
valid reasoning "correct"? From whence derives the justification for reasoning validly? 1 showed 
how, in the case of practical reasoning, the fundamental contributor of "correctness" to a conclusion 
is not the rules of inference used, but the interest which stands to win or lose depending on the 
outcome. If we are to establish an analogy between practical and theoretical reasoning, we need to 
look for the interest which stands to win or lose depending on whether the reasoning is "correct" or 
"incorrect". Rationalists sometimes claim that no such interest can be identified: that theoretical 
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reasoning is unmotivated by interests (Hampton 1998). But this is patent1y falseo Theoretical 
reasoning is aimed at the truth, or at knowledge (as justified true belief). This is the interest that 
rnotivates theoretical reasoning. If one is aiming to reach not knowledge but sornething else, then one 
does not, by reasoning invalidly, reason incorrectly. Valid inferences are "correct" simply because 
they reliably transmit truth frorn premises to conclusions - and because reliable transmission of truth 
is what we want when we reason theoretically. 
There is, therefore, a parallel between theoretical and practical reasoning: but it runs in a 
contrary direction to the parallel that the rationalist hypothesized. In fact, the one strong disanalogy 
between practical and theoretical reasoning is the absence of rules of inference in the practical case. 
Rules of inference are principIes conceming the transmission of truth frorn one proposition to another. 
They have a place in theoretical reasoning because knowledge (true justified belief) is its goal. The 
goal of practical reasoning is not true belief, but attainment of the object of the rnotivating interest. 
Rules of inference are therefore local to the theoretical case, which is simply a particular instance of 
practica! reasoning. What is practica! reasoning? It is ordinary reasoning pressed into the service of 
sorne practica! concem - which is really no more than to say that it is ordinary reasoning, which 
(contra Nagel. Hampton et al) cannot exÍst apart from a motivating concem. We can add nonnativity 
itself to value (normative properties) and reasons (normative entities) as a phenomenon that is 
interest-relationa! in nature and, as such, is properly understood only through an anti-foundationalist 
interpretation. 
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6. MORALITY, ABSOLUTISM, AND INCOHERENCE 
l. A problem for the semantic claim of the interest-relational theory 
According to the interest-relational theory, value, reasons for action and normativity itself 
have their substance in a relation to interests. This metaphysical thesis is based on a semantic analysis 
claiming that by our normative language we mean something interest-relational. Normative 
judgements describe relational facts holding between the judged objects and implicit sets of interests. 
One consequence of this stance is a significant forro of relativismo Assertions of sentences involving 
normative terms not explicitly relativized to a perspective of interest can only be understood and 
assessed as true or false from the perspective of sorne set of interests. If the semantic claim of the 
interest-relational theory is correct, then all value judgements are semantically tied to sorne interest 
for their meaning and truth-conditions. But here, the interest-relational theory confronts a difficult 
problem. Against it, foundationalism appeals to an everyday practice of ethical judgement that 1 will 
call moral absolutismo Foundationalists insist tbat moral judgement and disagreement manifest a 
thoroughly foundationalist assumption: they transcend contingent perspectives of interest in sorne 
manner, and can therefore only be accornrnodated by a foundationalist semantics. Moral value 
judgements are not relational in the proposed manner. 1 1 deÍme absolutism as the practice of using 
vallle language with an assumption of foundationalism. 
In chapter 4 1 rejected the claim that any non-relational value properties exist, in support of 
the metaphysical thesis that all value is interest-relational. It is not unusual to find defenses of such a 
metaphysical relativism about moral value. But the further semantic relativism of my stance may 
1 The "relativism" of the interest-relational theory is not the familiar thesis that there are no universal moral 
truths. On this relativism, there will be moral truth holding for all persons if everyone shares some relevant 
interests. The "absolutism" that is problematic for the interest-relational theory is not a manifestation of the moral 
universalism that holds there is only one true morality, but of foundationalism (there is a moral truth authoritative 
over us all regardless of our interests). 
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malee the interest-relational theory appear naIve and vulnerable. A moral relativism that attributes 
relativity even to the meanings of ordinary moraljudgements seems to falsify the phenomena in a way 
most detrimental to its plausibility. Even allowing that different moral agents form moral judgements 
by measuring the object against the particular framework of moral principIes they personally accept, 
and that such frameworks may differ from individual to individual, culture to culture, and that there is 
no standpoint external to such contingent moral frameworks by which they themselves may be 
evaluated - given all this that modero relativists insist upon2 it still seems false even to those who 
would concur with my metaphysical relativism to say that the moral judgement, ''This is wrong!" 
must be understood as asserting a merely relational thought, indexed essentially to particular interests. 
The reason for this is belief in the prevalence of moral absolutism. 
For tbis reason John Mackie - who otherwise favoured an interest-relational theory of the 
semantics and metaphysics of value very close to mine - advanced an alternative, foundationalist 
account of the meaning of ordinary moral language, and more recently (in the wake of widespread 
skepticism conceming bis error theory) moral relativists like Gilbert Harman (1996) have avoided 
making any claims about the meaning of everyday moral language, contenting themselves with 
statements concerning what we should consider as elliptical for ordinary moral utterances; what we 
should reinterpret moral utterances as meaning in order to be able to assign them truth values. 
Are the universal semantic claims of the interest-relational theory foolish or mistaken? In 
chapter 4 1 rejected the foundationalists' claim that there is interest-independent value on the ground 
there could be no interest-independent reasons, but it may be considered unproven whether any part of 
oue language of value ever has a non-(interest)-relational semantic meaning. Moral absolutism must 
be examined as evidence for value language with a meaning that requires foundationalist analysis. To 
retum a positive answer to the semantic question of whether there are any non-relational value 
2 For example, Gilbert Harman (Harman & Thomson 1996) 
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concepts while holding to a negative answer to the metaphysical question of whether there are any 
non-relational value properties is to endorse an error theory and indict ordinary moral judgement of 
being globally false and engaging in some form of nonsense. Ido not endorse an error theory, but wiIl 
argue that absolutism is indeed an incoherent practice, in a delmite sense. 
2. Nagel and Dworkin: The last word? 
The problem for my semantic thesis escalates into a problem for my metaphysical thesis. 
There is an argument designed to blow anti-foundationalism out of the water on the basis of the 
ubiquity of moral absolutism. Ronald Dworkin (1996) and Thomas Nagel (1997) cIaim that 
metaethical or second-order theories about the status of morality and moral judgements themselves 
take particular substantive stands within morality. As such, our acceptance of them is just one more 
conviction, and so their plausibility must be determined by weighing our convictions in their favour 
against any lrrst order moral convictions that conflict with them. This is to say that metaethical theory 
must be put in reflective equilibrium with lrrst order moral judgements - to prescribe an empirical 
method of theoretic justification which takes our lrrst order moral convictions as data to which theory 
must remain true. In Nagel's express ion, these first order practices and intuitions have the "last word". 
Dworkin and Nagel argue that any anti-foundationalist metaethical theory conflicts with the 
face value absolutist character of ordinary moral judgement, and therefore engages in an attempt to 
"debunk" ordinary moral thought and practice. But absolutism is so prevalent and deep-rooted in 
ordinary moral thought and practice that it cannot be undermined. Even the extreme moral skeptic is 
allegedly unable to refrain from making such moral judgements in unguarded moments. Since any 
theory attempting to "debunk" an ordinary practice or commonsense belief must be weighed against 
all the first order convictions supporting that practice or belief, it is impossible, according to Dworkin 
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and Nagel. that any reasons for accepting an anti-foundationalist theory could outweigh such a 
fundamental piece of common sense. 
We could object to the picture of philosophy as an enterprise aimed at articulating and 
justifying common sense and dominant intuitions. 1 prefer a picture of the philosophical enterprise as 
enquiry inspired by doubts about commonsense notions and everyday assumptions. driven by the 
suspicion that there is something wrong with the complacent opinions and practices we fmd around 
ourselves. Cornmon sense is not immune to error or even incoherence. as 1 shall shortly argue. 
However, this is not to the point, for what is at issue is not the argument itself but its premise. that 
moral absolutism is ubiquitous (from which it follows that any anti-foundationalist interpretation 
amounts to an attempt at «reconstruction" or "debunking".) 
Although many people affrrm the absolutist character of their judgements, many also affrrm 
the opinion that their judgements have a relativistic character. It is ofien complained by philosophers 
teaching introductory courses in ethics that many undergraduates espouse relativism. Harman claims 
that after weeding out those whose espousal of relativism disappears afier scratching the surface, he 
fmds classes evenly divided between those with relativist and those with absolutist intuitions about 
their moral judgements (1985: 29). 1 do not claim that this constitutes anyevidence for the relativity 
of the semantics of value, but it is relevant as a response to Dworkin and NageL If common sense and 
intuition are the "last word" on the question, then there is widespread counter-evidence they neglect 
to take into account. The case from endoxa or common opinion can be made more forcefully against 
the foundationalist. For the ancient Greeks, endoxa was not the opinion of the many, but the opinion 
of the wise. The proportion of people holding relativistic intuitions over those holding absolutist 
intuitions concerning their judgements increases relative to intelligence and education.3 This is not to 
3 This claim is based principally on personal observation, but the following empirical study, brought to my 
attention by Christopher Knapp, is interesting. Jonathan Haidt, S. H. Koller, and M. G. Dias present the results of 
a field study (in "Culture, Affect, and Morality: Or, 1s 1t Wrong to Eat Your Dog?" Joumal of Personality and 
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deny that there are sorne exceptionally intelligent and educated foundationalists and sorne 
exceptionally dim-witted and ignorant anti-foundationalists. But were we to give the "Iast word" to 
empirical data, it is not so clear that absolutism would emerge as the weightier practice. 1 do not wish 
to do so, however, and will provide an explanation of the connection between relativism and 
intelligence. (This connection is extremely loose - 1 do not mean to advance an ad hominem argument 
against the foundationalist). 
More importantIy, while the empiricist model of theoretic justification Dworkin and Nagel 
favour is aH very well, it is not the only legitimate method of approaching philosophicaI questions. 1 
don't believe it is the appropriate one in this case. ··Very few facts," J. S. MilI rightIy said, ··are able 
to teH their own story, without cornments to bring out their meaning:'" To be able to weight the 
evidence one frrst has to interpret it. and the phenomena to which Dworkin and Nagel appeal is very 
much in need of interpretation. Their conclusion depends upon a particular interpretation - the 
foundationalist interpretation of value language that they themselves favour - and therefore their 
strategy is fundamentally question-begging. The interest-relational theory provides a very different 
interpretation of the language of value and the practice of its use, which yields no such overwhelming 
weight of absolutist data in favour of foundationalism. 
We must investigate the aHegedly absolutist phenomena used to support foundationalist 
semantic accounts, to determine whether, as alleged. our ordinary practice aIready cornmits us to 
foundationalism and the existence of interest-transcendent value. 1 shall argue, against the Nagel-
Dworkin rejection of my substantive or metaphysical claim, that absolutism is not as ubiquitous and 
Social Psychology 65 (1993): 613-628) in which reactions by two sample groups to actions perceived as 
disgusting - one drawn froro students at the University of Pennsylvania, the other from a south Philadelphia 
McDonalds restaurant nearby - were compared for (1) their tendency to endorse interference of such practices. 
and (2) their tendency to universalize their judgements of moral wrongness of those practices. The McDonalds 
sample endorsed interference more than four times as frequently. and universalized approxirnately six times as 
frequently. as the Penn students. Interestingly. little differences were found in an intemationaI comparison. There 
remains an interpretive gap between this data and my cIaim, but it presents a reasonable prima facie case. 
4 J. S. Mill, On Liberty. London: Oxford University Press, 1963 (1859). p. 27. 
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inescapable a practice as they suppose. so we are not already committed to foundationalism. and then 
1 shall argue. against Mackie's rejection of my conceptual or semantic claim, that the phenomenon of 
absolutism does not require or involve a non-relational semantics ofyalue. 
3. Searching for absolutism 
What is the "evidence" for the absolutism of our moral judgements? We might see the 
phenomena of moral disagreement as such evidence. When you say sorne act is wrong. and 1 say that 
act is right. it is evident that we haye different attitudes toward the acto In no way howeyer does this 
dampen our commitment to argumento Evidently. we take ourselves to be contradicting one another so 
that only one of us at most could possibly be right - and noncognitivist reinterpretations of this 
intuition and behaviour in terms of attitudinal conflict are unsatisfactory. The phenomenon of moral 
disagreement itself is thus sometimes claimed as proof that our moral claims are essentially absolutist. 
However. the logical rather than attitudinal character of moral disagreement as such only 
presents difficulties for noncognitivist versions of anti-foundationalism. Moral disagreement as such 
only demonstrates that moral judgements are beliefs and not mere expressions of attitude. and beliefs 
about the nature of the object. not the attitudes of the indiyiduals judging. It doesn't follow that this 
nature is foundational and not interest-relational. The interest-relational theory can account for moral 
disagreement as such with ease. 1 do not believe there is just one correct analysis of moral 
disagreement. The assumption that matters are simple and admit of a single analysis is dangerous, and 
has done much harro to our understanding of moral judgement. The interest-relational theory enables 
us to distinguish several distinct situations in which disagreement can occur. 
First, disagreement oyer value is often simply disagreement within a context of shared 
interests. For example, two parents with substantially identical interests might disagree oyer the 
rightness or wrongness of physically punishing their child. According to the interest-relational theory, 
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they are disagreeing over whether physical punishment is a course of action that satisfies their implicit 
set of interests. One parent may judge that such punishment is right. because she believes punishment 
to be the onlyeffective way of teaching self-discipline. which she believes necessary for ensuring the 
child grows up happy and well-adjusted. The other may consider that such punishment is wrong. 
because he believes it will cripple the child's self-confidence and trustfulness. preventing her from 
growing up happy and well-adjusted. Such disagreement is common. and we need not interpret these 
judgements in a foundationalist way. This is a paradigm case for the interest-relational theory. 
Second. sometimes disagreement arises where it is falsely believed that there is a context of 
shared interests. One or more parties believe themselves to be participating in an argument of the 
previous type. Imagine two parents arguing over whether physical punishment is good or bad. The 
fust believes the discussion takes place within the context of a shared interest in bringing up happy 
and well-adjusted children. and accordingly maintains that physical punishment is bad. To her 
indignation the other parent disagrees, insisting it is good. After some fruitless argumento the second 
parent makes a revealing statement: "How else can you stop children from being little pestsT It 
suddenly dawns on the first that the other is not speaking from a concem abont the welfare of the 
children. but from a different and conflicting implicit interest. Although they have been verbally 
arguing. they have not really been disagreeing but taIking past each other. Breakdowns in 
understanding líe behind disagreements of this type. The interest-relational theory of value has no 
trouble accornmodating this. 
I believe this type of situation occurs more ofien than we might suspect. and that a 
considerable proportion of the purported examples of absolutist utterances can be accounted for 
thereby. It is also a respect in which intelligence or the lack of it becomes a factor. The ability to 
recognize the differing concems of others requires a certain degree of intelligence and 
imaginativeness. and there are people so obtuse as to be (socio-) pathologically incapable of 
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appreciating the different concems that other people have. (There need not be anything pathological 
about this inability, however: witness the well-wom popular wisdom that ··men are from Mars and 
women are from Venus"). Those bliokered in this way will be prone to appear absolutist in their 
communicative behaviour: they will as sume implicit interests that are not shared, and will fail to 
appreciate the interests motivating others. We do not need to go beyond the interest-relational theory 
of the semantics of value to account for their utterances. They simply fail to recognize that there is not 
a shared context of interest. 5 
There is a familiar phenomenon conceming moral opinion which falls under this rubrico Qne 
often hears the opinion voiced that there is no person (or aH but none) in whom there is no goodness 
whatsoever. Those optimistic about human nature have faith that hidden deep inside even the worst 
person is a remnant of something like Hume's ··sentiment of humanity" - a capacity for compassion 
for others. A moral appeal made to a villain - perhaps for mercy - is often bom from the hope of 
reaching this ··inner humanity". The unrelativized use of value language here - even if there is no 
evident shared context of interest - is nonetheless to be explained as an appeal to the other' s interests 
and sentiments (or at least the capacity for these). 
Not all disagreement over value is necessarily absolutist - but is any? lt might be replied that 
neither of the kinds of disagreement 1 have sketched is properly moral disagreement. The moral 
standards of the speakers in the fust case are the same, and in the second case although the standards 
might differ there is no real disagreement being expressed. Moral disagreement, therefore, is more 
than simply disagreement about value - it has sorne other necessary feature, which perhaps will lead 
us to genuine evidence for the eXÍstence of absolutismo 
s One of the potential practical benefits of the interest-relational theory, 1 believe, is that it enables us to clarify 
the logical structure of value judgements, so that "good" is never a simple predicate, hut a relational predicate 
with an empty place for an interest that must be filled before anything meaningful is expressed. Such notation 
enables us to avoid the equivocation that otherwise afflicts disagreements over value. 
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In both of the cases abo ve, value judgernents are voiced with the assumption that there is a 
shared context of interest. This is crucial for the explanatory power of the interest-relational theory. 
Sornetimes, however, statements about value are made where this assumption is not present, and the 
speaker appreciates well that the interest is not shared - even that there are conflicting interests. This 
might be the case if the rrrst parent aboye was to shift the dispute to a new level, saying, "It is wrong 
to put your own convenience aboye your children's welfare!" It is not a necessary condition of such 
disagreernent occurring that the speaker believes the other to have sorne common interest by which 
the claim of value gets a purchase. This is a circumstance that appears troubling for the interest-
relational theory, and suggests the existence of absolutist moral utterances. 
There are sorne phenomena here that are still interest-relational. Person A might recognize 
that B does not share certain interests with him, but choose to try and deceive B by concealing the fact 
that he does not share these interests. There is a Dilbert cartoon in which Dogbert announces he is 
going into business as a financial advisor, and that he wiIl "tell all [his] clients to invest in the 
'Dogbert Deferred Earnings Fund"'. (When asked, "Isn't that a conflict of interest?" he replies, "OnIy 
if I show interest in the client.") One can imagine Dogbert assuring a client that it would be good for 
them to invest in the Fund. He would not be lying - it would be good for them to do so - for Dogbert.6 
He slyly conceals the fact that he is speaking in the context of a different implicit interest than the one 
they assume. 
Sometirnes however a fundamental difference in interests is manifest to all parties, there is no 
thought that there might be sorne overarching common ground, and value language is invoked in 
direct dispute. Hurting animals for fun is just wrong, regardless of whether you care about them or 
noto Do we not here, at least, have clear evidence of an absolutist moral practice? As revisionist anti-
realist accounts such as the "quasi-realist" project of Simon Blackbum reveal, however, it is more 
6 Doesn't "good for them" conflict with "good for Dilbert?" No, because of the ambiguity revealed in chapter 4: 
what is meant is good (for x) for-rhem-to-invest, not good-for-them for-them-to-invest. 
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difficult than it might appear to get proof of a foundationalist assumption out of such judgements. 
First, even if the wrongness is relative to a concem for animals, A (someone with such a concem) can 
judge that B's cruelty to animals is wrong whether or not B cares for anima)s. Likewise, A can hold 
that it would still be wrong even in the circumstance that A herself did not care about animals. This is 
a judgement from the perspective of A' s actual interests, asserting that if A lacked that interest it 
would still be wrong relative to that interest to hurt animals. Because value judgements are interest-
relational. not subject-relational, there are no conjuring tricks here - this is the only correct 
judgernent. Cruelty to animals is wrong from the perspective of a compassion for living creatures, and 
no facts about the set of interests of any individual have anything to do with it. 
Even the fact that we extend moral judgements to cover those whom we do not suppose to 
possess the relevant interests does not yet provide us with any distinctly absolutist moral phenomena. 
If we are to fmd any such evidence, we must seek further afield again. If we draw our attention back 
to the phenomena of moral disagreement rather than simple moral judgement the absolutist case 
seems stronger. It is one thing to make third-person moral judgements from a distance, such as when 
we condemn Hitler as evil - this can be understood interest-relationally. But when we argue over 
moral value with another whose interests we recognize ourselves not to share, there seems to be 
sornething left to explain. In fact, several things: 1 will begin with the practical problem. 
We take ourselves, when engaging in fundamental moral disagreement, to be doing something 
at least potentially very important and worthwhile. We engage in moral dispute in large part because 
we wish to change the opinions or attitudes of others, or to influence them to act one way rather than 
another. We believe, therefore, that our moral utterances at least potentially (were the other "fully 
rational", etc.) have sorne purchase on the opinions, attitudes, and actions of others. But assertions 
concerning facts about interest-relational value will have no such utility where the persons addressed 
lack the relevant interests. If John hates animals and has no disposition to feel empathy for them, then 
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telling him that hurting animals for fun is wrong (if this means simply that it is incommensurate with 
an interest in the welfare of animals) will be of no practical consequence. Moral facts however are 
supposed to influence all people able to adequately cognize them (their consciences, if not their 
actions), regardless of the composition of their subjective motivational sets. Such value therefore 
could not be interest-relational. 
Need we therefore be absolutists about the proper interpretation of moral utterances? There is 
another option. Focus upon the practical functions of value language is the chief motivation for 
noncognitivist analyses. Here noncognitivists might perceive an advantage, since we can put beside 
these problems for the interest-relational theory the following difficulties for foundationalist 
interpretations. If moral claims appeal to moral facts that are unconnected with agents' interests, then 
how can we expect moral judgements to have any such influence, except in the contingent 
circumstance of an additional interest in moral value (appeal to which would undermine 
foundationalism)? The interest-relational theory of value, however, can help itself to all the 
explanatory resources of noncognitivism - emotivity and prescriptivity - without having to dirty its 
hands with a noncognitivist interpretation. 
Properly understood, value language asserts the existence of certain relations between objects 
and implicit interests. Since the use of unrelativized value language draws contextually on implicit 
interests for sorne of its sense, value judgements paradigmatically express interests and attitudes just 
as the noncognitivists claim, even though this expression is no part of the semantic content of the 
utterances (it is a "conversational implicature", as 1 argued in chapter 1). To. "express" an interest or 
attitude by the use of language is simply to make sorne utterance that indicates to one's audience that 
one has those interests. Since unrelativized value judgements draw contextually frorn irnplicit 
interests, they express these interests, and can be used in order to express interests. Saying that an 
object is good is an indirect way of stating that 1 approve of it (since it is usually safe to assume that 1 
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approve of objects that 1 believe to be such as to satisfy rny implicit interests) and additionally of 
stating that 1 amjustified in liking it (since 1 believe it to be such as to satisfy sorne interest ofmine). 
Taking an apparently absolutist stance on sorne issue can communicate sornething even 
stronger. Since unrelativized value language draws on implicit interests the perspective of which the 
speaker is willing to entertain. stubbom insistence on a contrary judgement communicates indirectly 
the speaker' s outright rejection of that interest, by manifesting her refusal to enter into such a context 
of value discourse. and her refusal to leave her own perspective of interest. The noncognitivists are 
therefore right that value language can be used to express attitudes toward objects. but unlike 
noncognitivism of all kinds. the interest-relational theory can plausibly account for how value 
language comes to have this function. Likewise. value language can be adopted to prescribe attitudes 
and actions to others. by capitalizing on the nonnativity built into the language of value as a result of 
its primary descriptive function. 
This seemingly absolutist practice accordingly provides no proof of a foundationalist 
assumption or semantics. The emotive and prescriptive functions of value language - which are extra-
semantic - provide us with an explanation of why we use value language moralistically. We do not 
need to waver. therefore. in our endorsement of the interest-relational theory in regard to the 
semantics in these cases. However there is more than simply the absolutist practice to contend with. 
and we can tum to the theoreticaI or intuitive accompaniments to the practice for more putative 
evidence for absolutism. 
Disputants in moral disagreements ofien do not merely engage in practices aimed at 
influencing the other. They engage in these practices with a certain understanding of what they are 
doing. and of why they expect their practices to have such an effect. It is clear that they do take 
thernselves to be disagreeing over sorne coromon ground. even though the interest-relational tbeory 
(and noncognitivism) would appear to have us making non-contradictory utterances. If A clairns act p 
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is wrong and B elaims it is right, they take it to be straightforwardly the case that only one of them at 
most could be correct - in exactly the same manner in which onIy one could be right in a 
disagreement over the answer to a mathematical problem. Those who engage in such argument take it, 
furthermore, that influence over the other is sought not as the effect of sorne psychological force or 
social pressure (which is what noncognitivism suggests), but due to the moral fact that one is trying to 
convince the other about.7 The moral facts described are supposed to be such that. ofthemselves, they 
present reasons to others to act, think. or feel appropriately - independently of any interests they 
might antecedently possess. It is important here, for what follows, to appreciate that the phenomenon 
we have identified as absolutist behaviour is accordingly composite, consisting of both a value 
judgement and a certain grasp of the significance of the content of that judgement. 
Evidence for absolutism that the interest-relational theory cannot explain away has proven 
most elusive - can we similarly demonstrate this phenomenon to be interest-relational? The prospects 
here however seem weak. Those who insist in this way on the wrongness or badness or rightness or 
goodness of something do not believe that people should onIy care if they possess certain interests. 
They firrnIy believe that the judgement has authority and normativity even where these interests are 
absent. They believe, in other words, in the foundational character of the value judgements they make, 
and reject the elaim of the interest-relational theory, that all vaIue is essentially relative to some 
interest or other. 
We have seen, however, that much of the phenomena that might at frrst glance appear to be 
evidence of absolutism are not so at al!. Anti-foundationalists can disagree about value, and can even 
emotively argue over fundamental differences in value - they just cannot do so, in circumstances 
where there is an acknowledged lack of common interest, believing they are arguing about an 
objective fact of the matter that provides reasons to which anyone would be irrational not to 
7 Michael Smith (1996) identifies the fact that moral persuasion is not a form of coercion as yielding one of three 
requirements for an adequate account of intemalism. 
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acquiesce. Whereas people do argue in this absolutist way. the practice is not universal - many 
reflective people disown such behaviour altogether. and even amongst those who haven·t. 1 suggest. 
fundamental moral disagreement of this kind. not subsumable under any of the other categories 1 have 
distinguished, is much les s cornmon than morality-obsessed philosophers suppose. 
Absolutism does exist, as Dworkin and Nagel maintain, but it is not nearly as ubiquitous a 
practice as they suppose. This is where someone who accepts the metaphysical claim of the interest-
relational theory that there are no non-relational value properties might. like Mackie. believe it 
necessary to give an error theory of the semantics operating in absolutism. on which moral language 
assumes the existence of fictional non-relational value properties. As defender of the further semantic 
thesis that al! value-terms are interest-relational in meaning, 1 seem to be on treacherous ground. 1 
now turn to investigate how we should handle the semantics of morallanguage in light of absolutismo 
4. The general problem of absolutism 
Given that 1 have advanced a relational account of value. and thus a relativistic account of 
morality, the task at hand must be to describe and explain the nature of the error or errors 1 take those 
with absolutist intuitions about their own practices to be cornmitting. We must take note, °first, that 
despite the furor over moral judgements, absolutism is not confined merely to morality.8 In other 
kinds of dispute over Value we also find the absolutist, who engages in practices manifesting an 
assumption of foundationalism, and avows foundationalist beliefs about his meaning and practice. In 
art-criticism we find both relativists and absolutists: those who think that aesthetic judgements are a 
matter of taste or relative to certain standards or interests (personal or conventional), and those who 
think they are objectively true and valid for aH. Conceming the "good life" or the "human good", 
sorne believe their judgements concem what is objectively true and valid for aH, and others believe 
8 Although it has been claimed that this is what is distinctive about morality. 
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the good life is contingent upon interests and preferences. It is often claimed in philosophical arenas 
that the relativity of the aesthetic value of certain tastes. odors. sensations. etc. is quite 
uncontroversial; but if we examine the opinions and practices of ordinary people (including. ofien. 
ourselves) we find a similar widespread absolutismo Sorne people truly believe that others are 
mistaken in liking the taste of beer, or the sound of heavy metal music or opera. or certain television 
shows or comedians, and so on. 
Neither is it the case that disagreement between relativists and absolutists is limited to the 
extensive domain of vallle. Both relativist and absolutist stances can be and are taken toward such 
matters as size, colour, and motion. Gilbert Harman makes use of the analogy with mass and motion 
in his case for relativism: once (and still today in many quarters) people avowed absolutism about 
motion. and rejected any claim that talk about motion always has to be talk about motion relative to 
something else. But we have been taught differently, and are now relativists about motion. George 
Santayana relates a story about a German woman who asserts that UEnglishmen called a certain object 
bread. and Frenchmen called itpain, but that it really was Brod." (1915: 133). Here we have a case of 
absolutism with regard to language. One commonly finds a similar absolutism about accent. such as a 
woman I was told about from the U.S. who. having lived abroad for many years, claimed that 
Americans are the only people in the world with no accent. 
We are all familiar with tbis broad class of attitudes. which on the whole we associate with 
some combination of stupidity, naivety, ignorance, and lack of imagination. We must be careful, 
however, not to assume too mucho It is important to keep open the question of whether moral 
absolutism is merely another instance of such obtuseness, or whether there is something distinctive 
about morality and moral judgements that sets moral absolutism aparto This does not prevent us, 
however, from recognizing the commonality of the absolutist attitude and asking how we are to 
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interpret it. 1 am concerned with analyzing absolutism in general. in virtue of how it helps us 
understand absolutism about value. 
5. Mackie's errortheory, McDowell's reply 
We should begin by considering the prospects of an error theory. since they may appear less 
problematic. 1 will be better able to defend the apparently implausible semantic claim of the interest-
relational theory if we have a grasp of the difficulties facing error theories. The pertinent question 
concerns how absolutism permeates semantics. and is most explicitly and infamously treated by Ioho 
Mackie (1977: ch. 1). His interpretation is based on the view of Hume. and fatefully recognizes that 
the absolutist error is not peculiar to moral or value language. offering us the Humean analogy of 
secondary qualities (particularly colour). 1 shall consider Mackie's error theory and diagnose its 
failure. 
According to Joho Locke, we can distinguish qualities as properties of objects and 
impressions or ideas as the effects that such qualities have on sensibility. Sorne impressions such as 
that of figure resemble the qualities that give rise to them C"primary qualities") whereas other 
impressions represent without resembling the qualities. These are the "secondary qualities" such as 
colour. sound. and odour, which exist as intrinsic properties of objects (in Locke's view, as complex 
primary qualities), but present us with experiences that are a product of our sensory nature. The quale 
we call "red" exists only in our experience. Creatures with differently constituted sensibilities will 
experience different impressions when observing the same objects. According to Hume when we call 
something "red'·. therefore, we should take ourselves only to be describing the subjective experience 
we are presented with. But due to the "rnind's propensity to spread itself on external objects" and an 
everyday obtuseness we rather believe and assert that the redness we experience is there "objectively" 
in the object. In Locke's terminology, we rnistake the idea or impression of a secondary quality for a 
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primary quality. Therefore we will argue over differing ascriptions of colour, heat, etc., mistakenly 
believing there is a truth of the matter independentIy of how each experiences it. 
Concurring with this picture, Mackie holds that everyday judgements of colour should be 
analyzed as erroneously attributing the fictional property of colour-in-itself to objects. Given that the 
absolutist character of moral disagreement presents the same panem, the analysis is easily extended to 
give an error theory of value judgements. Those disposed to use moral language in an absolutist 
fashion "project" their attitudes into the world, as intrinsic properties of objects, and then are incensed 
at the supposed moral blindness of others then they fail to see these fictional properties or see 
different ones. Hence, absolutist use of moral language is to be analyzed as ascribing fictional 
properties to objects (value-in-itself), committing a global error in virtue of which it is universally 
falseo 
Maclcie's attack is undermÍned by a critical examination of the model of truth, meaning, and 
reality upon which bis error theory depends, a model Joho McDowell demonstrates to be naIve and 
untenable in bis 1985 paper "Values and Secondary Qualities". We catch a glimpse ofthe problematic 
character of Maclcie's analysis when we reflect on the broader critique of everyday practice in which 
it is situated. As McDowell observes, Maclcie considers only Lockean primary qualities to be real 
objective qualities of things. The same error, as I said, is attributed to everyday ascriptions of 
secondary qualities such as colour, sound, and odour to objects. In all these cases, Maclcie cIaims, we 
are in the grip of the pathetic fallacy when we attribute these properties to the world - mistakenly 
projecting our own subjective impressions into the world as if they were primary qualities. 
Value is denied objective existence by Mackie on grounds that apply equally to judgements of 
colour, sound, odour, taste - and accordingly frnds itself in good company. To be no more or les s 
objectively real than these properties seems no mean thing. If value is not objectively real for the 
reasons Mackie provides, then neither are all these other properties we ascribe to objects, and we are 
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left at best with an objective reality quite unlike the worId of our experience, and al worsl (granting 
Berkeley's and Hume's objections to Locke's confidence in the existen ce of primary qualities) no 
objective reality at al!. According to McDowell, therefore, ifMackie's critique of objective value is to 
have any purchase, the devastation it will wreak upon the world of cornmon sense will be vast -
wbich greatly compromises the plausibility of bis analysis. While sorne might be inclined to welcome 
the suggestion that moral judgements are one and all fundamentalIy false, the suggestion that the same 
might be the case for alI judgements conceming colour, sound, smell, etc. will not be so welcome. 1 
am strongly inclined to insist that when 1 predicate colour of sorne object 1 can succeed in stating 
something tme about it. 
In fact, we aIready draw a distinction between something's being really red, and its appearing 
red to sorne individual. Mackie must acknowledge that there is sorne correct statement describing the 
actual objective situation that must obtain in order for us (in the grip of the pathetic fallacy) to be 
prepared to concur that a pool ofblood not only looks red to sorne particular observer(s), but is in fact 
red. Tbis will be something vaguely like: the light-reflecting properties of the blood are such as to 
cause it to appear redly to a normal human visual apparatus in normal conditions (de re, not de dicto). 
We can assume without begging the question that statements of this kind are often true. A parallel 
analysis could be offered for judgements of value (in facr. Mackie will favour the interest-relational 
analysis, since he argues for it in the subsequent chapter). In the cases of both colour and value, 
therefore, there is something we could mean with our statements that would be true and would not 
commit the pathetic fallacy. Furthermore in both cases there are identifiable metaphysical properties 
about which we would be speaking. In the case of colour, it would be the property of being 
constituted such as to present a certain impression to a certain kind of sensibility in a certain range of 
conditions. Why cannot this be what we mean when we make such judgements? 
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We may malee a second stab at this point. aimed more generally at the whole metaphor of 
"projection". A number of philosophers. including Spinoza. Hume. Nietzsche. Santayana. Mackie. 
and Blackbum. have c1aimed that we "projecf' our sentiments and passions onto the world and then 
presume them to be objective qualities of objects.9 But seldom is this mechanism c1early explained. 
Literally speaking. the projection of our sentiments onto the world would be the attribution of fear. 
desire. disgust etc. to objects themselves - but this is not the error the projectivists have in mind. 
What is projected must rather be properties that in sorne way answer to these attitudes Cor perhaps. 
which attitudes answer to) - the properties for example of fearsomeness. desirability. and 
disgustingness. But once projection is glossed like this. it is no longer c1ear that it is an error. If. for 
example. "answering to" is filled out naively in terms of "being a cause of·. then fearsomeness is the 
property of being a cause of fear. desirability the property of being a cause of desire, and 
disgustingness the property of being a cause of disgusto Objects realIy do pos ses s these properties, and 
there is no error involved in ascribing them - it is just that these properties are not intrinsic or 
"primary", and their concepts depend as much upon the constitution of our sensibilities as upon the 
constitution of the object. They are both objective - in the sense of being "out there in the world", 
independently of what we might believe or want - and subjective - in the sense of only being 
perceivable or conceivable frOID certain kinds of subjective perspective. 
This is the Hne ofMcDoweU's objection. He claims that colour-concepts are simply concepts 
of the way in which objects appear to observers. This prompts the question: how are we to conceive 
of this fictitious property that Mackie claims ordinary practice ascribes to the worl¿? What could an 
"in-itself' or prirnary quality colour concept be? If colour concepts are essentially observer-referring. 
colour supposed to be "in-itself' would be an oxymoron. a concept of an observer-referring yet 
simultaneously observer-independent property. Mackie's error theory thus accuses ordinary practice 
9 They differ concerning to what degree this constitutes a mistake on our part - Nietzsche and Blackburn are less 
inclined to view it as such than Hume and Mackie 
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not merely of global error, but of global incoherence - of believing something that canoot even be 
irnagined. 
Does this mean the complete vindication of ordinary practice against Mackie? McDoweIl 
appears to think: so: pointing out that Mackie's view attributes incoherence to ordinary practice seems 
to pass in bis mind for refutation. But this does not settle the case against the error theory. We cannot 
assume that common sense and ordinary practice are guaranteed against error and incoherence. Why, 
however, would anyone wish to construe ordinary practice as saying something incoherent and false 
when there is a perfectly proper altemative at hand? Indeed, in his (much overlooked) subsequent 
chapter, Mackie favours an interest-relational theory of the semantics of value. Given he had such an 
account of bis own, why advance an error theory at aIl? Mackie advocates an error theory because he 
recognizes a tension between the interest-relational semantics he theorizes, and certain characteristics 
of and beliefs about the communicative behaviour surrounding certain species of value judgements 
(notably, moral judgements) - those characteristics that we have identified as the marks of moral 
absolutismo It is ofien overlooked (even, 1 think, by McDoweIl) that Mackie's error theory is meant as 
an analysis only of judgements purporting to be foundationalist or in bis terms, categorical: 10 
My thesis that there are no objective values is specifically the denial that any such categorical 
imperative element is objectively val id. The objective values which 1 am denying would be 
action-guiding absolutely, not contingently upon the agent's desires and inclinations." (1977: 
29) 
McDowell' s defense of ordinary practice encounters problems explaining the varying 
degrees of ignorance conceming the relativity and conditionality of our experiences of things like 
colour and value. Whereas many people do appreciate that value qualities are essentialIy relative to 
some kind of interest or sensibility, there are also many people who clearly fail to recognize such 
10 On this point, see also Michael Smith 1993. 
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relativity, insisting for example that value properties provide reasons to persons regardless of their 
interests. In fact, even prominent philosophers (such as Kant, Moore and Nagel) have denied the 
essentiallink between value and interest or subjective constitution - which stance for McDoweU ll and 
myself is not merely false but incoherent. Absolutist beliefs are further demonstrated by certain 
pattems of behaviour, such as insisting on particular judgements against the contrary judgements of 
others even where the relevant difference in interests, standards, or sensibilities has been 
acknowledged, and even when all hope of emotively or prescriptively influencing the other' s attitudes 
has been given up. 
Even if McDowell is right about the objectivity of value, colour, etc., he is wrong in 
supposing that ordinary practice is never contaminated by misunderstanding, error, and even 
incoherence. There are pattems of belief and behaviour that do not square with bis representation of 
what such concepts are, and accordingly Mackie appears justified in maintaining his error theory. 
Indeed, McDowell observes that Mackie's response to his critique was to claim "that it simply 
conceded bis point" (1985: 121). 1 speculate Mackie meant that McDowell's secondary-quality 
analogy just granted his central claim. that there exist no value properties that have a bearing on our 
deliberations independently of contingent feaiures of subjects, and therefore there exist no value 
properties that would underwrite the absolutism manifest in ordinary morality. Mackie saw 
McDoweIrs analysis as failing to show sensitivity to the assumptions embedded in everyday moral 
discourse, and therefore did not see his error-theory analysis as threatened. 
The misunderstanding, however, is not all McDowell' s fault. Mackie introduces his chapter, 
entitled "The Subjectivity of Values", by claiming that its purpose is to argue there are no objective 
value properties. 1 have agreed with McDowell that Mackie's conception of objectivity is overly 
11 Except that McDowell talks about "sensibility" instead of "interest", and the reason may be that he believes a 
relational connection to our sensibility will support value that depends upon us to sorne degree but is nonetheless 
foundational, not tied to our interests. 
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simplistic. As it tums out however, Mackie is really concemed about the categoricity or 
unconditionality of moral values, and has erred by supposing that categoricity implies objectivity and 
vice-versa. If he had just attended carefully to the metaphysical implications of his own semantic 
analysis of Hgood" in the subsequent chapter, he might have recognized that he himself had 
demonstrated the objective reality of interest-relational value properties. 
6. They hzow not what they say 
Mackie's vindication does not mean that the error theory must be upheld. It remains an 
extreme view with some very counter-intuitive consequences. Must we disagree with the moral 
absolutist who claims that Caligula, Cesare Borgia, and the Marquis de Sade were bad men? Or with 
the aesthetic absolutist who insists that the Spice Girls made bad music? It seems we must, if what 
theyare saying is false as the error theory maintains. But our inclination is rather to agree, even if we 
have quaIms about the absolutism lurking behind these judgements. Much has been made ofMackie's 
significant failure to draw the obvious conclusion from his diagnosis of error. 12 Rather than trying to 
expunge moral discourse, he proceeds to moralize himself. Even Mackie therefore seems to have 
shared the intuition that the moral absolutist can succeed in saying something true. 
It may seem that the anti-foundationalist is faced with a dilemma, as Nagel and Dworkin 
contend. Either absolutist moral judgements are alI false, a conclusion that is most hard to swallow, or 
else we have to admit that there really are absolute moral values, the existence of which we must 
aclrnowledge to be able to consistently engage in moral discourse ourselves. But there is another 
option. which Mackie (along with Nagel and Dworkin) appears to have neglected to take seriously. 
Absolutist judgements are all false, if there is no foundational value, only in the circumstance that 
absolutism is part of the meaning of absolutist moral speech. We must consider why the error has to 
12 For example Blackburn 1985a, Williams 1985b. 
200 
be in the meaning of what is said. Does the absolutist have to say something that means something 
different from the rest of us when we malee value judgements? In other words it has yet to be settled 
whether the absolutist's utterance is an absolutist utterance. 
Since we want to be able to say many of the same things as the absolutist, and since we 
consider absolutist utterances at least sorne of the time to assert the truth, we have strong prima Jade 
reasons to suppcse that the absolutisCs speech act is not in itself absolutist. We previously identified 
absolutism as involving more than simply the speech act of passing a value judgement. It is the 
practice of addressing value judgements to others believing that we are presenting considerations that 
they should recognize as authoritative regardless of their set of interests. If absolutist practices 
incorporate some element of error, we are not yet licensed to suppose that it can be follOd in the 
semantics of the speech acto It should be clear. indeed. that the radical semantic claim of the interest-
relational theory of value cornmits me to the altemative, for if absolutism is part of the semantics of 
moral utterances. then the semantic cIaim of the interest-relational theory of value is falseo 
'Why might Mackie not have given the alternative serious consideration? Blackburn suros up 
Mackie' s reason as the observation that foundationalist assumptions are Hingrained enough to collOt as 
part of the meaning" of everyday moral assertions (l985a: 149). Jt might seem from the nonchalance 
of this rernark that not much is riding on the issue of meaning - but this is a mÍstake. Moral speech 
acts are not necessarily false if absolutist errors do not infiltrate their rneaning. The remark does 
correctly indicate, however, that a certain theory of meaning is operating here: the theory that 
rneaning is use. Absolutists use value language in an absolutist fashion, hence in their mouths it must 
possess an absolutist (foundationalist) rneaning. Unfortunately, we must delve into the dangerous 
world of semantic theory to investigate what detennines the meaning ofthe language we use. 
The concIusion that what the absolutist does with value Ianguage is essentially connected 
with its meaning only follows directly upon the assumption that the absolutist necessarily has an full 
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understanding of the meaning of his or her own utterances - an assumption fed by a naive semantic 
theory that considers the meaning of a speech act to be nothing but what the speaker has in mind, and 
holds that the authoritative word on the meaning of an utterance is therefore the description to which 
the speaker himself would assent. 13 This assumption leads in the direction of an error theory. To 
continue to argue my case, 1 must reject this assumption - since 1 cIaim value language is always 
interest-relational in meaning. Those who engage in absolutist linguistic behaviour and who affmn 
foundationalist linguistic intuitions are uttering language with an interest-relational meaning, but do 
not fuUy appreciate or understand the meaning of what they sayo As a result, 1 maintain, absolutist 
practices manifest a kind of incoherence as Maclcie claimed. 1 follow Simon Blackburn (l985a), 
however, in denying that the theory one holds of one's linguistic practices necessarily contaminates 
the practice itself. 
Do we always understand the meaning of our own utterances? It is ofien assumed that this 
must be the case. But if one accepts that language is not a private belonging but a social institution, 
which we do not take possession of but rather enter into, then one has made the first step toward 
realization that the meaning of what we say - in a strict semantic sense - is ofien other than we 
realize. Suppose Kim and 1 secretly arrange a trick to play on Aaron. In his company, 1 pretend to 
have a telephone conversation in which 1 loudly say, "Yes, that's right. 1 egrogated my thamblic." 
Aaron assumes that 1 mean something quite definite by "egrogate" and "thamblic" whereas these are 
just nonsense terrns. Later, Kim slyly asks him, "Do you know what happened to Steve's thamblic?" 
Aaron may make a variety of replies, but one definite possibility is that he will say, 'Yes, he 
egrogated it". He takes himself to be saying something meaningful, and furthermore to be 
cornmunicating something meaningful, since if Kim knows what a thamblic is then presumably she'U 
13 See for example Wiggins 1993b: 329. For the case against this assumption, see Burge 1986: 697-720. 
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know what it is to "egrogate" it. Naturally, what Aaron said was substantially (although not 
necessarily entirely) meaningless. 
This admittedly is an extreme case, and may not seem initially to assist us in understanding 
how absolutism might manifest incoherence. But this experiment is not so far removed from our 
everyday encounters with Ianguage. We use many terms we do not fuIly understand, sometimes 
beca use we believe that our audience wiIl understand them better than we, sometimes because we 
want to impress or overawe an audience we believe will similarly faíl to understand. Sometimes we 
don't even notice how weak our grasp is of the meanings of our words. 1 am moderately adept at 
taIking about "CV joints", but I have little idea of what I am taIking about other than that it is a car 
part with a tendency to need replacement. It might (in a wild flight of fancy) tum out that I am the 
victim of a cruel but very elaborate hoax similar to the one played on Aaron, and that "CV joinf' is 
essentially meaningless. Closer to home, nothing is more discussed in pbilosophical circles than 
"reason", but it seems that most people who confidently use this term have very Iittle grasp of what 
they are tallcing about. Arguably, there are sorne words like this that represent an "emperor' s new 
clothes" phenomenon in our Ianguage, their currency perpetuated through the widespread illusion that 
while 1 may not exactly understand what the meaning ¡s, clearly others do. 
We can thus recognize the faIsity of the thesis that speakers necessarily understand and are 
the authorities over the meaning of their utterances. But this does not yet enable us to understand how 
absolutists might faíl to understand the meaning of their utterances and how their intuitions and 
practices could accompany an interest-relational meaning, since there are notable differences between 
the absolutist user of value Ianguage and the type of semantic ignorance described abo ve. Aaron does 
not suppose himself to understand the meaning of what he says, while absolutist users of value 
language clearly do. How is it possible that we could use Ianguage, faíl to fully understand the 
meaning, faíl to recognize our failure to fully understand the meaning, and have an erroneous 
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conception of what the meaning really is? Furthermore. how plausible could it be that oue 
comprehension of oue moral Ianguage, of all things, is so slender - when we inhabit it pre-refleetively 
and use it with eomfort and assurance? The differenee here is not merely a "Socratic" one: it not 
simply that Aaron reeognizes his laek of understanding; it is also the case that he lacles understanding, 
unlike the absolutist. This differenee manifests itself in the faet that whereas Aaron wiIl not know 
how to apply the new words he has Iearnt to different situations, the absolutist will continue to use the 
language of value with ease and familiarity. 
It would be foolish to maintain that moral absolutists have yet to Iearn fully how to use the 
language of value eorreetly. We need a distinetion between two different types of understanding - one 
of whieh the absolutist has in abundance, the other in whieh he is lacking. We must consider how the 
meaning of a term is to be distinguished. Due to the profound controversy over the concept of 
meaning in the twentieth century, this necessitates my treading a narrow tightrope over numerous 
crocodiles, such as the doctrine that meaning is nothing but use, and the doctrine that there is no 
meaning other than speaker-meaning (Le. whatever the speaker takes himself to mean); that words do 
not have meanings exeept within sentences. and so on. A theory of meaning cannot be expected here, 
but 1 will draw loosely on Paul Ziff's dated but outstanding offering. Semantic Analysis (1960), to 
give an account 1 take to be substantially correct and minimally suffieient to defend my claim. 
What is involved in understanding the meaning of the language we use? It is a mistake to 
suppose that this consists in grasping a proper defmition, or being capable of recognizing a correet 
definition were we presented with one. This is an error deriving from the rnistaken assumption that 
the meaning of Ianguage must itself be something linguistic. R. M. Hare, for example, rejeets attempts 
to analyze moral beliefs in terms of "wishlng" or "approval", sinee these are concepts that we develop 
later than "good" and "ought" (1952: 12). 1t is thus clear he would reject interest-relational analyses 
of the meaning of "good" on the basis that we learn the meaning of "good" before leaming the 
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meaning of "relation" or "interesf'. and before forming the concepts of a relation and an interest. But 
Iearning the meaning of words as a speaker is not a matter of leaming a verbal definition. (Were this 
so, we couId never Iearn any Ianguage unIess we understood sorne to begin with). A verbal definition 
is rnerely a conceptual representation of the rneaning - a description of it. A child knows what an 
interest is and what is involved in satisfying it long before she shapes the words and concepts 
"interest" and "satisfies". Even a dog in an important sense can recognize an interest, and recognize 
what its satisfaction consists in (how else couId Lassie perform her trademark heroics?) but it is 
implausible that dogs have concepts of interests and relations. The meaning of Ianguage is Iargely 
Iearnt ostensively, by perceiving the crrcumstances in which it applies. This is the case with the 
rneaning of "value", which we implicitly grasp as the property of being such as to satisfy sorne 
contextualIy implicit interest. 
We use the Ianguage of value so adeptly because in normal conditions (those paradigmatic on 
the interest-relational conception) we do cornprehend the rneaning of this Ianguage quite adequately. 
We can now distinguish between the two different types of understanding. There is philosophical, 
theoretical or explicit understanding, in which we form a definition of a word in other concepts and 
terms - and then there is the pre-reflective, intuitive or implicit understanding that is constituted 
simply by having a feel for the circumstances in which the word is appropriate. AH competent 
language users implicitly cornprehend the meaning of value terms well enough to use them adeptIy in 
the circumstances they fit. But often we do not explicitly comprehend the tenns well enough to know 
where their limits are, and where we are using them nonsensically. (It seems that the distinction 1 am 
making is equivalent to that between knowing how and knowing that. Cornpetent language users 
understand how to use a word appropriately, but this does not entaiI understanding that the word is 
appropriately used in precisely the circumstances described by property x.) 
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The meaning of a word, if it has one, is the common element of the different environmental 
conditions in which the word can be recognized by competent speakers of that language as being 
appropriately used. To discem the meaning of a word, one must attend to the variety of circumstances 
in which it is appropriately used, and also the variety of circumstances in which its use would be 
inappropriate, taking into account the meanings and functions of the other words in which it occurs 
and how they shape the relevant conditions. For example, ''There are no Fs here" is appropriately 
uttered in precisely those conditions in which an F is not present: the relevant conditions are not 
exhausted by specifying the physical environment, but rather a linguistic environment which the rest 
of the sentence sets up. (One might object that it isn't possible to determine when a word is 
appropriately used except by determining the meaning, so that this proposed strategy would be quite 
useless. But a word does not have a meaning unless there is a community of language-speakers who 
implicitly grasp when it is appropriate and when it is not - and all semantic analysis must begio by 
inspecting the reactions of those who occupy the Ianguage. We are investigating our Ianguage from 
the inside, in order to acquire a fuller explicit comprehension, and so the circle here is hermeneutic 
and not vicious.) 
Once we appreciate the distribution of the conditions in which the word is appropriate and 
inappropriate, the next step is to identify the element common to alI appropriate contexts and absent 
from alI inappropriate contexts. We then characterize this element (describe it) as precisely as we can. 
If the result is a description the extension of which is virtually identical to the extension of conditions 
in which the word is appropriately used, then we have a definitíon or semantic analysis of the word. 
Hence, we chaHenge a proposed analysis by finding circumstances where the word is appropriate but 
the definition is not, or conversely, as Moore's "open question argument" does, by finding 
circumstances where the defmition is appropriate but the word is not. Not aH words will have such a 
definitíon, as Moore clairned, but "value" and the paradigrnatic value-terms as it happens do. This 
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account captures the fact that we may not have explicit knowledge of the meanings of our own words. 
We typically have an instinctive feel for appropriateness, but are unable to describe with any degree 
of accuracy the parameters of the set of conditions that present us with this feeling. 14 
We can now explain how language-users may fail to have explicit knowledge of the meaning 
of their words and fall into incoherent practices or assertions. The champion of synthetic accounts, 
however, may object that in avoiding the conclusion that we cannot be mistaken about the meaning of 
our own speech acts, 1 have fallen into error at the opposite extreme, by making every truth analytic, 
or determinable as a matter of semantic contento If the meaning of "water" is determined by 
examining the conditions in which it is appropriately used, then it seems that "water" means whatever 
water is, so that part of the meaning of water is an ionic mixture oi two hydrogen and one orygen 
atoms, since whenever one speaks appropriately about water this ioDic mixture is an essentiaI element 
of the relevant conditions. But the concept of water is much older than knowledge of its ioDic 
structure. If this is an unavoidable consequence of the account of meaning we cannot accept that 
account. It needs pruning, so that we can distinguish "unobvious analyticity" (Lewis) from "synthetic 
property identity" (Kripke) - i.e. draw the difference between meaning that can escape us and the 
identity of properties (such as temperature and mean molecular kinetic energy) whose identity cannot 
be determined by the content of their concepts alone. 
The account given already has the resources to make this distinction. The utterances and 
accompanying conditions to be examined are not exclusively of the "That is an x" variety - they are 
not all "ostensive definitions". We can also attend to conditions relating to the amount and nature of 
14 Our feel is not extensive for all words in our vocabulary. Due to the social nature of Ianguage, and our 
borrowing the meanings of others, there are conditions in which we are aware of our ignorance concerning the 
appropriateness of certain words. I am comfortable discussing CV joints at a general level. but should my 
mechanic engage me in a technical discussion, I will carefully avoid them. recognizing my ignorance. There can 
be slackness in our grasp of the appropriateness of word-use. Not all words are determinate in meaning - the sets 
of appropriate conditions don't always possess precise linúts. Meaning is determined by (although not 
identifiable with) the usage of the linguistic community, and typically there are uncharted regions where the 
appropriateness of a word has yet to be determined, and its meaning open to further extension or refinement. 
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information provided to a speaker and the impact of this on his or her propensity to consider the word 
appropriate. Speakers of English without knowIedge of the composition of water will llot be disposed 
to use the word "water" when discussing the product of combining hydrogen and oxygen gases. for 
exampIe. and will consider it quite odd for someone to start taIking about "water" in such a contexto 
They wilI discriminate water rather on the basis of what it presents to their unaided senses: its 
liquidity. cIearness. taste. etc. Tbe set of linguistic conditions in which H20 is an eIement 
substantially intersects with the set of Iinguistic conditions in which the word "water" is feIt to be 
appropriate. but not sufficiently so as to pro vide meaning. It is an eIement only indirectly connected 
with the propensity to feel the word to be appropriate. This is not to deny that "water" has in the 
idiolects of many (particuIarIy the diaIect of scientific discourse) acquired such a meaning. 
Meaning has strictly to do with matters to which the group of language users whose usage of 
a word determines its meaning (not necessariIy a1l users of the word - e.g. "CV -joint". "egrogate") 
have epistemic access; where this epistemic access is directly relevant to their application of the word. 
Epistemic access to the ionic cornposition of water was once irrelevant to the use of the word "water". 
and thus once the relation between "water" and "H20" was one of synthetic property identity. not 
unobviaus anaIyticity. To carry this back to the matter at hand. rny semantic cIaim on behalf of the 
interest-relationaI theory is that epistemic access to an object's standing in a satisfaction-relatian with 
an implicit interest is irrlInediately relevant to our propensity to feel the appropriateness of the word 
"value" (or "valuable") - in fact, that it is the one and onIy condition whose obtaining is exactly 
coextensive with appropriate usage of vaIue language. One feels that an object is "valuable" if and 
only if ane considers it to be such as to satisfy sorne implicit interest. 
Isn't tbis precisely what absolutist practices require us to reject? The absolutist uses the 
language of vaIue in a different way, and therefore has a different meaning. But ane has to ask of the 
absolutist how it is they discem vaIue, or determine what is of value. They are left with no reply tbat 
208 
is not implausible: like Moore and Scheler,15 they typically appeal to some hitherto unnoticed form of 
"intuition" or moral faculty. We have no good reasons to suppose they possess these faculties any 
more than we do. Nevertheless they can accurately discriminate value. Regardless of their own 
misunderstanding, the absolutists like the rest of us discriminate value on the basis of being such as to 
satisfy some implicit interest. Therefore, there are no distinctly "absolutist" value terms or concepts, 
merely a distinctly absolutist error. 
Even some staunch opponents of the interest-relational theory Hice Nagel and McDowell 
admit the universal connection between cognitions of value and the presence of interests.16 They 
attempt to avoid an interest-relational conclusion by arguing that the interests are in every case 
consequential upon the cognition of the value, and therefore not actually part of what it is for there to 
be value there to cognize. But the onus then falls on my opponents to say what value is - and their 
inability to answer is evident, for example, in Nagel's refusal to provide a theory of value, 
McDoweU's making do with vague analogies ofwhat value might be lilce, Moore's c1aim that value is 
indefmable and irreducible, and the nalve naturalists' error of identifying value with that which has 
value. 
7. lncoherence 
Absolutist uses of value language are cases where - despite our full implicit grasp of the 
meaning of our utterances - our explicit understanding of what we are doing is deficient or defective 
in a way that leads us into incoherent practices where tlle expectations and beliefs accompanying our 
utterances are inconsistent with their semantic contento On an interest-relational view, this is what 
foundationalists Hice Nagel do when they claim value and reasons are conceptually independent of 
15 Strictly speaking, Scheler does not so much introduce a new faculty as ascribe a new function to our familiar 
affective states. 
16 Nagel 1970, McDowell 1978: 13-29 and 1995. 
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interests. This however is a radical accusation, and demands carefuI explanation and defense. In 
particular, it is neeessary that 1 offer more detail about the nature of the "incoherence" involved -
which is rny ¡mal task. 
1 am not suggesting that the value judgement of the absoIutist is an incoherent speech act or 
thought - this is rather Mackie's stance. 1 c1airn instead that the value judgement is both coherent and 
potentially successful in asserting something true. As we saw, absolutisrn is a composite practice, 
which consists of two separable components. One component is the value judgement itseIf, and the 
other component is the understanding of the pertinence of that judgement to the other person, or the 
scope of significance of what is judged. The incoherence lies in the combination of the two 
components: they do not fit with each other as the absoIutist believes they do. 1t is heIpful to observe 
sorne analogous cases, since one might object that the very idea of widespread beliefs and practices 
being incoherent is absurdo Popular belief has never been irnmune to incoherence, and it is 
infonnative to observe how incoherence can infiltrate our practices. One example is the belief many 
lay people hold concerning the nature of time and space, as a result of misunderstanding what they 
have heard of recent scientific theory. Space is "curved'" we are told by modern science. Curvature, 
however, is a property belonging to a figure in space - it presupposes an external space. The literal 
concept of "curved space" is accordingly incoherent. Space is onIy figuratively "curved" - not strictIy 
akin 17 spe g. 
Many lay people however who attend to scientifie theory do not appreciate the extended sense 
in which space possesses the property of "curvature", and eonsider themselves enlightened in 
believing that space is literally curved; they consider themselves to know and comprehend the 
(incoherent and impossible) faet that space is curved. We need to appreciate the nature of their 
17 1 must confess to not understanding the sense in which space is "curved". My point is just that those outside 
the scientific community who think the idea quite straightforward are imagining something different from what 
they believe. 
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mistake. What they imagine is a curved soli~ which in their imagination stands in for space. But 
space cannot be a solid - rather, it is the field or pure extension in which a solid can exist - or which 
is left when all solids are abstracted away. The folk-scientific error lies in mistaking a spatial object 
for space itself, and thereby considering themselves able to conceive of curved space. There are two 
separable elements here, too: there is the representation to oneself of a curved spatial solid, and there 
is the supposition that what one is imagining is space itself. The incoherence lies in the supposition, 
not in the initial representation. 
Similar incoherence is manifested in popular conceptions of (1) the beginning of time, in 
which one conceives of a moment, immediately before which there was no time, and immediately 
after wruch time is in motion. The illusion that somethlng coherent is imagined here is similarly 
produced by the confusion of one concept with another. Taking the place of the spatial figure that is 
mistaken for space itself, we have a temporal process that is mistaken for time itself, like a c10ck 
starting after having been stationary. Likewise, we have (2) popular conceptions of many theological 
oddities, like being able to conceive of God being such that he can do the logically impossible (such 
as creating a stone that is too heavy for him to tift). This incoherence consists in confusing logical 
impossibility with physical impossibility. The logically impossible, however, is not just that which 
can't be done, but rather that which can't even be thought - not because we are unable to think of it, 
but because there is nothing there to be thought. We might add notions oftime speeding up or slowing 
down, of space having an edge or expanding, or of there being something located literally outside of 
space. These are aH cases where we have only a «half-baked" idea, confusing one thing for something 
similar, and thereby believing we can conceive of something that is actually incoherent and 
inconcei vable. 
How should we treat absolutism more generally, such as in arguments concerning motion, 
colour, size, and so on? If we choose, like Mackie, to put the absolutist error into the semantic content 
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of the speech acts, we postulate that the supposed absolutism is actualIy part of the semantic meaning 
of the terroso Thus, once when people said that an object was in motion, they were invoking a 
peculiarly absolute concept of motion, and saying something quite different from a modero assertion 
of motion enlightened by a grasp of the theory of relativity. But this seems to me falseo The meaning 
of "motion" is constituted by the phenomena observance of which stimuIates us to apply it, and in 
both the pre- and post-relativity world, these phenomena are the same. Rather, there is a difference in 
belief about rnotion. The absolutist about motion is entangled in an incoherence of exactly tbe sort we 
have aIready considered. Motion is considered absolute, because it is imagined in relation to sorne 
fixed space, or some absolute framework or system of coordinates. The point that relativity reveals to 
us is that space has no such framework - again, we have confused something spatial for space itself. 
In fact, tbe "absolutist" conception of motion is itself implicitly relativist - but it fails to recognize 
this. 
My cIaim is that while utterances about value are always interest-relational in their semantics, 
we may still be subject to being confused about their meaning and as a resuIt engage in incoherent 
practices. We now need a cIoser consideration of the case of value, and a description of the confusion 
in this case. Again, however, it might be a mistake to assume we can get by with only one analysis 
here. What folIows is a speculative look at some ways those who use value language in an absolutist 
fashion and tbose who hold foundationalist theories about their evaluative practices might be 
engaging in incoherence. 
One way incoherence arises is by holding an incomplete picture of the phenomenon in mind, 
so that one fails to see the absurdity of denying its connection to sorne part of it that is out of mind. 
VaIue has a number of aspects and roles, and therefore it is possible to have such an incornplete 
appreciation of it. Besides being relational to our interests, value is sornething an appreciation of 
which is normally sufficient to lead us to sorne belief about what we should do, or motivate us in 
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sorne way. Bearing this aspect of value in mind, one can postulate tbat reasons connect to value, but 
assert that value and reasons are unconnected witb interests - as Nagel and E. J. Bond do. Because of 
tbeir incomplete apprehension of what value is, they do not recognize tbe incoherence of this doctrine 
(and it is quite significant that neither of tbem is able to say what value is - as we saw in chapter 4, 
Nagel only malees accidental predications about value and reasons. He is unable to identify their 
essences, as that would reveal the nonsense at the root of bis position). It is also instructional in this 
regard to observe that modem puzzlement concerning the metaphysical nature of value begins with G. 
E. Moore, one of tbe pioneering foundationalists, holding tbat value is independent of interest. 
I have urged tbat it is crucial, for understanding what value is, to recognize a dangerous 
ambiguity in value language. When we try to identify tbe character we attribute to objects when we 
ascribe value-predicates like "good", we consider tbe associated substantive, and we ask (for 
example) what "goodness" is. But tbe substantive "goodness" (or ''beauty'', etc.) is ofien used to mean 
tbe qualities of tbe object in virtue of wbich it merits tbe judgement. Thus tbe goodness of a person 
might be their kind disposition, and the goodness of a carrot might be its nutritional content. 
Goodness accordingly can be any type of thing whatsoever. In chapter 2 we identified this as the nai've 
naturalist error of confusing the properties that are valuable with tbe properties that are value. 
This ambiguity feeds another type of incoherence. A second way incoherence arises is by 
mistaking one object for something else in our imagination, and thereby erroneously thinking that we 
can imagine something about the latter. We saw this in the cases of literally curved space and a 
beginning of time in time. In the case of moral absolutism, we fust imagine value, and recognize its 
intrinsically reason-giving nature. When we turn to consider tbe scope or the objectivity of value, 
however, we get confused by the substantive use of value terms. 18 The goodness, or the badness, or 
1& A different, but related confusion also arises from misunderstanding of our language. My account of meaning 
in the previous section explains how, despite proficiency in use of value language, we can form false theories 
about what we mean by it. When reflecting on the proper defmition of "good", it is easy to err about the 
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the rightness or the wrongness, of sorne object is in this sense a straightforward fact. The badness of 
the pain is simply its hurting. No one can deny that pain hurts, so no one can deny the existence ofthe 
badness of pain. This might be so, but only in virtue of equivocation. In the important, reason-giving 
sense of ''badness'', the badness of pain is its being such as to frustrate the interest in avoiding or 
escaping it. But this quality only attaches in virtue of our dispositions to dislike pain. 
These two types of incoherence, 1 believe, infect the practice of absolutism and the theory of 
foundationalism. 1 am unsuee, however, how extensive such confusion is in ordinary usage, and to 
what degree theyare peculiarly philosophical errors perpetrated by foundationalists. We have seen 
that many philosophers are confused in these ways, but it is possible that the appearance of garden-
variety "absolutism" is rather explicable in ways 1 have laid out: ignorance of the possibility of other 
perspectives of interest, or optimism about the fundamental goodness of "human nature" (Le. as 
universalism). Indeed, this seems to be the kind of analysis suggested for absolutism about coloue, in 
light of the Mackie-McDowell debate. McDowell identifies coloue-concepts as about the way objects 
appear to observers - and wonders what a "prirnary quality" colour concept might be like. We ha ve 
seen he misses the point conceming obtuseness about other perspectives. The absolutist error 
regarding coloue is the assumption that objects necessarily look the same way to everybody. This is 
what Mackie is after. To accept McDowell's analysis Ís to impute an overly sophisticated grasp of 
metaphysics to primitive minds. Only at a certain level of intellectual maturity does it dawn on us that 
the way things appear has much to do with us and the nature of our sensibilities, as well as with 
objects. Until then, we simply assume that every creature has the same experience of the same objects, 
because dictated by the objects - there is no discrirnination between the way they are and the way 
they appear. But even this realization doesn't lead to full enlightenment - it talces a further epiphany 
appropriate conditions of its use, and fix on a subset of the true meaning. For example, those who judge that 
what is good pleases God sometimes mistake "good" for meaning that which pleases God. They will then 
engage in absolutism, failing to recognize that the normative significance of value is bound to a perspective of 
interest. 
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to realize that one' s own perspective is not privileged over all ilie others: that it is just one perspective 
among many. Likewise wiili value, it is only at a certain level of wisdom that we recognize that the 
importance things have for us does not exist for those with different interests - a realization that is 
particularly retarded in fue moral case by fear of fue consequences of adrnitting this truth. 
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CONCLUSION 
Two questions demand answers: What has this dissertation accomplished? And what does this 
accomplishment matter? To expand on the first question: the preceding chapters have covered a wide 
range of topies - including value, reasons for action, the nature of nonnativity, the nature of 
obligation, moral absolutism, and more - and it is important to ensure recognition and appreciation of 
the broad unifying thesis. The second question arises because the social significance of theoretical 
research is the most important determiner of its vaIue. This dissertation has attempted to remain a 
work of abstraet and neutral metaethical enquiry, purporting merely to clarify the nature of our own 
nonnative practices, judgements, and experiences. It aims merely to teH us what we already know, if 
only implicitly. It may appear thereby to be both trivial and dry. How could mere anaIysis extend our 
knowledge or in sorne other way profit us? But from its beginnings (at least, as conceived by 
Socrates) philosophy's inspiration was largely the conviction that lack of self-understanding leads us 
into foolish, absurd, and even incoherent beliefs and practices. As intimated in the introduction, this 
dissertation is motivated by thoroughly practicaI and ethical concems, and 1 will now indicate why 1 
believe the results are important. 
This dissertation is in the first place a defense of the thesis of the absolute centraIity of 
motivation or interest in ethics and all matters normative, against the charge - explicitly brought 
against anti-foundationalism by value realists and rationalists - that it cannot explain or accommodate 
the phenomena of normativity: the existence of real objective value properties, reasons for aetion, and 
obligation. 1 have provided an interpretation of normative taIk, norrnative properties, normative 
entities, and of normativity itself that shows them aH to be real and objective, but, in being essentially 
interest-relational in nature, to be dependent upon motivation. This interest-relational theory enables 
us to deny there are any normative foundations transcending our interests. 1 have argued that this is 
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the corree! interpretation of normativity: it accommodates aIl the phenomena without discornfort, and 
it is the rival, foundationalist interpretations that cannot explain or accommodate these phenomena. 
So what difference does this result make? The interest-relational character of normativity, and 
its consequent dependence on our motivational states, has not been widely appreciated - in fact, it has 
commonly been outright denied. We have often profoundly misunderstood our own normative 
judgements, practices, and experiences, and this misunderstanding leads us into absurd, self-defeating, 
and incoherent judgements and practices. Clarification of the Ianguage and metaphysics of 
normativity will, 1 believe, make possible significant social and ethical advances, by enabling us to 
recognize such mistalces and absurdities for what they are - and thereby to stop committing them, and 
stop being fooled and misled by them. It would talce a new, Iargely sociological enquiry to establish 
this, but in the interest of indicating the significance of the interest-relational analysis, consider the 
following nontrivial, perhaps surprising consequences ofthe truth ofthe interest-relationaI theory. 
First, it is a consequence of the interest-relational theory that any normative judgement only 
has sense and importance within the context of a motivated perspective. There is no such thing as 
good per se, or as that which should be done per se. AH normative judgements are to be understood as 
at least implicitly prefixed by an "in arder to satisfy en, where e is a particular set of interests. This 
simple principIe prompts a fundamental critique of most philosophical ethics. Almost all ethical 
philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, MilI. Sartre, and Rawls, who have sought to 
malee judgements about what is good and bad, and what should and should not be done, have 
neglected to specify the fundamental presupposed motivational set from which these judgements are 
made and within the context of which they have meaning. They have (at least implicitly) presented 
their normative judgements as absolute; as not dependent upon any such interested perspective at aIl. 1 
suggest that we would lift ethical theory to a new level if we recognized that any normative judgement 
presupposes a context of interest. Why? Because when told we should cp, we would then know to ask, 
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in order to satisfy which interests should we cp? - and we may often f'md that the behaviour urged on 
us is being cornmended from the perspective of concems we do not share. We would not be foolishly 
inc1ined to respond simply to the words "should", "good", etc., but wiIl demand to have their sense 
compIeted, so that we understand fuIly what is being said. 
The second consequence concems the truth and danger of nihilismo Foundationalists c1aim 
that normativity must be "objective" (i.e. interest-transcendent or foundational) because otherwise 
ethics would be arbitrary. Given any perspective of interest capable of generating prescriptions of 
"should" and predications of "good", we can reflectively step back from that perspective of interest 
and ask why we need take on that perspective or act in its service. If the anti-foundationalist is right, 
we have no recourse for answers except to sorne further, equally contingent perspective of interest. 
The demand for justification thereby enters a vicious inf'mite regress, or else terminates gratuitously 
in an objective absence of justification. In other words, nihilism would be true: objectively (from a 
perfectly detached perspective) there is no good or bad, and nothing we should or should not do. 
Sorne anti-foundationalists have tried to avert this consequence by arguing that sorne interests are 
insurmountable. But this psychologistic attempt to f'md a foundation isn't acceptable. The 
foundationalists are right: we can in principIe reflectively step back from any interest and ask for its 
justification. They are also right that it is a consequence of anti-foundationalism that, when this 
demand for justification is carried to the limit and one determines in ethics never to accept any motive 
that cannot be justified by an ultimate appeal to something other than sorne further motive (just as 
Descartes determined in science never to accept any belief that cannot be justified by an ultimate 
appeal to something other than a further belief), one finds no normativity at all: nihilism is reached. It 
follows that to have any ethics, any normativity at all, at sorne point you must stop reflectively 
distancing yourself from and scrutinizing your motivations: philosophizing must come to an end 
somewhere. 
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Does it foHow that ethics is arbitrary. a matter of pure decision. as Sartre and other 
existentialists claimed? No, because we come to an end when we reach concems that grip us most 
powerfulIy - fundamental concems we have no motivation to distance ourseIves frOID. We are not 
ephemeral thinking souls, we are passionate animals, and our passions direct everything we do. Here 
is the point that is overlooked: even thinking is a motivated activity. We reflect because we are 
seeking something - idealisticaHy, the Truth - and so even the radical nihilist, who refuses any 
commitments because no normative principIes are "objectiveIy true", is a fanatic committed to an end. 
the end of knowIedge or objective truth. Nihilism and pure contempIation are therefore essentially 
unstable and Iead IogicalIy to despair and confusion - their ultimate insight has to be that even 
reflection is motivated by a contingent desire and no more justified a stance to take toward the world 
and existence than any other. The arbitrariness of pure decision is therefore not a genuine danger-
because the motive to reflect is just one drlve among many. and in aH but those who are most 
"corrupted" by phiIosophy, other more fundamental concems override any inclination to keep 
reflecting on justification at a certain point. 
Nihilism does. however, present a danger - preciseIy to we philosophers who embody the 
phiIosophical prejudice, marked in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. that the onIy good worth seeking for 
its own sake is objective knowledge. Stripped of the incoherent notion of vaIue-in-itself (interest-
transcendent value), the Iogical consequence of philosophical reflection carried to its extreme is 
recognition that there are no absolute normative truths. and the resuIt of this recognition for the 
person afflicted with the phiIosophical prejudice is the inability to reflectiveIy endorse any motive or 
action at al!. This is a danger, given that the contemplative person still wishes for happiness and 
success and all the other trappings of a humanIy good life. The nihilist is not the person who has 
escaped aH motivations except perhaps the thirst for truth, but mereIy the person who on principIe or 
by habit has come to reflectively endorse only those motives he considers objectively justified. It is 
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onIy the interests we can commit to that enable us to pursue medium and long term goals, and to 
achieve much of satisfaction to uso The nihilist is buffeted by ceaseless desirings, but is unable or 
unwilling to pursue thero to their satisfaction. He may envy the wealthy and desire their luxuries, for 
example, but be unable or refuse to talce the steps to procure wealth due to the destabilizing 
psychological infIuence of his insight that "objectively, nothing matters". The moral of this 
consequence of the interest-relational theory can be put like this: Aristotle neglected to apply his 
doctrine of the mean to the one activity where it was perhaps most needed, given his audience. There 
is a vice of excess in philosophical or refIective contemplationjust as there is a vice of deficiency. 
This last point is personal and existential: the third consequence that needs discussion is 
social and moral. We saw it in chapter 6: the interest-relational analysis unmasks the practice of 
absolutism. whether in the realm of moral, aesthetic, hedonic, political, etc. judgement. The 
absolutist's aim is to influence the behaviour and attitudes of others; typically, to coerce conformity. 
She uses normative judgements as her instrument of coercion, behind the fa9ade that she is making 
judgements that are of direct normative significance to the other. You must do what I want you to do, 
because it is "right"; you must want what I want you to want, because it is "good". You must not do 
what you want to do, because it is "wrong"; you must not want what you want, because it is "bad". 
The absolutist draws on the motivational power of normative language, while unhinging it from its 
meaningful contexto She attempts to foster and perpetuate an illusion that there is sorne interest-
transcendent foundation for this normativity - most likely, her frrst dupe is herself. This is a radical 
claim, but it reports what 1 perceive in the practice of absolutismo 
It may fairly be objected that I have offered no grounds for criticizing such a practice - no 
normative principIes fall out of my metaethical analysis by which I can justify the claim that we 
should not behave as the absolutists do. This is correct, but the basis for criticism here comes not 
simply from the analysis, but from its significance in the context of our own commitments and 
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dispositions. We prize honesty. openness. treating each other with respect and as "ends". Indeed. 
insofar as we are philosophers or open to phiIosophy. our creed is our commitment to truth and 
fairness. Given all this. we cannot but abhor the practice of absolutismo But philosophy has in the 
main been neither the opponent of nor a weapon against absolutism; rather. it has been a champion 
and vehicle of it. Clothed in the white robes of the phiIosopher. espousing love of truth and objectivity 
(buming crosses. one might say). the absolutist has been struggling for victory. The doctrine of 
foundationalism. the contrary of the interest-relational theory. is the philosophical or ideological arm 
of absolutism and the project of providing theoretical justification for absolutist practices. More than 
anything else. I hope that articulation of the interest-relational theory wiIl expose thi~ dirty secret of 
ethical philosophy. l 
\Vhat good would be achieved by unmasking absolutism? There is nothing in the interest-
relational theory to condemn the interests that such a practice serves. In large parto the motivation to 
unmask absolutism in my case derives from a disposition to sympathize with the disenfranchised, the 
misunderstood. the outcasts. It is this perspective of interest that casts the value that motivates me. For 
one thing, therefore. we stand to reduce the disenfranchisement of those who think. feel. and act 
differently from those in power. We retum to them dignity. respecto and the right to their own voice. 
But it is not only the alienated who stand to benefit from this unmasking. Faced with real conflicts of 
interest, we are freed from the perceived obligation to engage in the futile browbeating and 
intimidation of absolutismo and can rechannel our efforts into accornmodating or in some other way 
dealing with these conflicts. This is true whether we are disposed to be tolerant or intolerant. 
Obviously. where differences reduce to divergent interests and these interests are not vehemently 
opposed, such clarity enables us to rnake accornmodations for these differences. Sometimes however 
divergent interests clash incommensurably: the compassionate concems of the average person cannot 
1 Crudely, it is as Callieles suggests in the Gorgias: the moral philosopher is simply trying to trick his more 
powerful attacker into desisting from "knocking him on the jaw". 
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but cIash with the lusts of paedophilia. or the patriarchal interests behind the practice of female 
circumcision. Do not mistake me to be invoking the interest-relational theory to call for global 
tolerance and cultural relativism. But even where we are inclined to be intolerant. understanding of 
the true root of the conflict is empowering. We need not waste our time with fruitless arguments and 
diatribes over moral value - instead we can search productively for sorne purchase on the offending 
party through their wider set of concems, or to effect a change in their concems, or, when we 
recognize that such efforts at "moral reform" are psychologica1ly or socia11y impossible. we can talce 
action to control or overthrow such persons. This is essentia1ly what we already do. But it would help 
matters if we could clear away the myth and baggage of "objective moral truth" (absolute 
normativity). Instead of impugning the cognitive faculties and intelligence of others, we can devote 
our attention to dealing with the diverse complexity of interests that are the motive force behind 
human life and social conflicto 
Everything that has been said in this concIusion is open to chaIlenge. But 1 do not think it can 
plausibly be maintained that acceptance of the interest-relational theory of value, reasons, and 
normativity is socially, ethically, and existentia1ly insignificant. or that it is only of abstract. academic 
interest and importance. If the interpretation of normativity and ethical life 1 have presented lS 
substantially correct, the ramifications are significant for every area of normative discourse. 
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APPENDIX A: FACT AND V ALUE 
1. A disreputable distinction 
There is an old distinction in philosophy drawn between ''faet'' and "value". This has been 
eonstrued in numerous different ways. and today the distinetion stands in sorne disrepute. frorn the 
attacks by respeeted philosophers Hke Hilary Putnam. John MeDowell. and David Wiggins. 
Aeeording to Putnam. for example. the factlvalue distinetion is "without rational basis". "a rationaI 
indefensible dichotomy"! which unfortunately has become a cultural institution (1981: 127). Putnam 
bernoans the inevitability of eontinuing to eneounter people on the street or at cocktail parties who say 
to him. "Is that supposed to be a staternent of faet or a value judgernentT' 
On the basis of the interest-relational theory of vaIue 1 have artieulated. however, it is possible 
to get sorne new purchase on the distinction. and 1 will aeeordingly atternpt to rehabilitate it. Basically 
my eoncem is to defend the utteranees of the "man on the street" against the philosophieally informed 
skepticisrn of Putnam and others. However. as stated. the diehotorny can be taken in numerous 
different ways, many of whieh 1 am as eoneemed as Putnam to reject. Value judgernents are 
principally deseriptive speeeh acts. not expressions of attitude. and are therefore rationally assessable 
and open to at least sorne kinds of rational (by whieh 1 mean truth-direeted) dispute. 1 join with 
Putnam and others in rejeeting the legitimacy of distinguishing faet and value in this way - but it does 
not follow that there is no absolute diehotorny between a dornain appropriately labeIled ''fact'' and a 
dornain appropriately labelled "value". a dichotomy at the ground of at least sorne ordinary 
invoeations of the contrasto 
! Admittedly. the clause from which these quotes are taken is in the subjunctive. but I think it is quite clear that 
Putnam stands by the thought they express. 
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Normally one would introduce such a project by giving a few intuitive illustrations of the 
distinction, but here this is not possible, as the dichotomy has been taken in so many different ways 
that not only the explanation of the distinction, but even what it is that needs explaining is disputable. 
1 begin by discriminating sorne of the different factlvalue distinctions that are drawn, and observing 
how they fail under insightful criticismo This clears the way for a philosophically defensible 
dichotomy which, 1 shalI argue, it is useful to draw. 
Additionally, given that 1 have presented my project as an analysis of value, but have focused 
on a rather narrow group of value-terms, it will be helpful to examine how far the domain of value 
extends. The analysis of this dissertation is aimed at two distinct levels. On one hand, strictly 
speaking when we talle about "value" in everyday contexts, we mean something roughly synonymous 
with "goodness". But more loosely, "value" stands in our enquiries as the label for a much broader 
group, inc1uding for example badness, importance, beauty, ugliness, and much more besides (although 
the extension of "value" here is also open to dispute, and will require of us a decision). 
2. Fact-value and is-ought 
We must be careful to distinguish the factlvalue distinction from the isfought distinction, 
although the two are often considered to be equivalent. The isfought distinction, which is itself 
controversial, was rrrst observed by Hume, who c1aimed that propositions containing an "ought" or 
"ought noC' can never be validly derived from propositions containing only "is" or "is not" (1739: 
469). This distinction is urged initially on the basis of a consideration of grammatical difference, 
which clearly exists between utterances using deontic operators like "should", "ought", "must", 
"may", etc, and others using the operator "is" or sorne other form ofthe verb to be. 
Were the grammatical consideration the only basis for an isfought distinction, however, it 
would never occur to us to assimilate the factlvalue distinction to it, since assertions of value are 
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expressed with the "is" operator. Proponents of an is/ought distinction do not rest on the grammatical 
point, sinee it doesn't hoId up to close scrutiny. It seems ~at "ought" judgements can also be 
expressed by uis": "Voting is the right thing for you to do" arguabIy entaiIs, if it is not simpIy 
identieal in meaning to "You ought to vote". One can tum an ··ought" into an uis right to" and an 
"ought not" into an ··is wrong to", and from sueh "is" sentenees it is easy to derive an "ought". Some 
tenns, it seems. conceal from a grammatical anaIysis an essential eIement of prescriptivity in their 
meaning. discernment of which requires semantie analysis. Therefore. the mere grammatical fact that 
judgements of value take the form of ·'is", not uoughe. does not of itseIf establish that the factlvalue 
distinction is not assimilabIe to the is/ought distinction. 
Numerous philosophers have. in different ways and to varying degrees, attempted to 
distinguish value from faet by identifying a deontic or prescriptive eIement as the essence of value -
they differ. however. in the meaning they give to the "ought" or "shouId". Kant (1795), Ewing (1926), 
and Ross (1930) suggest analyses of "good" that reduce it to '·shouId'" and take "shouId" as 
something basically cognitive (although perhaps indef'rnabIe) in meaning (such as '·required by 
reason"). Hare (1952) and Gibbard (1998) reduce ugood" to '·shouId". but as noncognitivists. construe 
"shouId" as an aet of preseribing or recommending. so that Gibbard claims that value is essentially 
about preferability: to say something is "good" is to recommend it over something eIse. AdditionalIy. 
Sartre (1943: 143-6), and Heidegger (1977: 142) contrast "value" with "being" (what "is"). as what 
ought to be in the sense of how our desire wouId have the world. as opposed to how the world is. 
There ís undeniabIy a connection between vaIue and rightness. or between "good" and 
"should" - a connection 1 addressed in chapter 5. But we shouId reject alI analyses of value that try to 
reduce it to a "shouId". however interpreted. 1 have argued (in chapter 1) that our talk and thought 
about value presents it to us as a property of objects in the world. 1 have argued that this is a feature 
we should attempt to expIain. rather than expIain away. Likewise. notwithstanding the close 
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connection between value and ··should". there are circumstances where we acknowledge something to 
be good. but stilI without incoherence demand to know why we should act to obtain it. promote it. or 
bringitabout. 
Even if it is true that the factlvalue distinction dissolves into the is/ought distinction, 
therefore, this is something we would only discover after a long and scrupulous enquiry - not 
something we can assume at the outset. We must not cover up the many important differences there 
seem to be with the assumption we have just one and not two distinctions here. As it happens, 1 
believe any suspicion that the two distinctions are the same should be abandoned in light of what 1 
shall say in the way of explicating the factlvalue distinction. 
3. Natural facts versus nonnalÍve facts 
The interest-relational theory of value articulated and defended in the preceding chapters 
states that value is the property of being such as to satisfy sorne interest-type. This is a reductive 
naturalistic analysis, and so it might seem that value is simply one form of fact. and there is no 
distinction worthy of mention. Indeed, 1 maintain that value is a form of fact, and in this respect the 
suggestion that there is a factlvalue distinction needs qualification. There is still an issue, however, 
concerning what constitutes a value-fact as opposed to any other kind of fact. Furthermore, 1 will 
argue, at the level of speech acts there is a difference between ascriptions of value and other kinds of 
descriptive utterance which legitimates the application of the label "factual" to the latter but not the 
former, in virtue of one of its characteristic "marks" or connotations. The dichotomy 1 will argue for 
is, in other words, between factual and evaluative speech acts. Hut before considering attempts to 
draw such a line at the semantic level, 1 will examine the prospects of drawing the distinction on the 
metaphysical leveL 
226 
A distinction of this sort has been postulated on a number of different grounds. According to 
non-naturalists2, values are indeed facts, but facts of a metaphysically distinct kind, and so the 
distinction lies between natural facts and non-natural facts (facts about value or normative facts). 
"Non-natural" is Moore's term, and a large problem for any such distinction is making sen se of what 
the distinction is actually supposed to be. Moore does not mean, by bis claim that value is a non-
natural property of objects that value is supernatural or otherworldly. For this reason, his choice of 
term is rather injudicious. Value is still supposed to be part of the natural world - part of objective 
reality independent of any representation of it. 
Wbat distinction, then, does the "natural"f'non-natural" terminology aim at capturing? One of 
the claims of the non-naturalists is that value facts are irreducible to any other sort of fact, and value 
terms indefinable in any other kinds of terms. This might lead us to suppose that value facts are 
unique in being inexpressible in the "natural" language of the physical sciences, and irreducible to the 
"natural" properties investigated by the physical sciences. But metaphysical discreteness is not 
necessarily unique to value. 1t is argued by many philosophers that institutional facts cannot be 
reduced to non-institutional facts, and that mental facts are irreducible to non-mental facts. These 
theses are of course controversial, and strongly opposed by physicalists. But the point is that the 
legitimacy of the facúvalue distinction does not appear to depend upon these questions and how they 
are answered. The distinction is not licensed by the mere (alleged) fact that value-facts are 
discontinuous from any other dornain of facts. We still need to know what sort of facts value facts are 
- sornething about the nature of value facts must distinguish them from all other sorts of fact. 
The answer is that value facts are supposed to be normative facts - facts that are intrinsically 
action-guiding and justifying, such that it is necessarily the case that if one cognizes a value-fact one 
recognizes a reason for sorne form of action. This is supposed to contrast value-facts with any other 
2 Such as Moore, Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, FrithjofBergmann, and John Findlay. 
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kind of fact, all of which are action-guiding or justifying onIy in the contingent circumstance of 
possessing some form of interest to which they are reIevant. If an action is refIective, or cautious, or 
fast, or unpredictabIe - this is only of practical import in the context of particular interests. But if an 
action is good or bad, (and perhaps, cruel or kind) then it immediately has a practical importo 
This is, perhaps. a sufficient basis for claiming a distinction. The problem with non-
naturalismo however. which we have already examined in chapter 2, is this: the characterization of 
value facts aboye has toId us only about the influence and import such facts have to uso The non-
naturalists claim, however. that the nature of these facts has nothing to do with us or the way we are. 
It follows that the characterization of value has failed to tell us a single thing about the nature of value 
facts - it has onIy described an "aecident" of value. We can demand again, therefore. to be toId what 
value is. The non-naturalist answer: it ean't be said. Value is just value, we all know what it is. and 
there's nothing more we can say about it. Even if non-naturalism supports a distinetion between faet 
and value. therefore. ultimately we must reject the non-naturalist fact/value distinction. beeause we 
must reject non-naturalismo Its offense: turning value into an occult quality (not to mention the 
invocation of an occult faculty of value-cognition and an occult motivational propensity) and 
therefore crossing the boundaries of epistemological acceptability. 
4. Fact versus attitude 
Since Moore. however. the factlvalue distinction has been taken over chiefIy by 
noncognitivists like Ayer. Hare. Stevenson. BIackbum. and Gibbard. who deny that value language is 
(primarily) descriptive at all. and thus certainIy does not describe value-properties. Rather. in these 
hands the fact/value distinction becomes a dichotomy of semantics. not metaphysics. such that factual 
terrns describe something about the world while value terms express something non-descriptive and 
attitudinal towards it. Simon BIackburn helpfully puts it in terms of "input" and ··output" - fact is 
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input we passively receive from the world. while value is output. consisting in our responses to input. 
This semantic position seems to have assumed the mantle of the ufactlvalue distinction" in the thought 
of most contemporary philosophers. 
Noncognitivists have selected "thin" ethical terms like ugood". ''bad'" "important", etc. to 
argue their case. These terms are not obviously identifiable with any fact about the object judged, and 
always seem to convey sorne kind of attitude or practical stance toward it. Proponents of a factlvalue 
distinction then can contrast such terms with others like "molecule" and "gravity" that seem 
evaluatively neutral, to suggest the existence of a sharp separation in function between value terms 
that express attitudes or prescriptions, and fact terms that are used to describe the way things are. 
But our ability to draw any such sharp line has been thrown into serious doubt. There is a 
wide range of terms ("thick" ethical terms) that do not fit neatly and exclusively into either category, 
and realistldescriptivist opponents of noncognitivisrn have grasped these as presenting serious 
difficulties for the noncognitivist fact/value distinction.3 Blackbum accordingly writes, "1 am ... as an 
expressivist. harrassed ... by the place people accord to thickness in ethical theory" (1992: 285). 
Consider for example the following: brave, cowardly, clever, stupid, strong, weak, healthy, unhealthy, 
bigot, faggot. These terms all seem robustly factual, in that their application is substantially world-
guided. However they do not seem to be evaluatively neutral or rnerely descriptive. If the rnark of a 
value-term is that it is almost always used for the purpose of passing some sort of emotive or 
prescriptive judgeroent conceming an object - commending or condemning it, for example - then it 
seems all these terms and countless more like thero qualify as value terms, their indisputable factual 
credentials notwithstanding. 1t is difficult to call sorneone brave, clever, strong, or healthy without 
cornmending thern at least in that respect, or to call someone cowardly, stupid, weak, or unhealthy 
3 Classic accounts of thick ethical concepts inelude McDowell 1981 and Williams 1985a. 
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without criticizing them. It seems tben that we do not have a sharp distinction at all, but rather a 
sliding scale of greater to lesser emotivity. 
Does this permit us to maintain a distinction between fact and value language - perhaps not a 
sharp dichotomy, but a spectrum on one pole of which we have pure value and the other pure fact, 
with the distinction fading in between? Putnam has pointed out, however, that we cannot simply 
identify value on the basis of vocabulary, since one can express glowing praise or stark condemnation 
without using value-terms at all - for example, by stating <'Thece is nothing he would not do for 
money". Attitude, appcobation and disapprobation are not carried by vocabulary oc semantic content 
alone. If value-Ianguage is distinguished on the basis of the emotive use to which it can be put, it 
therefore tums out that there is no language that is not value language, since alllanguage can be put to 
emotive use in sorne context or other, while cIearly not changing in rneaning. If an expcessivist 
fact/value dichotomy is to be defended, thecefore, it must cepudiate uthick" ethical concepts - oc at 
least the cIaim that they are value-concepts, as indeed Blackburn does, in opposition to Allan 
Gibbard: 
Like Gibbard, I am perplexed ... by the place people accord to thickness in ethical theory. But 
I think thickness is overrated. I do not think there are any thick concepts, as these have been 
understood. There may be concepts that are encrusted with the thickest of cultural deposits, but 
I shall urge that this is a different matter, and indeed one that subverts the normal notion of 
thickness. Furthermore, although there are sorne thick words, they are of no great importance to 
the theory of ethics. And in fact, there are many fewer thick words than philosophers have been 
prone to suppose: I shall argue that attitude is much more typically, and flexibly, carried by 
other aspects of utterance than lexical ones. In the end I want to oppose the popular idea that a 
proper understanding of thickness tells us surprising things about ethical objectivity and even 
perhaps undermines the fact-value distinction. (1992: 285) 
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Blackburn's claim is that the supposed '"thick" ethical concepts are really factual descriptive 
concepts, wbich for various reasons have become extemally (non-semantically) bound-up with certain 
attitudes. This is to reject the thesis of the proponents of thick ethical concepts (McDowell 1981, 
Williams 1985a, Gibbard 1992) that one cannot even grasp such concepts except from some particular 
affective perspective. 1 shall, shortly, agree with Blackburn (also Copp 1995: 13) that it is quite 
possible to view with favour that wbich we consider to be lewd, or sinful, or impious, and to view with 
disfavour that wbich we consider to be brave, or selfless, or honorable. Every one of these concepts 
can be detached from the associated attitude. In the present context, however, what is relevant is that 
the expressivist factlvalue distinction depends upon Blackburn' s strategy of restricting the domain of 
"value" to exclude thick concepts. 
Blackburn is therefore in fulI agreement with Putnam that one can make emotive or 
expressive utterances without using distinctly evaluative terms: bis example is "contains south facing 
windows" (1992: 287). 
Of course, we may norroally expect someone who talles of a person's discretion, caution, etc. to 
be (somehow) implying or inviting a favourable attitude to them. But this is left to the 'passing 
theory' or theory of what a particular speaker is doing on an occasion by a particular utterance, 
rather than forged in steeI by a prior theory or convention goveming the terroso (1992: 287) 
Blackbum accordingly believes he has refuted the claim that thick ethical concepts indicate a 
blurring of the expressivist factlvalue distinction, by putting the expressive or ernotive function of 
such utterances outside the sernantic content. Unwittingly, however, he has shown the grounds on 
wbich his own expressivism must be rejected. Expressive function is the primary argurnent for the 
noncognitive status of thin ethical terms, and by denying the connection for thick terms, Blackburn 
has implicitly opened the door for a naturalistic or cognitivist analysis of thin terms like "good". He 
does not, however, consider such an analysis to be appropriate, and does believe that sorne terms 
(incIuding "good") are semanticalIy expressive of nonpropositional attitudes. There seem to be two 
231 
basic convictions underlying his stance: fust, tbat "good" and otber thin terms are, unlike thick ethical 
terms, essentially expressive of attitudes. This however is false, as Putnam points out (1981: 209), one 
can "know that something is good without having a ·pro' attitude towards tbat something." The 
second argument seems to be that tbere is no cognitive analysis that is adequate, or can explain why 
the connection between recognition of value and motivation is if not indefeasible tben at least normal. 
But tbis is precisely what the interest-relational theory disproves, as 1 argued in chapter 3. 
The results seem to bear out Putnam' s critique. If even goodness and badness fall into tbe 
category of fact rather than value (or, as Putnam would have it~ if even "molecuIe" and "gravity" falI 
into tbe category of value as well as fact), tben the expressivist semantic factlvalue dichotomy comes 
to nothing - except perhaps tbe uninteresting and obvious distinction between expressions of attitude 
like "Yuck!", "Boo!", '·Hurray" etc. and indicative utterances (including paradigm instances of value 
judgements like ·~his is good"). 
5. Drawing a new Une: two sorts of natural fact? 
According to the interest-relational theory of value, however, this whole approach to tbe 
distinction is fundamentally mistaken. The phiIosophically important factlvalue distinction has been 
overlooked in entirety by botb sides in this debate - and by the noncognitivists no les s tban their 
opponents. The basic error consists in taking the emotive or prescriptive function or connotations of 
language as the distinguishing mark of value. As has been amply pro ven against noncognitivism, we 
can very adequately commend or condemn by means of factual description. Insofar as tbere is any real 
basis to a sharp divide between fact and value language, accordingly, it will not be found in the 
commendatory or condemnatory functions of that language. One can commend or condemn an object 
merely by making a factual observation conceming it. and equally (as we shall see). one can ascribe 
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value to an object without thereby passing any cornmendatory or condemnatory judgement conceming 
it. 
The interest-relational theory of value accomplishes this. of course. by making the predication 
of value a form of descriptive statement about objects. The fact/value distinction accordingly needs to 
be understood. in this view. as a separation between two different sorts of fact and two different sorts 
of descriptive speech acto This is not. however. to appeal to ··non-natural" facts in contradistinction to 
··natural" facts. Rather. since the interest-relational theory provides a reductive naturalistic analysis of 
value terms. and thus a reductive naturalistic metaphysics of value properties. we have natural facts 
on both sides of the divide. If there is any metaphysical distinction. accordingly. it is between 
different types of natural facts. If there is any semantic distinction. it is between different types of 
desctiptive speech acto One might want to suggest at this point that the only discriminating factor that 
could do the job would be precisely the commendatory or condemnatory function of the words in 
question. 1 have already rejected this. however. and it certainly will not support a usefully sharp 
philosophical dichotomy. 
What other characteristics of value properties and value language might set them apart frorn 
the rest of the objects that we recognize and the rest of our descriptive language? The interest-
relational theory of value analyzes value as somethlng relational. and in previous chapters 1 have 
contrasted the interest-relation.al theory favorably with other naturalistic theories of value which 
portray it as something intrinsic or monadic in objects. Could the language of value. and value 
properties. be distinct in virtue of being relational? This is part of it. I think. but it is not quite 
adequate yet. There are relational predicates and properties that are not value predicates and 
properties. such as ··taller", ··brother", ··hunted" and so on. We need to go to our definition of value to 
find what is distinctive about value. Value predica tes and properties are distinctive in being relational 
to sorne interest. All descriptive language, 1 will assume, classifies objects according to sorne criteria 
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or other. The language of value is unexceptional in this regard. But where it is exceptional is in 
classifying objects according to how they relate to interests. This clairn however is vulnerable to 
misunderstanding, and there is an important objection I rnust counter. 
It can be objected, following Putnam. that all language classifies according to our interests. 
Language is a human artifact. and as such only exists because it serves our purposes. Our needs and 
interests have shaped it frorn the ground up, and accordingly it is impossible to distinguish "value" 
terms frorn "face terms on this basis - as Putnam puts it, "every fact is value-Ioaded and every one of 
our values loads sorne fact" (1981: 201). Part of the explanation of how we carne to distinguish 
different colours frorn one another, for example, has to do with the interests that such discrimination 
serves. On the basis of these sorts of concerns, Putnam has claimed very influentially that the factual 
is thorougbIy saturated with normativity, and that there is no such thing as a value-free fact; 
accordingly, no such thing as a philosophically defensible factlvalue distinction. 
But this strategy misses the point altogether. I concede the utterly essential role of human 
interests in shaping all human concepts and language - this does not touch upon the difference to 
which the interest-relational theory of value points. Value terms are not distinctive in that the 
classification they malee serves or connects with certain interests in certain ways. Rather, their 
distinction líes in the manner of their classification - which is intemally interest-dependent, not 
extemally so. A value term classifies objects according to the relation in which they stand to certain 
interests, as opposed to non-value terms, which classify objects according to sorne other criteria (such 
as the way they affect our senses, or the uses theyare put to, or the impact they have on other objects). 
These ··other criteria" of course are applied due to their significance for sorne interest we have, but the 
interest is external or accidental to the classification itself. In the case of value language, on the other 
hand, the interest is internal or essential to the classification. To say sornething is good is to say it is 
such as to satisfy sorne interest; to say sornething is bad is to say it is such as to frustrate sorne such 
234 
interest. Any term that does this, 1 maintain, is a value term, while any term that does not is a '"tace 
term (or, given that there is good reason to describe value as a certain sort of fact, a non-value fact). 
To tum from the consideration of language to the consideration of properties, any property of standing 
in a certain relation to sorne interest is a value property, and any other property cannot be a value 
property - including the many properties in virtue of wruch objects do stand in value-relations to our 
interests, which have ofien been misleadingly labelled "value properties" rather than "valuable 
properties" (the error of naYve naturalisrn). 
Given that the domain of '''value'' and indeed the proper dermition of "value" are subject to 
debate, and that we can naturally describe the emotive use of language 1 have designated '"tact" 
language as evaluative, it is apparent that the proposal of a fact/value distinction along the lines 
suggested by the interest-relational theory has basically the character of stipulation. It is not that we 
do reserve labels like "evaluative" only for such terms - rather, these labels seem to be inherently 
lacking in the type of precision a philosophical interest like ours would liIce from them. But any 
determination of boundaries by stipulation needs defense against the charge of sheer arbitrariness or 
question-begging. My response to this accusation is that my concem is not to capture a hard and fast 
distinction between what we classify as "value" and what we classify as '"ract" - HIce McDowell 1 do 
not believe such a line ean be drawn. Rather, 1 wish to argue that ofien we coherently eonceive of, and 
rneaningfully speak about, a distinction between fact and value, and at least sornetimes we do so with 
this particular distinction in mind. There is at least one philosophically irnportant distinction hiding 
behind the vague terms "faet" and "value". 
The distinction then is admittedly stipulative. That it is not thereby arbitrary will be 
demonstrated if we find that making this distinction is helpful in sorne way. Value-terms, as 1 have 
defined thero, distinguish themselves in two basic ways that 1 believe malee a fact/value distinction 
important. First, value terms classify objeets in regard to how they relate to certain interests -
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therefore. in terms of a relation they stand in with another objeet Can abstraet interest-kind). They are 
thus just as objeetive as faet terms in one important sense of "objective". The goodness or the badness 
of something is a real objective fact about it. determined by investigation of its natural properties and 
how they relate to other things. By "objective" we sometimes mean "out there" or a property of the 
object. Value accordingly is objectively real. But beeause of the relativity to a con textual interest. 
value terms Iack the objectivity of fact terms in a different important sen se of ··objective". Whether 
something is "good" or ·~ad" depends upon the interest-perspective that one takes on it. and 
accordingly lacks objectivity in the sense of transcending perspective. These two notions of 
objectivity have usually been confused - value terms pick out objectively real characteristics of 
objects. but they do not pick out the same charactenstics independent of perspective. 
This cannot however be the only characteristie worth mentioning of value terms. since 
although it might distinguish value from many other types of fact. a1l it rea1ly illustrates is the context-
dependence of value language - and this is not a feature unique to value language. Terms like ·~ig". 
"little". "heavy". ··light". ··hot". "cold" and so on are similarly dependent upon contexto and therefore 
display the same combination of presence and lack of objectivity Cdifferently construed) as value 
terms. It can be objectively true that this is a cold summer day. in the sense of depending on the 
natural properties of the world. yet it is not objectively true in the sense of being something everyone 
wouId be right to agree to. What counts as a coId summer day for someone from Mexico is entireIy 
different from what does for someone from Greenland. Context is all important - in this case. the 
contextuaI detail is a norm for the temperature of summer days. 
Making a parallel move to the previous section. we can observe that context-dependence is an 
necessary condition of value language (as a resuIt of the essentially relational character of value) but 
not a sufficient condition of value language. and to determine the additional feature we have to 
examine what is peculiar about the context-dependence of value Ianguage - a feature again revealed 
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to us by the other elernent in OUT definition of value. Tbe relevant contextual detall in value 
judgements is an implicit interest, whereas in other context-dependent judgements it is sornething 
else, such as a norm. For this reason, contextually dependent objective properties like "hot" are not 
value properties: the relevant contextual detail is not an implicit interest, but an assumed normal 
condition. We have, therefore, the one furtber characteristic of value we need to successfully rnark 
value off from other domains of fact. 
We can now identify what it is about value judgernents that makes their discrimination from 
"statements of fact" a frequently significant matter, and justifies OUT drawing such a line at cocktail 
parties. AH value judgernents depend on context to sorne degree (although sornetimes it is easy to 
guess the context from the content), and therefore to understand what is being asserted with a value 
judgernent one has to understand the contexto This is not exclusive to value judgements, as we have 
seen - although it does permit a diagonal contrast between "strong" statements of fact which are 
relatively context independent and value judgements. In value judgements and value judgernents 
alone, however, the element of context that one must grasp to understand what is said is an implicit 
interest, which provides the perspective within which the judgernent can be understood as stating an 
objective fact. The utterance of the sentence by which the value judgement is expressed is thus 
crucially indeterminate, and its full rneaning and title to OUT assent or dissent depends upon the 
implicit interest. Granting Putnam' s point that interests have played a crucial role in the developrnent 
of all OUT words and concepts, it rernains the case that we can understand all other types of speech act 
without having to recognize an implicit interest. The significance of ··fact", as it is appropriately 
contrasted with "value", is that sorne sentences assert something whose meaning does not depend 
upon such a context of interest: theyare "factual" in being semantically interest-independent. 
The perceptive might object here that my position to this point is inconsistent. There are 
statements of fact we cannot understand without grasping a context of interest, as an example 1 have 
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aIready considered illustrates. ·'There is nothing he would not do for money" is a statement of fact, 
not a value judgement, but it can mean quite different things (conveyed ofien by the tone of delivery) 
depending on one's attitude. It is most often used as a condemnation, but can be used as a neutral 
description, or even to praise. 
In reply, while it is true that appreciation of contextual interest is ofien necessary for 
understanding what it is that a speaker means to express or do with a non-value speech act, it is not 
the case that a sernantic understanding ever requires this. 1 have had numerous occasions already to 
observe that the meaning of a speech act is distinct from the use to which it is put, or everything that it 
expresses. The condemnatory aspect of an utterance of ·There is nothing he would not do for money" 
is not part of the semantic meaning, but something further - a ··conversational implicature" - carried 
by the semantic meaning together with the contextual attitude in light of a further social convention. 
This can be seen from the fact that the truth conditions of such a speech act do not depend at all upon 
the implicit interests or attitudes, but are common to both the condemnatory and cornmendatory 
utterances of the sentence, unlike ··It is good that there is nothing he would not do for money", the 
truth-conditions of which will differ depending on the context of interest. 1 therefore maintain that one 
never needs to appreciate contextual details of implicit interests in order to understand statements of 
fact, while one always needs to in arder to understand value judgements. 
1 have perhaps not said enough yet to account for the legitimacy of the question, ··Is that a 
value judgement or a statement of fact?" since it might seem that on the picture 1 have drawn the 
difference is quite evident - such that one can distinguish fact from value if one understands the 
utterance at all. The question becomes pertinent in light of sorne of the complexities of the distinction, 
which 1 will address in the last section of this chapter. 
The significance of the fact/value distinction goes beyond merely hermeneutical 
considerations, or issues of interpretation, however. Value and value language is also distinctive for 
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its intrinsic normativity or reason-givingness. To believe something has value simpliciter (which is to 
say. to be prepared to assert unrelativized value statements conceming it) is simultaneously to believe 
one possesses reasons for action or attitude conceming it. This recognition may or may not be 
motivating - but with all else equal, it will - as a consequence of the fact that such recognition of 
value is recognition of the relation the object stands in with an implicit contextual interest. This 
intrinsic normativity is unique to value, and sharply marles it off from all other types of fact, all of 
which have at best an external connection to interests. reasons. and motivation. That someone judges 
a summer day to be hot, for example, might ¡nfonn us of what they consider a normal summer 
temperature to be, but in itself it reveals nothing concerning the interests, reasons, and motivations of 
the speaker. They might like hot days, or dislike them. But that someone judges a certain object to be 
good reveals that they take a favourable view of it - or at least, that they are viewing it from a 
perspective in which it appears favourably. 
The great significance of the factlvalue distinction - based on these two characteristics of 
value - is this: in relation to practical questions and controversies, determination of (non-value) facts 
of itself decides nothing. No practical consequences follow until interests, ends, and agendas are 
plugged into the equation. But determination of value. and convergence of judgements concerning the 
same, constitutes the detennining of practical questions and controversies. We can agree on the non-
value facts of the matter without reaching any practical consensus, but if we agree on a1l questions of 
value (i.e. take on the same perspectives of interest and make the same value judgements from these 
perspectives). then all practical differences have been overcome. Likewise, if we are seeking to 
understand a person and perhaps predict their behaviour, having knowledge of all their non-value 
beliefs about the world will help us very little, if at all - but with a knowledge of their beliefs 
conceming value, we know what makes them tick. 
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6. Applying the distinction 
We can now try applying this distinction to the unruly mass of tenns presentIy represented by 
one or another philosopher as value terms. It is helpful here to draw a rough distinction between four 
cIasses of such terms. First, there are the most general C'thin") evaluative terms which have been 
seized by noncognitivist defenders of a semantic factlvalue distinction as examples of the primarily 
nonfactual and expressive nature of value language: terms like "good", "bad", "valuable", 
"irnportant", etc. Second, there are terms that are ofien labelled response-dependent: terms which 
appear to describe a quality of an object, but do so with labels that seem derived from particular 
subjective affects - for example "amusing", "boring", "exciting", "admirable", "desirable", 
''fearsome'', "disgusting", etc. Third, there are pejorative terms: which have extensions determinable 
with evaluatively neutral language, but which imply sorne attitude towards the thing denoted. 
Examples are "slut", ''faggot'', "nerd", "nigger", "honky", etc. Fourth, there are "thick" terms that 
likewise have a domain which is specifiable in evaluatively neutral language, and likewise seem to 
imply sorne attitude, but where unlike pejoratives the emotivity seems primarily connected with the 
characteristic ascribed rather than the term used to ascribe it: for example ''brave'', "cowardly", 
"strong", "weak", ''fat'' etc. Ido not mean to represent these cIassifications as exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive - there is good reason to think that the category of pejorative terms is either a subclass of 
thick terms, or blends into the category of thick tenns, and as we shall see it is difficult to draw a line 
between thin terms and response-dependent terms. B ut the cIassification is useful in facilitating our 
consideration of a number of different paradigms of what value can be like. 
A. Thick concepts and pejoratives 
Working fram the bottom up, our deímition prescribes the following judgements. The fourth 
cIass of terms, including ''brave'', is not a cIass of value-terms at all. They cIassify objects in terms of 
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characteristics otber tban tbeir relations witb interests. Bravery. for example. is arguably tbe property 
of being able to resist fear. Its evaluative connotations are supplied extemalIy from tbe almost 
universal high regard in wbich we hold such a trait. But because of tbe extemality of tbe connection to 
our interests. it is possible to use tbe term in an evaluatively neutral way. and even an evaluatively 
negative way. It is quite possible. although uncommon. for someone to judge tbat a brave act is a 
stupid act. and to endorse cowardice as a virtue of tbe wise. 
It has to be acknowledged. however. tbat sometimes such terms are treated as if tbeir 
evaluative connotations were more essential tban this. People are ofien loath to ascribe such qualities 
as bravery or intelligence to tbose who all things considered they desire to blame or censure. Thus. "It 
wasn't braveo it was just stupid" is an expression we sometimes hear used to describe situations that 
would seem to satisfy any non-evaluative criterion of bravery. Likewise, many philosophers including 
Socrates and Plato have wished to deny that any virtues can be ascribed to a wicked persono 
Behaviour that counts as moderation or courage or wisdom in the virtuous does not deserve these 
names when manifested by the vicious. This rnay seem to cause problems for my analysis.4 and we 
shall see it more sharply in tbe case of pejoratives. Its explanation is that due to strong attitudinal 
connotations of such terms. tbe use of them carries a presumption of commendatory or condemnatory 
attitude. If we wish to avoid saying anything favourable about sorne thing or sorne person. 
accordingly. we will refuse to use such terms. Nonetheless it seems false to deny that a rnurderous SS 
soldier defending his post to bis death is brave and loyal. 
This claim - that the descriptive component of so-called thick ethical concepts can be isolated 
from any evaluative content and identified as the strict semantic content of the term - is highly 
controversial, and runs contrary to the treatment of McDowell and Williams. who introduce thick 
4 1 am not completely convinced that my stance here is correcto It should be noted that in the last section of this 
appendix 1 pro vide an analysis that could be used in support of the contrary thesis: that "brave" and the lilce are 
fact-value hybrids. 
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terms as breaking down the distinction between fact and vaIue. It is instead maintained that the 
extension of such terms is shapeless and arbitrary except from the perspective of certain interests or 
affective sensibilities, and accordingly that the concepts cannot be properly grasped without grasping 
the affective perspective. It is, aIlegedly, impossible to genuinely view something as lewd, sinful, or 
bigoted without viewing it with speciaI. culturaIly-IocaI kinds of disfavour, and irnpossible to 
genuinely view sornething as courageous, pious, or decent without viewing it with similarly 
culturaIly-locaI kinds of favour. 
As 1 intimated earlier, 1 concur with Blackbum and Copp in considering this faIse - and now 
it is appropriate to atternpt to establish this.5 The basic claim to be proved is that, if a concept has an 
extensionaI shape which is not determined simply by reference to the subjective dispositions of 
response of sorne affective sensibility (and therefore sirnply response-dependent and not world-guided 
at all), then its shape is necessarily determinable objectively - Le. independent of any such sensibility. 
If no such objective principIes can be identified as underlying a particular family of affective 
response, then those responses are effectively arbitrary. Let us suppose, rust, that rnernbers of a 
linguistic community find, in regard to a particular thick concept, that their attitudes appropriately 
track their intuitions concerning the applicability of the concept, so that, for example, there are no 
objects they consider tapu6 that they do not feeI a certain sort of reverence toward, and that there are 
no objects they feel this reverence toward that they do not consider tapu, and that it is not possible to 
describe the extension of the concept tapu in terms that do involve or invoke this very attitude. We 
have no reason to suppose that tapu does not mean simply, "Sornething that we ofthis community feeI 
this sort of reverence toward" - and any outsider trying to leam the language would find no 
s Fuller treatments of the dispute can be found in the dialectically opposed pairs of McDoweU 1981/Blackburn 
1981, and Gibbard 1998/Blackburn 1998. 
6 A New Zealand Maori tenn Ioosely translated as "sacred". 
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breakdowns in communication if he started to use the term with this meaning. 1 will turn to the 
analysis of"response dependent" concepts like this in a moment.7 
This supposition is implausible, however, and not made by the proponents of thick concepts. 
The case for their not simply being subjective or response-dependent concepts is based on the claim 
that attitudes need not track the application of the concept perfectly. People can dispute whether 
something is tapu, be unsure whether something is tapu, decide that something they thought was tapu 
in fact is not, and that something they thought was not tapu in fact is. But the problem for the thick 
concept theorist now is to demonstrate that a certain attitudinal sensibility is conceptually prior or at 
least not posterior to the discrimination of the property. It rather seems the people have the 
appropriate reverence to the things that they believe to be tapu, where they are operating on an 
independent understanding of what makes something tapu.8 
Toward this purpose, it is helpful to tum frrst to consider pejoratives, which are like thick 
concepts in being substantialIy factual or world-guided while at the same time carrying evaluative 
colours that cannot be separated out. But pejoratives differ from thick ethical concepts in that -
usually at Ieast - there is an available term with the same extension that is evaluatively neutral. A 
"faggot" or "queer" is a homosexual. A "nigger" is a black person; a "honky" is a wrute persono A 
"pom" is a Brit, and a "kraut" is a German. Pejoratives, in other words, offer the opponent of thick 
etrucal concepts a template of the type of deconstruction he wishes to perforro on thick concepts. 
However the analysis of pejoratives is controversial, and there are sorne who would offer them as an 
objection to the kind of factlvalue distinction 1 am suggesting. 
7 Note that it is no objection to such an analysis that a concept might be partially world-guided, in that it is only 
applied to certain sorts of objects, a subset of those which are viewed with the appropriate attitude. Response-
dependent concepts can have world-guided clauses built into them: "An action by a child that we feel a certain 
attitude toward", for example. 
8 This is Socrates' problem in the Euthyphro: the Gods love an action because it is pious - it therefore cannot be 
the case that an action is pious because the Gods love it. 
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Should someone call a homosexual a "faggot", we are placed in a curious position. If we are 
forced to answer the question, "Well, is he a faggot or iso't he?" it seems we have to answer "Yes. 
but.. ... Indeed. a notable strategy of response adopted by many people who find themselves the target 
of such pejoratives is to accept and furthermore to affinn the labe!' "Yes. rm a fag. And rm proud of 
it. Do you have a problern with that?" Of course. such a response is usually the result of a decision 
between unsavoury alternatives, and we cannot ignore the other temptation. which is to deny the labe!' 
It has been. and can be argued. for instance. that the property denoted by the pejorative term is itself 
intrinsically evaluative. Why else. one might wonder. would we want to resist its ascription to us or to 
others? According to the proponents of thick ethical concepts. approaching the world with certain 
attitudes in sorne way brings to light properties answering precisely to such prejudices. Blackbum 
accordingly ascribes to McDowell the view that a scornful attitude towards obesity conveyed with a 
derogatory use of the word "fat" reveals a peculiar. evaluatively-Iaced objective property of fatness. 
distinct frorn obesity as clinically defined (1998: 95). 
Here. however. Blackbum's warning against mixing input and output seems appropriate 
(1998: 6-7). The property of fatness is the same, just subject to differing judgements in the different 
cases. Of course, what counts as fat and what does not is contingent upon certain social norms or 
models - but this is a different point altogether. As Blackburn points out, it is absurd to suggest that 
simply in light of possessing a certain prejudice, sorne people are able to detect properties in the 
world to which those without that prejudice are blindo The thick-concept theory entails that those who 
view fatness negatively can have knowledge that others cannot. There is a further unwelcorne 
consequence. If the property is truly objective and out there, why would we be justified in resisting its 
ascription, as we feel we are? We would not be on any higher ground than those who dismiss the 
ascription of cowardice to themselves because they don't like the condemnation involved, although 
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they concede that they acted on fear, or who reject the label of "wife-beater" although they admit they 
strike their wives. 
In the context of a conversation with someone who uses pejorative labeIs, if we simply reject 
the ascription of such a label - say to someone that we know but our companion has never met -
without any sort of qualification or squirming conveyed by expressions like "Y es, but. .. " then our 
companion will consider us to have deceived him when, on encountering the person, he discovers they 
really are homosexual, or black, or femaIe, or French, etc. Tbis response would not surprise us - but it 
shouId if we understood him to mean a property that requires a certain attitude. In fact, those who 
engage in the use of such language do not use it appropriately on the analysis we are considering. 
Arthur might know that Barbara has no negative attitudes toward homosexuaIs, but might nonetheless 
say in disgust, "Barbara knows Chris is a fag - but she still likes him. She Iikes people she thinks are 
fags." According to the interpretation in question, however, Barbara cannot know Chris is a fag if she 
doesn't have the relevant attitude. A bigot doesn't distinguish between being a faggot and being a 
homosexual. 
We still need an explanation of why tbis language is so offensive, if it simply pieks out an 
evaluatively neutral domain of objects. Our reluctance pertains not to accepting the extension of the 
terro, but in engaging in that language in the trrst place. It is not the classification that is offensive and 
attitudinally coloured, but the choice of term itself. Simply that use of terminology, rather than sorne 
other, signifies a certain sort of prejudiee. Consider for example the label ''faggot''. Originally it did 
not simply signify homosexual s in a pejorative way. Rather it was used figuratively - a "faggot" is a 
piece of wood used to fuel tires, and so by calling homosexuals "faggots", people expressed (without 
stating) an opinion that homosexuality is a sin for wbich the proper punishment is burning. In time, 
the figurative significance faded, so that "faggot" carne to mean "homosexual" more literally. 
However the prejudiced origins of the term continue to have an influence on its use, and it still 
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conveys a certain attitude. Pejorative terms, then, notwithstanding the essential connection their use 
has with certain attitudes and interests, remain factual tenns representing factual properties. 
The thick concept theorists must accordingly maintain that thick concepts differ from 
pejoratives in some significant manner. They might, perhaps, gain leverage from the already observed 
fact that whereas pejorative terms usua1ly have non-pejorative counterparts, thick tenns as such 
usually lack any evaluatively neutral counterparts. It is not that they don't have approximate 
synonyms: frequently they do (fat, overweight, and obese, or brave and courageous). But the 
synonyms are just as attitudina1ly loaded. We might infer from this that the properties in question are 
undivorcably tied up with certain attitudes. But it is not the only, nor the simplest, explanation. Thick 
terms differ from pejoratives mainly in that our attitudes connect principally with the qualities they 
stand for in the former case, but connect principa1ly with the particular term used in the latter. It is 
bravery that we approve of, and obesity that we scom, which explains why any near synonyms we 
might possess will carry the same attitudinal connotations.9 The word "faggot", on the other hand, 
expresses disapproval we automatically recognize even ifwe don't view homosexuality as vicious. 
Another argument that has been offered in defense of the thesis that thick terms can be value 
terms tries to make telling the point that the extension of such terms to cover new cases (as 
Wittgenstein put it, the "going on" from familiar cases to new cases) can be guided by such interests 
or attitudes. lO 1 see no reason to deny this. For example, consider the following crude pseudo-history 
of the concept of "bravery" (which, although 1 believe it bears sorne resemblance to the truth, is mere 
speculation that nonetheless illustrates the point well): the concept of "bravery" began as the concept 
of standing Ímn before the onslaught of enemies and the danger of death at their hands - a most 
9 This, incidentally, is why the attempt to clispel prejudice by creating neologisms is futile. The attitudes are 
connected with the traits, not the terrns used to represent them, and so the new words quickly gain the same 
attitudinal colourations. 
lO See for example Plato's Protagoras (350B): Attempting to define courage, Protagoras rejects the attribution of 
courage in certain circumstances on the grounds that "for if so [i.e. such acts were courageous] courage would be 
something to be ashamed of." 
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useful trait to discriminate for societies whose continued existence depended upon such behaviour. As 
such, we have a non-evaluatively describable concept with a contingent but sufficiently universal 
connection with a certain attitude. In time, however, people ponder the extension of the termo 
"Bravery is something essentially admirable," they might say to themselves, "But the warrior who 
stands firm in the face of death because he wants to die is oot admirable. Bravery, then, must have to 
do with the inner psychology underlying such behaviour". The concept of bravery thus undergoes an 
internalization, driven by the attitudes with which the concept is associated. Here, it is indeed the 
attitudinal associations of the concept that drive its development. But nonetheless, the concept has 
accordingly changed, as has the semantic content of "brave". Thick ethical concepts, therefore, may 
ofien be descriptive, non-evaluative concepts whose evolution is controlled by certain vested interests 
in those concepts. 
B. Response-dependent concepts and (hin concepts 
"Response-dependent" concepts are particularly favoured by those who, like McDowell and 
Wiggins, wish to sofien the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity (which ofien goes hand in 
hand with the wish to deny any rigorous factlvalue distinction). Such concepts often, although not 
always, wear their response-dependent character on their sleeves. The admirable, contemptible, 
laughable, frightening, disgusting, amusing, humorous, fearsome, etc. all have labels derived from a 
particular kind of subjective affect (contempt, fear, etc.) or action (admire, laugh, fear. etc.) There is 
little consensus over whether such properties should be counted as ''value'' properties or not: Scheler 
(1966) and Bergmann (1973), for example, both treat them as such, but McDowell, who articulates a 
theory of what value might be like on the basis of an analysis of concepts like the "funny", 
nonetheless does not consider them to be value properties. but merely closely related to value 
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properties (1985). 1 shaIl concur with this judgernent, and try to drawa line between vaIue concepts 
and response-dependent concepts. 
To aid our anaIysis of response-dependent concepts, it is important to consider what we can 
read into the different suffices which response-dependent terms have. The majority of these terms 
have either an "-able" (or "-ible") suffix or an "-ing" suffix. Does this lexical difference indicate any 
difference of greater significance? 1 believe the basis of the difference is simply this: some response-
dependent terms are derived from verbs which take the object as the (grammatical) subject, while the 
subject (person) is the (grammatical) object acted upon. These terms typica1ly take the suffix "-ing". 
For example, the amusing is that which amuses, the revolting that which revolts, the disgusting that 
which disgusts, the inspiring that which inspires, etc. On the other hand, sorne response-dependent 
terms are derived from verbs which indicate action on the part ofthe subject towards sorne object, and 
these typically take the suffix "-able". For example, the desirable has to do with desiring, the lovable 
has to do with loving, the respectable with respecting, the condemnable with condemning, the 
laughable with laughing, etc. 11 
The less common suffices inelude "-ive" (as in "repulsive"), "-some" (as in "fearsome"), and 
"-fuI" (as in hateful). They seern to be assimilable to the two anaIyses offered for "-able" and "-ing". 
"Repulsive" is based on "repulse" as an action of an object on a subject, and could therefore with only 
conventional oddity be rendered "repulsing". "Fearsorne" is based on ''fear'' (which is ambiguously 
both an affect and an action, but seems in this case to be the latter) and could equally be rendered 
''fearable''. Likewise, "hateful" is based on "hate" and could be rendered "hateable". 
II "Contemptible" might appear to throw a spanner in the works, since "contempt" is not a verb indicating action 
on the part of a subject. There is such a verb, "contemn", which remains in OUT dictionaries even if it has largely 
passed out of everyday use. From contemn is formed the now obsolete word contemnible - and one might 
suppose that contemptible has evolved from it. However, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us instead that the 
word contempt "Atfirst applied to the action, in modem use aImost exclusively to the mental attitude or feeling." 
Accordingly, contemptible is based on the now obsolete verb contempt. 
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Does this difference in suffix. indicate anything more significant than the difference between 
active subject and active object verbs? 1 don't believe so. Consider for example "fear", as a psychic 
action of a subject toward an object. We have a mirror-image term in "frighten", as an action of an 
object on a subject. If something frightens me, then 1 fear it. If 1 fear something, then it frightens me. 
As response-dependent concepts accordingly we have "fearsome" and <'frightening", which appear to 
me to be synonyms. 
There is a problem however with discriminating response-dependency from value on the basis 
of the construction of words. For «desirable" also fits this formula, but has often with good reason 
been talcen to be synonymous with "good" (e.g. Sidgwick 1907: 110) and thus a paradigmatic value 
termo How then should we analyze response-dependency? The classic answer is MilI's: we should 
interpret "desirable" analogously to the way we interpret "visible". The construction 1 have identified 
as response-dependent is not limited to concepts derived from affects and affective action. We 
likewise form such concepts of many sorts of action. From the concepts of "see", «hear", "permit", 
"access" for example we develop the concepts of "visible", "audible", "permissible", and 
"accessible". Perhaps, therefore, a simple answer for the analysis of «desirable" and other response-
dependent concepts can be found by examining the proper analysis of these, as MilI suggested. If the 
"visible" is simply that which can be seen, maybe the «desirable" is simply that which can be desired. 
The admirable would then be that which can be admired, the respectable that which can be respected, 
etc. 
Mill, however, is widely accused of having fallen prey to a fallacy in considering «desirable" 
to parallel «visible".12 The charge is that unlike «visible" and its ilk, desirable, contemptible, and the 
other response-dependent concepts involve an essential element of normativity that the analogy fails 
to accommodate. The analysis, it is claimed, fails to malee provision for the implication essential to 
12 See for example Gibbard 1998: 240-1. 
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ascribing desirability etc. that the response in question is not merely evoked in or possible for the 
subject, but is merited. A normative account of response-dependency therefore identifies such 
concepts as classifying objects not on the basis of the type of affective response that is actually 
excited or potentialIy excitable, but on the basis of a type of affective response that is merited or 
deserved. Desirability differs from visibility in containing this essential element of merito 
Such an analysis is far from satisfactory, however, as the notion of "merit" is most unclear. In 
fact, I believe that the proper analysis of "desirable", "admirable", "cornmendable" etc. does parallel 
the proper analysis of "visible" and "audible". It is not just the analysis of "desirable" that is 
unsatisfactory in Mill's account, but also the analysis of "visible". To draw the contrast between 
desirability as involving merit and visibility as not, visibility is interpreted as the property of being 
such that someone can see it. It is then easy to point out that by desÍrable we do not mean being such 
that someone can desire it. But "visibility" does not simply mean being such that someone can see it. 
Things count as visible and not visible for different reasons in different situations. Sometimes, we say 
something is not visible if it is too far away for us to see it. Here, clearly, we do not mean to say it is 
such that nobody could see ilo Someone who is there, where it is, could possibly see it. Someone with 
a telescope or binoculars could possibly see it. Likewise, if something is behind us then we cannot see 
it - but it is not necessarily therefore invisible. 
This reveals that the meaning of "visible" is itself context-dependenlo It might mean "visible 
to human eyes from a close distance", or "visible to me from my current vantage point", or "visible to 
bumble bees" etc. Within such a context, "visible" means such that it would be seen. Any factor 
outside of the context which might prevent the object from being seen does not count against its being 
visible. For example, if I object to an object' s being visible (to me from my current vantage point) on 
the basis of my having my eyes shut, or wearing a blindfold, etc. I am merely playing games. Such 
obstacles do not stand in the way of the visibility of the object in those contexts. Visibility consists in 
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being seen in the hypothetical situation the context assumes. 
This does not of course demonstrate that "visible" involves an ingredient of merito But the 
notion of merit remains somewhat obscure, and my contention is that properly analyzed here, it 
reduces to something quite consistent with the case of "visible". Desirability is similarly context-
dependent. To ask what is desirable is to ask what is desirable in certain circumstances. A context is 
assumed, and an object counts as desirable only in case it is desired in the hypothetical situation. In 
particular, discussions of desirability posit contexts of fuII infonnation and normal mental 
functioning. An object is desirable, therefore, not merely if it is the case that somebody can manage to 
desire it, but only if it is such of its own nature that a person (within certain contextual parameters) 
would desire it if they were suitably informed concerning its character and free of any unusual 
influence such as drugs, etc. So far our analysis of "desirable" has incorporated no elements not 
included in our analysis of "visible", but we can now show that the intuitive element of "merit" has 
already been captured. The desirable merits desire because it arouses it solely on the basis of its own 
nature (within the context of a certain human sensibility and set of interests), rather than on the basis 
of illusion or artificial influence or erroneous belief etc. To "merit" is to qualify on the basis of one's 
own attributes, rather than on the basis of sorne extrlnsic factor. What exactly is merited is not built 
into the concept of merit itself. To rnerit desire is to qualify as an object of desire on the basis of one's 
own attributes, just as to rnerit being se en is to qualify as an object of sight on the basis of one's own 
attributes. 
The point, however, is to consider the qualifications of response-dependent concepts for being 
value concepts. The suggestion that they incorporate an essential element of "rnerit" certainly 
suggests they are value concepts, but 1 have rather explained away this intuition. According to the 
interest-relational theory of value, value properties are relational properties the relation of which 
subsists between objects and abstract interests. 1 have analyzed response-dependent concepts in a 
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different way, as counter-factual or hypothetical concepts concerning the responses of certain subjects 
or kinds of subjects. I must declare, therefore, that response-dependent properties are not value 
properties. To have value is to be such as to satisfy some interest, but to be x-able is to be such as to 
stimulate a response of x in some subject or subjects under certain ideal conditions. Response-
dependency, accordingly, involves an element of subjectivity that is absent from value, since it 
depends on the affective and responsive tendencies of certain living creatures. 
This, at least, is the judgement that the interest-relational theory requires. But its plausibility 
can be challenged, and in particular we need to pay further attention to the concept of the desirable. 
As 1 have said, "desirablen has afien been taken as a direct synonym of "goodn • But "goodn is the 
paradigm thin value term, and "desirablen is response-dependent in construction at least. If they are 
synonyms, then there is at least one response-dependent concept that is also a value-concept. Does 
"desirablen mean exactly the same thing as "goodn , as Sidgwick claims? 
On my analysis, "desirablen means such that the members of A would desire it - in ideal 
circurnstances, and where A represents a set of individuals membership of which is determined by 
context. "Goodn means such as to satisfy some interest 1 (where 1 is determined again by context). 
The analyses are clearly different - but they have a very interesting connection. which 1 will address 
in a momento Is it then the case that "desirablen means something different from "goodn ? So 1 suggest. 
But does it then follow that things can be good without being desirable, or desirable without being 
good? Certainly I maintain it is logically possible - but Ido not believe tbis ever happens. Although 
"desirablen and "goodn have different meanings, they have identical extensions. 
We must keep in mind that both "goodn and "desirablen depend upon context for sorne of 
their sense in any utterance in which they occur. If we keep the context of interest constant, we find 
that anythlng that is such as to satisfy an interest is, relative to a..'1d restricted to the possession of that 
interest at least, such that one would desire it in ideal conditions. In other words, substituting terms 
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for defmitions. within the same context anything that is good is desirable. Likewise. anything that is 
such that we would ideal1y desire it (within the context of sorne interest) is something that is such as 
to satisfy that interest. In other words. anything that is desirable is good. This equivalence is the 
consequence not of synonymy. but of the nature of our affective disposition of desire under ideal 
conditions. Desire is for that which would satisfy it. analytically. So as creatures with interests, frorn 
the perspective of sorne interest it is invariably true that under ideal conditions we will come to desire 
that which is such as to satisfy our desire. This is to agree with Plato's dictum that al1 desire aims at 
the good. My qualification: that "good" has to be understood within the context of certain interests, 
which makes the principie almost tautologous. Not tautologous, however. since "good" rneans 
(roughIy) not that which is desired. but that which is such as to satisfy (contextua!) desire, and we can 
accordingly bave false beliefs about what is good, and accordingly the Greek distinction between real 
and apparent good also has a place in the interest-relational theory of value. 
One might wonder, bowever, at the justification for discriminating between the meaning of 
"desirable" and "good" if they are basically equivalent in extension and use. Indeed. bere we can look 
to two accounts of value and the meaning of "good" which give basicalIy response-dependent 
accounts of the meaning of "good" equivalent to my analysis of "desirable". According to Sidgwick-
who explicitly identifies "desirable" and "good" - and Michael Smith - who does not - value is the 
property of being such that we would desire it under ideal conditions (for Smith, these conditions are 
''full rationality"). Smith's dispositional analysis of value, however, actually facuses on "desirable", 
and although in chapter 1 1 rejected his dispositional theory as an adequate analysis of value, 1 am 
now concurring with his treatment of "desirable". 
1 only rejected Smitb's account on the basis of the phenornenology of value judgement - on 
the basis of the conviction that talk about value is not talk about subjects and their responses, actual 
or hypothetical. As 1 observed, however, this is not actually to disagree with Smith at aH, since he 
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concedes that bis analysis doesn't seem to capture what we mean, and therefore does not propose to 
be offering a reductive semantic analysis, but rather a reforming definition - a functional equivalent 
which he believes models the value judgements we actually malee. Smith therefore agrees with my 
objection to bis account - he is just less ambitious. Sidgwick is even more explicito For despite giving 
the dispositionallhypotheticallresponse-dependent analysis of value, he also admits that as an account 
of what we mean it is unsatisfactory. expanding on this by pointing out as 1 have that the response-
dependent analysis seems far too complicated to capture our ordinary meaning. My objection to 
Smith's account is that it is false that thought about value is hypothetical thought about our own 
responses to objects Can objection that has affinities with charges of "psychologism" in ethics), and 
that it seems to interpose a redundant and undesirable medium between ourselves and value. We are 
now in a position to appreciate how this is so. Value, as a matter of relations to interests. is effectively 
modelled by hypothetical responses of actual subjects to objects. in virtue of the fact that these 
responses manifest a recognition of the relations we have identified as the essence of value. We are 
furthermore in a position to explicate the obscure invocation of '"fuII rationality" - wbich amounts to 
the disposition to be motivated to pursue those objects wbich actually satisfy our implicit interests. 
Does the functional equivalence of "desirable" and "good" blur the line 1 am attempting to 
draw between "fact" and "value"? My account of "desirable" may in fact be rather idealized - it 
construes "desirable" along the pattero of other response-dependent concepts. But the functional 
equivalence of "good" and "desirable" as 1 have analyzed it makes it easy for "desirable" to slide in 
meaning, so that it effectively comes to mean "good" rather than simply modelling it. CertainIy, 1 am 
not inclined to think that we typically think about hypothetical responses when we judge something to 
be desirable. 
An even larger problem for the distinction is presented by the term "valuable", wbich 
although response-dependent in construction ("such that under certain conditions one would value ¡t") 
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is simply the rnost generic term to predicate having value. But "valuable" is response-dependent in 
construction only, not in everyday rneaning. The slide frorn response-dependency to value is even 
easier here than in the case of "desirable", since to value is to engage in a cognitive or intellectual act, 
not an affective or conative one, and therefore is truth-directed. What is value-able, therefore, as that 
which would be valued (in context) in ideal conditions, is exactly that which has value, and thus 
value-able exactly reproduces the extension of "has value". It is rnerely speculation, but we can 
observe a possible reason for the apparent response-dependent construction of "valuable" in the Iack 
of what would normally have been the logical alternative. That which has facets is facetted, that 
which has talents is talented, that which has hue is hued, but there is too rnuch ambiguity in saying 
that that which has value is "valued", since "value" is a verb as well as a no un, and thus "valued" 
sounds intuitively like a past-tense verb. l3 
The line between value concepts and response-dependent concepts is very hard to draw - in 
large part because response-dependency is a rather broad and difficult phenornenon. I have atternpted 
to capture what I believe to be the difference, but in the end the distinction I am atternpting to draw 
between fact and value does not greatly depend on whether rny account of response-dependency is 
accepted. The point is this: value concepts classify by reference to sorne relation to implicit interests. I 
have claimed that response-dependent concepts classify instead by reference to sorne disposition of 
response in sorne group of actual individuals. If this is so, then they are by the lights of the interest-
relational theory factual, and if not and response-dependent concepts (or sorne of thern) also classify 
by reference to sorne relation to interests, then they also are value and not fact. 
13 Although sometimes "valued" is used in this way, as in "many-valued logics". The Oxford English Dictionary 
supports the point, indicating an obsolete meaning for "valued": "In which value is indicated", along with the 
more familiar "Estimated, appraised", and "Highly esteemed or appreciated". For "valuable", it indicates 
response-dependent analyses (value-able) as obsolete senses, describing its common senses as "Of material or 
monetary value" and "Having value or worth". 
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7. Complications 
The defense of the interest-relational fact/value distinction must deal with sorne mueh more 
difficult cases than the ones already considered. Given that language is a vital, dynamic thing that 
shifts, ehanges and grows, and that the proposed line is drawn between different types of reducible 
natural descriptive concepts, it is difficult to imagine that the two domains remain separate and never 
get blurred or interbred. Many terms and eoncepts are complex, permitting analysis into a 
combination of simpler terms and concepts, like "brother" can be analyzed into "male sibling", and 
"bachelor" can be analyzed into "never-married eligible maIe". What is to prevent "fact" and "value" 
terms from getting together and spawning offspring similarly? \V0uld this issue be "fact" or "value", 
both at once, or something eompletely different? 
Quite simply, fact and value eoneepts have indeed matched up in our language. A "vice" is a 
bad characteristic o[ persons, a "virtue" a good characteristic o[ persons. A defect is abad 
characteristic of objects generally. "Bad" is value, "charaeteristic" is fact. (MedicaI) heaIth is bodily 
well-being, where "body" is fact and "well-being" is itself a composite of faet C"being") and value 
C"weU"). These relationships get even further embedded: if "doctor" means person who works to 
retum others to health then "doctor" itself contains elements of value as well as fact. Insofar as aH 
these terms classify, therefore, they classify both in terms of relations to implicit interests and in other 
terms. Surely this constitutes a refutation of the interest-relational fact/value distinction? 
But I think not. As I have defmed "value", it is that which is classified in terms of a relation to 
interests. "Faet" is defmed not as that whieh classifies in terms of something other than interest, but 
that whieh does not classify at all in terms of relations to interests. In other words, any concept that 
contains any element of value is itself a value termo "Vice", "virtue", "defect", "health", and "doctor" 
as defined aboye are accordingly aH value-terms, not faet terms. (It must be remembered that "faet" is 
here used as a term of art - 1 do not mean to deny that there is perfect sense in other contexts in 
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considering such things factuaL) The significance of this classification is that like "good" and "bad" 
and other thin ethical terms, one must appreciate the implicit interest that provides important 
contextual information in order to understand the full sense of what is said. To understand what is 
being said about an object when it is said to have a "defect''' one must understand the interest in the 
object that underlies the badness of the characteristic. Paradigmatically, this amounts to understanding 
the usual function of the object in human activity - it is typically tools, or artifacts manufactured as 
instruments in the pursuit of certain interests, that have defects. Likewise, to appreciate what is being 
said about a creature if it is described as "unhealthy", one must appreciate the interests that underlie 
the well-being of such a creature. 
This answer however presents us with a new problem. The meaning of our language can be 
quite indeterminate at times, and quite malleable at others - since meaning is a product of use, and we 
humans can be quite creative and novel in our use of the language at our disposal. We see this 
particularly in the case of "doctor", where my definition does not seem adequate to capture the normal 
use of the word. It is arguable that any connection to "health" has dropped out of the concept of 
doctor, which in the mouth of a contemporary speaker might well mean something more like a person 
with a college medical degree. Here, on the interest-relational distinction, "doctor" is a fact term, not 
a value tean. Actually, we probably all use the term with both meanings on different occasions, and 
ofien with a meaning indeterminate between the two. 
Because the interest-relational fact/value distinction makes the border between fact and value 
a land border, so to speak, rather than a sea border as the noncognitivist fact/value distinction does, 
there is significant commerce between the domains of fact and value. This is a fact about our language 
which it is pointless for me to deny. It may appear to pro vide fuel for a fresh objection to the 
distinction I am drawing. But I rather maintain that as difficult as the fine migbt be to discem at times, 
it is a line that nonetheless is always there. The last matter we need to consider therefore is migration 
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between the realms of fact and value. Whether a term or a statement is a case of value or of fact 
depends on its meaning, which depends in its turn on usage (see chapter 6). The migration of words 
between fact and value is a consequence of the dynamic nature of our language usage. lt is easy for 
the value-content of "doctor" to drop out, in everyday use, in which case it constitutes fact, not value. 
This is the reason for the real social importance of the cocktail party question that Putnam wishes 
would just go away. There is a real difference between fact and value (as dermed), but there is 
occasion to enquire whether another intends a value judgement or a statement of fact only in 
circumstances where it is not obvious which of the two types of speech act is being performed. So, if 
for example one were to be told that "Smith isn't really a doctor", there is an ambiguity here between 
"Smith isn't a person who works to restore the health of others" (which one might hold, for example, 
if Smith is a cosmetic surgeon who only does nose-jobs and breast implants) and "Smith has no 
medical degree". In this situation, it is quite legitimate to ask, "ls that a statement of fact or a value-
judgement?" (This contrast is complicated by the fact that the former meaning is itself ambiguous 
between fact and value, in virtue of the possibility of the migration of "health" to the realm of fact.) 
Another example: were someone to tell us that "Selfishness is a disease", we wouId have occasion to 
enquire whether a statement of fact or value judgement is intended (the answer to which depends on 
whether "disease" has in this occurrence a value-component to its meaning - as it does in more 
metaphorical uses, or not - as it rnight in a more technical medical context). Likewise, "Alcohol is a 
drug" or "Alcohol is a poison". 
Migration can occur in both directions. Migration from value to fact occurs when a term 
loses, in the present use, a connection with an implicit interest. This is not merely something that can 
happen to concepts of mixed nature like "doctor" or "health". Even "good" can become ossified into 
fact in certain circumstances. This happens particularly in the case of moral value: "good" and "evil". 
Throughout the history of civilization, there has been a dominant social concern with unselfish regard 
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for the interest of others. From the perspective of such a concem, persons of a selfish and cruel 
incIination are appropriately termed "bad", and persons with an altruistic concem for others are 
appropriately termed "'good", as ascriptions of value-predicates in keeping with the analysis of the 
interest-relational theory of value. Accordingly, these intrinsic features of persons come in time to be 
cIosely associated with the words "good" and "bad", and a change can occur unnoticed, in which "'good" 
comes to mean "'altruistic" and "bad" comes to mean "selfish and cruel". This unremarked change 
constitutes the development of a new meaning of "good" and "bad", which have ceased to become 
value-concepts and are now faet concepts. An indication of this ehange líes in the following faet: it is 
quite coherent to now be scornful and derisive of the "good" - as, for example, Nietzsche does. This is a 
cIue (although not proaf, since one can adopt a context of interest in communication that one does not 
share in) that "good" and "bad" have migrated from the reaIm of value into the realm of fact. 
Migration occurs in the other direction as well, from fact to value. Examples of terms which 
have suceessfully jumped the divide from values to facts include "choice", "coa!", "cosmic", "radical", 
and genera1ly all the terms of endorsement of youth-culture. The process is the exact reverse to the 
migration from value to fact. First, a factual term is used in a context in which it comes to be associated 
with something in which there are interests involved. From the cIose association of the term with the 
context of interest, the term is adopted as a value-term to classify objects in virtue of their standing in 
such a relation to the operative interests. In this way, for instance, green-grocers' adoption of the word 
"choice" to describe the best vegetables (signifying that they were carefully selected for quality) carne to 
be associated with being choice-worthy in relation to some interest, and a new meaning of "choice" was 
bom, in which "choice" could apply to any object, signifying merely that the object stood in a certam 
relation to one's interests. 
In conclusion, two facts about our language malee the discrimination of non-evaluative 
("fact") and evaluative concepts and utterances very difficult in limit cases: one - since both non-
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evaIuative and evaIuative concepts are descriptive they can be combined to form complex evaluative 
concepts. where it can be difficult to determine the presence of evaluative elements; two - since 
meaning is a function of use. and we are so very inventive in our use of the language at our disposaI. 
the precise meanings with which a particular word or utterance is used can vary considerably from 
one instance to the next. even within a single language community. and thus words and utterances can 
acquire and lose evaIuative significance with abandono Together. these factors can malee 
discrimination difficult work indeed. But the difficulty of determining whether a term. or utterance in 
some particular use counts as ufacC or "vaIuen does not present us with any reason for rejecting the 
factlvaIue distinction. Rather. it is because of the difficulties involved in such discrimination that the 
question "Is that a statement of fact or a value-judgementT' is so indispensable to us. Putnam' s 
complaint against bis unsuspecting fellow cocktail partiers is not necessarily warranted. 
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APPENDIX B: AN ANAL YSIS OF OBLIGATION 
In chapter 4, my engagement with arguments for foundationalism led us to the problem of the 
phenomenology of obligation. 1 could not pursue this problem there, because of the need to first address 
the nature of normativity in chapter 5. A solution to the phenomenological problem was briefly 
mentioned in that chapter, and in this appendix 1 provide a more detailed, interest-relational response to 
the foundationalist argument from the phenomenology of obligation. 
How are normativity and obligation related? ''Normativity'' is an ambiguous word, having both a 
broad and narrow sense. In the broad sense (in which 1 have been using it), normativity is just the 
character of practical correctness or should-ness. The interest-relational theory identifies this 
nonnativity as a matter of an object fitting with an interest, and so identifies the motivational force of 
nonnativity as the force carried by our motivational states themselves. But philosophers talking about 
"normativity" are ofien concemed about a particular form of such correctness, the kind we can less 
ambiguously call obligation. (I will use ''normativity'' for the broad phenomenon). Foundationalists are 
principally concemed to defend moral obligation from the perceived threat posed by anti-foundationalist 
accounts like the interest-relational theory of value. There are certain actions and attitudes, they cIaim. 
that are rationally or morally required of us, regardless of our interests. These obligations come from a 
reaIm of foundational reasons, which are reasons for us, but are in no way functions of our interests. 
The evidence for the claim of interest-transcendence is phenomenological, although not 
necessarily of the character of an external object or property. This point is ofien made in terms of an 
intuitive insight into this realm of absolute reasons through our consciences or moral sense, but it needs 
no appeal to dubious mental faculties. The experience of being obligated presents itself as a dernand that 
forces itself upon us, a requirement that conflicts with our desires, and that we obey, if we do, 
reIuctantly. Obligation presents itself not only as independent of our interests, but ofien also as in 
261 
fundamental conflict with thern (Hampton 1998: 89-90). To insist. as anti-foundationalist phiIosophers 
do, that obligation is explicable in terms of our own interests. appears to cling dogmaticaIly to a theory 
that cannot accommodate the obvious character of its subject - as Nagel charges. Here is Kant. waxing 
uncharacteristica1ly poetic in eulogy of obligation' s independence frorn desire: 
Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuating but requires 
submission, and yet does not seek to move the will by threateIÚng anything that wouId arouse 
natural aversion or terror in the mind but only holds forth a law that of itself finds entry into the 
mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all 
inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly work against it; what origin is there worthy of 
you, and where is to be found the root of your noble deseent whieh proudly rejects all kinship with 
the inclinations, deseent from whieh is the indispensable eondition of that worth which human 
beings alone ean give themselves? (1788: 73/5:86) 
To consider oneself under an obligation is to recognize a reason of sorne kind to act accordingly 
- whether or not that reason is seen as decisive. The phenornena, therefore, suggest the existence of 
interest-transcendent reasons and (on a realist account), interest-transcendent vaIue. Sorne anti-
foundationaIist accounts simply overIook this phenornenologicaI cIairn. Others recognize it as an 
appearance, but reject it as nothing more than that. My strategy here is different: 1 both recognize the 
phenornena of obligation, and will provide a "non~ebunking" anaIysis of ir. 1 will argue that an anti-
foundationaIist and interest-relationaI analysis can live up to the appearances. 
A satisfactory theory of our practicallife must acknowledge the fact that we experience the force 
of obligation, and give an account of what this is. The basic feature of obligation - the feature that 
foundationalists like Kant, Nagel, and Hampton point to in support of the doctrine of interest-
transcendent reasons - is its "demand quality": the experience of obligation is the feeling that one must 
act in accordance with sorne reason, no matter what one wants to do. 
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Although obligation is ofien taken to be a characteristically moral phenomenon, it is easy to see 
that this is inaccurate: there are many types of obligation. The deontic language of obligation has a far 
broader use, ami the phenomenal "demand quality" is equally to be found beyond the boundaries of the 
moral. There are obligations of etiquette: in certain circles one must not poinl. or rest one's elbows on 
the table, or use certain forms of address. There are also pmdential obligations: no matter how much 1 
may want to, 1 must not bet all my paycheck on a sporting evento Since our subject is obligation as such, 
we must here consider it generically. 
The foundationalist may offer a broad account of interest-transcendent reasons that covers most 
if not all of these cases. But consider the following example. 1 am writing my Ph.D. dissertation, and 1 
need to complete it quickly if 1 am to have the chance to complete it at all. On this particular Wednesday 
night, 1 have a free evening to write. But 1 discover there is a basketball game on television, and 1 very 
much want to watch it. This places me in a conflicted deliberative state. Should 1 watch the basketball or 
work on my dissertation? There is no question in my mind that 1 should do the latter - but still 1 hesitate 
and weigh the options. This makes it clear that what 1 most want to do is turn on the television - for if 
my desires did not favour this option, the matter would already be settled. But reluctantly, 1 manifest 
"strong will": 1 am swayed by my better judgement, and morosely settle down to write. In this scenario, 1 
fmd myself subjected to a demand that mns contrary to my inclinations - a demand to which 1 subrnit. 1 
recognize an obligation to work. Is it accurate to say that 1 perceive a foundational reason - existing 
independently of rny interests - that ultimately motivates my decision? One rnight say thal. but one need 
not in arder to make perfect sense of the situation. 1 have strong interests in completing the dissertation -
both intrinsic and instrumental. It is these interests that present me with a demand - so 1 am obligated by 
rny own interests. How can my own interests present me with such demands? This is the question that 
the interest-relational theory must answer. 
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The awareness of obligations arises in tbe following way. When, in deliberative reflection, we 
represent to ourseIves a proposed caurse of action, it is always possibIe in principIe to ask for reasons for 
or against such action. Usually, reasons are weighed, and on tbe basis of tbis deliberation a decision is 
made. Under normal circumstances, it is always possibIe - altbough pragmatically beside tbe point - to 
ask for further reasons for tbose reasons, and tbis is a process tbat has the potential to go on indefiniteIy. 
With an obligation, however, tbe case is different. A reason is given for or against a course of action, and 
with it comes the judgement that ane cannot legitimately demand higher order justificatian. If 1 ask 
myseIf why 1 cannot stand by and permit genocide, 1 arrive at tbe reason tbat genocide invoIves tbe 
killing of innocent peopIe. One could go on to ask, <Why shouldn't 1 stand by and permit tbe killing of 
innocent peopIe?" But it is precisely this extension of tbe reflective process that is somehow Jorbidden in 
obligation. It is "unthinkabIe", or impennissible for me to consult my set of interests to see whetber in 
fact there might be reasons in favour of genocide that outweigh or undermine tbis reason. Can we then 
say that obligations derive from all-things-considered reasons as opposed to prima Jade reasons? But 
when obligations conflict, one has ta pursue further reasons in order to choose between thero. The 
bindingness of obligating reasons does not amount to tbeir being the Iast word on practical problems. At 
least in tbe circumstance of conflicting obligations, the necessitation of obligation is defeasibIe. 
The puzzle concems the nature of this «illegitimacy", <<[orbiddenness", and "necessity". This 
"must" is very strange, on reflection. For it doesn't entail that one will do what one recognizes ane must. 
ClearIy then, it is not a deterministic causal necessitation, nor logical necessitation. We can (logically 
and psychologically) ask for justificatians far normative principIes - and many people do. If they are not 
laws of logic or nature, tben perhaps they are Iaws of sorne being or other: perhaps one's society, or a 
godo This at Ieast wouId heIp us understand the origin of tbe «demand" or "command" factor. But 
external commands are not by tbemselves satisfactory candidates. For when we are commanded, there is 
no illegitirnacy in searching for reasans for obeying. 
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Kant's great insight here is that the authority of obligation has to come from within oneself: 
obligation has to be a matter of autonomy, of being a law to oneself. For it is only if we ourselves are the 
authority forbidding the search for further justifications that we will feel the necessity of accepting the 
demands of obligation. The feeling of necessity is within us - therefore the necessity itself rnust reside 
there as welL Kant locates the necessity in the will's aspiration (through respect for and the interest of 
"pure practical reason") to will only maxims that can be willed as universal laws. Much ink has been 
spilt on this. Here, 1 will simply observe that Kant himself recognizes the necessity of sorne soft of 
subjective interest (respect for reason and moral interest) in order for a reflective agent to feel the 
obligation of pure practical reason (1788: 68). Whether such a disposition exists in any person 1 do not 
know, although 1 see no reason to deny its possibility. However many of us find in ourselves no such 
disposition for respect toward considerations about the logical consistency of maxims posing as 
principies of universal law - certainly 1 do noto 1 find, for example, that 1 can with a clean conscience 
decide not to vote, on the ground that 1 am only one person who makes no real difference and has better 
things to do with his time - even though 1 recognize that the result of everybody adopting this maxim 
would be intolerable to me. 1 recognize that rny voting practices do not, so long as 1 do not advertise 
them, affect others or their voting practices, and so do not affect the outcome. In other words, 1 have no 
quaIms about treating rnyself as an exception to the law in Kant's sense. The fact remains that virtually 
all of us, even without Kant's respect for pure practical reason, feel the dernands of moral (and 
nonmoral) obligation. Obligation therefore cannot arise only from such interest and respect. 
Christine Korsgaard offers a theory of the source of obligation that marries Kantianism with 
existentialism. Like Kant, she maintains that obligation arises autonornously. But she displaces respect 
for pure practical reason in favour of our self-conceptions as the ultimate source of obligation. When 
seeking reasons, sornetimes and at sorne point in the process, we arrive at a consideration that is 
grounded in our basic conception of who we are. To push further, to seek further justification, would be 
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to raise a question concerning our very self-identity. But this is so integral to our entire psychic well-
being and unity as rational agents that disturbing it is completely out of the question to uso It is this point-
blank: refusal to continue the reflective process at the cost of one' s own self that constitutes the perceived 
necessity of obligation. To continue to seekjustification once one has arrived at the fact that a proposed 
course of action requires the murder of innocent people requires that one contemplate the possibility of 
becoming a murderer. Our deep commitment to and dependence upon a self-conception that portrays us 
as caring, decent individuals prompts us to react with outright abhorrence at the very suggestion, and we 
ourselves utterly forbid such questions to be raised. 
1 wish to endorse part of Korsgaard' s picture of obligation, but also to challenge its adequacy. In 
endorsement, the mechanism of refusal to which Korsgaard appea1s enables us to understand the peculiar 
"must" or necessitation of obligation. It is not that we actua1ly cannot do otherwise - logically, 
psychologica1ly, or physica1ly. It is rather that we react with outright refusal to the prospect of even 
contemplating such an ''unthinkable'' possibility. This is why situations of obligation are characterized 
by the perceived illegitimacy of requests for further justification. No externaI authority or sanction is 
necessary, because we ourselves forbid raising such questions or contemplating such actions. 
Granting that refusal is a crucial element in obligation, Korsgaard's account is too limited. We 
might suppose that the source of obligation she has reveaIed is an interest the subject holds so dear and 
integral that contemplating its violation is out of the question. This, at least, is what 1 propose we draw 
from her analysis. But Korsgaard doesn't see it this way. She doesn't want to ground obligation in 
interests, rather in "conceptions of practicaI identity". This is an attempt to get a Kantian strategy to 
work: the strategy of showing that morality is necessary for rational agents because without it, we would 
not be rational agents at al!. Insofar as one is a rational agent, therefore, one must comply with moral 
obligations. And one cannot opt out of being a rational agent since "opting out" is form of deliberative 
act only possible for rational agents. Korsgaard fills out the Kantian notion of the "rational agent" here 
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with the notion of the person with a conception of her practica! identity. On Korsgaard's ana!ysis of 
obligation, therefore, we must remain true to our conceptions of practica! identity in order to remain 
persons with an intact conception of practica! identity. This, 1 suggest. explains nothing of the 
phenomenologica! demand character of obligation unless we assume sorne IDotivations toward 
maintaining such personality. In effect. therefore, we can read her as taking the stance that the only 
interests that can prompt such refusals are those that are centred on our conceptions of practica! identity. 
1t is onIy considerations stemming frOID who one considers oneseIf to be that can generate reactions 
forceful enough to provide obligation. For this further cIaim we need justification. 
No explicit argument is in evidence for this assumption - but the following seems to reconstruct 
her reasoning. People will sometimes die in order not to violate an obligation. Such a violation must 
therefore be as bad as or worse than death to that persono The onIy thing that could be worse than death 
for a person is the destruction or loss of one's identity, which is a form of death. This argument however 
is not sound. First. there are many obligations for which we wouldn't dream of dying. Second, there are 
no good reasons to accept that the onIy thing one can care so deeply abeut is one's own self or identity-
a1though this seems a characteristic prejudice of the century that gave us existentialism. 1 do not mean to 
deny that our commitments to certain identities generate obligations. But it requires an egoistic 
conception of our motivational set to believe that self-centred interests enjoya unique and privileged 
status. 
Korsgaard misses, for example, that ofien (especially in adolescence) people trnd themselves 
confused about who they are, and search for reasons to adopt one identity rather than another. Ofien, 
they find themselves presented with obligations to adopt one identity rather than another. Likewise, 
obligation is ofien generated by our concems not for our own integrity, but for the welfare of those 
whom \Ve love. 1t sometimes happens that out of love a person sacrifices their own integrity and chooses 
the good of another over their own honour. Korsgaard could of course respond by telling a story about 
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howall these situations really derive from a deeper core of self-conception. But there is a problem here 
about when the concept of one's "self-conception" gets so large that it is at the same time a conception 
of the whole world. My point is simply this: the phenomenon of obligation is characterized simply by a 
demand quality that derives from some concem that we refuse to tolerate surrendering or calling into 
question. There is no good reason to suppose that ooly one sort of commitment can fit the profile. The 
same effect can have a variety of causes. 
This is true even of moral obligations. People feel moral obligations from different sources. It 
might actually be the case that someone could feel a moral obligation on the basis of a refusal to 
countenance questioning therr respect for pure practical reason. More mundanely. we feel moral 
obligations on the basis of our self-conceptions. as Korsgaard claims. One common source ofthe feeling 
of moral obligation is our deep concem about the OpiniODs others (either in general or in particular) have 
about us. This is why "What would x say if she could see you now!" ofien has such a potent normative 
effect. Concern for the disapprobation of others, I suggest. is the chief source of feelings of obligation 
conceming the attitude of taking oneself as an exceptioD to a general rule, as I did in regard to voting, 
aboye. As a society we disapprove strongly of anyoDe who treats themselves as an exception - and fear 
of such disapprobation is a powerful source of obligatioD to vote. Truly moral motivations, however, are 
grounded in an altruistic concern for the well-being of others. 
With what we have gained from Korsgaard, we can now articulate an interest-relational and anti-
foundationalist account of real obligations: Le. one that preserves the fact that we not only feel obligated 
at times, but also have real obligations. even ones of which we might not be aware. A course of action x 
is obligatory for y if and only if it is the only course of action open to y that is such as to satisfy a non-
negotiable interest i. A fact that reveals such a state of affairs to us is an obligating reason. This formula 
now requires explanation and defense. By "non-negotiable interests" I mean interests disregard of which 
is for us "unthinkable" (which is a matter of degree). The condition of uniqueness might perhaps be 
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challeoged. But if ooe can swim after a droWDÍog persoo or run to tbe oext beod in tbe river and fish 
them out, theo oeitber individually is obligatory. If there are 00 otber optioos, it will be obligatory that 
ooe either swim after them or run and fish them out. The course of actioo x can therefore be disjunctive. 
We still have oot, however, specifically replied to the pheoomeoological point. If obligatioo is 
simply the course of actioo mandated by our stroogest interests, why does it strike us as beiog in 
oppositioo to OUT desires, and why is obedieoce so ofieo characterized with reluctaoce? There are two 
answers. First, the ioterest-relatiooal account of obligatioo permits a distinctioo betweeo internal and 
external obligatioos. TaIk about obligatioo is interest-reIatiooal, and draws 00 the cootext of (000-
oegotiable) interests for sorne of its meaning. When ascribing reasons and obligations to persons, 
accordingly, it is not necessary tbat the contextual non-negotiable interests be non-negotiable interests of 
the person in question: when tbis is not the case, we are ascribing "external obligations". This is 
particularly helpful for understaoding moral obligations. MoraIity constitutes a system of non-negotiable 
interests, and we can investigate courses of action in regard to tbese in order to determine whether a 
course of action is morally obligatory. But the immoralist - someone who hasn't completely internalized 
the moral motivations - can judge what is morally required of him, and then without incoherence ask 
"Why should 1 care about rny moral obligatioos?" Obligation is only normative to y in the circumstance 
that the non-negotiable interests in question are motivating non-negotiable interests for y. 
This cannot be the main answer, however, since the person who only recognizes an external 
obligation doesn't feel obligated or act out of a sense of obligation at all. Even internal obligations are 
phenomenologically antagonistic to our interests. The second answer is as follows. Our non-negotiable 
interests are primarily aversions - they include fears of events such as conviction and imprisonment, the 
death and suffering of our loved ones, and the loss of reputation. Traditional moral psychology attempts 
to identify a desire corresponding to each aversion, but this seems both phenomenologically false and 
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unnecessary. and 1 suggest rather that aversions can be directly motor-affective. Obligations thus derive 
primarily from con-attitudes. not pro-attitudes or desires. 
This however is only part of the answer. Our obligations are requirements imposed upon us. in 
virtue of our non-negotiable interests. by circumstances. This is most evident where we have desires 
incompatible with the obligation. For example, suppose 1 see somebody drowning in the river. 1 strongly 
desire to stay warm and dry. 1 recognize my obligation is to dive in and swim to the rescue. 1 most 
certainly do not want to do this: rather 1 have a distinct antipathy to it. 1 am painfully aware of my 
obligation, however: 1 recognize that ifI do not dive in, 1 may become responsible for a person's death-
and bearing such responsibility is complete anathema to me - an unthinkable prospect. My antipathy to 
bearing the responsibility for another' s death outweighs my desire to stay warm and dry, and reluctantly 
1 dive into the river. 
Why reluctantly? In part, because 1 have no desire for the action as such. 1 have recognized its 
moral value (that it is such as to satisfy my moral interest), but that doesn't entail that 1 thereby desire it. 
1 am motivated by my aversion toward a separate and absent occurrence to do something which 1 
nonetheless maintain an antipathy toward. More importantly, however, there is a logical gap between my 
wet and cold act of dutiful heroism and the non-negotiable interest that prods me toward it. Such an 
action is only obligatory if it is the only way to satisfy my non-negotiable interest. But this is something 
that is difficult to determine, and the possibility that 1 am not so obligated will tempt me to entertain 
other possibilities - and therein lays the reluctance with which 1 act. Perhaps someone else will dive in 
and be the hero? Perhaps rescue is impossible? Or the danger to oneself is so great that there would be 
no responsibility incurred by inaction? Perhaps the person will be able to reach the bank in a moment, or 
perhaps they are only pretending to drown? All ofthese scenarios open the possibility that 1 may not be 
obligated to do anything at al!. 1 willlook hopefulIy to a11 of them, before reluctantly conc1uding that the 
only way to avoid bearing such responsibility is by swimming to the rescue. Reluctance amounts to 
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searching for any way out of the action if possible. and as we can now see. is compatible with an anti-
foundationalist account of obligation. 
This analysis of obligation explains the phenomenal "demand quality" of obligation. 
undennining the argument from obligation for interest-transcendent reasons and value. Obligation is 
founded on interests that are deepIy embedded in our psyches. and thus is a function of interests. just as 
the interest-relational theory of value and reasons maintains. One might wish to object with Nagel that 
all interests can be subjected to further demands for justification. I don't deny it - but it is also quite 
possible to subject putative foundational principIes of obligation to such demands. It remains true. 
however. that there are certain demands for the justification of our ends that we are not prepared to 
tolerate. If someone were to suggest to me that I would be a more successful philosopher if I neglected 
my daughter. and demanded a justification for why I love her. 1 would not be inclined to reflectively 
distance myseIf from my affection and engage in the invited deliberation - I would rather be outraged. 
This is not because I believe there is a reason transcending my interests that directs me to give priority to 
my daughter. but because my love is a non-negotiable interest. deliberation concerning which I aro not 
prepared to countenance. 
Much more can be said in the way of expanding on the interest-relational account. However we 
must bear in mind that obligation and normativity have relevance in this context onIy insofar as they 
constitute evidence for the foundationalist c1aim that reasons and value exist that transcend all our 
interests. 1 have provided an analysis of these phenomena that analyzes them - far from being interest-
transcendent - as deriving from particularly deeply imbedded interests we possess. In response to the 
c1aims of the phenomenological argument, 1 have shown that the interest-relational account of obligation 
does indeed recognize and explain the objective and demanding character of the experience of 
obligation. I thereby conc1ude that the argument from the phenomenology of obligation fails. 
271 
BmLIOGRAPHY 
Altham, J. E. J .• & Harrison. Ross (eds) (1995) World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the ethical 
philosophy 01 Bemard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Anscombe. G. E. M. (1969) lntention. Ithaca & New York: Comell University Press. 
Anscombe. G. E. M. (1989) "Practical Inference" Reprinted in Hursthouse. Lawrence & Quinn 1995. 
Audi. Robert (1986) "Acting for Reasons" The Philosophical Review. XCV. no. 4. October. 
Audi. Robert (1989) Practical Reasoning. London & New York: Routledge. 
Audi. Robert (1993) "Axiological Foundationalism" The Structure 01 Justification. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Audi. Robert (1997) ''Moral Judgement and Reasons for Action" Cullity & Gaut 1997a. 
Beardsley. Monroe C. (1965) "Intrinsic Value". Reprinted in Sellars & Hospers 1970. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1823) An lntroduction to the Principles 01 Morals and Legislation. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1907. 
Bergmann. Frithjof (1973) "The Experience of Values" lnquiry 16: 247-279. 
Blackburn. Simon (1973) "Moral Realism" Reprinted in Blackbum 1993. 
Blackburn. Simon (1981) "Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism" Holtzman & Leich 1981. 
Blackbum, Simon (1985a) ''Errors and the Phenomenology ofValue" Reprinted in Blackbum 1993. 
Blackburn, Simon (1985b) "Supervenience Revisited" Reprinted in Blackburn 1993. 
Blackburn, Simon (1988a) "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist" Reprinted in Blackburn 1993. 
Blackburn. Simon (1988b) "Attitudes and Contents" Ethics 98 (April): 501-517. 
Blackburn, Simon (1990) "Just Causes" Reprinted in Blackbum 1993. 
Blackburn, Simon (1992) "Morality and Thick Concepts", Supplementary Vo/ume LXVI, 1992, The 
Aristotelian Society: 285-299. 
Blackburn, Simon (1993) Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Blackbum. Simon (1995) ''The Flight to Reality" Hursthouse, Lawrence & Quinn 1995. 
272 
BIackburn, Simon (1998a) Ruling Passions: A Theory 01 Practical Reasoning. Oxford: CIarendon 
Press. 
BIackburn, Simon (1998b) "Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity" Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. LVIll, no. 1, March: 195-198. 
Bond, E. I. (1983) Reason and Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boyd, Richard N. (1988) "How to Be a Moral Realist" Sayre-McCord 1988. 
Brandt, Richard (1959) Ethical Theory: The Problems 01 Normative and Critical Ethics. Englewood 
Cliffs, NI: Prentice Hall. 
Brandt, Richard (1985) "The ExpIanation of Moral Language" Copp & Zimmennan 1985a. 
Brighouse, M. H. (1990) "BIackburn's Projectivism - An Objection" Philosophical Studies, 59: 225-
233. 
Brink, David O. (1989) Moral realism and the 10llndations 01 ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brink, David O. (1997) "Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, & Supremacy" Cullity & 
Gaut 1997a. 
Burge, Tyler (1986) "Intellectual Norms and Foundations ofMind" JOllmal of Philosophy, vol. 
lxxxiü, no. 12, December: 697-720. 
Campbell, C. A. (1935) "Moral and Non-Moral Values: A Study in the First PrincipIes ofAxiology" 
Reprinted in Sellars & Rospers 1970. 
Charles, David & Lennon, Katbleen (1992) Redllction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Copp, David, & Zimmerman, David (eds) (1985a) Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the 
Foundations 01 Ethics. Totowa, NI: Rowman & Allanheld. 
Copp, David (1990) "Explanation and Iustification in Ethics" Ethics 100 (January): 237-258. 
Copp, David (1995) Morality, Nomzativity, and Society. New York & Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cullity, Garret & Gaut, Berys (eds) (1997a) Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Cullity, Garrett (1997b) "Practical Theory" Cullity & Gaut 1997a. 
Darwall, Stephen L. (1983) lmpartial Reason. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press. 
273 
Darwall, Stephen L. (1987) ·'How Nowhere Can You Get (and Do Ethics)?" Ethics 98, (October): 
137-157. 
Darwall, Stephen; Gíbbard, Allan; & Railton, Peter (l997a) Moral Discourse and Practice: Some 
Philosophical Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Darwall, Stephen; Gibbard, Allan; & Railton, Peter (l997b) uToward Fin de siecle Ethics: Sorne 
Trends" Darwall, Gibbard & Railton 1997a. 
Darwall, Stephen L. (1998) ·~xpressivist ReIativismT Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
voL LVIll, no. 1, March: 183-188. 
Davidson, Donald (1963) HActions, Reasons, and Causes" Reprinted in Essays on Actions & Events. 
Oxford: CIarendon Press, 1980. 
Dewey, John (1939) ·Theory ofValuation" lntemational Encyclopedia of Unified Science, voL 11, 
no. 4, ed Otto Neurath. Chicago: University ofChicago Press. 
Dreier, James (1997) ·'Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification ofMorality" Cullíty & Gaut 
1997a. 
Dworkin, RonaId (1996) HObjectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It" Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 25, no. 2 (Spring). 
Fehige, Christoph & WesseIs, Ulla (1998) Preferences. Berlín & New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Findlay, J. N. (1970) Axiological Ethics. London: MacMillan. 
Firth, Roderick (1952) ··Ethical AbsoIutism and the Idea! Observer" Reprinted in SelIars & Hospers 
1970. 
Farrester, James W. (1989) Why YOlt Should: The Pragmatics of Deontic Speech. Hanover & Londan: 
Brown University Press. 
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1988) uThe importance of what we care about", The importance ofwhat we care 
abolit: Philosophical essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gaut, Berys (1997b) ·The Structure of Practica! Reason" Cullity & Gaut 1997 a. 
Gauthier, David (1998) HSubjective Obligation: A RepIy to Wiggins" Fehige & WesseIs 1998. 
Gibbard, Allan (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory ofNormative Judgment. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Gibbard, AlIan (1992) HMorality and Thick Concepts''. Supplementary Volume LXVI, The 
Aristotelian Saciety: 267-283. 
Gibbard, AlIan (1998) ··Preference and Preferability" Fehige & Wessels 1998. 
274 
Grice, Paul (1961) 'The Causal Theory ofPerception" Reprinted in Grice 1989. 
Grice, Paul (1989a) Studies in the Way ofWords. Cambridge, MA & London; Harvard University 
Press. 
Grice, Paul (1989b) <LOgiC and Conversation" Grice 1989a. 
Griffm, James (1992) "Values; Reduction, Supervenience, and Explanation by AscenC Charles & 
Lennon 1992. 
Haldane, John & Wright, Crispin (1993) Reality, Representation, and Projection. New York; Oxford 
University Press. 
Hampton, Jean E. (1995) "Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception ofPractieal ReasonT Hume 
Studies, volume xxi, number 1, April; 57-74. 
Hampton, Jean E. (1998) The Authority of Reason. Richard Healey (ed.). Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hare, R. M. (1952) The Language ofMorals. London; Oxford University Press. 
Hare, R. M. (1985) "Ontology in Ethics" Honderich 1985. 
Harman, Gilbert (1985) "ls There a Single True MoralityT Copp & Zimmerman 1985a. 
Harman, Gilbert & Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1996) Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. 
Cambridge, MA: Blad .. -well. 
Harman, Gilbert (1998a) "Précis ofMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity - Part One" Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, vol. LVIII, no. 1, March: 161-169. 
Harman, Gilbert (1998b) "Responses to Crities" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 
LVIII, no. 1, March; 207-213. 
Heidegger, Martín (1977) "The Age ofthe World Picture" Published in The Question Conceming 
Technology and Other Essays. William Lovitt (trans.). New York Harper & Row. 
Herman, Barbara (1996) "Making Room for Character" Published in Engstrom, Stephen & Whiting, 
Jennifer, Aristotle, Kant, and the stoics. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hill (Jr.), Thomas E. (1973) "The Hypothetical Imperative" Reprinted in HiIl 1992. 
Hill (Jr.), Thomas E. (1989) "Kant's Theory ofPractical Reason" Reprinted in Hill1992 .. 
Hill (Ir.), Thomas E. (1992) Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant 's Moral Theory .. 1thaca & London; 
Comell University Press. 
275 
Holtzman. Steven H. & Leich. Christopher M. (1981) Wittgenstein: to Follow a Rule. London: 
Routledge & Kegan PauL 
Honderich. Ted (1985) Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L Mackie. London: Routledge & 
KeganPauL 
Hooker. Brad (1996) Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Hume. David (1739) A Treatise 01 Human Nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
1888. 
Hume. David (1751) An Enquiry Conceming the Principies 01 Morals. In Henry D. Aiken (ed.). 
Hume 's Moral and Political Philosophy. New York: Hafner Press. 1948. 
Hursthouse. Rosalind; Lawrence. Gavin; & Quinn. Warren (1995) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa 
Foot and Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Johnston. Mark (1989) "Dispositional Theories ofValuen Supplementary Volume LXIII. The 
Aristotelian Society: 139-174. 
Kant. Irnmanuel (1788) Critique 01 Practical Reason. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1997. 
Kolnai. Aurel (1978) "Deliberation is ofEnds" Ethics, Value, and Reality: Selected Papers 01 Aurel 
Kolnai. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Korsgaard. Christine M. (1986) uSkepticism about practical reasonn Reprinted in Korsgaard 1996b. 
Korsgaard. Christine M. (1993) 4'The Reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between 
agent-relative and agent-neutral values" Reprinted in Korsgaard 1996b. 
Korsgaard. Christine M. (1996a) The Sources 01 Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Korsgaard. Christine M. (1996b) Creating the Kingdom 01 Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Korsgaard. Christine M. (1997) 4'The Normativity ofInstrumental Reasonn Cullity & Gaut 1997a. 
Langton. Rae & Lewis. David (1998) uDefining Intrinsic'" Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. vol. LVIII. no. l. March: 333-345. 
Lewis. David (1989) 44Dispositional Theories ofValuen Supplementary Volume LXllI: 113-137. The 
Aristotelian Society. 
Mackie. J. L. (1977) Ethics: lnventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
276 
McClintock, Thomas (1971) ·'The Basic Varieties ofEthical Skepticism". Metaphilosophy. v.2. #1. 
January. 
McDowell. 10hn (1978) ··Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" Supplementary 
Volume LIT. The Aristotelian Society: 13-29. 
McDowell. 10hn (1981) ··Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following" Holtzman & Leich 1981. 
McDowell. 10hn (1985) ·Values and Secondary Qualities" Honderich 1985. 
McDowell. 10hn (1987) Projection and Truth in Ethics (The Lindley Lecture. The University of 
Kansas. October 21st) 
McDowell. lohn (1995a) ·<'fwo Sorts ofNaturalism" Hursthouse. Lawrence & Quinn 1995. 
McDowell. 10hn (l995b) ·~ight there be external reasonsT Altham & Harrison 1995. 
McFetridge. L G. (1978) ··Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical ImperativesT Supplementary 
Volume LIT. The Aristotelian Society: 31-42. 
McGinn. Colín (1983) The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and lndexical Thoughts. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
McMahan. leff (1998) ·<Pfeferences. Death. and the Ethics ofKilling" Fehige & Wessels 1998. 
Meggle. Georg (1998) ··Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman" Fehige & Wessels 1998. 
MilI. 1. S. (1863) Utilitarianism. Roger Crisp (ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1998. 
Millgram. Elijah (1995) ··Was Hume a HumeanT Hume Studies. volume xxi. number 1. April: 75-93. 
MilIgram. Elijah (1997) Practicallnduction. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 
Millgram. Elijah (1998) ··Deciding to Desire" Fehige & Wessels 1998. 
Moore. G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
NageI. Thomas (1970) The Possibility 01 Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Nagel. Thomas (1986) The View From Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nagel. Thomas (1996) ··Universality and the reflective self' Korsgaard 1996a. 
Nagel. Thomas (1997) The Last Word. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Nowell-Smith. Patrick (1954) Ethics. Penguin Books. 
Parfit. Derek (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
277 
Perry, Ralph Barton (1926) General Theory ofValue. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 
Price, A. W. (1983) "Varieties ofObjectivity and Values", Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, 
voL lxxx.iii: 103-119. 
Prior, Arthur N. (1949) Logic and the Basis of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Putnam, Hilary (1981) Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Quinn, Warren (1993) "Putting rationality in its place" Reprinted in Hursthouse, Lawrence & Quinn 
1995. 
Railton, Pe ter (1986a) "Facts and Values" Philosophical Topics, vol. XIV, no. 2, FalL 
Railton, Peter (1986b) "Moral Realism" The Philosophical Review, XCV, no. 2, April. 
Railton, Peter (1993a) 'What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to 
Explain" Haldane & Wright 1993. 
Railton, Peter (1993b) "Reply to David Wiggins" Haldane & Wright 1993. 
Railton, Peter (1996) "Subject-ive and Objective" Hooker 1996. 
Railton, Peter (1997) "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and 
Action" Cullity & Gaut 1997a. 
Railton, Peter (1998) "Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity" Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, voL LVIII, no. 1, March: 175-182. 
Ross, W. D. (1930) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Santayana, George (1915) "Hypostatic Ethics" Reprinted in Sellars & Hospers 1970. 
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (1988) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Comell University Press. 
Scanlon, T. M. (1995) "Fear ofRelativism" Hursthouse, La~ence & Quinn 1995. 
Scheler, Max (1966) Fonnalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics ofValues. Fifth edition. Transl. 
Manfred S. Frings & Roger L. Funk. Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1973. 
Schueler, G. F. (1988) "Modus Ponens and Moral Realism" Ethics 98 (April): 492-500. 
SeIlars, Wilfred & Hospers, John (1970) Readings in Ethical Theory. Second Edition. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Shoemaker, Sydney (1998) "Desiring at WilI (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram" Fehige & Wessels 
1998. 
278 
Sidgwick, Henry (1907) The Methods 01 Ethics. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Smith. Michael (1989) ''Dispositional Theories ofValue" Supplementary Volume LXIII: 89-111. The 
Aristotelian Society. 
Smith. Michael (1992) "Valuing: Desiring or BelievingT Charles & Lennon 1992. 
Smith. Michael (1993) "Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology 
ofMoral Experience" Haldane & Wright 1993. 
Smith. Michael (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford & Cambridge. MA: Blackwell. 
Smith. MichaeI (1995) "Internal Reasons" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. vol. LV. no. 
L March: 109-13 L 
Smith. Michael (1996) "Internalism's Wheel" Hooker 1996. 
Smith. Michael (1997) HA Theory ofFreedom and Responsibility" Cullity & Gaut 1997a. 
Stevenson. C. L. (1937) '"The Emotive Meaning ofEthical Terms" Mind 46. 
Stevenson. C. L. (1950) '"The Emotive Conception ofEthics and Its Cognitive Implications" 
Philosophical Review 69. 
Stroud. Sarah (1998) "Moral Relativism and Quasi-Absolutism" Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. vol. LVIII. no. l. March: 189-194. 
Sturgeon. Nicholas (1985) "Moral Explanations" Copp & Zimmennan 1985a. 
Sturgeon. Nicholas (1998) '"Thomson Against Moral Explanations" Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. vol. LVIII. no. 1, March: 199-206. 
Taylor, Paul (1961) Normative Discourse. Englewood Cliffs. NI: Prentice Hall. 
Thomson. Judith Jarvis (1998a) "Précis ofMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity - Part Two" 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, voL LVIII. no. 1, March: 171-173. 
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (l998b) "Reply to Critics" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 
LVIII. no. 1, March: 215-222. 
Velleman J. David (1997) "Deciding How to Decide" Cullity & Gaut 1997a. 
Velleman J. David (1998) "Is Motivation InternaI to Value?" Fehige & WesseIs 1998. 
Von Wright, G. H. (1963) The Varieties oIGoodn.ess. London: Routledge & Kegan PauL 
Wellman, Carl (1968) "Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity" American Philosophical Quarterly V, 
ApriL 
279 
Wiggins, David (1976) "Truth, Invention, and the Meaning ofLife" Reprinted in Wiggins 1998a. 
Wiggins, David (1991) "Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs" 
Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, voL 112: 61-85. 
Wiggins, David (1993a) "Cognitivism, Naturalism, and Normativity: A Reply to Peter Railton" 
Haldane & Wright 1993. 
Wiggins, David (l993b) "A Neglected PositionT Haldane & Wright 1993. 
Wiggins, David (1995) "Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty" Hursthouse, Lawrence & Quinn 1995. 
Wiggins, David (1996) UObjective and Subjective in Ethics, With Two Postscripts about Truth" 
Hooker 1996. 
Wiggins, David (1998a) Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy ofValue. 3rd Edition. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Wiggins, David (l998b) "In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical 
Reasons" Fehige & Wessels 1998. 
Williams, Bernard (1980) "Interna! and external reasons" Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical 
Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Williams, Bernard (1985a) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Williams, Bemard (1985b) UEthics and the fabric ofthe worId" Reprinted in Making sense of 
humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Williams, Bernard (1995) ''Replies'' Altham & Harrison 1995. 
Williams, Bemard (1996) UTruth in Ethics" Hooker 1996. 
Wright, Crispin (1996) "Truth in Ethics" Hooker 1996. 
Ziff, Paul (1960) Semantic Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Zirnmerman, David (1985b) "Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity" Copp & Zimmerman 1985a. 
280 
VITA 
Stephen Finlay was boro on the 2200 of February. 1973. to Roben and Robyn Finlay in Te 
Puke. New Zealand. He grew up in Tuakau. a small rural New Zealand town. and later. in Papakura. a 
suburb in South AuckIand. He attended the University of AuckIand. eaming a B.A. in pbilosophy and 
bistory. graduating as Senior Scholar in pbilosophy in 1994. He graduated with an M.A. in 
pbilosophy from the same institution in 1996. with a thesis entitled "Nietzsche and Nibilism: Truth 
versus Life?". directed by Julian Young. Tbis research investigated Nietzsche's thought conceming 
the nihilistic crisis in modero values. and the possibility that living affrrmatively depends upon 
illusions. Subsequently he spent two years in the corporate world. working as a computer consultant 
for a New Zealand pharmaceuticals wholesaler. during wbich time he married Sarah Roberts. also an 
AuckIander. and welcomed the arrival of their daughter AshIeigh Rachel in September 1997. 
In 1998 he moved to the United States with bis family to study for a Ph.D. in philosophy at 
the University of Dlinois. Urbana-Champaign. where he was awarded the positions of Distinguished 
Fellow from 1998-2000 and University Fellow from 2000-2001. In 2001 he defended bis doctoral 
dissertation. 'What Does Value Matter: The interest-relational theory of the semantics and 
metaphysics of valuen , directed by James D. Wallace. This treatise. and bis current research interests. 
concero the foundations of ethics and normativity, and the semantics of normative language. At the 
present time. he has an appointment as Visiting Lecturer in pbilosophy at the University of lllinois. 
and with bis wife Sarah is looking forward to the arrival of a new addition to the family. 
281 
